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
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THE PANMURE PAPERS



Brechin Castle, 1826.

THE
PANMURE PAPERS

BEING A SELECTION FROM THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF FOX MAULE,
SECOND BARON PANMURE, AFTER-
WARDS ELEVENTH EARL OF
DALHOUSIE, K.T., G.C.B.

EDITED BY
SIR GEORGE DOUGLAS, BART., M.A.

AND

SIR GEORGE DALHOUSIE RAMSAY
C.B.; LATE OF THE WAR OFFICE

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER BY
THE LATE REV. PRINCIPAL RAINY, D.D.

VOLUME II

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON: MCMVIII

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CHAPTER XII

DECEMBER 1855

ACTIVE operations were not to be looked for during this month, and, beyond a slight reverse sustained by Vivian's Cavalry, and a couple of unimportant outpost affairs, we hear of nothing in that kind.

Thus the military position continued unchanged—the enemy holding his ground, whilst the Allied Armies remained prepared to seize any advantage which might be offered by his movements. 'The destruction of the South Side of Sebastopol, its docks and forts, is in our power,' writes Codrington to Panmure on December 8th, 'but the enemy holds as much control over the harbour as we do: we have not possession of it at all in a naval point of view; it is a large mutual wet ditch under fire from both sides.' It would, therefore, have to be decided by the Allies whether the war was to be prosecuted in the Crimea or not, and meantime it was becoming apparent that the French had grown tired of a war so far from home. The comparative advantages of various defensive lines had lately been discussed with the aid of experts in Committee of the Cabinet. But before the end of the month we find Codrington contemplating the situation which would be brought about by a withdrawal of the French Army within its own lines at Kamiesh.

As regards the prospect of peace, the position is defined as follows: After the fall of Sebastopol, Austria had submitted to France and Great Britain certain new bases of

treaty, which she suggested should be sent by her to St. Petersburg. After undergoing modification in London, so as to define the conditions on which England would be willing to treat, these proposals had been accepted by Austria in their new form and were now on their way to the Russian capital.

In the Crimea, by the beginning of the month, bad weather had set in in the shape of rain and gales, which were followed by cold sufficiently severe to cause frost-bites and even deaths. By flooding mines, the rain delayed the blowing up of the docks of the South Side, whilst the depth of the mud interfered with endeavours to restore the Army's drill. The health of the troops, however, continued good; drunkenness abated, or accounts of it proved to have been exaggerated; the state of the supplies was declared to be gratifying, and the progress made in hutting the troops satisfactory. It had also been announced that the road from Balaclava 'would do.' Codrington had profited by the criticism directed against his predecessors in the command, and the fulness of his despatches won the approval of all, from the Queen downwards.

Among the questions of organisation discussed between him and Lord Panmure, perhaps the most interesting was that of the advisability of completing each Division with its proper complement of baggage-animals and means of transport, instead of maintaining the Land Transport as a separate and independent department.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 1, 1855.

Huts lately
received are not
watertight.

I am sorry to say that the huts sent out are anything but decently watertight. I went into many of them some days ago just after rain, and found that the best new ones, those long ones of seventy feet, with double boards and

felt, were yet defective at the junction of the roof-squares to such an extent that the water came in plentifully, and men had to use their waterproofs and all sorts of things whilst lying down. . . . The huts, old ones, are some of them built round with stone and mud walls close, and the roofs covered with bits of tents, old sacks, condemned blankets. I had ordered that the hospital huts containing sick should first have all assistance that could be given to make them sound; but to limit, at present, to the huts that actually contained sick. . . .

Older huts out of repair.

Patching of huts.

The weather is bad—broke well into winter with rain and gales, varying with frost at night, and depth of mud during the day. The locomotive railway engine, by Colonel M'Murdo's account to me, will scarcely do the work expected of it. He thinks we shall have to trust to horse-power on the rail principally, and complains of the chains of the harness traces being so weak that they snap.

Locomotive engine unequal to its work.

Colonel M'Murdo goes home to-day, and of course you will see him. The question will have to be decided of the continued independence of Land Transport Corps: if they are to be continued as a corps independent of the Army, they must have the establishment of a little army, which never could go on without officers, and many a good non-commissioned officer. Superintendence is wanting to a degree from what I see, for the English disposition with horses is generally that of violence, pulling and kicking; and responsible non-commissioned officers are wanted with parties to see to that and all details connected with it.

Question as to continued independence of Land Transport Corps.

I suspect it will be found, if the Corps is to be made efficient, that a thousand men and non-commissioned officers will not be too many to take from the bayonets of this Army and make the remainder movable.

The accounts and information from the front do not give any present indication of the Russians retiring; why should they now? And I think the visit of the Emperor to the troops in this part of the Crimea has a tendency to confirm this impression of their holding their ground if possible.

No word of the Russians retiring.

Difficulty of
drilling troops.

There are no people more anxious for carrying on the drill of the men than the officers commanding, from Divisions downwards: could you but see the sticky and hopeless mud of this plateau, except during frost, you would understand that as much would be lost in efficiency as gained by drilling upon it. I do not mean that there will not be days in which marching could take place, but, if at all like last year, they will be few and far between.

Almost all the Cavalry is gone to its destination in the Bosphorus and Scutari. General Scarlett will command there for a short time, but has requested leave for really urgent business in England for a time, which I have granted: the command would remain with General Lawrenson there. I have settled the point of senior officer command in the Bosphorus command by saying that the senior officer is always the commander; but that Brigadier-General Storks¹ need not be interfered with in any of his orders and arrangements, unless from absolute necessity.

I shall not avoid taking advantage of any opportunity of going to Kertch and elsewhere; but business here would necessarily be delayed by it: the decisions requisite, the references are, of course, perpetual; and many can only be decided by the chief authority of the Army.

The rain and mud made some parts of the new road very bad, and it was not improved by the night frost, but people were put on at once, and the greatest part of it is doing its duty well.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 2, 1855.

Condition of
the Balaclava
road.

I shall probably put things down as they happen, as some means of my not forgetting things which may give you information.

The road from Balaclava will do—it has been for three or four days in a curious state . . . but I have desired

¹ Commanding British troops at Constantinople.

Mr. Doyne to put on the road a considerable number of Army Works Corps to be constantly working at it.

When at Balaclava yesterday, I saw Colonel M'Murdo on the point of going on board the [*Severn?*].¹ He has the impression that the men he has, and is enlisting, will establish the 'personnel' of the Land Transport Corps. I do not think so. And where are the non-commissioned officers, or whatever that rank may be called in the Corps? We shall want the steadiest men, the most attentive supervisors of detail (non-commissioned officers of some sort); we shall want many officers for such a Corps as the Land Transport. You must enforce, and have the staff to enforce, military discipline among them. It must be a little army of steady, good men—all the steadier from the nature of their duty, subject to being detached and to accidents. You must let me know if the Land Transport system is to remain an independent establishment, furnishing means of moving to the Army, or whether I am to be responsible for making it so, taking my own means of ensuring it. I am not at all sure, on talking much about it to-day with General Windham, that we shall not have to take it into Army hands, abstract from Brigades 400 or 500 men with non-commissioned officers and officers, let them be the efficient transport attendant upon their own brigade—identified with it, and feeling an interest in it—and consider the main establishment of the Land Transport Corps as the reserve to feed the front by bringing supplies from the main base. The large number of drivers you mention as being sent out are so much raw material, but they will want non-commissioned officers—as all establishments do.

I want to see the Land Transport attached to the Divisions of the Army, made a part of that Division, for the General Officer to control, to arrange, to pay attention to, as the best means of efficiency of his troops; and not to be an excrescence of the Division as it now is. When Colonel M'Murdo gets home, you will make up your mind as to the line you empower me to take.

¹ Name undecipherable in MS.

Accident to
huts.

We have had blowing weather yesterday, and last night, on visiting the Guards' Camp, I found that two hospital huts had been regularly blown over—down; it seems the wind was strong enough to unsettle that part of the roof near the sides, lifting it a little; it then got out of sockets and at once gave way. Fortunately only two people were at all hurt.

State of the
ground.

As to drill, mentioned in your last private letter, I think I mentioned to you the state of ground here; a poached Northamptonshire clay lane would give you some idea of the majority of the ground on this plateau, marked as it is with similar broad tracks over the face of it, through which it is difficult for a man to lift his feet. And I fully expect that to ease the Land Transport, which would tear itself to pieces on the roads, I shall have to ensure getting huts up by marching almost the whole Division to Balaclava to bring them up on their backs. I yesterday settled to let Division Generals give authority for their Commissariat officers to issue from their stocks on the plateau, and save the transport animals and carts during this state of the roads; the accumulation will be going on at Balaclava, and they will then take advantage of dry days and roads to work hard.

Commissariat
stores on the
plateau to be
drawn on
during bad
state of roads.

December 4.

Well out of
the Arabat
expedition.

Yesterday was a fine day, and I rode for an hour or two towards the Monastery, meeting Marshal Pélissier and apparently all the officers of the Army at a steeple-chase; the arrival of the mail did not allow me to share more than half an hour of [sport¹] which is of interest to so many, and therefore does good. Referring to your private letter of the 19th, I again say, look at the time of year. I am glad that the Arabat expedition is viewed in the light it was by me. To-day, for instance, as a consecutive of one fine day yesterday, we have a soaking S.W. rain; we should have been in the thick of that operation—indeed I don't think we should have got into the thick of it, for siege guns could not move over this country

¹ Illegible in MS.

in the rainy time without enormous expenditure of transport.

You will get my official account of the explosion, which I wrote in such a way as to avoid public mention of the mill containing—or which will when repaired contain—small-arm ammunition. The French wished it not to be again used for powder, but I decided it should be: the walls are nearly three feet thick, a circular (former) wind-mill; it has been a magazine from the first arrival, and the French have put themselves, long since that time, in its neighbourhood. They had a hospital establishment and a canteen village close about it, the latter blown to pieces, the former so much damaged as to make the removal of both easy. It is perhaps quite a work of supererogation not publishing the word mill, for the very first thing that was done in October, or November, 1854, was to publish the fact in our newspapers for the information of the Russians.

Reticence as to scene of recent explosion.

You have telegraphed about schoolmasters coming out. Like many other people who come to this Army, the first thing we shall have to do will be to take care of them, for they can't take care of themselves; and the next thing we shall have to do will again be to take care of them, and the third thing—to take care of them. Are they also to march with the Army hereafter, with the separate rights and establishment which it is my impression they rather affect?

As to the schoolmasters which it is proposed to send out to the Army.

There is one corps that must be put on an effective footing, and which is not so—the Land Transport Corps. I have the utmost confidence in its being done by Colonel Wetherall, if done at all; but we must not be hampered; it will require a total change, a large number of officers and non-commissioned officers and men of the only really organised body we have, viz. the Army. You must take from the Army to make the remainder of the Army efficient, you must make up your mind to the deduction from the fighting-men in order to put these others in the place for fighting. People seem to think that when Sir J. Paxton has shipped 100 navvies, when Messrs. Some

Necessity of an effective Land Transport.

Requirements of the above.

One Else have sent 50 skilled labourers, when John Bull has sent 3000 drivers, of all sorts of trades unconnected with horses and carts—has sent about 5000 ‘natives’—that everything has been done for the Army. Why, these numbers are regiments, brigades—human creatures: have sickness, have misery, have quarrels—want food, cooking, medicine, rest, and, above all, supervision and arrangement, like the rest of the world: more indeed than many others, for there are animals, pack-saddles, carts and waggons to be cared for, inspected and replaced. You want therefore a large, intelligent, and steady staff; and you have comparatively nothing.

The foundations of discipline are good non-commissioned officers; and you will hear from Colonel M'Murdo how utterly he has felt and feels the want of them.

The fighting-men—the regiments—and the transport to enable them to feed and fight in the right place, these are the main things of an army, and to these we must put our whole, our first consideration, if the Army is to move.

Army Works
Corps quite
inadequate
to possible
requirements.

The very ‘Army Works Corps’—on my direct question to Mr. Doyne a few days ago, as to whether he could ensure me the presence in the front of these men, if I wanted to throw up an earthwork ten or twenty miles from hence, after a march, he had no idea that at present I could make sure of a hundred. I suspect two-thirds of them expect to be carried in waggons, and work in shelter.

Sir Colin
Campbell's
return.

I am more surprised at Sir Colin Campbell's coming out again than I am at his going home: you know I have expressed publicly what I feel for his services and character; and any casual private communications which I have had with him formerly lead me to think that personally all will go smooth. Human nature is human nature, however, and it is one element of military nature; and it is no use, now that you and Lord Hardinge have settled the point, inquiring whether his position in this Army is one which consideration towards me would have suggested.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

December 3, 1855.

I have just received your letter of the [*Blank in copy*] inst. . . . It gives me great satisfaction to see that you allow neither confusion nor difficulty to dismay or dishearten you, and the cheerful manner in which you face everything contributes much to lighten my burthen here. The voyage of the Contingent Cavalry sounds very ridiculous, and what on earth made Vivian send for them so late I cannot imagine! However, I dare say they will find good quarters at Baltchick.

Approval of
Codrington's
spirit.

I have desired a most stringent inquiry to be made into the stowing of the vessels named in your despatch, and I will certainly have somebody hanged if I can only bring the crime home to him. I cannot imagine where the bulk of our huts can be, as all should have reached you ere the time you wrote.

I have had a long conversation with Lord Hardinge on the subject of the Corps d'Armée. We both agree that you have judged prudently in not forming them at once, and though we must keep faith with Sir Colin, who will soon return, we shall leave you perfect discretion to form the 2nd Corps when you please, or not at all unless you like it. I wish to impress on you that, while I direct the war from here, I do not wish to alter the organisation of the Army without giving you full freedom to carry out any views I may express as you think right. I set the question of the two Corps on a right official footing; you had better write me a despatch in which you set forth your reasons for not concurring in the recommendation, and to this I can reply so as to leave on record the reason why the proposal was abandoned to some degree.

Relative powers
of the writer
and Sir W.
Codrington.

You will no doubt be inundated with many vague reports from all quarters, and dark hints from Pélissier as to the future. Rumours of peace will be circulated, but you must believe in none which you do not receive from me. I think you should know confidentially the political

The French
Emperor weary
of the war.

aspect of affairs, which may guide to a certain extent your military contemplations. There can be no doubt that the Emperor of the French is tired of war at so remote a distance from France, and he is fast making up his mind to do no more in the Crimea. What object he has in desiring to bring the bulk of his Army home I cannot say, but such is his drift.

He tries to deceive us by saying that he replaces those he takes away by similar numbers sent out. We are incredulous, but you can easily keep me informed on the point.

A Council of
War probable.

They point to a Council of War to deliberate on future operations, and if this Council confines itself to chalking out a sphere of operations, and abstains from fixing any precise plan, it may do some good.

It may well deliberate as to whether we should prosecute an advance into the Crimea or not, or whether the French should attack Nicholaieff or Cherson, and we Georgia and Circassia. It may settle that the two armies shall each operate under its own Chief from distinct bases and with defined purposes, but into no minutiae of a campaign must the Council descend, otherwise it will be blazoned throughout Russia, and all success rendered doubtful by being anticipated. In case we turn our eyes to Georgia, you will do well to collect all the information you can as to the climate, roads, localities for magazines, as well as to an organisation of your transport corps to suit it to as many men as possible. I have given orders to get the best maps for you, but I fear any detailed plan of the country is not in existence.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

December 7, 1855.

Winter
prospects.

The accounts you give me of your weather and the progress you have made in getting your men under cover is very gratifying, and the state of your supplies seems to place you beyond risk for the coming winter. I cannot yet make out how far the enemy will be able to keep the

open field when winter sets in with its usual severity, but, in case he weakens his outposts and is driven from them by stress of weather or deficiency of provisions, I hope you will have a flying corps ready to fall on any weak point and to make a little harvest of glory even in mid-winter. As soon as the troops have done with their roads, I would suggest your securing, as far as you can, your position to protect Balaclava. I am not sufficiently master of the ground to enter into the question, but I believe it to be a general opinion that, unless you occupy and defend the plateau, an enemy in possession of it would annihilate your shipping and shell all your magazines. You must lay out your plans on the supposition that your French allies withdraw within their lines at Kamiesh, and you may require to replace them by troops of your own drawn from Scutari, Smyrna, or Malta.

To this extent you will have to take counsel with the Admiral in command to keep means of transport at his command throughout the winter. Again I am by no means easy as to the force at Kertch. Rumours are rife that an attack is intended when the ice will enable the Russians to collect force and material for the purposes. This may or may not be true, but it must be considered. Vivian writes that he is throwing up works, but has no means of arming them. He says you can spare him 32-pounder guns from Balaclava. There is no use in works without guns, and I do hope that somehow or other they will be forthcoming. But supposing no attack is made, there is no little anxiety as to the supply of provisions for the garrison, to which I hope your attention will be turned. I know not how you hold communication with Kertch, but you must see to its being regular. Should General Wrangel form any deliberate scheme on Kertch, I think you should be prepared to throw 20,000 men on Kaffa, so as to threaten his rear whenever he moves. These you may get, as follows, in a little time. Two thousand Swiss, well-trained and old soldiers, from Smyrna; 3000 Germans, ditto, from Scutari; 8000 men from Malta to fill up your ranks at head-quarters. Total 13,000; and with 7000 of

As to a possible
Russian attack
on Kertch.

your present numbers, you can make up the force to which I refer. I hope this is only speculation, but it proves that we must not lapse into any false security against a foe up to all dodges. Such a movement as this would require transport, and affords another proof of [necessity] for its being kept in readiness.

This is a hurried letter, and I have only to add in conclusion that I am glad to hear that you are busy with the docks. The sooner they are blown up the happier I shall be.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 8, 1855.

As to temporary
withdrawal of
Turkish troops.

Some time ago Marshal Pélissier suggested to the Ambassadors at the Porte that the Turkish troops at Eupatoria, who were in a bad state of health, and, I believe, of Commissariat arrangement, which was the cause of it, should go partly to Varna and elsewhere to recover, and be available for next spring. I understand that he objected to their being taken so entirely from hence, viz. to the Asiatic campaign; which would prevent their being again available in the Crimea.

The Ambassadors at the Porte seem to have settled with the Porte that the troops should go, and the *Simoom* is now at Eupatoria with orders to embark some of them, the Pasha of the Turkish troops having, however, no such orders.

Marshal Pélissier also cannot consent, unless by orders from Paris direct, to their removal. The telegraph is broken, and probably seriously, at sea—consequently delay is taking place. The Ambassadors and probably Omar Pasha consider the arrival of troops at Trebizond as of great importance, but the defence of Eupatoria is in French hands now; our Cavalry is withdrawn to the Bosphorus. Marshal Pélissier would be willing to consent, personally, to the departure of the Turkish troops, but he cannot do so till he receives the approval of the Emperor of the French.

In order to secure the efficiency of the Turkish troops at Eupatoria, the French had undertaken to supply them.

The last of our Cavalry were embarking yesterday at Balaclava for the Bosphorus. . . . You must not suppose in the possibility of much drill going on during a short, severe, and excessively muddy season.

British Cavalry
embarking for
the Bosphorus.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

Confidential.

SEBASTOPOL, December 8, 1855.

One point, one general outline has to be settled by the Allied Government[s] as a guidance to their Generals in Command, viz. whether the war is to be continued in the Crimea as long as the enemy holds positions in it more or less menacing, more or less of political or military importance.

Necessity of
deciding
whether the
war is to be
continued in
the Crimea.

The destruction of the South Side of Sebastopol, its docks and forts, is in our power; but the enemy holds as much control over the harbour as we do: we have not possession of it at all in a naval point of view; it is a large mutual wet ditch under fire from both sides.

It is probably of political consequence to the enemy thus to keep their hold of the North shore: it is also of military consequence for them, as putting the Allies to a similar difficulty as that which has long existed—of attacking a central, and in some points naturally unattackable, position.

Present position
of hostile
armies.

The enemy would probably leave troops in sufficient numbers to continue that difficulty to us; and yet not so numerous as to have difficulty in supplying them.

Our business here is to overcome that difficulty of attack upon them, when once it is settled that the war is to be continued here: it is not necessary for me to enter now into any details; the main point only requires to be settled for us first.

P.S.—I shall probably send a copy of this to Marshal Pélissier.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

December 9, 1855.

Defence of the
nearer line of
Balaclava.

The Queen wishes me to write to you, to say that Sir W. Codrington's telegraph is no answer to your question as to what he can do to defend the nearer line of Balaclava, so as to protect an embarkation or the shipping. He states the difficulties of embarking, when pressed by the enemy, probably very correctly, but, whether we mean to embark or not, Balaclava ought to receive all the protection by fortified lines which it may be capable of, as a security in case of the Tchernaya line being broken through. The Queen is very anxious that this should be made clear to Sir W. Codrington.

The Queen would further wish to have Morning States regularly sent of the Turkish Contingent under General Vivian, and the Land Transport Corps under Colonel Wetherall. They are the two only forces who make no return at present.

With respect to the Bath, I wish to remind you that it would be very important that the investiture should take place at Paris whilst the Duke of Cambridge and our other Generals and Admirals are there. . . .

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

December 10, 1855.

Many thanks for your letter of the 8th. Your return of huts sent out to the Crimea leaves no room for doubt that the Army will be well covered when they shall all have arrived.

I am glad to find that your meetings for the consideration of home defence proceed satisfactorily.

I have seen Colonel Laffan and gone over the plans of the Cavalry barracks with him, which are very well worked out. . . . Colonel Laffan sees no difficulty in adopting the plan.

I had a long talk with Sir Richard Airey. His opinion on the present position of the Army is that neither Bala-

clava nor Kamiesh could be held by themselves, (he told the Emperor at Paris that the Russians, once on the plateau, could completely drive the French into the sea)—that the line from the Careening Ridge and Inkerman heights to Balaclava was strong, but very extended, and by no means unassailable; that the strongest line was that of the Tchernaya, now occupied by the French and Sardinians, and the one most easily defended, covering the whole position. The features of the ground were much stronger than our maps and plans showed, and art might make them almost impregnable. That position acquired great strength from the Tchernaya and Aqueduct running parallel to each other; the former is passable only in two or three places, and the latter impassable for Artillery, as the banks are perpendicular, the inside is deep and only eight feet wide, so that a vessel once striking there could not be extricated again. I should advise you to hear him on this point, and then to compare his opinion with that of Sir Colin Campbell and others. Your Council of War in the Cabinet ought to take this into consideration, and I should be very glad to hear from you on the subject afterwards.

Opinion of Airey on present position of the Army.

Strength of the French position on the Tchernaya.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 10, 1855.*

I have seen and had a long conversation with Airey, and I am well satisfied with his report of the advance of the Army in its provision for the winter.

There is scarcely anything on that head which he leaves me to suggest, as all seems going on better than I could make it do by any advice of mine. We had a long talk as to our future operations, and I find that he has a strong impression that Eupatoria, in spite of all that is said to the contrary, is a sound base of operations, and the want of water in the line of advance is more imaginary than real. He thinks, too, that, were that to fail of being undertaken, Kaffa would likewise make a good base, from which you might advance by Karasa or Baidar to the same point.

Airey's opinion of Eupatoria as a base.

He gives me many interesting details, and the satisfactory assurance that your temporary annoyance from the intemperance of the troops had begun to disappear.

You must send Vivian what guns you have to defend his position at Kertch, and I hope you will soon take a look at it with one of your Engineers.

I have talked much with Airey about the Land Transport Corps, and I shall have to write you my views on that now that you have got a new head to it.

Sir Colin Campbell has not yet informed me of the day of his departure, but I have written you an official despatch to form a Corps for him, and left it discretionary with yourself when to form the second, if at all. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 11, 1855.

The mail this instant arrived, as that from hence leaves the Army, I can only acknowledge your private letter.

Pressure of correspondence, and how alone it can be reduced.

Do not imagine that I am released from writing : it is endless ; it must be constant with the number of questions which can only be decided by the head authority ; I get out when I can, and see all I can, but it will require operations in the field to simplify the correspondence of this Army, and all its civil and half-independent offshoots. . . .

Congestion in the harbour.

I have stopped for the present the sending more ships up with huts from Constantinople : the harbour here cannot hold them, the wharfs could not receive their cargoes ; and, if landed, we could not get them away from the heap of all descriptions of things now daily being moved out of Balaclava. The railway carriages!—the idea of sending them out so that forges, coals, carpenters are positively necessary to repair, and sometimes materially alter, them before they can be of use.

They have now to occupy sound trucks to get them away from encumbering the wharf, and require days and days and labour at another spot before they can be useful to us, and this at a time we most essentially want them. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 11, 1855.

General Rose came here yesterday evening, and mentioned that the Russians attempted to surprise a French outpost beyond Baidar. They not only did not succeed, but lost 130 or 140 men killed and wounded, 3 officers, and several men taken prisoners by the French.

Unsuccessful
attempt to sur-
prise a French
outpost.

The French lost 4 killed and 8 or 9 wounded; but I have no written or authentic details. I did not see General Rose myself.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 14, 1855.*

I have very little to say to you by this mail, and I shall confine myself to a very brief letter. We have been interrupted in our usual telegraphic correspondence by the breaking of the wire in the Black Sea, and I am afraid we shall have some trouble in picking up the flaw. I am engaged on a secret despatch to you on the subject of our next year's campaign, and I hope to get it done by Monday next, and despatched to you by that mail. I have had the benefit of my colleagues', and also of Sir Harry Jones', Sir Richard Airey's, and Lord Hardinge's advice on the subject, and we all are pretty well agreed on the various points to be submitted to your consideration, and on which you should give us your opinion. I am glad to find that the Army has had its *sprees*, and that you have tightened the reins, and are, as I hear you are, at drill and organisation and ball-practice. A note which I have from General Vivian states that he has just heard of the enemy, in some force, within eight miles of him, and he was on the point of making a reconnaissance. I hope he will give a good account of whatever he meets. I am not altogether satisfied in my own mind with his position, but I hope the best. Colonel Lefroy, who is my wandering A.D.C. just now, is to visit and report to me on all he can overtake,

'The Army has
had its spree.'

and he will have paid his respects to you before you can receive this. I have no doubt you have, or will have, given him every detailed information which you think it necessary for me to know and to combat Parliament withal.

We meet on the 31st January, and, I hear, are to have some warm work.

We have reports of the fall of Kars, but nothing certain, and I for one still hope even against hope.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *December 15, 1855.*

I received a very kind letter indeed—a most valuable one from the Queen, and I should be obliged to you to forward the enclosed. . . .

Arrangements
for destroying
docks impeded.

The pressure of water, by sudden flood of rain, has half filled the shafts of the mines for the docks; it has also, I find, since my public letter, damaged the French arrangements, and I do not think they will begin on the 17th. . . .

The weather has for a day or two been very cold—thermometer down to 22°; but clear and healthy, roads hard.

I thought it right to send a copy of my letter to you, on the subject of a decision being come to as to the war being continued here or elsewhere, to Marshal Pélissier and General La Marmora. The enclosed is the answer from Marshal Pélissier: I do not quite make out whether he thinks attack from any side upon the enemy impracticable; and whether he would move the war to another part of the south of Russia, holding positions at Kamiesh and Balaclava only—and that these two places are the 'gage' he refers to.

Argument
against confin-
ing the British
position to
Kamiesh and
Balaclava.

I do not think much of this sort of 'gage.' If the Allies confine themselves to the occupation, opposite the enemy here, of Kamiesh and Balaclava, it puts the enemy at once into the town, though ruined, of Sebastopol; it

puts them on this plateau, it puts them apparently on the offensive, and ourselves certainly on the defensive and cooped up. And with all this abandonment of the morale, and indeed the physique of this main position, my impression is that we shall require the same number of men to defend the two separate points effectually, when once the enemy is admitted to these heights and the town, as we now have to defend the strong line of the plateau itself.

I have no communication from the Sanitary Commissioners about the ration of rum ; but for some time it has been diminished to one half what it was : I have desired attention to the wearing of the flannel given by Government and to inspections to see it is done.

MARSHAL PÉLISSIER TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

AU QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL,
le 10 Décembre, 1855.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—Je vous remercie cordialement de la communication que vous avez bien voulu me faire, en portant à ma connaissance copie de la dépêche que vous avez adressée le 8 de ce mois à S. E. le Ministre de la Guerre, au sujet des projets ultérieurs de nos deux Gouvernements sur la conduite de la Guerre. Nos affaires n'auront qu'à gagner à ce que l'on prenne une prompte décision.

Pélessier on
future
operations.

Quant à moi, mis en demeure par mon gouvernement de donner mon opinion sur ce qu'il serait avantageux d'entreprendre, en Crimée, au printemps, en supposant que les puissances alliées se décident à y maintenir la totalité de leurs forces, j'ai répondu : qu'il résulterait, à mon avis, des renseignemens recueillis par les reconnaissances faites en forces, et qui ont tâté les positions ennemies, à l'automne, de Mackensie jusqu'à vers Batchi Serai, que ces attaques, poussées à fond, offriraient des chances peu favorables de succès ; qu'en admettant qu'on réussit, on n'achèterait cette victoire qu'au prix de pertes énormes, que ne compenserait

pas le résultat obtenu, car l'ennemi aurait toujours la possibilité de se retirer devant nous, que ces considérations, enfin, me portaient à penser qu'il fallait renoncer à pousser la guerre de ce côté.

Je conclusais aussi à ce que le théâtre de la guerre fût déplacé, tout en conservant en Crimée les forces nécessaires pour défendre contre tout attaque le gage que nous y avons conquis.

Voilà, mon cher Général, comment j'ai envisagé la question générale, et comment je l'ai soumise à mon Gouvernement. Il me semble, en lisant attentivement votre dépêche à Lord Panmure, que tout en parlant de l'attaque possible des plateaux de Mackensie, vous ne laissez pas ignorer que cette entreprise présenterait de grandes difficultés. À ce point de vue, je me félicite de la concordance de nos opinions, qui pourront, dès lors, amener nos deux gouvernemens à juger la question de la même manière.—Veuillez agréer, etc.

(Signé) M^{AL}. PÉLISSIER.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 15, 1855.*

As to the
writer's attend-
ing the Council
in Paris.

I am ready to go to Paris, or to do anything else that may be thought useful, as long as for my sins I am in office, but I must *feel for myself* whether it really will be useful or not. Now I have great doubts whether my going to Paris for the Council of War would be the right thing at the right moment. I have privately consulted Cowley, on whom I entirely rely, and he advises me by no means to go now, and his reasons, which are too long for writing, appear to me sound. I think if we make up our minds as to what our policy should be as respects both Circassia and the Baltic, there would be no difficulty in having it clearly expounded by Cowley. I can have no objection, however, to the subject being discussed at the Cabinet. . . .

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PLYMOUTH, *December 16, 1855.*

I have just been reading a despatch from Milbanke at Munich, of which a copy has been sent to your office, containing a description of an improved gun-lock invented by a man at Munich, and which he is willing to make over to the ENGLISH Government for £25. The merit of the invention is said to consist in its simplicity.

Improved
gun-lock.

I think it would be desirable to try the invention, and give the man what he asks. If you write to this effect to the Foreign Office, they will manage the matter.

PS.—I see that Zamoysky is not yet gone. It would be very desirable to settle all his affairs, and pack him off, before we begin negotiations with Russia, if negotiations there are to be. If he is at work before we begin, his levy will be a very useful instrument of pressure upon Russia. If we delay, and send him off after negotiations are opened, those who do not know how long the arrangement has been hanging fire will think that it began only with his departure, and will consider it as a step calculated to irritate and to impede the negotiation. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 17, 1855.*

I send you by this post a despatch covering a Memo of Lord Hardinge's on the subject of Corps d'Armée, in which I concur with him. He, however, prefers two Divisions to three, and his reason is that he may have room to attach to the corps a Division of foreign troops in British pay, should such be expedient. We must remember, however, that we have promised Sir Colin three Divisions. He is not a man to break faith with, and you must adhere to the arrangement. The papers say that the 'Highlanders' are *wild* at his return. . . .

Highlanders
enthusiastic
over Campbell's
return.

Alas for Kars! It is gone, and Williams and its brave defenders are the victims of intrigue, cowardice and

ignorance on the part of the Turks. However, I console myself with the idea that Mouravieff will have a day of reckoning for it all as soon as our Army can move.

You must not take it amiss that you are not at the Council at Paris; but as Pélissier was not sent for, and as you could not well be spared, I did not suggest your presence. You will have to devote all your energies to your Land Transport Corps. Why should not you fit Division by Division with their transport animals, carts, etc., etc., and if you find weather, turn them out in marching order. I am sending you European drivers by hundreds, and your proposal to take men from your own ranks will soon supersede the necessity of employing natives at all.

It is your difficulty, and if you overcome it your credit is pinnacle high.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 18, 1855.

Opposed to a
contemplated
council of war.

By Marshal Pélissier's conversation with me on the 16th there seems to have been some idea of all the Commanders going from hence to a sort of council of war. Though General la Marmora is ordered home, and to Paris for this purpose, it seems the other idea must have been abandoned: so much the better; for the fact of the necessity (seeming necessity) of such a meeting would show undecided purpose.

Wintry
weather.

We are well in winter; snow covering the whole face of the ground, with heavy dark clouds and patches of blue sky—rapid hail-storms which blind everything for the time: the thermometer was low, down to 13° and 18° a day or two ago, but it is generally healthy weather; the rain and mess of mud, with its accompanying change of temperature, is apparently that which most affects health, and certainly so the comfort of the men.

I have heard nothing official from Erzeroum and Trebizond about the fall of Kars: so little has this Army been apparently considered as in communication with, or of

any intended support to Kars. If much of this army had got into the difficult passes between Trebizond, Erzeroum, and Kars, it would have arrived too late to be of use, unless much earlier arrangements had been made, and would probably have lost half its men and two-thirds of its transport in doing it. Omar Pasha certainly went to Somboun Kalé, and thus far from Erzeroum; but he must have left this and Constantinople at the end of August, and his troops have had no effect as yet in preventing the Russian success at Kars. But for next spring, from Katais, he can put himself on a very vital line against the Russians if he has a large and movable army.

Army of Kars entirely independent of that of the Crimea.

The Turkish troops from Eupatoria, about which there was a difficulty made by Marshal Pélissier, have sailed for Trebizond: about half of them at all events.

Turkish troops from Eupatoria have sailed for Trebizond.

The docks are still encumbered with water; the French have suffered by the same—the destruction is thereby delayed.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *December 18, 1855.*

Would it not be right to ask Codrington to explain his reasons for stopping the hutting of the Army, and to tell him that we attach more importance to the comfort of the men of the Army than to the condition of the animals of the Land Transport Corps? If the soldiers are not well sheltered during the winter, they will not maintain their health, and the Army will not be fit for service in the spring. If the Land Transport horses are a little overworked in the winter, we can buy others to take their places for the campaign. We shall make a bad figure if it can be said that there are plenty of huts at the Port, plenty of draught animals to carry them up to the Camp, plenty of men at the Camp shivering for want of the huts; but the General will not let the huts be brought to the men for fear of tiring the horses.

Huts for seat of war.

Such a state of things would have made a spicy passage in the Report of the Sebastopol Committee.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

December 19, 1855.

Against a
reduction of
Cavalry.

Lord Panmure is in error when he argues as if the Queen asked for an increase of Cavalry beyond the numbers submitted by the War Committee. She requires the regiments to be replaced, not more men. The Duke of Cambridge's memorandum contemplates even fewer men than Lord Panmure's submission, but more regiments. It is because the House of Commons do not understand and feel the necessity of keeping up a Cavalry force that the submitted proposal would act so injuriously to our future military condition, for it would leave us at present with seven, but permanently with five, regiments less than we had at any time since the peace of 1815, even in our worst times for the Army; and this is proposed for no imaginable reason! Nothing has happened to call for such a change except that new heavy demands have been made upon our Cavalry, which require additional strength for the future to meet them.

Against sug-
gested innova-
tions in regard
to Cavalry.

When further reductions shall be contemplated, the regiments reduced in number will be infallibly cut down to the strength of which the Cavalry used always to consist, and then the whole arm will be destroyed. But even if the House of Commons could be prevailed upon to keep up regiments of 600 strong, the system would be bad in itself for a Peace Establishment, as in time of war you could not increase your Cavalry in a short time by increasing the strength of regiments already ample, but you would be obliged to form new corps, which could do no service for a very long time. Moreover, the barracks in the country are built and arranged for a large number of regiments at a lower establishment; you would have to leave many empty, and the others would be incapable of containing the stronger regiments. To break the regiments up into detachments would ruin the service.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *December 20, 1855.*

The Queen has to acknowledge several letters from Lord Panmure. She cannot sufficiently express her great satisfaction at Sir William Codrington's letters; he attends to everything with an energy and activity which is most praiseworthy and satisfactory. Codrington's letters.

The Queen most strongly advises Lord Panmure to adopt Sir William's proposed plan of attaching the Land Transport Corps to each Division of the Army. These detached Civil Corps as at present composed, instead of being an assistance, are only a clog to the Army. Upon this subject the Queen knows there is but one opinion amongst the officers of the Army. By Sir William Codrington's account, it is clear that the Army is even now totally unfit to move, which is a very serious question. Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon should see Sir William's letters, as they will be much struck by them. Land Transport Corps.

The Queen rejoices to hear that the ground for the Hospital is at length to be purchased.

Lord Panmure has not reported to the Queen the result of the meeting which he had to have with Lord Hardinge, Sir R. Airey, and Sir H. Jones as to the future plans of campaign.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 20, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's note of this morning.

Lord Panmure quite subscribes to Your Majesty's opinion of Sir William Codrington's letters, which are most refreshing; and they leave the conviction on the mind of those who read them that they have a zealous and honest man to deal with. It happened very curiously that Lord Panmure had written to Sir William Codrington privately to ask his opinion as to the feasibility of com-

pleting each Division with its proper complement of baggage, animals, and means of transport, instead of keeping that department, as it is at present, entirely separate and independent.¹

Land Transport
Corps.

Your Majesty appears to think that the Land Transport Corps is a Civil Corps. This is not the case; it is entirely and essentially military, and under the Horse Guards. Colonel M'Murdo tried to avail himself of the aid of native drivers, and of people gathered from all quarters, but he has found such aid to fail, and 3000 men are already enlisted and despatched to fill up the Corps, and 2000 more remain to be sent. Sir William Codrington's plan to appoint some steady men from the combatant ranks of the line, both non-commissioned officers and privates, is well worth consideration. Lord Panmure does not gather from Sir William Codrington's letters that the Army is so totally unfit to serve as Your Majesty fears, though as a whole the Army could certainly not take the field. All Sir William Codrington's private as well as public letters are circulated to the Cabinet.

Conference as
to best and
most economic
mode of defend-
ing positions
now held by
Allies.

Lord Panmure has to offer a thousand apologies to Your Majesty for having omitted to inform Your Majesty of the result of the meeting of the Committee of Cabinet at which Lord Hardinge, Sir H. Jones, and Sir R. Airey were summoned to attend. Lord Hardinge was not present. The conference with Sir H. Jones and Sir R. Airey was confined to the best mode of defence, with the smallest number of men, of the positions now held by the allied armies. These lines were discussed; first, an advanced line behind the Tchernaya and aqueduct, extending the position where the battle took place. Second, a line from the old French right, resting on Mount Sapouné and covering the Inkerman heights, and carried round till it meets and concludes in the Balaclava lines; third, independent fortified lines round Balaclava for the British Corps, and round Kamiesh for the French. The general opinion was in favour of the first plan, because it

¹ Upon this question there were differences of opinion as lately as in the recent South African War.

required fewer men to carry it out, and therefore left more at liberty for other operations; moreover, it was stronger and far more compact than the second line, which was nearly nine miles long. The plan of two distinct occupations of Balaclava and Kamiesh was ridiculed by Sir H. Jones and Sir R. Airey, because if the Russians were once in possession of the plateau they could shell everything in both lines.

Comparative merits of different lines of defence discussed in Committee of the Cabinet.

The campaign in Asia was not discussed, as it was agreed that, in respect to it, Lord Panmure should write a despatch to Sir W. Codrington in reference to the whole question. This despatch is not yet in shape for submission to Your Majesty, but will be forwarded as soon as prepared.

In preparation of the Estimates, Lord Panmure has spoken to Lord Palmerston and Lord Hardinge, and they both concur in the expediency of taking 2000 men fewer for the line, and adding that number to the Artillery. An increase, likewise, of 1400 Sappers has been agreed to, and if these changes meet Your Majesty's approval, Lord Panmure will submit them in the usual manner.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 21, 1855.*

I have just received your letter of the [*Blank*] inst., and I am happy to find that all the regulations as to the sale of spirit are so well defined in our lines. I quite subscribe to your doctrine that it is best to leave the remedies for such a condition of things as my despatch referred to in the hands of those whose paramount interest it is to preserve the sobriety of the Army, and who know better than we at home can the ins and outs of the question. But John Bull is not easy to deal with, and unless some anxiety is exhibited he is apt to think that we sleep on our posts. To a certain extent he makes one do so, for I am chained like a slave to my desk. The great cry now, and Miss Nightingale inflames it, is that the men are too rich; granted, but it is added that they have no means to remit their money home. In vain I point out that this is not true,—

The soldier
'not a remitting
animal.'

that the soldier may put his money in the Savings-Bank, or remit it through the Paymaster, with no trouble at all. We have now offered the Post Office to them, but I am sure it will do no good. The soldier is not a remitting animal; all who are inclined to do so do remit continually, but there are many so selfish and brutish, whose appetite is their God, and everything is offered up to gratify its sensual longings.

You must change the class of the British soldier if you would have it otherwise. I got your telegraph about huts; we are all frightened that we should find part of our Army frozen up some night, but, as long as I see Dr. Hall's columns in the Morning State as they are, I am easy.

The interruption of the telegraph is not felt by the British public, as I have not treated them to a 'wiry word' for many a long day, and they are sulky in consequence.

Kars is up, and unless the Russians attack Kertch, I see no prospect of whetting your sword. Thanks for the guns you have sent there though, for they will inspire confidence. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR, December 22, 1855.

Land Transport
to be organised
forthwith.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's answer to her letter from Osborne, and is glad to see from it that he is quite agreed with the Queen on the subject of the Land Transport Corps. She would most strongly urge Lord Panmure to give at once *carte blanche* to Sir William Codrington to organise it as he thinks best, and to make him personally responsible for it.

We have only eight weeks left to the beginning of spring,—a few references home and their answers would consume the whole of that time! The Army has now to carry their huts on their backs up to the Camp; if it had been fighting, it would have perished for want of them like last winter. If each Division, Brigade, and Battalion has not got within itself what it requires for its daily existence in the field, a movement will be quite impossible.

The Queen approves the intended increase of Artillery and Sappers and Miners, but hopes that these will be taken from the nominal, and not the existing, strength of the Army.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON, TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *December 22, 1855.*

We had very cold weather on the 19th. The thermometer was down to 2°, and this with a breeze made it cold indeed. Several men had their ears frost-bitten, and during the several cold nights we have had four men have died—two of them in huts with other men, one in a French Guard tent, one found out of doors. It is usually found that in these cases drink, either at the time or previous habit, has been the cause of it. I had been arranging the cessation of working-pay before I received your official letter on the subject. You will see the terms of a General Order I have given: I shall to-day so far except Balaclava troops as to give them half working-pay per day for their loading and unloading, etc., as it is work for the whole Army. I put it on the constant wear and tear to their clothes. Either the garrison ought to be changed, for others to share the constant work, or men marched down from this plateau, which is a loss of four hours' work per day. Not worth while. Skilled labour such as miners', or any really extra work, I shall consider myself still empowered to order.

Severe cold,
with deaths
therefrom
resulting.

Cessation of
working-pay.

Snow is covering the ground; but to-day is mild and thawing, and the face of the country will be indeed in a mess if it breaks up. I went to see about some business of the Purveyor's stores at Balaclava: what a heap of things!—many necessities, many non-necessities, many luxuries!

The last week's expenditure from the store there for the sick, which cannot number above 3000 in all, was 124 dozen port wine, 116 dozen porter, and other things: in all, 3244 bottles.

The sick and
their consump-
tion of liquor.

The next week was 272 dozen port wine, 86 dozen porter, 8 dozen brandy, 6 dozen ale; in all, 4264 bottles!

This cannot be right or necessary. I have desired an account of numbers of sick and stores in Regimental and Division hospitals, to check such expenditure as this. The Purveyor's stores are heaped up, where room is valuable, with a cargo of chairs, I see, with sheets sent down to Scutari and Malta for washing, blankets, ditto—all this requires an immense stock. Thirty large affairs of vitriol (dangerous stuff) and lime, to make artificial soda-water! I think one need not be ashamed of thinking that such things for an army on service are absurdities, to use plain terms.

Best material
for 'tentes
d'abri.'

About tents: I think we had better have some *tentes d'abri*: the French have tried waterproof, have tried everything: they say there is nothing so good as the plain strong linen cloth; but it is closely made—not a mere contract affair, but real good close and light linen material. It would be well to send us 5000 such tents and poles—get them from the French, if they will let you have them, and either have them marked W. D. or not, as you choose; but they have had experience—it is a good material, and you might not be sure of an imitator with us. 5000 tents give cover to 15,000 men.

A dock to be
blown up.

The French blow up one, their west dock to-day at half-past twelve: I have ordered all our people out of the Karabelnaia, for it is somewhat of an experiment and may send stones, etc., very far. Also the Russians are pretty sure to begin to fire upon the place immediately. If I can get away from post in time, I shall go down to see it from the neighbourhood of the Redan.

The French from D'Autemarre's Division at Baidar surprised a Cossack post, killing 1 officer and 9 men, and taking all the horses and arms of the party—this a few days ago.

The general information about the Russian troops in the Crimea is that there are 120,000 of all arms, and 298 guns.

Strength and
distribution of
Russian forces.

About 4000 of these 120,000 men on the harbour, about 13,000 men about Inkerman, about 14,000 men about Mackenzie, about 12,000 men at Orta Korales, about 10,000

men in front of Yeni Lala, Upper Belbec, about 8000 on
Lower Belbec, about 2000 Bakshi Serai, about

17,000 Regular,	} at Alma Kermen (Upper Alma),
4,800 Militia,	
1,600 Cavalry	

about 11,000 Infantry (some of them Militia), 6000 Cavalry,
in neighbourhood of Eupatoria.

The Army is very healthy : the cold weather was dry ;
but we must expect that the wet weather will make some
difference, when it comes.

You will have received by this time, I see you acknow-
ledge the receipt, indeed, of my official letter on the subject
of the 'Corps d'Armée.' . . . I shall be somewhat puzzled
about the position of Sir Colin Campbell, and should be
glad, if possible, to leave Divisions as they are. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *December 23, 1855.*

. . . I read Codrington's letters that you circulated
yesterday with some pain and anxiety ; they are satisfactory
as regards himself, for I think they show that he is alive
to the realities of his position, and that he sees with his
own eyes, and forms his own opinions and has reasons to
give for those opinions ; but it is impossible not to draw
from his letters the melancholy conclusion that, after two
years' experience and boundless expense, we have an Army
ill-housed, ill-disciplined (for discipline cannot exist where
drunkenness prevails), and worst of all, unable to move.

Melancholy
conclusions as
to our Army.

It is clear that many things want reform, but I cannot
help fearing that, work your brain and your fingers as you
may, think and write as hard as you can, you will not be
able to meet all the requirements of a case that is urgent
and that is 3000 miles off. Bit-by-bit reforms won't do,
and yet you can only apply remedies when the evils come
to your knowledge. It is *the man on the spot* who, if he is
worth his salt, should be the best judge of the remedies for
the evils which he must be the first to perceive and to suffer
from, and I believe Codrington *is* worth his salt, that the

Army approved your choice of him as Commander-in-Chief, and that his conduct has always justified the opinion of the Army. You have given him the best man as Chief of the Staff, and upon those two together should devolve more responsibility than they at present seem to have for securing unity of purpose and harmonious action between the different Departments.

You, I am sure, would not shrink from any amount of responsibility, but the question in my mind arises whether, if you took upon yourself the responsibility of delegating a portion of it to the man on the spot, the objects you have in view might not be better promoted.

Writer's views
as to the Army.

The letters of yesterday might justify you in calling upon Codrington for a comprehensive report upon the Crimean Army question, and how in his opinion the evils he points out might be cured by the means at his own disposal or that the Government might provide, and further to permit him, subject to your final approval, to adopt any measures he thought urgent for rendering the Army more efficient and more movable; for it must be remembered that we are now at the end of December, and that in eight weeks' time the Army ought to be ready to take the field if the weather permitted, and that, if constant references home are required, this precious time will be lost, and that the spring will again bring with it unavailing regret.

You will probably think that I have been writing about what I don't understand, and that I had better stick to protocols, but I am sure you will not misunderstand my motives. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 24, 1855.*

I send you a secret and confidential despatch on the subject of Land Transport Corps and Army Works Corps, and referring slightly to what I trust is gone by of intemperance and to what is progressing in organisation.

I give you full powers to deal with your transport as you please, and I shall continue to send you English

drivers as I can pick them up. The new system which you mean to adopt differs considerably from Colonel M'Murdo's, and I have no doubt he will not be pleased with the change which you contemplate making. Nevertheless I think you are essentially right, and I have no hesitation in giving you as full powers as you desire to have. There are a great many mules waiting you at Gibraltar and in Spain, and you can get horses in considerable numbers nearer to you. Your proposal to take from your combatant ranks a sufficient number of men to form steady N.C.O.[s] seems to me to be an excellent plan, and I think it not improbable that you may find among the German regiments some good men for the purpose as soon as you call them up to the Army. The evil against which you have to contend is the proneness of our men to ill-use the animals committed to their care. They neglect the 'stitch in time saves nine,' and thus in many cases a useful animal is ruined. Perhaps when the distribution of animals is made as you propose, one of the results will be that Divisional and Brigade Officers, being more responsible for the efficiency of their Transport Corps, will look better after them.

Contemplated
change in
transport.

You will have to keep Sir G. M'Lean alive to having forage for the Army ready to transport to such points as it may be required, and you must let me know as soon as you can by telegraph what you wish me to send you. All the carts and ambulances should be overhauled.

You will no doubt hear reports of all sorts circulated with respect to peace, and it may be as well that you should know in confidence from me how matters stand in that respect. Some little time since Austria submitted to France and England a proposition, which she proposed to be sent by her to St. Petersburg, containing new bases of treaty. We altered these so as to define generally the conditions on which we could consistently with the English honour treat, and, Austria having adopted them, they are now on their way to St. Petersburg. I confess I cannot see how Russia can accept them, and yet I can scarcely conceive how Austria should have offered them without

State of matters
as regards
peace.

some notion of their being acceptable. The result will not be known for some weeks. I see rumours in the Russian Press of an intention to attack you. I fear no such good luck is in store.

You must see to your means of sea-transport for early operations being soon looked to, and as I understand that Admiral Fremantle is the N.O. Commanding, you will doubtless communicate with him.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

Private.

December 24, 1855.

Exchange of
decorations,

1. I send you to-day (to Hammond) 3000 medals asked for by the Emperor. I can now give you 10,000 a-week till he has got all.

2. The orders: I will cause to be transmitted to your care as soon as possible the insignia for all the officers recommended in the Emperor's list for the Bath, and will thank you to ask him to send to you the insignia of the L. of H.¹ destined for our people, of which I will cause an official list in numbers to be sent to your Office. . . . Never imagine that in writing to me on the conduct of the war you travel out of your line. It is the act of a friend as well as the privilege of a colleague, and I value both.

I have telegraphed to Codrington to arrange the Land Transport Corps as he thinks best for the Army. He is alive to the condition of his Army, and I feel with you that he is fully to be trusted, and perfectly safe to be supported in all he may contemplate.

The Army in
the East to be
reported on.

I don't take quite so gloomy a view of the Army as you do, but I have already asked Codrington to give me a comprehensive view of his Army before the Meeting of Parliament, and I have had for some weeks past Colonel Lefroy,² of my Office, in the East, inspecting every hole and corner, from Crimea, including Balaclava and Kertch,

¹ Legion of Honour.

² A distinguished R.A. officer, of high scientific attainments, attached to the War Office.

to Scutari and Smyrna, and he is to be home by 14th or 15th of January with all details.

The medical reports of the Army are excellent, and so long as they are so satisfactory I am quite sure that physically our troops are fit for work. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *December 24, 1855.*

. . . Cowley says there is to be a great ceremony for distributing our medals, and I hope it will do good to the international feeling, which is not quite what we could desire at this moment. Pray have the additional medals expedited.

International feeling not at present quite what might be wished.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 25, 1855.

The Light Division, which suffered so much from the explosion, has with regard to huts even benefited by it, for that Division is now more hutted than any of those on the plateau. . . . All damage of huts, etc., consequent on the explosion, you may consider as rectified. Perhaps you will hear about the horror and inhumanity of stopping the supply of huts for the 'poor men'—quite possible. I am quite willing to bear the brunt of any arrangement I think best, and even of sending huts away from hence in the 'depth of winter,' 'living under canvas in such inclement climate,' and all those expressions.

Forestalls criticism at home on the subject of canvas *versus* huts.

Lucky perhaps that the two poor fellows—or, rather, hard drinkers—who were dead of cold were actually in huts and not under canvas. It has nothing to do with it, but probably it would have come on our shoulders. As I myself lived all last winter under a tent, and past the 14th November in a bell tent, and without the appliances now to be had, I know what can be done, and that one is not necessarily frozen to death.

I was quite sure people had run wild about drunkenness: there was certainly more than enough of it, and the very appearance of it was not creditable; but see what in

Drunkenness in Camp not after all so very bad.

reality it amounts to, and judge if many a town and village in England would have done better. I am sure it is what you have officially in my letter: the drunken and noisy man is seen, and seen in a confined space in which there are 30,000 or 60,000 men assembled in the prime of life with money in their pockets.

Under Arms,	}	36,522.
Batmen,		
Staff Employ,		
Excluding Sick,		
21st November 1855,		

Cases of drunkenness (not men, who would be fewer) for 12 weeks,	}	16,666.

—that is, 197 per day. That is, in rough numbers, 365 companies of 100 men had a little more than one man drunk in two days in each such company.

The facilities of a camp, of course, prevent many cases being known and seen; but let us double or treble the amount—take two men or three men a-day out of every company of 100 men. Is it anything so horribly bad that the Army is to be held up as nothing but drunkards?

. . . The other points in your letter of the 7th are too important for me to answer in a hurry; but they are vital—for many things. The English and Sardinian Armies cannot hold this corner of the Crimea alone as an *offensive* position: we should be reduced to a difficult defence, I think, from the immense extent, and after the deduction of 100,000 French.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 26, 1855.

In view of a
Russian
advance on
Erzeroum.

Mouravieff's Order of the Day seems to indicate in the last sentence a march upon Erzeroum, and if he goes there, and things there remain as they now are, Selim Pasha and his small force will either take to their heels or surrender. The only chance of preventing this second reverse will be to send Turkish reinforcements without delay to Trebi-

zond, from whence they may be able to get to Erzeroum. I wish you would by telegraph instruct Codrington to enter into communication with the British Admiral on the station, with Pélissier, and with the Turkish Commander at Eupatoria, with a view to make arrangements for sending off to Trebizond the Turkish and Egyptian troops now at Eupatoria, in order that they may get on from Trebizond to Erzeroum.

I have written to Charles Wood to ask him to give similar instructions to the Admiral.

Clarendon will probably desire Stratford to urge the Porte to send what they can from Constantinople. But what is wanted as much as anything is a Commander of courage and activity at Erzeroum.

I fear it would scarcely be possible to send a British force to Trebizond, and, if it were possible, such a force could scarcely at this time of year make its way over the mountains to Erzeroum.

If the war goes on, and we have a campaign in Georgia next spring, General Mouravieff and his army will not find themselves comfortably placed in Asia Minor with their communications with Russia cut off; but if we are to negotiate, the Russians would be on a vantage ground if in possession of Erzeroum as well as of Kars.

Considers conditions under which possession of Erzeroum would be an advantage to Russia.

I was told a few days ago that the Swiss troops in the service of the King of Naples are many of them leaving his army, their period of engagement being over, and it was said that many of them might be disposed to enter into our Foreign Legion. This may be worth attention.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

December 28, 1855.

I return you the Draft of Warrant for the new decoration. Having gone through it carefully together with the Queen, I have marked in pencil upon it all that occurred to us. I should recommend, however, a reference to Lord Hardinge before the places of the Army

The new decoration, viz. Victoria Cross.

and Navy are assigned in such a formal document, so that the Army should have been heard on the subject as well as the Navy.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

December 28, 1855.

I have just received your letter of the 11th inst., and, though I reserve a public answer to your despatch on the subject of the Land Transport Corps and the reports of General Windham and Colonel Wetherall for another day, yet I cannot avoid touching on the question.

As to Codrington's proposed changes in Land Transport.

Having placed you at the head of the Army, it is my duty as well as my inclination to give you full scope to make that Army useful for operations of any kind which it may be called on to make. Your representation to me that the Land Transport Corps was not organised on a good principle, and your intimation that you could arrange it with more efficiency, was no sooner intimated to me than I resolved to intrust the responsibility to you, and to sanction any new system that you decided on introducing. I am sorry to find that so many men are required from the ranks to work your future scheme, but I cannot deny the force of your reasoning. I shall expect a full report on your means of transport, and I do trust that General Windham will find that he may do much on wheels which he does not at present conceive to be easy. Though, of course, we shall be fallen upon for not having hutted all our men, still I shall uphold your double and floored tents as being better than green huts. They will be of use to set up in the spring wherever the face of your field operations is decided upon to be made.

Malconstruction of railway trucks.

The railway trucks are all sent out in pieces, and I have sent to the maker to call him into court for their malconstruction. I cannot comprehend how the apparently shameful cases occur.

We look every day for news of the docks. We had heard of the French affairs; I wish they would give you a chance!

I am sure you will regret Kars. The immediate blame rests with Selim Pasha.

We have some gallant British blood in Erzeroum, which offered to make a dash on Kars on horseback and to throw provisions in, but Selim Pasha would *not agree*!!

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

December 28, 1855.

I send you a despatch from Major Stuart, which is satisfactory, as he says he can defend Erzeroum. Pray return it, and let me know how matters stand as to sending reinforcements to Erzeroum or Trebizond.

As to reinforcements for Erzeroum and Trebizond.

Palmerston told me two days ago that he was about to write to you and Colonel Wood on the subject, and I should like to inform Stratford by the mail of to-day what assistance the Turks may expect and what they ought to be doing. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

December 29, 1855.

I have your telegraph about the Land Transport Corps, and shall begin at once. . . .

I have sent Colonel Fielding in *Banshee* to Sinope, and subsequently to Omar Pasha, with a letter from me in general terms to him, desiring Colonel Fielding to get all information he can through Colonel Simmons¹ of present situation and future intentions, as well as notes on the country, landing in all places he wished. Sinope, Somboun Kalé, or Anaklia, Trebizond, and return by Sinope, will probably be his course.

Mission of Colonel Fielding.

If there is any idea of even a small number of troops moving, and landing on an enemy's coast, I think we should have many more men-of-war, and very many more merchant steamers. But no doubt you will see Sir E.

If landing on enemy's coast is contemplated, recommends sending out more ships.

¹ He had been attached to Omar Pasha in Silistria from the commencement of the war.

Lyons: he will tell you that this climate is not to be reckoned on at ten miles' distance, or half-a-day's fine weather. Kertch is half ice-bound: the fine siege guns arrived, and they hoped to land them on the ice.

Loss sustained
by Vivian's
cavalry.

That is a bad business about the loss of Vivian's cavalry—1 officer killed and 43 men, 37 horses gone: all done contrary to his orders. He gave a severe reprimand to Major Macdonald, but mentions in the private letter that his is a peculiar force, and that he thought it better not to take stronger measures so as to lower an English officer in the eyes of the Turks.

The weather is very fine—clear but cold, particularly at night. The men healthy; do not be afraid about their not being hutted.

The French killed an officer and some men of a Russian outpost some few days ago. This besides a former one I mentioned: it does not compensate, however, for our cavalry small disaster at Kertch.

I hope one dock will be blown up by us three days hence.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

Secret.

December 29, 1855.

Contemplates
a possible
withdrawal of
the French.

There are many important vital considerations hinted at in your letter. I can scarcely suppose that the French Army will withdraw from the plateau and the occupation of Sebastopol itself except for the purpose of evacuating the Crimea.

It is a question for the Allied Governments to consider if a defensive occupation of this corner is to be left to the English and Sardinians; I say *defensive*, for the amount of troops in the Russian position, particularly if reinforced in the spring, must reduce this Army, after the withdrawal of 100,000 French, to defence, and that of a somewhat precarious nature.

Sebastopol, Inkerman heights, and the edge of this plateau form a large semicircle, terminating at Balaclava—this, being in a hollow, is not defended entirely by this

plateau, but requires the strong occupation of heights on its further side.

The plateau being held, there has been no necessity for lines or batteries to defend it from the plateau itself; but, give up this position, it becomes a very different state of things, with an enemy (and that supposes a superior enemy) in possession of the plateau itself. Pursues the same subject.

Your Lordship mentions the general opinion that Balaclava cannot be held without the plateau, that I must lay my plans on the supposition of the French withdrawing to their lines of Kamiesh, and that I may require to replace them by our own troops from Scutari, Smyrna, or Malta.

That is to suppose that, unless for mere defence, 10,000 or 12,000 men can fill the gap made by the French Army of 80,000 or 90,000 bayonets. In the eventuality contemplated, the British Army could only act on the defensive.

The lines of Kamiesh will probably require from 35,000 to 40,000 men.

More are scarcely necessary to defend the outer line, viz. the edge of the plateau itself.

During the last winter the Feduchine heights, those running, as it were, across the plain and parallel to the general course of the Tchernaya up to the Sardinian position and our position at Kamara, were occupied by the Russians: they once made an attack towards Balaclava, a large force of theirs being in the plain; it was thought probably too much risk to continue an attack in length of line, in presence of troops up here. It was dangerous, and might so be again if Balaclava could take care of itself by strong defensive works.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December 31, 1855.*

I have sent your letter to the Queen. You seem to imagine that I might be absent at this merry season, but, except going down to Scotland for a few hours to deposit my poor brother's remains in their last resting-place, I have never been out of reach of the bag since I took Office. All have their holidays but me.

I am quite aware of your difficulties about the docks, and wait with patience, but hope with earnestness to hear of their destruction every morning. One pair of gates is all we care about. I am glad to hear you have cold weather, for I am sure it is best for your troops, and your Bill of Health seems to be excellent.

Effect of a withdrawal from Sebastopol.

I quite concur with your view of Pélissier's letter. It is meant to be vague, as he has not got his instructions from Paris. If you and he retire within your *dens* at Balaclava or Kamiesh, you return Sebastopol to Russia, confessing before all Europe your inability to hold it, and, as you observe, from assailants you become assailed. This will neither suit you nor us.

As to Codrington's powers of disposing of his Army.

Your public despatches on Land Transport Corps and your powers of disposing of your Army shall be answered officially when I have an opportunity of consulting with my colleagues on Thursday. In regard to the former, I trust my full powers to do as you think best for moving your Army have arrived ere this, and that with Windham and Wetherall you have already begun to organise.

In regard to the latter question, it is not easy to answer you off-hand. While the Allied Armies lie together and hold, as it were, different portions of one large position, no one Army can direct any considerable portion of its force to any other quarter. But if, for instance, Vivian was threatened by a superior force, you would be perfectly justified in sending, or even moving yourself, to his relief either directly or by a division.

The Government and myself will support you in any attempt to aid Omar in Asia, should he require assistance, as we feel that you will do so judiciously. But you have asked for official instructions, and you shall have them. Colonel M'Murdo has arrived. He comes to me on Wednesday for a regular Land Transport discussion, and we shall then go over all the details and yours and Colonel Windham's suggestions.

Lyons will also be here on Wednesday, and I hope our Council will meet at Paris soon.

I hear Pélissier does not like the idea of it.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

December 31, 1855.

. . . We have a great case now against the Prussian Government for exporting powder to Russia, but the Prussian Government say that we get munitions of war from Prussia, and that what is fair for the one is fair for the other. I don't know what contracts you have still on hand, or whether you consider it important to supply yourself from Prussia, but if not, we might call upon the Prussian Government to do as the Austrian Government have done, and strictly to prohibit the exportation of all munitions of war to any of the belligerent Powers. . . .

As to Neutral
Powers supply-
ing munitions
of war.

CHAPTER XIII

JANUARY 1856

‘If you desire peace, be prepared for war’—this would seem to have been the guiding principle of the Allied Governments during January 1856.

So, whilst awaiting Russia’s reply to the Austrian peace proposals, a Council of War was convened for the purpose of discussing plans for the campaign of the ensuing spring.

The Council met at Paris on the 9th January, and was attended by military representatives of France, Italy, and Great Britain—the last being the Duke of Cambridge—whose letters to Lord Panmure detail the proceedings from day to day—with Generals Sir Harry Jones and Sir Richard Airey, and Admirals Sir Edmund Lyons and Dundas.

The object of the deliberations is defined as being, ‘simply to propound all plans of every kind’ for the coming campaign, ‘to discuss the merits of each,’ and to record, for the use of the respective Governments, the opinions and conclusions of so many men who are not only familiar with the different fields on which they have acted, but well versed in their own professions.

When this had been done, and the result of the discussions had been laid before the Governments of the Allied Powers, and a decision arrived at on what Codrington calls the fundamental and half-political points relating to the place of operation, it would then (to quote Codrington

again) become the duty of the Generals in command to overcome every difficulty in the adoption of those views. Meantime he himself was opposed to dividing the Allied Armies.

The plans most considered by the Council were, first, that of cutting the Russian communications and driving the Russian Army from the Crimea; and, secondly, that of a campaign in Asia, having for its object to drive Mouravieff's army beyond the Caucasus—of which details are to be found in Lord Panmure's letter to Codrington of 7th January, and in the Duke of Cambridge's letter of 12th January; whilst Codrington's letters will be found to give his views as to an evacuation of Balaclava in face of the enemy.

The situation, however, was complicated by uncertainty as to whether the Russians would seek to hold the Crimea at the cost of fighting, as well as by doubts as to the persistence of the French, who had now begun to wish for peace at any price, whilst the difficulties in which the Emperor found himself involved had tended to weaken his personal influence.

The Council continued its sittings until the 21st January, by which time it had been decided that the Crimea could not be abandoned without disgrace, and that the Allied Armies should therefore combine in driving the Russians out of it.

Meantime, in the Crimea, winter operations having been prohibited except in case of pressure, the activity of the troops was directed mainly towards the blowing up of the captured docks, which was begun on December 31st and completed by the end of January.

Except for a cold 'snap' in the middle of the month, the weather was favourable, which of course tended to enhance the contrast between the preceding and the present January, and made it all the easier for Panmure to

congratulate Codrington on bringing his Army through the winter 'with great *éclat*.'

At home, among the subjects occupying attention were the military reserves, the enlistment in the Foreign Legion of deserters from foreign armies, and the new decoration called the Victoria Cross.

By the end of the month the prospect of peace had become more promising. But any appearance of a relaxation of Britain's warlike attitude was nevertheless still carefully guarded against.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 1, 1856.

I am too much pressed in time to do much more than 'officials.' . . . I presume this to relate to their health, their camps, their arms, their general state of equipment and well-doing.

Blowing up
of docks.

The docks will be gone on with in succession: you will see by my official report that one of ours was blown up successfully (the bottom mines) yesterday, and part of the basin wall also by us.

You will have received some expression of mine long ago that I was very glad not to be sent for to a Council. I think that all going there would have shown 'decided indecision.'

There will be some difficult cards to play—particularly if the Russians *do* continue to think the Crimea worth holding and fighting for; and still more so if our Allies intend to quit, or even retire.

Repeats request
for more ships
if winter ex-
peditions are
in view.

If there is any idea of winter expeditions, and they are, as you will learn from Sir E. Lyons, most hazardous for Navy at this time of year, we should have more steam and sailing transports and ships of war at once at Constantinople: that is the only place that any great number of them can lie with certainty and safety at this time of year.

PS. . . . The French are somewhat nervous about

Kinburn—their men-of-war are frozen in, and apparently not in as favourable positions as they might wish. The vessels are also, some of them, frozen at Kertch. Colonel Lefroy came back a day or two ago. Some heavy guns had been moved from Yenikale to Kertch, and General Vivian and Captain Hall hoped to land on the ice those which I sent from hence.

Ships at
Kinburn and
Kertch ice-
bound.

There was some order (but I have it not) about the Russian works, Redan, etc., being maintained; what was that for? I propose, and shall begin indeed whilst the ground is hard, to take Russian guns up to our dépôt for ulterior purposes.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 4, 1856.*

I am yet scarcely in a position to write you the despatch on the campaign which I promised some days since, and I will therefore still keep to this mode of correspondence till the issue of the Council of Paris enables me more formally to address you. This Council meets on the 9th, and the Emperor proposes to have present at it Marshal Vaillant, Canrobert, Niel, Bosquet, Admiral Hamelin, and another admiral. We send the Duke of Cambridge, Sir H. Jones, Sir R. Airey, Admirals Lyons and Dundas. The course to be taken is simply to propound all plans of every kind, to discuss the merits of each, and to record, for the use of the respective Governments, the opinions and conclusions of so many men who are not only cognisant with the different fields on which they have acted, but well versed in their professions. To me it appears that, so far as our Army is concerned, the campaign has but two faces. 1st, We must either take part in clearing the Crimea, or 2nd, We must carry the war into Asia on the ground now occupied by Omar Pasha, and, in co-operation with him, but not in conjunction, drive the Russians beyond the Caucasus.

As to the forth-
coming Council
at Paris.

Now, for the first plan, I conceive that, taking the Russian Army at your own numbers of 120,000, there can

Plan of clearing
the Crimea
considered.

be no difficulty in accomplishing it by means of a vigorous movement in spring, and by landing an Army between Eupatoria and Alma and marching at once on Simpheropol. The Russians must fight or retreat: if they fight, they will be beat; if they fly, the road is open to the North Side, and you begin the campaign by possession of Sebastopol, and you can use its waters as you require.

The French could do this affair, and if you wished to share its glory, you could send a Division or two to secure the presence of the banners of England. Meanwhile you would hold yourself in readiness to advance if the Russian retreated, or to threaten an attack should he weaken his centre to present a front of battle to the French; on the Russian left demonstration would be made, and I feel quite certain that the enemy must fight at disadvantage or retreat in disorder.

Now, to be prepared for this, you will require your Cavalry to be with you early in March, and all your reinforcements to your Regiments of the line. I should recommend your sending as many of your sick as you can to the Hospitals in the rear, and taking from your men all that is superfluous, giving them every facility to exert those powers which this winter will have fostered. Let us now see how in this case our numbers would stand: I make a note of this on a separate sheet,¹ and my data and base of calculation is your Morning State of the 21st December. I leave you a roving Army of 72,000 men, and I do not believe you can manage more in that country, if you can do that. I cannot suppose that the French can be inferior in strength, and, if you have a joint force to guard your magazines, I see no reason why you should not push the enemy from the Crimea, or at all events from all the country south of Simpheropol.

2. Suppose our destination be Asia, and, as this is the most probable, I think you should turn your attention to it, and consider what should be your base at the sea, your line of advance, and the localities for your depôts to carry the war on your part into Asia.

¹ See next page.

You must secure your material at Balaclava to begin with. For this purpose you would leave, say, 25,000 men to be added to 35,000 French, who would keep the advanced post on the Tchernaya, which is capable of being strengthened as a position which no Russian Army could force. Landing 60,000 men in Asia, you could sweep the country before you on one side, while Omar Pasha will advance by Trebizond to Erzeroum and prevent the Russians from a further advance into Asiatic Turkey.

I find I must stop this letter, and I will continue it on Monday.

LORD PANMURE'S ESTIMATE OF TROOPS AT CODRINGTON'S
DISPOSAL IN THE CRIMEA

	N.C.O. AND MEN.
Artillery (96 guns), . . .	5,000
Horse Artillery, . . .	500
Sappers and Miners, . . .	500
Cavalry, . . .	6,000
Infantry, . . .	50,000
From Malta, . . .	10,000
Foreign Levies, . . .	10,000
	<hr/>
	82,000
Sardinians, . . .	20,000
Turkish Contingent, . . .	22,000
Osmanli Cavalry, . . .	3,000
	<hr/>
	127,000
Deduct for sick $\frac{1}{10}$ th, . . .	12,700
	<hr/>
	114,300
Deduct for employés $\frac{1}{10}$ th, . . .	11,430
	<hr/>
	102,870
Deduct for detachment, . . .	30,000
	<hr/>
	72,870

This includes no Land Transport Corps or Commissariat employés.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 5, 1856.*

The Queen returns the drawings for the 'Victoria Cross'; she has marked the one she approves with an X; she thinks, however, that it might be a trifle smaller. The motto would be better, 'For Valour' than 'for *the* brave,' as this would lead to the inference that only those are deemed brave who have got the Cross.

The Queen thinks Lord Panmure may be interested in reading these 'Journals,' which Sir William Codrington kindly proposes sending to her regularly, and which from their not being formal reports are the more interesting and valuable to her.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 6, 1856.

Favourable
winter.

We have had a good fall of snow, the earth is all white now; but to-day is beautifully clear, and altogether the winter has been as yet most favourable: it has been dry; but gales of wind and change of weather are wonderfully rapid in this climate.

Difficulties of
embarkation
of troops at
Balaclava in
face of the
enemy.

I have your telegraph yesterday, asking rather an important question—one to which attention has not been fully given, though I have looked at the possibility of it. I cannot yet give you a decided opinion; it is a question of much detail, depending not only on one outline of ground to maintain a fixed position, but of successive positions in retreat, diminishing the number of troops gradually by embarkation;—withdrawing, therefore, to positions defensible by fewer troops, and yet not allowing the enemy's artillery to reach the ships and place of embarkation. In short, to get away from a narrow harbour, with steep commanding sides, in face of a pressing, and, at last, superior enemy.

This, under the best circumstances, will be no easy matter.

The principle of such a business on our side must be

to compensate for our decreasing numbers on embarkation by such works with artillery as will keep the enemy far off; to make a succession of works, open or nearly so in their rear, and commanded by a last, innermost line; and, on evacuation of the last, having ships to secure by fire the embarkation of the last troops.

The fire of ships is not available in support of the flanks of Balaclava harbour; they are too high, and their possession by an enemy at last would cut off ships inside. A ship's broadside could, from inside the harbour, fire along the flat ground at the head of the harbour, reaching a short mile north; but the spurs of the hills forming the sides of the harbour make this line of fire a narrow space, and the spurs, once evacuated, give the enemy cover, though the ground of the spurs is rocky.

It is an anxious question I have long had an inkling of; and I had proposed to myself, and one other, to place Russian guns in any such positions, so as to leave none of our own. That artillery could not be got away from our last defences; therefore Russian guns should be used, and spiked or destroyed at last if possible. The soil on the hills or hilly mounds west of Balaclava is rocky—some of them entirely rock. My impression is that it would require four or five considerable redoubts or works on the west side of Balaclava, and the maintenance of the old lines to the east side of Balaclava at first; but the line of defence must at last be also retired to an inner line there—taking the nearer hills and the old Genoese castle hill as the situation for inner and last defensible works.

In presence of an inferior army—a decidedly inferior army—this retreat might be looked on as comparatively safe; though even that inferior army must at last become the superior.

In presence of a pressing and superior army, your Lordship must be aware that it is dangerous; for the morale and the physique must naturally be with the advancing and repossessing army of ground from which they will affect to be driving us away. I know not if your message contemplates the employment of the Army in any

other part of the Crimea, or the quitting the peninsula altogether.

Circumstances
of evacuation
would count
for much.

If the Army (I speak of the Allied forces) is to be employed in attacking the Russian Army, by disembarking so as to move on Simpheropol or Bakshi Serai, that changes much the state of things, and puts the national and allied morale as the attacking party: if we evacuate the Crimea in defence and difficulty, your Lordship will see what national and European use will be made of that fact.

Destruction
of docks.

The destruction of the docks is progressing: it is a great point to well destroy the bottom of the dock: it is the most important part; and is effectually done by us. Shall the quays be destroyed also—fine quays, leading to the ruins of Fort Paul, on which are dockyard buildings?

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *January 7, 1856.*

As to a cam-
paign in Asia.

I again resume the subject that was interrupted in my last letter, though I am sorry to say that I am obliged to use my Secretary's hand instead of my own, which gout has disabled. My last letter to you closed as I was on the confines of a discussion as to the scheme of operating with the English Army on the ground lately occupied by Omar Pasha. With an army of 50,000 or 60,000 men, conveyed to Redoubt Kalé, and either landed there or pushed up the river Rion as far as navigable, would (*sic*) launch you at once upon Kutais, from which you could either advance upon Tiflis or occupy the central passes of the Caucasus. If Omar Pasha, with the body of the Turkish Army, landing at Trebizond, advanced to Erzeroum, you would then have the Russian Army in a trap between you, and, even if he should occupy Kars, the same game is open to you as was to Mouravieff against Williams. The advantage of this scheme of operations is twofold: you, in the first place, will carry on the war amongst a Christian population, and the cry which is represented to have been raised by Mouravieff of 'Cross *versus* Crescent' will be of less con-

sequence ; and, secondly, Omar Pasha will be fighting in a country where the hearths and altars of a great portion of his Army are to be found. In conducting such a campaign, it appears to me that your supplies could be easily transported to Kutais, as the river Rion is said to be navigable within thirty miles of that fortress. I should imagine that you would find yourself amongst a not very hostile population, and all the more disposed to look with favour upon the advent of an English Army if they were assured that, in driving forth the Russians, their liberties and religion were to be permanently secured to the Turk. I send you in the bag a small map of Asiatic Turkey, which appears to me to give in a small compass an excellent notion of the country.

Details of proposed Asiatic campaign.

I think that Colonel Simmons should be able to give you correct and decided information of the nature and resources of the country, the character of its people, and the extent to which you will find forage and supplies as you advance into the interior. You might either summon him to your Camp and get from him all the information he could afford you, or you might send one or two intelligent officers to Omar Pasha's camp to gain the intelligence you require.

The Council at Paris sits on Thursday ; you will understand that they are to fix upon no plan of operations whatever, but to discuss every possible contingency which the experience of its members, the amount of force capable of being furnished by each country, and the power of moving that force, may suggest. It will be for the two Governments to decide afterwards what shall be undertaken by each, giving to their separate commanders the earliest possible information, so as to enable them to carry out whatever plan of campaign may be determined on.

The telegraphs have begun to arrive again. I have ordered your *tentes d'abri*. Dr. Smith tells me that he has heard from some source or another that, if your Army takes the field, you do not propose that it shall be accompanied by its tents. The doctors here are all open-mouthed about what will happen under such circumstances, and I am

inclined to think that if you purpose, for want of means to carry it, to leave the bell tent behind, you must send a very much larger supply of *tentes d'abri*. I suppose the docks are still unpumped out, as we are still without any tidings of their blowing up being *un fait accompli*.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

January 7, 1856.

. . . I shall send you to-day an excellent despatch of Seymour's,¹ with the account which the three American officers give of our Army, and I hope you will send it to Codrington, as it will please him and all English officers. I expect a good result from it in the U.S.

Russia's reply
expected.

The Russian answer is expected at Vienna to-day. I should say it was even betting as to whether it is affirmative or negative, but Gortschakoff² is making his preparations for departure.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 8, 1856.

Sea-transport.

The means of transport, sea-transport, and ships of war must be looked to in England soon: you will have had several letters of mine referring to it. We are six Divisions of the Army, and as a general outline for transporting the Army you must reckon seven large steamers, and fourteen sailing transports to be towed by those seven. The Admiralty probably have the very clear instructions and plan of the vessels and landing (coloured) which was arranged at Varna by Captain Mends³ and Sir George Brown. It will give me a very good idea of what is wanted.

I have put the amount of the Division at 6000 Infantry and two field-batteries of Artillery.

Sir E. Lyons will, I think, tell you that this fleet and

¹ Sir H. Seymour, British Minister at Vienna.

² Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

³ Flag-Captain to Sir Edmund Lyons, afterwards Admiral.

men-of-war should be collected at Constantinople; and he will probably agree with me that no time should be lost in preparing it in England. I mentioned to you in my last letter what we had here of steamers and transports (sailing-vessels). I am just going to see another part of the dock blown up by us: viz. a pier forming the separation of two of them.

. . . The weather has broken from frost for a time: the face of the country was covered with snow, but two days of a warm southerly gale, blowing strong, have made it almost disappear again. Troops very healthy.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 8, 1856.

The moving the whole of the guns—seven hundred, I think, are our portion of iron guns—from the dockyard of Sebastopol will work our horses of Artillery sadly: they are working the French horses heavily: they are surely not worth the moving—many being carronades with carron on them.

As to moving
of captured
guns.

I propose taking some of them up; and sending some of those peculiar ones, or knocked-about ones, from the Redan, as Woolwich or Horse Guards' curiosities. But the bulk of those lying on the gun wharf to be destroyed. I should like authority for this—the positive moving the lot will take at least forty-four days: a horse is worth £100, a gun is worth £7.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, January 10, 1856.

I hope you will see Dr. Sandwith,¹ who is a really fine fellow. He will tell you that the Russians had 25,000 men before Kars, huddled for the winter and wanting for nothing.

Investiture with
the Order of
the Bath.

The Queen writes that she does not wish any of the

¹ Medical Officer at Kars.

Baths to be delivered separately, but that all the officers should be invested at once by Cowley. She says the Baltic officers had best be considered separately, but thinks that Admirals Penaud¹ and Dundas should be decorated (*i.e.* exchange of Bath and Legion of Honour, I suppose).

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

TUILERIES, *January 10, 1856.*

Account of the
Council's de-
liberations on
the first day.

I have officially written to you to-day to give you an account of what took place at our first meeting. There was not much more done than putting the great question of the day in motion by the appointment of two sub-committees, who were in the first instance to sift the question submitted to them, and which had been drawn up by the Emperor himself. This was clearly a very prudent course to adopt, and it was assented to unanimously. The Emperor reserved to himself a third proposition, to be submitted to another sub-committee in the event of Austria siding actively with the Allies. It was deemed advisable to postpone such committee for the present, and consequently only the two others were formed, the one on the Crimea, the other on the Baltic. These have been sitting in deliberation all day, and I have just learnt from the members of them that, so far, they have got on satisfactorily and well, and have answered the question as to the evacuation of the Crimea as an impossibility, and have further given it as their opinion that 60,000 men would be required to defend the position before Sebastopol as at present occupied. There is not time to-night, before the departure of the messenger, to enter into further details as to what passed in the sub-committees, but you shall be informed of this as soon as possible. I am happy to tell you that nothing could be more fair or more satisfactory than everything which fell from the Emperor. It is clear that he is *de cœur et d'âme* with us, and that he enters fully into our views, wishes, and feelings. He is evidently against the evacuation of the Crimea, and I do not think

Attitude of the
Emperor.

¹ Commanding French Fleet in Black Sea.

that he thinks an expedition to the Baltic on a large scale practicable, but I see that several of our allied friends are of a different opinion, and these, we doubt, will try to carry their point. But still, with the decided views of the Emperor on these subjects, I question their making much resistance, and I therefore look hopefully to the result of our deliberation. The Emperor was very strong in his views as to a French General-in-Chief having no right to allow political considerations to enter into his military calculations, and his assertion in this respect has, I think, done much good, as it no doubt will prevent much unnecessary discussion. He further laid it down most clearly that all we had to do in Council was to consider every feasible plan, and to sift out those that were practicable from those that were not, leaving it entirely to the two Governments to do afterwards what they thought best. General La Marmora appears to me to be greatly in favour of a Baltic expedition, which I regret. He further did not seem much disposed to commit himself either as to acting with us or with the French, saying that he thought this must depend on the plan of campaign to be formed. Nothing could be more gentlemanlike than he was, and he by no means said he would make any difficulties if called upon to act with us, but I do not think he is disposed to think that he is *called* upon to act under our orders, or rather in conjunction with us, in preference to so acting with the French. I have not time to add more to-day, nor indeed have I more to say, but you shall hear again from me, and meanwhile my impression, as far as we have as yet got, is most favourable.

Attitude of
La Marmora.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

January 11, 1856.

I have been in the sick list ever since I last wrote to you, and I am still incapable of using my hand. I have not much in consequence to tell you. I see my way to obtain for you as many *tentes d'abri* as you may require, and considerably beyond the number which you have asked

A campaigning
hint.

for. I should get them as you suggest from the man who makes them for the French intendance, and, so far as my exertions go and Claremont's superintendence in Paris will avail, they shall be the best of their kind. Talking of them, I merely take this opportunity of mentioning to you that when, as a boy, in Canada, I used to camp out in the woods under a *tente d'abri* of birch bark, I always took care to put between me and the ground a lot of branches if I could possibly obtain them. This is a campaigning hint which I dare say is useless, as known to you before. I have been turning in my mind every possible means of lightening your transport, and there is a commissary here, of the name of Julian, who thinks he has achieved a sort of compôte of forage, capable of doing as much for an animal as pemmican for an Indian. I rejoice to learn that you are busy with the organisation of your transport corps. I will do all I can, when I get hold of Lyons again, to convince him of the necessity of having in the Black Sea the amplest means of transport, because one of the best means of annoyance to the enemy which the Allies possess is the power of embarking their men, and throwing them on shore where they please, and so keeping the enemy dodging them round the coast perpetually. The Council of War met at Paris on Thursday, but their proceedings are to be kept perfectly secret, and all that I tell you of them you must consider as strictly confidential and not to be communicated to Marshal Pélissier. The attendance has been pretty numerous, and they have divided themselves into committees to discuss all the plans which they can think of for the ensuing campaign. My private opinion is that the Emperor has arrived at two conclusions. 1st, that the Baltic is no fit theatre for military operations, and 2nd, that the Crimea cannot be abandoned with honour, and scarcely with safety. Judging from hearsay and appearances, I think it not improbable that some change in the command of the French Army may be the result of this deliberation in Paris. We shall hear tomorrow or next day the result of the mission to St. Petersburg, and you will hear of it by telegraph in all

A change in
command of
French Army
probable.

probability before you receive this. My own opinion is that nothing will come of it, and that the whole case has got to be decided. I published in the newspapers your despatches upon drunkenness. It has turned the tide which had been so set against the Army, and has strengthened your hands as its Commander. I will now close this as my tormentor is troubling me. . . .

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 12, 1856.

I have to acknowledge three letters. The copies of the memorandum of what passed on the first meeting of the Council of War was very satisfactory to the Queen.

The Queen is glad also to hear that you have sent another telegraphic message to Sir W. Codrington, calling his attention to the second line of defence round Balaclava.

Ditto, that the plans for the Military Hospital are under consideration.

With respect to the Bath, the Queen would wish Lord Cowley, as her representative, to hold the investiture, and I would ask you officially to communicate to me, as Grand Master, the Queen's pleasure on this subject. Thinking that a formal investiture in the Crimea will be more agreeable to the French officers, the Queen thinks that, as Lord Stratford cannot be spared from Constantinople, Sir Edmund Lyons might be charged with the commission. He is eligible for the purpose as a G.C.B.; the only other in the Crimea would be Sir C. Campbell, but, as he is second to Sir W. Codrington in the Army command, his performing the ceremony would damage the Commander-in-Chief's authority. I hope you will also let me hear on this subject.

We trust that your enemy is by degrees retiring, and that you will soon again be quite free from pain.

P.S.—The Queen misses, amongst the questions submitted to the Council of War by the Emperor, that of dividing the Armies. She trusts that this will yet be brought forward by us, if not by him.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

TUILERIES, January 12, 1856.

Deliberations of
the second day.A plan of
campaign
considered.

Our second meeting took place to-day, and I think was on the whole very satisfactory. The great question under consideration was thoroughly and ably sifted by the replies that were embodied in reports from the two sub-committees to the question submitted to them as regards operations in the Crimea and the Baltic. The reports on the latter are not quite completed, but will be issued at our meeting on Monday. Rather lengthened discussions took place on some of the details of various operations. Without entering minutely into particulars, it appears evident to me that most of the members of the Council are of opinion that the Crimea must be held as regards our present position; that to evacuate this position would be most difficult, if not impracticable; that at all events the usual (?) effect of such an evacuation would be most disastrous, that 70,000, or at least 66,000 men would be required to defend this position, and that the rest of the Army, amounting to about 150,000 men, would be available for other operations. That Eupatoria would be the best point for making a diversion, it being thought that, by boring, water might certainly be obtained there at given distances. That, in order to make the diversion an effectual one, a large force should be landed, at least 80,000 or 100,000 men, and that probably the operation would be still further successful if, at the same time, a dash was made to Yenikale in the Sea of Azof, with a view of destroying the Tchorgoun Bridge, with about 15,000 men. You will observe that, allowing for the garrison of Yenikale and Kertch on the one side, and Kinburn on the other, these numbers would absorb our whole available force in the Crimea. Nothing would, therefore, in the first instance, be left for an expedition to Asia; but a campaign such as I have roughly sketched it would not be a big one, and, if the great object to be gained by it could without great difficulty be accomplished, the British force might then be easily moved to Asia, with a

view to stop the advance of the Russians in that direction. I cannot help hoping that, for a time, Omar Pasha and his Army, if judiciously posted, might be able to stop the further advance of the Russians upon Erzeroum, and, under any circumstances, the certain defeat of the Russians in the Crimea, and then driving them out of that country, would fully balance any partial successes that the enemy might at the opening of the campaign obtain in Asia. The only real objection to such a plan would be the impossibility of entirely separating, or dividing, the two Allied Armies till the Crimean campaign were brought to a successful close, but this is a difficulty for which, under present circumstances, I see no escape. As the British Government feels most strongly the necessity of remaining in the Crimea and driving the Russians out of that country, or at least striking such a blow as to destroy the power of Russia there completely, I do not well see how we could press a campaign of our own in Asia when it is clear that the whole of the Allied forces are required for a really successful operation in the Crimea. Kaffa as a base is generally felt, I think, to be too wide, and I cannot but think this myself, if we can land and operate from Eupatoria, and at the same time attack the rear of the enemy, which is simultaneously threatened in front by the force left in position on the South Side of Sebastopol, and the Eupatoria force would also threaten if not entirely cut off the communication between Perekop and the Russian Army operating in the field [*sic*]. Should the Russian Army in the Crimea really amount to 130,000 men, as it is assumed, how would they receive the double attack thus prepared for them, and would the Tchorgoun Bridge be destroyed at the same time? I doubt their even venturing to fight a battle, but I think they would make the best of their way out of the country. I have entered rather fully into these details, as I think this is the drift of a considerable portion of the views expressed, and should they not accord with the opinion or wishes of the Government, it might be well that by Thursday I might hear from you to what objection is made.

Objection to a
campaign in
Asia.

THE FANMURE PAPERS

[JAN.

...the ... Niel read a long paper ... was to be bombarded and taken by a ... wild scheme for attacking ... of 60,000 French ... not named, but which I ... However, the scheme ... by saying that it was im- ... have saved us the time ... any plan of this descrip- ... not be entertained by ... I have only to add that ... at the Council was ... expressed his opinion ... to say that with an army ... could be done. This ... produce its effect on ...

A ... TO LORD FANMURE

Stirling, January 12, 1856.

... which I wrote to-day to ... will get you in *fall* with ... sea-transport and ... I have no doubt that ... and have got ... of such a ... On the ... with the ... commence- ... of weather, warm ... the 8th, ... is entirely gone; ... to-day the ... and enjoyable. ... of this climate:

no doubt we shall have some severe and unpleasant weather yet.

I received your telegraphic message about General Grey's letter;¹ but I do not quite understand if you mean the memorandum referred to to be an official letter for my guidance (which was not the original intention of it), or whether it is still to be considered a private, or rather a confidential, though public service communication, coming from the Minister of War.

As to
despatches
addressed to
an officer in
command.

The fact is, an officer must consider all communications which guide his public acts and conduct as on the public service. Not necessarily to be made public, certainly; but they are of a public nature and importance if they are to influence his conduct.

My public despatch will show you the present state of the docks; I hope and think that more will soon be done. You must not think our Engineers have had so easy a job as the French: in the first place, the French two docks are at a higher level, and even with that higher level they did not sink their shafts to (I believe) as much as half our depth below the bottom. Some of ours were 12 feet deep; and the destruction of the bottom is the most essential part. With ours this destruction is seen, and its extent known, before the sides have been thrown in upon it. But the rapid thaw pressed the water in upon our remaining dock and again filled the shafts. The mines have been, in fact, exploded *in* water.

Details of
destruction of
docks.

Prince Gortschakoff, in answer to my proposal to exchange two Russian officers off the mouth of the harbour, he sending a boat, answered that he thought it might be done by the *Parlementaire* in the harbour, as arranged with my predecessor. No, no, thought I, that won't do; I therefore declined other than my first proposal; and, as a ship of war was going to Odessa necessarily, I sent them² at once, and have notified by a second letter to Prince Gortschakoff. . . .

Exchange of
prisoners.

¹ See letter of January 18th. General Grey was Private Secretary to Prince Albert.

² The prisoners.

Nature of the
country
overlooking
Balaclava
harbour.

I have ridden about the ground to the west of Balaclava; it was the scene of advance of the Brigade I commanded when we took the place. We advanced to the mouth of the harbour, from the flat valley of Balaclava, over difficult ground not in military possession of the enemy. There are many defensible points; but the rounded rocky hills are high, and have the same sort of height, which must finally be in possession of an enemy, if superior; and he must be superior at last in the case contemplated.¹

This is the sort of thing, looking towards Balaclava from a brow, a continuation of the hilly undulating plateau, from the Monastery side,



Under what
circumstances
and to what
extent the
harbour might
be shelled by
the enemy.

and the question is if, from this foreground, which would not be within our lines at last, shot and shell could reach or interfere with the embarkation. It would not by field-pieces; but, once the plateau is given up, though there might be difficulty, there would not be impossibility of bringing a heavy gun or two, or mortar, to this foreground; mortars, I think, would reach. On the east side of Balaclava there is a road from Baidar: it would be a long, difficult business for an enemy to bring anything of heavy artillery that line; but when once evacuation begins, it would be a signal for energy on the enemy's side: I scarcely think they could bring heavy mortars or guns on the east side in time to hurt; but if they did, and placed them on the neck at the extreme height we now occupy, they could shell down to the harbour.

¹ *i.e.* of the embarkation of the British Army.

Kamiesh and Kasatch ground is comparatively flat, and no doubt the fire of two or three line-of-battle ships might be of assistance in last defence and protection of embarkation, when they could be of little use at Balaclava. They could sweep a good part of the ground at last ; and, I think, cross their fire in front of the small peninsula which divides the two harbours. But when I get the proposals, or suggestions, you refer to, this important and anxious question will have the best attention of all who can assist me.

Comparative merits of Kamiesh and Kasatch as harbours in case of evacuation.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 14, 1856.

I return the Duke of Cambridge's reports, which the Queen has read with much interest, and of which she hopes to receive copies, when they can conveniently be made.

The Council of War seems to proceed very systematically and industriously. With regard to the entire regiments yet in the Mediterranean to do garrison duty, it would be very unwise to add them to the forces in the Crimea, as is done in Lord Hardinge's memorandum. As it is, our reserves bear no proportion to our fighting Army, and a heavy campaign might cripple this altogether, and might render it necessary to replace some regiments which may have suffered beyond the means of filling them up from the depôts which we possess. . . .

Regiments doing duty in Mediterranean.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

January 14, 1856.

I am sorry to say that I have not yet been able to compel my enemy to beat a retreat, and after a painful and sleepless night it is somewhat of an exertion even to dictate my usual letter to you.

Your mail which reached me this morning gives a most satisfactory account of the state of the Army, and shows you to have set to work in a businesslike manner with the organisation of the Land Transport Corps. No winter operations shall be undertaken from the Crimea,

No winter operations will be undertaken from the Crimea.

except under most extraordinary pressure. I thought it, however, prudent to put you on the *qui vive*, in case some extraordinary exertion might be demanded of you. Nothing of importance has yet come from Paris, but to-day there is to be an important meeting of the Council, to discuss the suggestions which have emanated from the committees into which it was divided. The news from Russia tends more to war than to peace, and I have no great expectation that the war will be closed either so speedily or so quietly as some people are disposed to think.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

January 14, 1856.

Instrument by
which the V.C.
is to be
instituted.

I received your Royal Highness' note yesterday, with Her Majesty's final approval of the decoration. I will attend immediately to the instrument by which the new order is to be instituted. It must declare, throughout, the Royal Will and Pleasure of the Queen, and bear the stamp of an act of her own prerogative.¹ The Sovereign is the fountain of all honours, and commands their institution as well as their revocation. The drafts which I have hitherto sent for your Royal Highness' perusal were for the object of ascertaining in what manner it would be most agreeable to the Queen to have her commands carried into effect.

I have sent for Her Majesty's perusal some further private communications from the Duke of Cambridge, but into these I cannot enter to-day, as pain and want of rest have made me somewhat unfit for business. I trust therefore to your Royal Highness' kindness to excuse me.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

TUILERIES, January 15, 1856.

Distribution of
the British
medal.

I have just returned from distributing the medals. Nothing could have gone off better, and the greatest enthusiasm pervaded the troops. It is thought here that

¹ In a letter of January 13th, the Prince had recommended that it should be made clear whether the document in question was the Draft of a Royal Warrant or of a Recommendation to the Queen.

this ceremony will produce a very favourable effect in France and be advantageous to the Alliance. I have reported the ceremony officially to you, and have sent a copy of the speech I made. . . . There is nothing particular to report of our meeting of yesterday. I hope on Tuesday we shall have our last meeting, and that thereupon the Emperor will intrust me with his views as to what has been said and done, which I shall be able to carry over with me to England. Knowing the anxiety the Government feels at arriving at some definite resolution, I hope I shall have finished my business here and shall be enabled to return to England with the result of it, in conjunction with my colleagues, by the end of this month. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

January 15, 1856.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness' various private communications of the 10th, 12th, and 13th instant.

The Council of War seems to have been conducted with much circumspection and prudence; and the tone and bearing of His Majesty the Emperor, as detailed by your Royal Highness, has given us great satisfaction. The Council
of War.

The appointment of committees will facilitate much the clearing away of many points of delay, and get rid of discussions which would only have consumed time without being of the least use.

I gather from your Royal Highness' letter one main point—that it seems the conviction of all that the Crimea cannot be abandoned without infinite disgrace. The views which you take of operations to be conducted within it are those which a practised commander cannot fail to see, and which I have not the smallest doubt are quite capable of being carried out.

The only thing which puzzles me in their accomplishment is the difficulty which will exist of giving separate action to the English and French Armies.

With regard to your Royal Highness' suggestion that

Numbers of the
Turkish and
Sardinian
Contingents
computed.

I may have miscalculated the Turkish Contingents,¹ I shall briefly run over the data by which I have put them down at 22,000 men. I calculated that the Infantry of that force would be made up to 16,000 men in the spring, that there would be 1000 Artillery, 2000 Cavalry, making 19,000 in all. So then I thought I was not over the mark in adding 3000 as a fair calculation for Zamoyski's Cossacks of the Sultan.

This would have made the 22,000 men which I calculated Vivian would have to command. The Sardinians have over and over again stated that they were good for 20,000, but of this I was so doubtful that, in calculating them, I calculated the Italian Legion in with them, and I think the conclusion will not be found to overstep the boundary of fair calculation. I regret now that in our connection with Sardinia we did not specifically bind her troops to act with ours, but I think La Marmora's good sense will tell him that there are advantages to be gained by casting in his lot with us which are not to be found in casting it in with the French.

I am happy to inform your Royal Highness that I have begun to shake off my attack of gout, and I hope soon to be able to write to you with my own hand.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 15, 1856.

I went down to the docks on the last post day ; but the writing had kept me late, and the mines had been fired—quite right, for it is better not to delay such things when time is of consequence from the powder being almost in water.

Blowing up
of docks.

I saw the result, however, which was the complete blowing in, upon the broken foundation of the dock, the two lower projecting angles of the side ; part of the top also on the ground level was thrown in, and all the rest so shaken that everything would have to be taken down.

¹ In a letter dated January 13th, in which the Sardinian force is likewise alluded to as having probably been overestimated.

The Engineers think it is perhaps better left as it is—half standing, and totally shaken out of place; but I suggest that, as the large copings of granite and stone will have to be moved, they are moved with more facility from their present position than if they were also thrown down upon the mass. This, I think, will be done.

The thermometer yesterday morning was down to 16°, and subsequently 11°, with a gale blowing from the N.E.: it was very cold certainly, and required fur cap and quick movement out of doors. I am afraid we shall hear of some frost-bites. The thermometer had been the previous morning up to 54°, a fine, mild, and agreeable day.

A sort of disturbance at Sinope among the native Land Transport Corps: this is the second time that something has threatened: I hope it may not be necessary to have to send troops at this time of year. I shall probably send an officer of the Land Transport Corps and an officer of the Army from hence to know, and to arrange something definite. It is rather a strong case to have to take care of these gentry, who are intended to take care of us.

Disturbance
among native
members of
Land Transport
Corps.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

Undated [between 14th January and 21st January.]

Since I last wrote to you I have gone through a fierce ordeal, but I think that the storm is past and I shall soon be able to resume my usual avocations. I hope by next week to be able to send you a confidential statement of what has passed at the Council of War in Paris, but a new phase has come over our affairs and the peace prospects are becoming more strongly developed. Still no preparations must be relaxed and no vigilance omitted. Though I confess I shall be glad to see peace restored, I shall feel considerable regret at not giving these fellows a general licking in the field before we withdraw from their country. If we are to have peace, I shall be curious to see the state of Russian affairs in the Crimea when the curtain is drawn up. I fear it will show many golden opportunities lost by the indolence and incapacity exhibited immediately sub-

Peace prospects
developing.

sequent to the fall of Sebastopol. We have been some days now without any postal communications from you, and there is very little just now to write about. You seem to be bringing your Army through the winter with great *éclat*, and certainly the contrast between January 1855 and January 1856 affords every one unmixed pleasure.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 17, 1856.

Papers of
Council of War
criticised.

We are exceedingly sorry to hear that you are suffering so much. I return the papers from the Council of War, which the Queen hopes to receive copied at a later period. They show a sad relapse to the disease of the Crimean Council of War 'that nothing can be done.' Councils of War never fight, is the old proverb, and the French are bent upon peace *à tout prix*.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

Secret.

January 18, 1856.

I have received the telegraph to destroy General Grey's letter, and note the communication as having come through your Lordship.¹

General Grey's letter stated that I was to consider the communication as a private one of individual opinion, not intended to bias my judgment in any way, or claiming the least authority, and, above all, as requiring no answer.

Duty of
Generals when
once Govern-
ment has come
to a decision.

In acknowledging the receipt to General Grey hurriedly, and before I had opened other letters, as the post was on the point of leaving, I said: 'There will be some serious points to decide, both at home and here: when once the Government has decided those fundamental and half-political points relating to the place of operation of this Army, it then becomes the duty of the Generals in command to overcome every difficulty on the adoption of those fundamental views.'

¹ See Codrington's letter of January 12th. Lord Panmure here adopts General Grey's letter as his own.

‘England must remember that we are an Allied Army, strong in union, weak in separation—the nations depending on each other politically for the war, and the armies being a reflection of the same state of things militarily. Although the defensive maintained here is probably greater wear and harm to the troops of Russia, at this corner of her empire, than to us with our facilities of sea conveyance, yet the forces of England and France ought not to be merely on the defensive in such a war.

Forces of
England and
France ought
not to be merely
on the defensive
in such a war.

‘I trust that if such is the feeling of the Governments of the two nations, we, the Generals, shall be enabled to enter into it with the same feeling, and with success. But, I repeat, the groundwork must be settled by the decision of France upon the employment of her large force.’

I should be glad to know if the memorandum, coming through your Lordship, is still to be considered merely as a private one of individual opinion, and not to bias my judgment; or whether it is intended now to be a public document for my guidance, and for record amongst your Lordship’s despatches with the name of the author of it.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 19, 1856.

I send you the copy of a letter which I have to-day addressed to Lord Hardinge, and I recommend the subject of it to your most serious consideration, as the future condition of our Army in the East may in some degree depend upon it.

We sincerely trust that your enemy will have begun his retreat.

Copy referred to.

I am very much obliged to you for sending me the copies of your letter to Lord Panmure, with its enclosures, the memoranda with respect to the reinforcements of the Crimean Army. Nothing can be more important than your insisting on a proper quantity of reserve ammunition being attached to the Artillery. The Artillery will be very fine.

Against re-
ducing the
reserves.

With respect to the Infantry, I cannot at all agree in the propriety of sending the three Service Battalions in the Mediterranean on to the Crimea, and replacing them by three out of the six at home. As it is, our reserve bears no proportion to our fighting Army, and the same principle which guides you with regard to reserve ammunition is true with regard to regiments. We have fifty-four Battalions before the enemy, and only nine in reserve! Our depôts being only one-third or at the utmost three-fourths (?) of the Service Battalions, will hardly keep them full. What is to happen if our Army should be exposed to great losses in the ensuing campaign? You have got nothing to replace a disabled regiment. The 62nd consisted for a part of the winter of 1854-55 of ninety-three men. As the Army was stationary before Sebastopol, that did not signify so much, but, if it had been moving, this, and many other regiments, would have been entirely broken up. As it was, we should have been obliged to run away from the Crimea, if you had not been able to send fresh regiments out after Inkerman. 'Send me entire regiments, if you can, not drafts from the depôts,' was Lord Raglan's continued demand at that critical period.

Such times may occur again, and the safety of the whole Army may depend upon the addition of nine entirely fresh regiments at the right moment. Some of the disorganised ones might require to be relieved, even if no disasters befell the Army.

Pray consider this in your discussion with Lord Panmure, to whom I shall send a copy of this letter.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

Secret.

January 19, 1856.

If I understand the question put by your Lordship with regard to Balaclava lines, it is this:—

That you contemplate the whole Army embarking, quitting this part of the Crimea, evacuating by Balaclava.

I have answered the telegraph in that sense; for it is a question in such cases of saving, securing the embarka-

tion of a rear-guard, to which an active enemy must at last become entirely superior.

It is a very different question that of a permanent and retaining defence of the fortified lines of Balacava.

Is Balacava to be evacuated or defended?

In the first case, as I have already, in previous letters, stated to your Lordship, it must be a succession of withdrawals of Infantry to diminishing spaces, protected by heavy Artillery, which must be destroyed before the enemy is admitted to the ground occupied. It can be done, if necessary; but it must at last be with difficulty if the enemy is numerous, active, and pressing—and, above all, if his activity enables him to bring a heavy mortar or two.

In the second case, that of permanently holding Balacava, giving up the plateau, I repeat my opinion that the defence of the plateau itself will scarcely require more troops than the two separate and isolated defences of Kamiesh and Balacava. I do not know the opinion of Marshal Pélissier or the French Government on this point; but it is one easily known at Paris.

Defence of the plateau will scarcely require more troops than defences of the ports.

By this time your Lordship will have received private and public letters from me on this point; but I may as well again state that four or five open or closed Artillery works, and lines for Infantry connecting them, will be necessary, west of Balacava, over a space of about a mile and a half: that I reckon the defence of those lines, and those to the east of Balacava, would require 20,000 men, and more indeed in presence of a very superior army.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

TUILERIES, *January 20, 1856.*

I thank you for your letters of the 15th and 16th inst. and have carried out the instructions contained in it. . . .

I understand that to-day, after dinner, the Emperor intends to communicate to the members of the Council his views or ideas as to a campaign, that with this act our mission will be closed, and that he will communicate to me any further observations he has to make to the English Government as to the conduct of the war. Such being

Deliberations of the Council about to close.

Present position
of the French
Emperor.

the case, I have communicated with my colleagues and have obtained the consent of the Emperor to our returning to England to-morrow night. General La Marmora will accompany us. My reasons for wishing to get back as soon as possible are simply these, that, should the war be continued, the preparations necessary for carrying it on, and their direction, should be settled and determined upon with the least possible delay, and, further, that, in the present very altered circumstances of the case, it is most important that I should myself see the members of the Government and communicate to them the real position of the Emperor as regards the French nation, and the very serious difficulties in which he at this moment finds himself placed. This is a matter of so much importance that not a moment is to be lost, and I feel that my usefulness would be greater by direct communication with the Government than by a longer residence here. I shall explain my meaning more fully in a letter I intend writing to Clarendon on the subject. I have not failed to urge upon the Emperor the absolute necessity for allowing all preparations for the continuance of the war to be carried on as vigorously as can be, so as to be prepared for all eventualities, and to prove to Europe, and Russia in particular, that the Allies were determined to carry on the war with the greatest vigour, should the pacific turn that affairs have momentarily taken not be continued in that direction. The Emperor entirely concurs in these views, and I had a further very satisfactory conversation on the same subject with the Marshal Minister of War. I hope to see you certainly on Tuesday, and hoping to find you much better, etc.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN.

January 20, 1856.

Bounty for
recruits placed
on a more
satisfactory
footing.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and is glad to be able again to address Your Majesty with his own hand.

Lord Panmure has the honour to forward for Your Majesty's signature a Warrant which will place the bounty

of the recruit on a much more satisfactory footing than at present. An explanation paper accompanies the Warrant.

Lord Panmure transmits for Your Majesty's use the Quarterly Returns from the several civil departments of the Military Service.

The *Bucephalus* transport has arrived with the Russian trophies from Sebastopol, which Lord Panmure has ordered to be arranged at Woolwich until Your Majesty's pleasure is known as to their disposal. Major Lucan, who has brought them home, is to make an immediate report upon them, which shall, with a correct list of their numbers, be transmitted to Your Majesty.

Lord Panmure has just received the despatches by the messenger; the Army is high in condition and health.

Lord Panmure will submit to Your Majesty a list of recommendations for the Bath during the present week.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 21, 1856.

Although I do not know that any ideas of mine on the future will be definitely worth having, or sending to you in a more official form than this, I will nevertheless refer to your last letter, namely that of the 4th January.

You must not conclude that the North side road is open; the works on that side are the North Fort; being much strengthened and having had an addition lately of at least fifty guns, it is the centre of lines of entrenchment extending from a steep rocky part of the coast across the whole front, from the sea down to batteries on the harbour—thus cutting off a sort of corner or triangle, and including the stone forts of Constantine, Michael, Catherine at the water's edge, and various intermediate and commanding earthworks. You must not therefore consider the road open now, though it might be made so by starvation or attack upon these works, lines, and batteries.

The North side road must not be considered open.

This is surely well known in England, that there *are* such lines enclosing the North ground opposite us, for they have been long in existence.

Repudiates the idea of the British Army playing a quite subordinate part.

I am rather sorry to read your idea of the French doing this affair—I mean the landing between Eupatoria and the Alma, and marching on Simpheropol—with an idea of the English casually helping with a small force, in order to be present in name. It would be long before I would willingly consent to the English Army playing so small a game; for it would leave to French enterprise, boldness, and courage the attempt, by the success of which the English Army would come in to claim but faded laurel. No, if such a decisive movement is to take place, let England bear her full—her very fullest—share of the high enterprise; for it will be a high one, a difficult one, and as likely to be a bloody struggle as any in this war; that is, if the Russians intend to hold and fight for the Crimea, and throw their strength into the lists.

If the Russians are as good as many of them have shown themselves to be in this siege, and if they take the advantage of their central position, those who first are landed, or placed in a position, ought to have to bear the brunt of a tough onset. That it would succeed I have no hesitation in believing, and I equally believe that in such an undertaking England and her Army must play no second part. She would do so if the Army here, sending a detachment to assist, were to remain waiting for the success of others, to advance.

Estimate of forces at command.

But the numbers you quote rather puzzle me: where are the 50,000 Infantry you put down? [Codrington here appends an estimate of the force at his disposal, maintaining that, if 25,000 men be left before Sebastopol to take care of the British positions there, the Infantry of his field force will not exceed 33,000.]

Difference between Codrington's estimate and that of Lord Panmure.

. . . I think an Army of 33,000 Infantry, with Artillery and Cavalry in proportion, a very fine force, and that it may do a good deal; but numbers on paper, and numbers in the field with bayonets, are very different things. And if Balaclava and Kertch are to be maintained, as your letter leads me to think, whilst the rest of the Army is taken to Asia, these last will not number 60,000.

On the main points you must also remember, with

regard to Asia or any other place, that the landing of 52,000 men is not the putting of that number at the fighting point of meeting a Russian army, although, of course, the enemy has his communications to maintain as well as his opponent. I do not mean that the detail of such things need be entered into in England, but they must not be kept out of sight.

Army would require to be not merely landed but maintained.

Also, on the main point generally of operations, you know my opinion that it is better not materially to divide the Allied Armies, and not materially to divide the English Army. To bring the greatest number of troops to act on the one decisive point is what we ought to look at; and it cannot be good to do the business half in the Crimea and half in Asia.

Opposes dividing the Allied Armies, or the British forces.

I must come back, therefore, to what I have said to you before; when once you, the Allied Governments, settle that it suits your national policy to possess the Crimea, or to beat the Russian arms in the Crimea, let us devote all our attention, all our means, to that point. If the Russians reinforce their army here, there will be no superabundance of troops on our side; if they do not, and that we do, it may make matters more decisive and more quickly done.

I again refer to my expressed opinion that the confining ourselves, the Allies, to the restricted defence of Kamiesh on one side and Balaclava on the other side puts the Russians in possession again of Sebastopol, in possession of this plateau, in possession of the offensive, and confines us on this spot to the defensive: that it loses to us the morale and the physique of a commanding position, and that that commanding position, viz. the brow of this plateau, can be held with as few troops as would be required for the separate, less commanding, and more difficult defence of Balaclava and Kamiesh separately.

Opposes confining the Allies to the defence of the ports.

If the war is to be continued here, our object should be to make our Armies on this plateau strong—to make our position strong, as the best means of departure for placing the largest number of disposable troops on the flank, or main communications, of the Russian Army by transporting

Recommends strengthening position on plateau.

them by sea. The Sea of Azof, the commanding the Spit of Arabat by our Navy when that sea is open, turns their line of communication, short of Arabat, by the Tchongar Bridge, their other line being by Perekop.

Kaffa on one side, the west coast from Eupatoria south on the other, are the spaces on which this could be done ; but it must be done by an army and a large one—not by a detachment.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

January 21, 1856.

I have much satisfaction in learning from your last private letter that your attention has been given to the protection of the western side of Balaclava, with a view to a possible embarkation of the Army in face of the enemy. It is a contingency for which prudence dictates to us to be prepared, but one at the same time which I have not the smallest expectation of having to face.

The Council at Paris breaks up to-day, and I hope before next mail to be able to send you its proceedings in strict confidence. I have not yet received its final conclusions, as the Emperor had not quite made up his mind when I last heard from the Duke of Cambridge. My impression is that the first act of the campaign will be by a series of manœuvres, and if necessary by a battle to clear the Crimea. But in the midst of these movements towards peace, one can scarcely bring one's mind to settle definitely upon future arrangements for war. With the exception of John Bull, everybody leans to peace. But I am convinced that the people of the country will be disappointed if our Army and Fleet have not an opportunity of showing what they can do.

From the despatches which I have received from General Vivian, it appears to me that he has disposed of his force at Kertch very well. He seems to be under some notion that Baron Wrangel means to attack him, but I don't think the Baron has either the means or the inclination to do so ; if Vivian had only had Cavalry, he on the other hand might have attacked the Baron.

I am glad to see the docks going up by degrees, but I hope soon to hear of a more complete destruction than has yet taken place.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 21, 1856.

I return the enclosed papers from the Council of War, which you have sent us, and which the Queen and myself have most attentively perused. The perusal has given us but little satisfaction, as they show that the French are tired of the war, and have only taste for the Rhine 'pour faire subir à l'Allemagne sa destinée habituelle,' as General Niel expresses himself, that is to say, to be invaded, plundered, and devastated by the French.

Opposed to the French scheme of a campaign from the Rhine.

It will be difficult for the two Governments to form a plan of campaign out of these papers.

I was delighted to see your own handwriting again.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

Undated [between *January 21* and *January 28, 1856.*]

I have once more recovered my hand, and though I cannot write at great length, I will endeavour to compress as much as I can into this note. The peace is yet but a rumour, and you are not to relax any of your preparations for a keen and vigorous campaign. The Council of War at Paris is finished, and I will send you confidentially all its proceedings as soon as I can get them printed. They tend to one course, and on the whole I think it the most practical one. It is proposed to clear the Crimea by sending an Army, composed of English, French, and Sardinians, to Eupatoria and all the coast, to advance to Simpheropol, or at all events till the communications between that place and Sebastopol are interrupted, when it might fall on the North Side and M'Kenzie heights if the enemy remained. This Army to consist of a large proportion of French, three Divisions of English, and all the Sardinians, and to be

Plan of ensuing campaign.

under a French General-in-Chief. An Army to be formed of English, French, and Turks in English pay at Sebastopol, to occupy the position on the Tchernaya, and to advance or act according to circumstances, and to be under an English General-in-Chief. The Emperor contemplates a diversion by Aloushta, and also to maintain our forts at Kertch and Kinburn. This seems to me to be, on the whole, a wise plan, and with such an army as we can produce in April it will be as inevitable as it is wise. We shall have to provide means of transport for so large an army, so as to throw them on shore in the least possible space of time; but Sir E. Lyons says that this is practicable. If, as I expect, this movement succeeds, you will clear the Crimea in six weeks, and then you may finish your work of destruction north and south and wait orders for withdrawing, or carry the war into some other quarter. Nothing has yet been said of a movement in Asia, but, should the war last, I fancy we should scarcely leave Mouravieff's army unmolested. Omar and his army, landed at Trebizond and Samsoun, will easily prevent the fall of Erzeroum, and keep the enemy in check till we have time to fall on his rear by following Omar's course of this autumn with an English Army of 30,000 strong.

I presume you will soon be sending for your reinforcements to Malta, and making up your regiments. You will not, of course, draw on the Mediterranean for fresh regiments unless you are in earnest need of them.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 23, 1856.

I now return the last papers from the Council of War, which we have read with great interest. The summing up by the Emperor seems to me very good, but it ought now to be thoroughly sifted by the Government, with the assistance of our members of the Council just returned.

The Queen hopes to receive copies also of these papers.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 26, 1856.

I know I have plenty to write to you ; but I am much pressed to-day for the mail. I have no wish to interfere with the details of telegraph ; but pray do not let any one so employed—or in any other capacity with the Army, if possible—suppose that he is not amenable to military power and propriety even.

Fine weather overhead—plenty of dirt—practice of Miniés going on well. Light Division will be armed, and others sent to Kertch.

I hope our dealings with Russia with regard to Sebastopol and its forts will be with a high hand : this harbour is THE magnificent place of the Black Sea : if a free port, might become surely the *entrepôt* of commerce, of the deep-sea ships into which the cargoes of the lighter vessels of Sea of Azof and the coast of Russia and Asia would be transferred for other parts of the world.

Possibilities of
Sebastopol.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

January 28, 1856.

Might I remind you of the Victoria Cross ? Parliament meets on Thursday, and the subject will immediately be discussed in debate. It would be very desirable that the statutes should be signed by the Queen and published before.

The Victoria
Cross.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 28, 1856.*

I have not a moment to write you, as our Cabinet has lasted till the mail is about to start. Peace looks more definite, but you are not to relax any preparations, notwithstanding any news Pélissier may give you, or any course he may take in consequence of instructions from Paris. I will write you on Friday.

War prepara-
tions not to be
relaxed.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 29, 1856.

I am sorry to hear and to see that gout continues to molest you. A private note from Lord Stratford mentions (received to-day) that the Russians have accepted without reserve or condition.

Destruction of
docks and
barracks.

I have continued, as actively as the Engineers can, the destruction of the docks; all are destroyed except the sides of the West Dock, which will be so to-morrow most probably. I have desired the large terrace-wall in front of the barracks, and the barracks themselves, to be examined as to the best means of destruction; and the walls will be mined at once in several places, so as to bring them and the roof down upon the ruins.

Hopes that
right of con-
quest will be
maintained.

I hope that England and France will maintain their right of conquest and position here with a high hand: nothing ought to limit our power over our own lines; and if possible we should see our flag in the harbour: if we cannot insist upon that, let us show that we have the power and the will over what we have taken; for if the Russians are to force us to conditions, we are put in the lower position, and they bring us to terms political and military—we do not force them to terms. However, all this is probably decided, yes or no, by this time. We have weather most beautiful: these last two days have been almost summer, no necessity for a fire even. . . .

A Black Sea fog drives over this moment, concealing everything, though when I wrote the sentence above all was clear.

I hope you do not mean to change the principle now adopted of the Land Transport.

CHAPTER XIV

FEBRUARY 1856

THE uncertainty between peace and war which had characterised the previous month was prolonged through February. For, on the one hand, negotiations on the basis of the Austrian proposals were being carried on—as the outcome of which, on February 25th, Plenipotentiaries met at Paris to treat.

Yet, on the other hand, even as late as this, Lord Panmure, with characteristic caution, was warning Codrington of the uncertainty of all such Congresses—from whence he drew the moral that ‘our duty is to keep everything in full swing and activity,’ at the same time charging him to reinforce his ranks, to organise his troops for Eupatoria, and to arrange for getting his Cavalry from their winter-quarters to the front.

In commending such exhortations, Palmerston had written (February 3rd), ‘Your active preparations will be as persuasive as the eloquence of our negotiations.’ It was only in the contracts of the Commissary-General that the prospect of peace was allowed to make any difference.

The first act of the Congress, however, was to draw up the conditions of an armistice, which was to last till March 31st; so that, as by that date peace was already signed, the end of February may be said to all intents and purposes to have seen the conclusion of the war.

But, notwithstanding that they were never carried out, a certain interest still attaches to the plans made for the

spring campaign, and these will be found discussed in detail in the correspondence for this month.

The campaign was to be opened by the advance of an army, chiefly composed of French troops, from Eupatoria against the Russians; whilst an army of British, under Codrington, was to avail itself of opportunity in moving against the enemy from the plateau.

On the score of the numbers involved, this plan was criticised by the Queen in her letter of February 3rd, and it will be observed that Her Majesty's criticism is adopted by Lord Panmure (February 4th). On the ground that the opportunities afforded by it to British arms were poor, Codrington also criticised it unfavourably. But, in addition to the above campaign, the memorandum adopted by the Cabinet, and forwarded to Paris for the approval of the Emperor, provided for the expedition to Asia by a portion of the British Army, which has been already referred to, and which, as was now decided, was to follow the clearing of the Crimea.

Meantime the destruction of the captured forts and barracks was being continued, and was turned to account as a means of experimenting with explosives. Codrington's letter of February 4th contains a striking picture of the blowing up of Fort Nicholas; whilst that of February 26th describes a review of the British Infantry by Pélissier and himself, designed to produce 'a mutual conviction of power.'

At home, means of checking the indiscretions of war correspondents were still engaging attention, but were, for the time, of secondary interest to the ferment raised by the latest Report of the Tulloch-M'Neill Commission.

This Commission had been sent to the Crimea a year before, to inquire into certain allegations affecting the Commissariat.

Its second Report had been placed in Lord Panmure's

hands on January 20th, and, having been submitted to Parliament, had suggested to Mr. Layard the introduction in the House of Commons of a Motion hostile to the Government. But the whole question of the relation of the Army to the Crown and to Parliament was involved, and, as the War Minister held that Parliament was no fitting tribunal before which to discuss the conduct of military officers, it was decided to appoint a Board of such officers, of high standing, who should in their turn report upon the Tulloch-M'Neill Report, and on the statements of those who considered themselves to have been thereby aggrieved.

The questions of the composition of this Commission, and as to whether its proceedings should be open or closed, are discussed in the following letters.

Also an important statement made by Lord Panmure in this connection in the House of Lords will be found in the form of a note appended to the letters of February 21st. An Appendix to the unprinted correspondence for the month supplies State Papers giving full details of the plan of campaign for the ensuing spring.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 1, 1856.*

The Queen wishes to invest General La Marmora herself to-morrow (in the closet) with the G.C. of the Bath, and would therefore wish Lord Panmure to send it down, with a silver star, by two o'clock to-morrow. In several of Sir William Codrington's last telegrams and letters he speaks of the decided insecurity of our position in case of embarkation, but never talks of doing anything. Should he not be forthwith directed to make the necessary work to ensure security? He has plenty of men and nothing to do. The Queen thought this had been ordered as far back as the end of December.

She will be anxious to see the List of Trophies, which she greatly fears may be our last in this war.

The Queen hopes Lord Panmure continues improving in health?

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 1, 1856.*

The Government here have considered the reports with the members of the Council of War, and on Monday I shall be able to send you an official intimation on the subject. I am glad to learn by your letters to-day that you have so effectually destroyed the docks.

Should the projects of peace fall through, on which I at present give no opinion, you will have, as far as English will goes, an active campaign. It will be opened by an army under a French General moving from Eupatoria, and you will be at the head of another army lying on the plateau, and moving against the enemy as opportunity presents itself.

As to clearing
the Crimea.

The intention is to clear the Crimea, and the more effectually and more speedily done the better. There are so many complications that I cannot give you any assurance of action, but as soon as I can you shall have the plan, and I shall do no more than give you such orders as I consider necessary for the general purpose of its execution, leaving you as much discretion in carrying them out as you will like as a Commander-in-Chief. I like your scheme for your Land Transport Corps much, though it will excite commotion, I suspect, in M'Murdo's mind! I have sent it on to Lord Hardinge; when you send home printed documents always send *two*, for I have been obliged to part with your Army General Order to Lord Hardinge. I hope the little cloud of Vivian's having commented to me on one of your despatches will disperse. It was more my fault than his, and it will not occur again. I don't know why you wished your despatch to go to the Commander-in-Chief, but it is gone.

In regard to General Grey's communication, all you

have to do is to note the document as a *private* communication sent through me. It is not to bias your judgment in any way, and must remain among your private papers.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 2, 1856.*

The Queen approves of the recommendations for the Bath submitted to her by Lord Panmure, and has signed the submission. She wishes, however, the name of General Wetherall to be added to the List of K.C.B.'s; considering the responsible duties which the Queen's Adjutant-General has performed during the whole war, he fully deserves such a reward, being already a C.B. and a distinguished officer, particularly as the services of the Deputy Secretary at War are to be so recognised.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 2, 1856.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter and the copies of despatches from Sir William Codrington. He speaks of all that ought to be done, but does not seem to intend doing anything. The Queen thinks he ought without delay to be directed to do what he says is requisite. Codrington to be urged to act.

Has Lord Panmure settled to send Sir R. Airey to the Crimea with the instructions for Sir William Codrington?

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 2, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty a copy of the memorandum adopted by the Cabinet on the subject of the ensuing campaign, and which has been forwarded to Paris by to-night's messenger.

Lord Panmure trusts that Your Majesty will forgive the hurry in which the copy has been made.

Your Majesty will perceive that the Cabinet have so far departed from the views of the Emperor as to introduce prominently into their plan an expedition to Asia, to be undertaken by a portion of the English Army, and, while Omar Pasha moves from Erzeroum to recover Kars, we shall move on Tiflis, and so place the Russian Army between two fires.

Memorandum
adopted by the
Cabinet on the
subject of the
resuming
campaign.

The Cabinet came to a clear conclusion that, if no operation were undertaken in Asia, the campaign would turn out certainly a disappointment to Your Majesty's people, and any credit to be gained would be more likely to accrue to the Army commanded by the French General than to that under the English.

Lord Panmure does not expect a candid co-operation in the plan now sent over on the part of the Emperor, nevertheless he thinks that a general assent will be afforded to it, partly in the hope that peace may override any operations at all, and partly because, if His Majesty's calculations of the number of his troops be correct, it is in reality the only rational mode of employing the force.¹

Lord Panmure has communicated with Sir Richard Airey, and he will be ready to start on Thursday next for the Crimea should the Emperor send an answer in time for us to instruct Sir Richard as fully as it will be necessary.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 2, 1856.

We are now with a white ground again from snow, and very heavy squalls of sleet and hail from the south.

Resumption of
peace.

Your letters, and particularly the last account I had from Marshal Pelissier of the proposed immediate arrangement at Paris of the terms of peace and an armistice, all tend to a peaceable solution. The point on which I want a decision in England—perhaps the only one—is the stopping the purchase of horses and mules for the Land Transport Corps, and the decision of Government about

¹ Because the numbers available would be greater than would be required in the Crimea.

peace or war, or its probability even, affects the giving commissions to non-commissioned officers from regiment(s) to that Corps. I have thought it right to put in orders, subject to Her Majesty's pleasure, those non-commissioned officers and officers who have been probationary, as it were, with Colonel Wetherall, and who are essential men for the proper maintenance of the regiments now lately formed as the Land Transport of the Divisions of the Army. I see that on a prospect of peace, some officers withdraw their volunteering for the Land Transport Corps; I am not surprised at it: if it is meant to continue the Corps as a future and permanent portion of the Army, you must let me know it; officers and non-commissioned officers will want to know on what footing their continuance in the Corps is likely to stand.

How the Land
Transport
Corps is
affected.

I shall probably put in orders that all officers for the present, those now volunteering on probation, should only be 'attached' and do duty with, not transferred from their regiments permanently to the Corps. (This is done.)

You will see by my public letter that the docks are destroyed: I am going on with the large barracks, but shall still hold off the destruction of the quay to Fort Paul, and the storehouses upon it, hoping that you may gain advantages by holding their preservation up as a return. If you wish to do the thing handsomely, why not let even small Russian vessels of war show their flag afloat on their side of the harbour, and we on ours? We can escort them from Nicolaieff. But I would insist on no limit on our power of removal or destruction of everything in our hands, or under the water on our side of the harbour.

As to destruc-
tion of docks,
quay, and forts.

Fort Nicholas, that essential part of the 'standing menace,' will be blown down by the French on Monday; and I presume the other sea forts will share a similar fate. When I see Fort Constantine a heap of ruins, and Forts Catherine and Michael blown into a mass of débris, I shall think that there is real and practical sincerity; it will be a tangible result. Not that such destruction would prevent the command of the harbour, and the sea approach to it, by other earthworks; of course not, but it would be an

apparent European proof of acquiescence in the principle; it would be carrying that principle into practice—the only way in which principles are valuable.

Asks instructions as to captured guns.

I should be glad to know the opinion about guns, Russian guns. I propose sending home several from the Redan, wounded and damaged, with their carriages, and many good ones from the gun wharf. You know the French are moving any number for the purpose of making a 'Boulevard Sebastopol,' as a pendant to the French guns at Moscow. We have now about forty guns up on the plateau, which I wished to have ready for possible ulterior purposes here near Balaclava: these can go home if there is peace. I *can* get the whole, carronades and all sorts which are of no artillery value; but it will be a long job, and somewhat tear the horses about, which are of more value than the guns. If you wish no gun to be left on the ground, I can do so: if you prefer their destruction, and throwing into the water, I can do so—the policy thereof depending on the power of entrance of boats to our side of the harbour. As yet I have not sanctioned the risk of hurting Artillery horses of the field-batteries for all the old iron under the sun. The weather at this moment is impracticable almost for moving weights. There are an engine of 30-horse-power, 3 steam-engine boilers, some old copper bolts, 4 cranes, 4 windlasses, large fire-bricks for steam purposes, 46 blocks of *lignum vitæ*, a very large quantity of new iron in bars and pigs; the Navy want these moved by land to Kasatch—a heavy job I know, but said to be of use there, and at our works at Constantinople (as I understood).

Enumeration of some captured articles.

Some heavy firing from the batteries of the North Side a few nights ago reminded us, by the constant flashes in the sky, but almost without sound from contrary wind, of the siege time. It arose from some French boats employed on a previous night, and then some Russian boats on that night. No harm was done at all.

It was good to publish that letter about drunkenness: perhaps some extracts from a former official one might have helped it well. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 3, 1856.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter, with the copy of his despatch to Paris agreed upon in the Cabinet. Although the general principle of not allowing Russia free scope to invade the Asiatic provinces has the Queen's entire approval, she is afraid that the calculation upon which the division of forces is to be based assumes a larger force than will in reality be found to exist. The Queen, moreover, misses that more detailed consideration of the plan of operation from Eupatoria, which the Emperor will have thought himself entitled to look forward to. This Emperor's plan was a detailed one, marching 60,000 French from Eupatoria with 20,000 in reserve, forming entrenched camps on given spots, landing 20,000 Sardinians at Old Fort, and finally 40,000 English at the Bulganak, and thus completing the line which is to take the Russian Army in flank, and thus obliging it to retreat. The answer of the Queen's Government returns again to more general principles, and considers 120,000 men enough for the Eupatoria movement, without giving any reasons upon which this opinion is based, or any counter project, how this force is to be composed, or how it is to operate. It remains silent upon the question of command and the composition of the Sebastopol Army, says nothing of Kertch and the Turkish Contingent. These are all omissions which will strike the Emperor.

Plan of
campaign for
current year.

The Queen presumes that Sir Charles Wood's plan for the Baltic is also gone to Paris. The Queen has not yet seen it, and wishes Lord Panmure to cause it to be sent to her.

Lord Palmerston has also written to the Queen upon the result of the Cabinet, but in order not to repeat herself, she asks Lord Panmure to communicate this letter to him.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *February 3, 1856.*

Disposal of
guns, barracks,
forts captured
at Sebastopol.

I quite agree with you about these guns. The few that may be worth sending home might come, or they might be used at Malta or Gibraltar if wanted there. The rest should be burst up by being fired into, and then thrown into the harbour or into the ruins of the docks, or left where they are.

The great range of barracks ought, I think, to be destroyed, as far as may be practicable, if not wanted for our use. The forts should also be blown up.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *February 3, 1856.*

Panmure right
to go on doing
everything as if
there were no
prospect of
peace.

You are quite right to go on doing everything just as if there was no prospect of peace; your active preparations will be as persuasive as the eloquence of our negotiations.

I return the Queen's letter,¹—our calculations were founded upon the Emperor's numbers, and our knowledge of what our own force would be—of course we assumed that the army for Georgia would be English.

Russian losses
estimated at
400,000, or two-
thirds of the
original army.

The Russians are supposed to have lost 400,000 out of the 600,000 they had at the beginning of the war,² and their battalions, nominally 1000 strong, are said scarcely to muster 500. Their Crimea army will be reduced by the severity, the exposure and the diseases of the winter, and the deuce is in it if they will not find 120,000 in their rear and 70,000 in their front more than they will like to deal with. They must keep a large force in the north, and they must try to send reinforcements to Mouravieff. We did not pretend to point out to the Emperor how the 120,000 men from Eupatoria under a French General were to be manœuvred. He must be the best judge of that.

¹ Of date 3rd February

² Hamley says: 'Her losses, never accurately known, had been stupendous. Up to the end of August those in the Crimea alone were estimated at 153,000 men, while hundreds of thousands, drawn from the recesses of the vast Empire, had died of the hardships of the march. Altogether it was believed that her total losses during the war was not less than half a million of men.'—P. 300.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., *February 4, 1856.*

I return your female listener's letter,¹ which is very interesting. I shall so far make use of its contents as to warn our Minister at Berlin and Vienna about the iron which is to be exported for the defences at Cronstadt. . . .

Information
derived from
letter of a
female listener.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

February 4, 1856.

I send you a secret and confidential despatch, containing a sketch of a plan of campaign which embraces a plan of (advance) from Eupatoria, a descent on Asia, and the defence of the lines before Sebastopol by an army to act eventually in co-operation with that which moves from Eupatoria. I am afraid, however, the Emperor will never consent to the contemporaneous move in the Crimea and Asia, because I am pretty well convinced he has overstated his means in men, and that he relies in the second [place] on the support of the English Army, as I learn that his regiments are frightfully shabby, a state in which the French line regiments have been left by the practice of so many picked corps. People are so determined, however, to see something done in Asia that I am convinced we are right in pressing it, and I see just credit to be gained by either entrapping Mouravieff, or forcing him to fall back on his line of retreat beyond the Caucasus.

Importance of
a campaign in
Asia.

I have sent you, as I said, the sketch. I send you with this, and in still greater confidence if possible, the proceedings of the Council of War at Paris. This you may study, and avail yourself of the knowledge you will derive from it, but you must keep it a profound secret and let no one know—not even Sir R. Airey, who comes out to you by next mail—that such a document is in your possession. It will enable you to know the opinions of many officers of

¹ This refers to an English lady, who, being employed as governess in the family of a Russian official of high position, made use of the opportunities of gaining information thus afforded her.—See Sir A. West's *Reminiscences*.

the French Army, and compare what Martimprez may say at Sebastopol with what he said at Paris.

I have not yet confidence in Peace. I see many rocks ahead which it is difficult to describe, and, whatever our Allies may do, you must go on preparing for offensive operations until you receive positive orders to hold your hand. I have sent a telegram to you to strengthen yourself to the west of Balaclava. The Queen and Prince give me no rest on this point, and it seems to me will have no rest themselves till they hear of something being done. I have got home your brass trophies; in regard to the others, I have telegraphed to you to destroy them and throw them into the harbour. If you can save any of the best you may, but it is of no great consequence.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 5, 1856.*

The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of two letters from Lord Panmure, one on the plan of campaign, the other on the 'Victoria Cross.'

Calculation as
to force
available.

She is glad to hear that it is intended to work out a more detailed and precise plan before it be sent to the Crimea. As to our force, the Queen is afraid that it is overestimated as much as the French. The last Morning State of the Eastern Army, inclusive of the German and Swiss Legions and the Cavalry at Scutari, shows 58,000 men of all arms; from these must be deducted 4892 Land Transport Corps and 6960 sick—together 11,852, say 12,000 men, which will leave 46,000. If the whole 10,000 said to be at Malta be added in the spring, this would give 56,000 men of all arms, batmen and staff corps included. Of these, 50,000 are to go to Asia Minor, 20,000 are to co-operate with the French from Eupatoria, and the rest to form the body of the Sebastopol Army.

It becomes, then, quite clear that the whole of the British Army is to go to Asia Minor, leaving a Contingent of about 5000 men at the disposal of the French. But if this is so, it ought to be stated to the Emperor.

Has Sir Edmund Lyons been asked whether the Navy can carry on both expeditions at the same time? Is the Sardinian Army to be permanently attached to the French?

The Cross looks very well in form, but the metal is ugly; it is copper and not bronze, and will look very heavy on a red coat with the Crimean Ribbon. Bronze is, properly speaking, gun-metal; this has a rich colour and is very hard; copper would wear very ill and would soon look like an old penny. Lord Panmure should have one prepared in real bronze, and the Queen is inclined to think that it ought to have a greenish varnish to protect it; the raised parts would then burnish up bright and show the design and inscription. The reverse ought not to be quite flat, but should be finished as much as the front.

Design for
V.C.

The Queen has to thank Lord Panmure for the Quarterly Reports; the only one now remaining in arrear is that of the Barrack Department.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 5, 1856.

I have written a public despatch about the information given by our correspondents and our newspapers: no details are omitted by these gentlemen present in camp, and I am not sure that in the articles written in England there are not seen details evidently obtained from an authentic source and published without hesitation. I do not know if you can bring public opinion to bear upon this point: I have written my letter to you with the view of publication if you think it could do good; but it is quite necessary that some one should be able to check the abuse, the utter want of common prudence and consideration which exists: it is specially necessary at this time, when preparations might be making which it is an object to conceal. As I say, it is not pleasant to put one's fingers into any such hornet's nest, of which the inhabitants will be brought about my ears; but somebody should tackle the question, and perhaps it falls more properly to my lot to bear the brunt of it. I have no objection to do so, but I

Energetic protest against excessive communicativeness of the Press.

think that the publication of my letter may help me if it becomes necessary to interfere hereafter.

Destruction of
Fort Nicholas.

I have also written to you about the blowing up of Fort Nicholas yesterday: perhaps the mere mention of the fort being destroyed would have given the Government sufficient information, without entering into any description of the scene of great interest then before our eyes; but other people have not the information, or the plans or the descriptions of these places, and I have therefore written several of my letters in order to give others a better idea of it, perhaps, than the mere formality of a despatch. I never saw anything more beautiful than the clouds of smoke from the nearly simultaneous explosions gathering together as a shroud of darkness over the fort which it concealed, gradually expanding high into the air, caught by the sunlight, and, being slowly wafted away, betrayed the complete disappearance of the long line of casemates, the familiar object of our acquaintance during the whole siege. I went to the large white barrack buildings afterwards and to the docks: about 100 feet of wall of the roofless barrack was blown down a day or two ago, completely and easily, with one lb. of powder per foot: it is a very eligible opportunity for the engineers trying some experiments as to the best means of doing such things. I hope to be able to let them mine the whole façade and tumble it down in one mass together in a short time hence. On the destruction of Fort Nicholas, the preparations for which seem not to have been suspected, the men on the North Side showed themselves out of huts and behind parapets—not very numerous, or looking like large garrisons; but still a good sprinkling all about, and many working at a large and complete redoubt on a hill commanding a side valley of approach on the Inkerman front. A cluster of officers came to the telegraph at the North fort, Severnaya,¹ and were signalling with flags, answered from the redoubt above mentioned.

An armistice—
its principles and
incidents.

I have letters from Lord Stratford, telling of detailed arrangements in the view of peace and the probability of an immediate armistice. This certainly should take

¹ The Northern Side of Sebastopol.

place at once. I look on the principle of an armistice as a prolonged truce—no further interchange or communication, a cessation of firing—that is all, and limits of neutral and not to be occupied ground marked out. I shall not consider myself precluded from destruction of everything within our lines: the cessation of fire from the opposite side is of no value to us to give up the advantage of destruction, or taking away of guns from any place above or below water; for there is some idea of some field-battery guns in the Dock Yard Creek. I hope you will not limit our powers in this respect. Do not understand that I have done anything about redoubts on the west side of Balaclava: nothing could be settled till the plan of operations is known, and you know my opinion as to the maintenance of our present position on the heights.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 7, 1856.*

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's letter, and is extremely sorry to see that Sir R. Airey cannot well go to the Crimea: she thinks the only way to make up for it would be to send him¹ a copy of all the papers which were printed of the Council of War at Paris, in order that he may be in possession of all that passed.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 8, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a copy of the memorandum which it is proposed to send to Lord Cowley for the information of H.M. the Emperor.

Although Lord Panmure feels the strongest repugnance to the command of the Eupatorian Army being entrusted to Marshal Péliissier, having no confidence in that General's activity or vigour, the Ministers present at the meeting yesterday thought it prudent, under existing circumstances, not to press any objection in a public and official document.

¹ This alludes apparently to Sir W. Codrington.

As to plan
for ensuing
campaign.

The calculations of Your Majesty's forces is the result of the examination of the means at disposal to reinforce the Army made by Lord Panmure and Sir R. Airey, and supposing the Infantry to be overrated by 5000 men, still there remains for the Army of Sebastopol 60,000 men of all arms.

It is somewhat singular how much Sir William Codrington in his last letter but one coincided with the Emperor in discouraging two operations at once.

Lord Panmure foresees some little difficulty in reconciling Sir William to the apparently sedentary duty to which the main body of his Army will be destined, but it is quite possible that, if the movement from Eupatoria is properly conducted, much glory may be achieved by the timely advance of Sir William's army, and he may possibly assume the principal part in the closing scene of the Crimean campaign.

Lord Panmure has desired the Messenger to wait to bring back Your Majesty's pleasures and the memorandum.

Lord Panmure quite agrees with Your Majesty that, as Sir R. Airey cannot go to the Crimea, more especially after the announced attack upon him by Mr. Layard, copies of all the confidential proceedings of the Council of War at Paris should be sent to Sir William Codrington, in whose discretion Lord Panmure has full reliance.

First object of
next campaign
to clear the
Crimea.

Lord Panmure proposes to send to Sir William full instructions by the mail on Monday, and in the meantime to telegraph to him that the first and single object of the ensuing campaign will be to clear the Crimea, and to desire him to make all exertions to have his Army in a movable state.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 7 [9th?], 1856.*

The Queen returns to Lord Panmure the proposed memorandum for the Emperor, which she approves, and of which she would wish to have a copy. She entirely shares all the opinions expressed by Lord Panmure in his letter.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

February 8, 1856.

I have to thank you for a long and a shorter private letter since I last wrote you. I see you are beginning to rouse yourself from your winter inaction, and barring the advent of peace, to speculate on the forthcoming campaign. You are quite right in your views as to one great and vigorous effort to sweep the Crimea, and although all may have entertained hopes that we could have done something in Asia, at the same time we have resolved to put our whole steam on the Crimea. The plan is settled to have two armies distinct and separate, and so get rid of the curse of divided command. The one army will proceed to act from Eupatoria, and will consist principally of French, aided by a portion of English and the Sardinians, and the other will be formed at Sebastopol, principally of English troops and those in English pay, and aided by French, the whole under your command. I see you already demur to the French having all the credit of the Eupatoria move, and you anticipate that all the laurels grow there and none are to be gathered elsewhere. I do not agree with you, or I should not have consented to [confine] you to the plateau. My opinion is that the Russians will not fight, and that you will have an early opportunity of signalling yourself and your Army by a move on the enemy. I thought to have sent out Sir R. Airey with full instructions to you, but Mr. Layard has given notice of an attack on him in the House of Commons, arising out of matters in Sir J. M'Neill's and Colonel Tulloch's report. I must therefore refer you to the document which I sent you out in strict confidence by last mail for the different views of the members of the Council of War, and by the mail of Monday I shall have prepared a despatch detailing the whole plan of the campaign, and giving you such instructions for carrying it out, as appear to me, to belong to the responsibility of my position, leaving you as far as possible free to carry out the instructions

Efforts of the
Allies to be
concentrated
on the Crimea.

Clearing of the
Crimea pro-
bably easier
than is
expected.

in your own way. I don't think Kertch has ever been in any danger of an attack. If the Russian army has been moving at all, it has had its face to the north. Private information leads me to believe this, and I suspect your clearing of the Crimea may not be as bloody an affair as you contemplate. The Russian resources are failing, and, having neither trade nor agriculture to fall back on, she must suffer the process of exhaustion long before the Allies. I have just completed the Army estimates, which include Army, Ordnance, and Commissariat and are to the tune of thirty-five millions. You shall have a copy for your amusement. My secretary has just brought me in print the memo which I have sent to the Emperor, on which our two armies are to be formed. I transmit it to you in strictest confidence, and will follow it by a secret and confidential despatch of instruction on Monday.

Your last public despatches were most interesting, and will all be answered in course of official routine.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *February 9, 1856.*

Protection of
troops em-
barking from
Balaclava.

I send you a secret official letter on the subject of the defending the remains of embarkation from Balaclava, if necessary. No doubt you will communicate it to Lord Hardinge; for, though mine is the responsibility, which I accept, of doing all that can be done in such circumstances, your Lordship will know from him whether I am right in the main principles, and their necessary consequences, that must guide the placing, the movements, and the withdrawal of troops.

We must remember always it is not the maintaining a fixed position, it is the embarkation in safety of the last Infantry.

Experiments
in destruction.

The weather is fine—frosts at night, the sun and air melting the surface in the day, and making the ground as usual almost impracticable. The opportunity of trying some experiments was so good that I sanctioned its being done on parts of the large walls of the barracks; when

this has been done, the whole will be blown down together for a smash.

I think of making an exception of the long wall of them facing the North Side batteries, in order to hide any of our people working at the roof timber, which will be thrown down on the mass, and which I want to keep for future contingencies. If the whole is thrown down and laid open, they would of course see and fire at us at about eleven or twelve hundred yards distance—so that, although people will probably imagine it a failure, you will know the object. But if the newspapers get hold of the reason, the Russians will, as usual, know where to fire with the best effect from the 'authorities' within our own camp. . . .

I have your private letter about future movements. I only hope no part of this Army will have to play a small game.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 10, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a rough draft of a despatch which he proposes to send to Sir William Codrington by to-morrow's mail. The Emperor of the French fully coincides in the last proposal of Your Majesty's Government, and has with his usual good faith sent orders to commence this plan of campaign immediately. These demonstrations, besides placing the Allied troops in a proper attitude for commencing the campaign if War is to continue, cannot fail to have considerable effect in supporting our terms of peace in the Congress.

Sir William Codrington seemed to grudge the movement of Eupatoria to the French; Lord Panmure feels that Your Majesty's Arms are by no means slighted in the proposed arrangements, and that they occupy, though in inferior numbers, the post of honour at Eupatoria, and may play a most prominent part from Sebastopol if occasion offer. Lord Panmure has the honour to forward to Your

British opportunities in forthcoming campaign.

Majesty a printed copy of the last memorandum sent to the Emperor, and will forward to Your Majesty a complete set of these latter papers should it meet with Your Majesty's approbation.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 10, 1856.*

The Queen returns the Draft to Sir William Codrington. The only suggestion she would wish to make is that Sir William ought to be informed that we expect the whole Campaign to be concluded within a month, at least as far as our Army is concerned, and that this is then at once to turn to Asia Minor. Unless this be stated from the beginning, the necessary preparations will not be made in the meantime, upon which the possibility of the second movement will depend. Sir William ought also to see, with respect to this question, what passed between us and the French Government, and receive copies of Lord Cowley's despatches giving an account of his interviews with the Emperor.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *February 11, 1856.*

Your addition is very good. Perhaps you might mention the compelling the Russians to evacuate Turkish Territory, first, and the driving them over the Caucasus, second. It would be well to ask Charles Wood whether he could not get two or three river-going steamers of light draft of water for the ——. ¹

Codrington might turn his attention to Trebizond and Erzeroum as an alternative instead of a landing in Mingrelia, if the season for going to either becomes so late that the fevers on the Mingrelian Coast would be an objection to a landing there.

¹ Name illegible. Probably a river in Georgia.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 11, 1856.*

The mail of this day carries out to you a secret and confidential despatch of some length and no ordinary importance. It contains our views in regard to the future and a detail of the operations which, in accordance with the calculations of the Emperor and the strong opinion expressed by you against having more irons in the fire than one at a time, we have determined to adopt. In that document I have endeavoured to show you that we have given the main body of the British Army no inglorious place, and you may rely on it that, had I had a suspicion that such chance might happen, I would never have consented to the arrangement.

Detail of
operations
determined on
forwarded.

Your weather seems to have become much improved, and I hope you may get your troops a little trotted about in Brigade Field days. I cannot understand what has alarmed you about the Land Transport. I do not mean to deviate from the *carte blanche* I have given you to organise it after your own way, as I am convinced that the gigantic schemes of Colonel M'Murdo are all of Indian and not of European dimensions. I cannot reconcile his immense requisitions for Carts, Harness, etc., with the moderate demands that I get from Colonel Wetherall. With these latter I will comply as soon as possible.

I can tell you nothing as to peace. Everybody hopes for it, but I cannot find many very sanguine of its security. One thing I am glad of, and that is that you have so well destroyed the docks and are still progressing in the work. We shall try and get our flag into the harbour if we can, but I doubt our succeeding in this unless we are disposed to give a longer armistice than we can afford to do.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *February 12, 1856.*

A day or two ago Marshal Pélissier mentioned to me that he had received directions from Paris to establish

troops at Sak, a village to the south of Eupatoria. The Marshal mentioned the probability of his sending another Division of troops there, if this view is to be carried out, as well as from some sickness, as I understood him.

As to carrying
out works to the
westward of
Balaclava.

Colonel Gordon, R.E., and an officer of Artillery will examine the ground for carrying out the detail of works and lines west of Balaclava. Your Lordship must expect that troops will not be as healthy encamped on the open in single tents at this time of year. It will be necessary to move and encamp the Divisions on the spot in turn; for, the distance from their present huts and camps being from the third Division and fourth Division about five or six miles, at least four hours' work every day would be lost in going backwards and forwards; and we cannot expect the bad weather of the winter to be yet passed away. If, therefore, anything decisive happens to prevent the necessity of such works, I trust you will telegraph to me.

Are we to act as
if the state of
war were likely
to continue?

The Land Transport must be thought of. I mentioned to Your Lordship that I had suspended the immediate purchase of 1000 horses; but if you really mean that everything is indiscriminately to go on as if we were at, and to continue, war, we must bring up the Land Transport numbers of horses and men very much. But as I have telegraphed about this, I shall have received your answer.

The weather is quite fine—inspections and ball firing going on well.

There is no truce here, or idea of it, in practice on the part of the Russians: they fire away.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 15, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty copies of the despatches which have arrived from the Crimea.

Your Majesty will perceive with satisfaction the continued good health of the Army, and officially announcing the final destruction of the docks. Lord Panmure does

not coincide in Sir William Codrington's opinion as to suspending the continuance of operations in the way of levelling the Russian public buildings in our possession, and has so signified his views to Sir William, whose ideas on this subject are somewhat chivalrous.

Lord Panmure transmits for Your Majesty's use copies of all the documents of a secret nature consequent upon the proceedings of the Council of War. Your Majesty will perceive that, in accordance with Your Majesty's views, Lord Panmure made an addition to the Secret and Confidential despatch of the 11th inst., on the subject of operations in Asia, after those which are to be executed from Eupatoria are concluded.

Lord Panmure has the honour of forwarding to Your Majesty a daily state from Scutari.

There likewise is forwarded to Your Majesty a series of interesting letters for Your Majesty's use, showing the armaments in use and the material expended in the siege of Sebastopol.

Lord Panmure has the honour of transmitting to Your Majesty the last quarterly return from the Small Arm Department.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

February 15, 1856.

I am much obliged by your letter which I received this morning. . . .

We are about to be involved in a serious difficulty by the ferment made by the report of Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. The four officers blamed especially in it for the disasters of 1854-1855 are indignant at the evidence given in the Crimea. The House of Commons are indignant against the officers. High personages are fearful lest this opportunity be seized to get the administration of the Army placed, as the Admiralty, under the control of Parliament! All is unhinged, and Layard has given notice of a motion for the 28th which will be full of difficulty. All mean to put in written defences against the

*Effect of the
Tulloch-
M'Neill Report.*

report, and I shall lay them before Parliament. It is a pretty mess, but I have fought through worse, and hope to get over this without any serious change, or injury to the Queen's authority, which I desire to see upheld. You will be duly instructed about guns. We have no desire to have a 'boulevard Sebastopol,' but a few reminiscences of our long siege will be acceptable.

Desire to avoid serious changes.

The Docks seem to be in ruins, and all the public buildings of a military character should follow.

From all we can hear I think peace is in the ascendant, but, as the treaties approach, our allies, at least the Army, are not quite so clamorous for peace as they were. Here there is no desire to avoid it, but a general impression exists that they would have done something great had the campaign gone on. I must now stop as I am expected at the House of Lords to meet some observations of Ellenborough's.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 16, 1856.

. . . If the proceedings of the Council of War at Paris are printed, they will surely be known; a secret is not kept by so many people, and by those who print besides.

The writer withholds his own opinion.

I have your private letters mentioning the general outline of two armies: the fact is I need not give an opinion upon a point settled; whatever is so settled shall be carried out by me in the spirit in which such operations have been formed; and if I had a difference of opinion at all, that difference should be merged in the general view, for the success of which more considerations than mine must enter.

Disposing of the Russian guns.

We have had fine weather up to the present time—to-day a blowy fog; but for some time it has been very favourable, admitting of ground drying; I have taken advantage of it to put the Artillery strength upon the Russian guns, of which 125 are away from the town, 106 being on this plateau near the rail, 11 at Balaclava, and 8 embarked in the *Edward*.

I won't leave an old English broken gun for a lamp-post either. And with our strength of horses I hope to do much pretty soon in getting most of them up.

I keep many good guns (forty Russian good ones) for possible ulterior purposes round Balaclava.

The ground west of Balaclava is difficult, indeed, for the purpose of defence: never mind—it shall be done.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 17, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that at the Cabinet yesterday Your Majesty's letter to Lord Palmerston was read.

The Commission of which Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch were members was sent out in February 1855—their instructions bear date 19th of that month—to inquire into matters purely connected with the Commissariat supplies to the Army, it being stated by the public accounts from the Army, confirmed too fearfully by the casualties there were occurring, that both men and beasts were starving, while over-work and want of shelter helped the havoc of the war. The instructions given by Lord Panmure touch in no way on the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, nor could he anticipate that even accidentally the report of the Commission would involve charges against any but some non-combatant officers of the Army.

Your Majesty will perhaps recollect that the appointment of that Commission was intimated to Parliament as one of the first acts of the Government, and the results of its inquiries were anxiously looked for after the miserable failure of the House of Commons' Committee.

Lord Panmure received the first report of the Commissioners, dated from Constantinople, on 10th June, about the end of that month. With the exception of the Earl of Cardigan, to whom one paragraph at the top of page 20 refers, none of the officers subsequently alluded

Reports of
Tulloch-
M'Neill
Commission.

to are mentioned, except the Commissary-General, whose incapacity appeared to be so conspicuously proved that Lord Panmure recalled him.

The second report was not produced to Lord Panmure till the 20th January, and he was unaware of its contents till that period.

It appeared to Lord Panmure and his colleagues inexpedient to withhold these reports from Parliament, more especially as much had been built upon the Commission, and the result of its labours had been promised.

Lord Panmure read the report with a view to strike out inconvenient passages, but he found that he could not do so successfully unless he struck out or altered the evidence also, a step which Lord Panmure could not take, and of which Your Majesty would justly have expressed your condemnation.

Object of said report.

In presenting that report to Parliament Your Majesty's servants do not constitute themselves the accusers of any one, and Lord Panmure stated in the House of Lords that the object of the Government in acting on that report was to avoid for the future the errors which had been pointed out, and not to assume a vindictive course against any individual.

Mr. Layard's motion in the Commons. Appointments given to officers referred to in Report.

Lord Panmure has troubled Your Majesty with this history of the report, but Mr. Layard's motion implies, if it does not assert, that, while in possession of this report, the Government had concurred in the appointment of the four officers especially referred to in it to places of honour.

I cannot believe that any stress will be laid on the admission of these officers to the Order of the Bath, an act of grace emanating from Your Majesty and never conferred on braver or more loyal soldiers.

The motion evidently refers to the situations held by these officers under Your Majesty. The Earl of Lucan has been appointed Colonel of a Regiment, the Earl of Cardigan is Inspector of Cavalry, Sir R. Airey is Your Majesty's Quartermaster-General, and Colonel Gordon Deputy Quartermaster-General.

That these officers still continue to hold these situations

is perfectly true, and Lord Panmure is prepared to justify the fact. That they were appointed to them while Government was in possession of the report in which reference is made to them is not true, as a simple reference to dates will show.

In the first report reference is made only to Lord Cardigan. That report arrived at the end of June 1855, and Lord Cardigan, unless Lord Panmure's memory fail him, had been long before appointed Inspector of Cavalry.

The second report was not placed in Lord Panmure's hands till the 20th January, 1856, and Colonel Gordon received his appointment in August 1855, and Sir R. Airey in December, while Lord Lucan got his regiment in the latter months of the year.

These officers are naturally most desirous to make counter-statements in their vindication, and Lord Panmure at once admits the justice of their wishes. . . .

Vindication of
officers referred
to in the Report.

The mode of dealing with these vindications has occupied the attention of Your Majesty's servants, and they have come to the conclusion that Parliament is not the fit tribunal before which the conduct of Military officers ought to be discussed. They propose, with Your Majesty's approbation, to advise Your Majesty to issue a Commission of high Military officers, to whom the report of the Commission and the replies of the officers shall be referred, and who shall report to Your Majesty their opinion as to the conduct of Your Majesty's officers, and the extent of blame to be attached to them for the sufferings of Your Majesty's Army.

A Commission
of Inquiry
proposed.

Whether this course will disarm the keenness of Parliament on this question is yet to be seen, but it will maintain Your Majesty's right as well as exhibit Your Majesty's anxiety that the conduct of your officers should be fully investigated by competent tribunals.

The names of the officers which have occurred to the Cabinet as fitting to constitute the Commission are :

General Sir Howard Douglas, G.C.B., President.

General Lord Seaton, G.C.B.

Earl of Beauchamp.

Submits names
of proposed
members of
Commission.

Lieut.-General Sir John Bell, K.C.B.
Lieut.-General Sir De Lacy Evans, K.C.B.
Lieut.-General William Rowan.
Lieut.-General J. Peel.

Should Your Majesty approve of these names, Lord Panmure will more formally submit them to Your Majesty.

Lord Panmure regrets giving Your Majesty the trouble of perusing so long a letter, but he has felt it to be his duty to lay before Your Majesty the facts of this case as they stand.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 17, 1856.*

Commission
of Inquiry.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his long explanation. She approves of the names for the proposed Commission of Inquiry with the exception of Sir De Lacy Evans, who, being an officer of the very Army of the Crimea, may very likely become a witness that ought not to sit in judgment.

The Queen thinks that no one from the Crimea ought to form part of the Commission.

She feels sure that Lord Panmure will be impressed with the importance of not losing any time.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 18, 1856.

French war
medal for
English
soldiers.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that he has been informed by Lieut.-Colonel Claremont that Marshal Vaillant has signified the desire of the Emperor to confer the French war medal on Your Majesty's troops, in proportion of ten for every 1000 men of the various arms engaged.

Should Your Majesty be graciously pleased to approve of such a gift being accepted, Lord Panmure will desire Lieut.-Colonel Claremont so to inform Marshal Vaillant and have the medals transmitted to this country.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 18, 1856.*

The Queen has to thank Lord Panmure for the papers he has sent her; she returns General Storkes's returns.

The Returns from the War Office Departments would be much improved for use if the numbers were summed up at the bottom of each page, and a gross total given at the end of the Return.

The Returns of the Barracks Department to the end of the year is still wanting.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 18, 1856.

. . . The Queen has sent for me in consequence of the *Times'* article to-day. I must try to explain to her that no Department paid by money voted by Parliament, and which performs functions important for the interests of the nation, can be kept out of discussion in Parliament.¹

No departments paid by money voted by Parliament can be kept out of discussion in Parliament.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

February 18, 1856.

I have very little to say except that I have resolved to send off your reinforcement of Artillery and Infantry directly, in case anything should interrupt our negotiations, so that you may be ready to avail yourselves of the opportunity for immediate action. The first portion will consist of one troop Horse Artillery and four field-batteries; 5000 Infantry (4000 Regulars and 1000 Germans) will follow immediately. We shall have a good many Cavalry remounts to send you and some men, but these will follow hereafter. I have just got yours of the 4th, and read your despatch on the press. I agree in every word of it. But I will give no opinion on the prudence of publishing it till I consult

As to Codrington's despatch on the Press.

¹ The Queen and Prince Albert were disposed to regard the Army as depending on the Crown.

with my colleagues. I do not think you can conceal a great movement, such as is contemplated by the expedition to Eupatoria, from the enemy. He will sniff the preparations, and a little exaggeration on the part of the press may terrify him; but it is in small and sudden affairs, in the detail of the strength of your force, in the statement of the number of your guns and such like, that the danger lies, and it is very difficult to see how these things can be checked unless we close the Camp against correspondents entirely. And what if you do? They will at once get your own officers to give the information, and if they refuse they will descend lower to obtain it. I have been meditating a despatch to you on the Press in event of your moving at the head of the Army into the field, and I would in such an event authorise you to exclude all followers on the part of the Press, but your despatch brings the thing home to me, and I will send you such reply to it as we shall in Council decide on.

Your description of the explosion of Fort Nicholas is quite a composition and shall adorn the *Gazette*. . . .

Peace rumours gain ground, but I am an infidel still.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 19, 1856.*

French war
medal for
English troops.

Though the Queen has seen Lord Panmure and mentioned to him her grateful acceptance of the Emperor of the French's offer to confer his war medal on her troops, she thinks it is better that Lord Panmure should have a written record of this, and she therefore repeats it here.

Would Lord Panmure inquire to whom these medals are given in the French Army, and how the selection of the men is made, in order that we may conform to their regulations and not become answerable for the mode of distribution? It is only given to privates, the Queen believes. Will the sailors participate in it?

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 20, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's note.

Lord Panmure will convey through Lord Clarendon Your Majesty's gracious acceptance of the French war medal, and ascertain without loss of time from Colonel Claremont all the particulars which Your Majesty desires to know. . . .

Lord Panmure has to inform Your Majesty that Lord Derby has given notice that he will ask a question on Thursday as to the duties of the Secretary of State for War,¹ which will involve the discussion of the whole question of Military administration. Lord Panmure does not know in what spirit Lord Derby will put his question, or what line he will take, but he does not regret that this matter is to be brought to an issue at once.

Forthcoming
parliamentary
discussion as
to duties of
Secretary of
State for War.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 20, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty. He has telegraphed to Sir W. Codrington to take steps to carry out what he considers requisite on the West side of Balaclava to secure the embarkation of his troops in the face of an enemy.

The memorandum which went to Paris on Saturday evening was transmitted by Lord Clarendon in a despatch to Lord Cowley, and Lord Panmure has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's note graciously acknowledging the copy.

Lord Panmure forwarded Your Majesty's note immediately to Lord Palmerston as Your Majesty desired.

Lord Panmure is glad to find that Your Majesty

¹ See note to the Queen's letter of February 22nd.

entirely approves of the principle of not allowing Russia to [have] free action against the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan.

The calculation of the forces disposable for operations in the East was made on the basis that the Emperor of the French was correct in his statements of numbers.

Doubt as to
correctness of
numbers
counted on.

His Majesty knew the means at the command of Sir William Codrington, inclusive of the Sardinian Army, and Lord Panmure did not state those means without the concurrence of Lord Hardinge, and he is prepared to support his calculation by the practical production of the force stated to be forthcoming. If any defalcation therefore ensues, it must be on the side of the French, and Lord Panmure is by no means sure that Your Majesty's suspicion as to the non-existence of a part of that force may not be perfectly correct, but Your Majesty's Government could not hint that state of things, and felt bound to treat the Emperor's data as correct.

Details of
memorandum
approved by
Cabinet.

Proceeding, therefore, on this basis, the memorandum first deals with the abandonment of the Crimea, which Your Majesty's Government concur with the Emperor in opinion to be an impossibility. It next points out *how*, in the opinion of the Government, Sebastopol and the *place d'armes* of the two Armies may be efficiently protected, and sets aside 70,000 men as sufficient for this object. The Cabinet thought it unnecessary to the forward action of this Army, as sketched out in Lord Panmure's original memorandum, reserving such details for future arrangement. The memorandum then went on to deal with the Eupatoria plan, and expresses concurrence in the proposal of the Emperor for an offensive movement on the rear of the Russians from that base. Your Majesty's Government state their opinion that 120,000 will be sufficient, and assign 100,000 as movable force, and 20,000 as the Reserve.

They do not in the memorandum give any opinion as to the composition of this Army, but leave the Emperor to infer that its majority is to consist of French troops, and these are to be moved to their base as suggested by the Emperor.

The memorandum then goes on to impress on the Emperor the necessity of early action, and likewise the inexpediency of an armistice prolonged beyond the 31st March, suggesting the movement of a portion of the French Army to Eupatoria before the armistice commences.

Nothing being said in opposition to the plan of operations, suggested by the Emperor, of the Army of Eupatoria, His Majesty will infer that the details are not objected to. The Cabinet assumed, though the Emperor's memorandum did not say so, that he concluded that a French General would command the Eupatorian Army, and left the strategy of the operations to him,—the numbers and description of force to be furnished by England can only be settled in consultation with Sir W. Codrington, and with a complete knowledge of his power to move.

The same observation as to the composition of the Army of Sebastopol must hold good. The contemporaneous movements in Asia is what will be indigestible by the Emperor, and yet, if this be not undertaken early, it must either be given up altogether, or Your Majesty will have to lament many a gallant soldier, the victim of disease engendered by a summer sun acting on a swampy soil, if the expedition be delayed.

Unless some steps are taken to arrest Russian progress in Asia great discontent will prevail in this country, and therefore the Cabinet have thought it but due to Your Majesty's interests, and due to objects of the engagements under treaty, to urge upon the Emperor such a line of operations.

*Desirability
of arresting
Russian pro-
gress in Asia.*

Lord Panmure entreats Your Majesty's forgiveness for this long note. He has the honour to enclose a copy of Sir Charles Wood's memorandum on the plan of naval operations in the Baltic. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 20, 1856.*

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's letter. She entirely approves of Lord Seaton as President of

the Military Commission, and General Knollys as one of the members, which she thinks a very good arrangement.¹

The Queen would wish to see Lord Panmure at half-past five to-day in order to speak to him about Lord Derby's Motion.

The Queen sees by Sir William Codrington's letter that he has written a despatch upon the Press, which he wishes should be published, but she does not find it amongst those sent her, nor does she see it in the papers. The Queen hopes Lord Panmure will not hesitate to comply with Sir William Codrington's request, as it will be quite impossible to let the reporters go on unchecked, and she feels sure that public opinion in this country would, at this moment, strongly express itself in the same sense, were a proper case to be laid before the nation.

War corre-
spondents to
be controlled.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., *February 20, 1856.*

The Emperor
approves of
Panmure's last
memorandum.

. . . General Martimprez leaves Paris to-day for the Crimea with orders founded upon your last memorandum, of which the Emperor entirely approves. I hope you will also send out an officer immediately. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 21, 1856.*

The Queen has read Sir William Codrington's despatch, which she thinks is not altogether worded so as to be published with advantage, yet it would be important that the Press should receive a hint. The Prince has thrown hastily on paper what Sir William Codrington might have said instead of his verbose despatch. The Queen encloses it.

¹ The personnel of the Commission had been discussed in previous letters.

The Queen likewise returns the Victoria Cross, merely burnished up by rubbing, with a little green colour put on the sunken parts: something like this is what the Queen would wish to have prepared for inspection, but with bolder relief by sinking the die deeper.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 21, 1856.

I suppose we may as well call it a Board of General Officers to enquire into the matters adverted to in the Report of the Commissioners, and to receive explanations from those officers whose conduct has been called in question by that Report.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

Pv., February 22, 1856.

The Queen is anxious to express her satisfaction to Lord Panmure at the manner in which the Debate in the House of Lords went off yesterday, and at the manner in which he explained and stated the position of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary for War.¹ His speech and Lord Derby's the Queen thinks very important, and she is sure, will do much good.

¹ In the House of Lords, on Thursday, February 21, 1856, the Earl of Derby moved: 'That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for a copy of any Document in which the respective duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State for the War Department and the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces are limited and defined.'

In the course of his reply, Lord Panmure said:—'My Lords, I now come to [a question] of far greater magnitude and far greater importance, namely, what are the relative positions of the Secretary of State for War, and the Commander-in-Chief.' After reviewing the past relations between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Panmure then passed on to a consideration of the relations which have been established between them since the creation of a Secretary of State for War, saying,—'When that office had first been constituted there was no intention, I believe, of carrying the duties attached to it further than to provide for the transference to the Secretary for War of all the powers relating to the Army previously vested in the other

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 22, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and begs to tender to Your Majesty his grateful

Secretaries of State. It was considered that the exercise of these powers would afford ample employment to the new War Minister. But in stating what the duties of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies formerly were, I have omitted one of the highest importance which was likewise transferred to the new Minister. On all occasions of foreign war it was the duty of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to conduct the correspondence with the generals commanding the troops abroad, who all took their orders directly from him. So completely indeed was the Commander of the forces abroad, under the direction of the Secretary of State, that he did not correspond with the Commander-in-Chief at all. It is quite true, as stated by the noble Earl, that it was found from the very commencement of the war that difficulties and confusion arose in consequence of the collisions which took place between different departments, all conducting different branches of the military administration. At that time the Commissariat was under the direction of the Treasury; the Ordnance was a distinct department in itself; and the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary at War were two distinct and separate offices. Soon after my appointment as Secretary for War, having been previously six years Secretary at War, I saw no difficulty whatever in combining that office with the office of Secretary of State; and before long I found from experience that it was absolutely necessary to place the Ordnance Department, so far as the civil duties were concerned—the branches of stores, supplies, contracts and manufactures—under the entire and sole control of the Minister for War; and so strong were my convictions upon these points that, even in the midst of war, at a time when great changes could not be made without considerable inconvenience, I deemed it indispensable that those additional branches of military service should be brought within my immediate jurisdiction. Now, therefore, all the civil departments of the Army—all that relates to the Ordnance Department—all that relates to the clothing of the Army—all that relates to the Storekeeper's Department—all that relates to the department which superintends the contracts for the supply of the Army, and all that relates to the manufacture of those supplies are under the control of the Secretary of State for War. And I may add that, since that control has been committed to my hands, I have been enabled, with the assistance of the gentlemen connected with each separate branch, to secure for the British Army abroad full and abundant supplies, not only of all the *matériel* of war, but also such supplies of the necessities and even comforts of life as must render the condition of that army during the summer, and the condition in which it now is, matter of deep gratification to your Lordships and the country at large. After all the civil departments of the Army had been brought under one and the same control, I took care that all the military departments should be placed in their proper relative positions; and the result of the important changes that have been accomplished in that latter direction is that now, for the first time, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army is commander in fact as well as in name of every arm in the service—of the Artillery and the Engineers, not less than of the Cavalry and the troops of the Line. In carrying out these extensive reforms, it was impossible to lay down on paper any rules which should establish a

acknowledgment of Your Majesty's approbation of the course which he took in the House of Lords last night. Lord Panmure thinks that this important question of the position of Your Majesty's Commander-in-Chief will be set at rest and fully recognised for the future.

Lord Panmure has the honour to forward the despatches

distinct line of demarcation applicable to every case between the civil and military departments of the service. It is true that an attempt was made to lay down some such line of demarcation in a paper drawn up in the year 1812. A very long controversy had at that time arisen between the then Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief. . . . So warm became the controversy between the two functionaries, with regard to their respective jurisdictions, that the difficulty was solved by an Order in Council in the year 1812, which laid down to a certain extent a very broad line of demarcation between the War Office and the Horse Guards; and that line of demarcation has been observed ever since. But the line is not rigidly defined, and it was quite impossible that the Order in Council should draw a distinction in all respects, because questions arose every day in which points of discipline and points of administration are so nicely mixed up that it would be utterly out of the power of any man, however skilful, to determine precisely where one jurisdiction should commence and where the other should end. Many of these questions are settled by means of private communications between the Commander-in-Chief and myself. . . . Those questions are settled amicably between the two departments; and I cannot conceive that any such rupture can arise between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary for War as could lead to the necessity of having recourse to that appeal to the First Lord of the Treasury provided in the document of 1812—an appeal to the First Lord of the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or to one of the Secretaries of State. But it is impossible that some difficulty should not occasionally arise in drawing the line of demarcation between the two offices. For instance, that difficulty presented itself in the very case of an Inspector General of Fortifications, to which the noble Earl has referred, for an Inspector of Fortifications has civil as well as military duties to perform—civil duties in the erection of barracks, and military duties in the erection of places of mere defence. How is it possible to distinguish accurately between them? Under these circumstances it appears to me that to attempt to lay down by any definition a strict line of demarcation between civil and military duties in the management of the Army would only be to attempt to frame a rule which must be revised from day to day.

‘Then, my Lords, with regard to the patronage of all those civil departments which have been placed under my charge as Secretary of State for War, it is extremely large, and if administered by me would lead to embarrassment. I hold myself responsible for all the appointments to those departments, but I leave many of the details to those gentlemen who have been placed at the head of them. I have the utmost confidence in their discretion. I am satisfied that no man should be introduced into any of the offices of those departments who is not so far fitted for them as to be able to pass the examination required by the Civil Service Commissioners; and I take care that, after he has so passed, he shall rely for promotion on his merits, and on his merits alone. Such is the state of things with regard to the civil departments of Secretary for War.

‘With regard to the present state of the Horse Guards, all that I have to say may be summed up in these few words—that the Commander-in-Chief still continues to administer the discipline of the Army uninterfered with and

which arrived last night from the Crimea. Sir William Codrington's conduct shows that he is a prudent administrator, and Lord Panmure feels some regret that his skill as a General will not probably be tested.

Had Sir W. Codrington written such a despatch as that drafted by H.R.H. the Prince, there would have been no

Submits draft
of warrant for
appointment
of Board of
Inquiry.

uncontrolled by the Secretary for War, further than that, in all the superior appointments, either regimental or on the staff, the Commander-in-Chief consults the Secretary for War before he takes the pleasure of the Crown with respect to them; and so far the Minister for War renders himself responsible for the acts of the Commander-in-Chief. The Secretary for War does not interfere in the first appointments to the Army; but at the same time I do not deny that I ought, perhaps, to be considered legally responsible for these appointments; because there is no act of the Commander-in-Chief, however small or however great, that does not constitutionally come within the revision of my department. That is the present state of these two departments.

'My Lords, there is no document such as the noble Lord has moved for to be laid on the table of the House; and I have already said enough to show that I conceive it would be impossible for me to frame any document which should precisely define the respective duties of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Secretary for War. But I must say that, in all material points, the line of demarcation between the two departments is so great that no necessity can exist for attempting to draw up any such document.

'There remains behind the important question raised by the noble Earl as to what are the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the continuance of the present relative powers of the Secretary for War and the Commander-in-Chief. It would be quite useless for us now to attempt to shrink from a consideration of that question. We all know perfectly well that it largely occupies the public mind, and that it is much discussed in the public prints, and that opinions have been formed regarding it in both Houses of Parliament; I believe, therefore, that it is now high time for the Army and the country to be made acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject.

'Hitherto the Crown has administered the patronage of the Army through the Commander-in-Chief; and through him the Crown has conducted the discipline of the Army. But the Crown would not be able either to administer the patronage of the Army or to conduct its discipline, unless Parliament in the first instance granted the money required for the maintenance of the Troops and passed the Mutiny Act, by which they are made amenable to military law. And while Parliament continues to possess the power of voting the supplies for the Army, and of passing the Mutiny Act, it is useless to say that its constitutional power over the Army is not ample and complete. But you would find that you would have to deal with a different state of circumstances if you were to determine that noble Lords and honourable Gentlemen, as well as Officers in the Army, should have to look to the Ministry of the day for the introduction of their sons to the service, and for their subsequent promotion. . . . I say that such an arrangement would be as fatal to the efficiency of the Army as it would ultimately be unsatisfactory to the people generally of this country. An idea has got abroad that the management of the patronage and discipline of the Army is in the hands of an officer not himself directly appointed by Parliament, and, therefore, that in his case no responsibility at all to Parliament exists. There never was a more erroneous impression. An idea has also got

difficulty in publishing it. Lord Panmure will consult the Cabinet on this point to-morrow.

Your Majesty's commands in regard to the Victoria Cross shall be forthwith attended to. The alterations made by Your Majesty are very great improvements upon its appearance.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

February 22, 1856.

I have received yours of the 9th inst., and I have scarcely a moment to write to you. Your public despatches are most satisfactory, and your prudent dealing in regard to your transport animals gives us just confidence in your administrative powers. The peace is assuming a definite shape, and, from all I hear from Paris, Russia is ready to yield all our points. Your despatch about the press I can scarcely publish, but as there will be time enough to do something to counteract the evils you mention before any new operation is undertaken, I will use it as a means of doing good.

Peace assuming a definite shape.

You are quite right to restrain your doctors, and I hope if you catch them, or any other gents giving their opinions *ultra crepidam*, that you will pull them up.

I write in great haste to get down to the House, as the

abroad that, because the patronage of the Army is in the hands of an officer in the position of the Commander-in-Chief, it is exercised unfairly, and even that it is exercised in obedience to some secret influence on the part of the Crown itself; but a greater mistake than this again was never made. It may be that, in dealing with this question, I am taking what is at present the unpopular side; but I am quite sure that, if I were to advocate a system which should place the patronage of the Army in the hands of the Minister of the Crown, we should have Parliament interfering from day to day in the administration of the discipline of the Troops. I believe we should then establish a practice which could not tend to promote the interests of the Nation, or to uphold the dignity of the Crown. Therefore, looking at all the circumstances of the case, and convinced as I am from experience that the present system is the one best calculated to give satisfaction in the end, it is my intention to support the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and to maintain, as far as I can, the connection which the Crown at present holds through the Commander-in-Chief with the Army. I can see no constitutional objection to that course!

—*Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, vol. cxi. pp. 1033, *et seq.*

Estimates are on in the House of Commons. We had a discussion in the House of Lords last night as to whether the army was to be governed by the Queen or the House of Commons, and I think we have settled that question for some time.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *February 23, 1856.*

I received on the 19th inst. the printed copy of the proceedings; and on the 21st February your telegraph of not relaxing preparations for 25,000 men to Eupatoria; together with your private letters referring to the same subjects, and the single printed sheet of paper. I am not sorry to find, notwithstanding all that may somewhat inconsiderately be dashed off in England, that one business at a time is likely to be taken in hand. We shall probably find that the enemy has made, and will continue, *preparations* for retreat by the Tchongar bridge.

Were the
Crimea to be
evacuated,
enemy would
probably
occupy it at
once.

We may probably find also that his retreat will not be further carried than is necessary, and that he would put himself in a position to re-occupy the Crimea the moment we evacuate it.

This, however, leads to larger speculations than are at present necessary. In the plan of operations, however, I think two things are to be seen—one of which my letters will have referred to, and to which you have written in answer, and to this I will first refer.

Objections to
the plan of oper-
ations from
Eupatoria, and
the part to be
played in them
by England.

The operations from Eupatoria are to be the vital ones against the Russian army in the Crimea: you give to France this, the high service, the culminating point of the war in the Crimea: the Commander-in-Chief of the French army is there; the Sardinian army is placed under his orders; the Sardinian Commander-in-Chief is also present at this, the main movement of the war.

England is to send a detachment of its army which, if small, is under the wing of others; if large, it becomes the main strength of the English army, and the Commander

of the Forces is positively excluded from its command. According to this, any accident to me here should necessitate the withdrawal of the General Officer, probably the next senior, placed in command of those detached troops; for he would then become at once the Commander of the Forces. Circumstances might render even necessary the presence of the Commander of the Forces with that, perhaps the main, body of the army. What seems to be acquiesced in presupposes a want of cordiality, a want of unity, which, if truly to be attributed to the presence of the Commander of the Forces, must happen the moment the operation has become successful—for the armies will then join.

I scarcely think the position, the positive limit, is one in which England ought to see her Commander, if his position is to represent the main body of her army; we are here in front of a wall, waiting for the Commanders-in-Chief of our Allies to open the way for us. This is the way in which Europe may look at our situation.

How Europe
may view it.

A small detachment of our army to the main point puts us nationally in inferiority *vis-à-vis* our Allies: a large one—mentioned by you as 25,000—is, I presume, infantry with artillery; and the whole cavalry will be added—that is, it is the best part of the English army, and must probably be four divisions.

I need not conceal from you what my personal feelings might be, 'cabin'd, cribb'd, confined' by arrangements for which there can be no more reason now than during any previous part of the war. Still less, indeed, for there could be no question as to superiority of rank and service now.

Personal
feelings of the
writer.

Personal feelings may have to give way, should give way, to public duty; nevertheless they are entertained, though sacrificed, and they may be known as a fair subject for consideration.

But it is not from mere personal considerations these circumstances are mentioned—though in my position, with officers senior to me in this army, they are rendered peculiarly strong—it is in the fair consideration of higher things, and of the impolicy of fettering any Commander

when events might change in a moment every condition which gave rise to arrangements insisted on from a distance.

Though in a position made difficult, as every military man can understand, you will find me ready to do my best for the Service—to disregard, if possible, hopes long cherished, peculiarly valuable, perhaps necessary, to me from what has happened to me before Sebastopol; and from the presence of senior officers, one particularly, made junior to me in rank, though long senior to me in the Service.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 24, 1856.

Submits draft
of warrant for
appointment
of Board of
Inquiry.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward for Your Majesty's perusal and comments the drafts of the proposed Warrant, hereafter to be submitted to Your Majesty, for the appointment of the Board of General Officers to inquire into the matters contained (and complained of) in the Report of Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. Your Majesty may probably desire to retain the draft, in which case Your Majesty's approval signified to Lord Panmure will enable him to have the drafts drawn up for Your Majesty's signature.

The Cabinet went carefully over the wording of this important document, and care has been taken to recognise in it Your Majesty's position as the Head of the Army.

No intimation has been given to any of the officers named as members of the Board, as the service is considered one of duty required by Your Majesty, which admits of no excuse except that of illness.

SIR W. CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, February 24 and 26, 1856.

Somehow or other I was in a hurry when I read your last private letter to me, which referred to the formation of

the two armies, and I did not pay sufficient attention to the latter part of it, which mentioned the printed paper which you had just received from your Secretary, and which you enclosed to me. I took it into my head that it referred, or rather was similar, to the one previously sent, and did not look at the details until after the post was gone. Although I might have the same feelings about the policy of having the English Commander present, with the main part of the English army, in the place where the French and Sardinian armies are doing the vital business of the campaign with their Commanders, yet I do not know that I should have written so fully in the tone in my letter had I looked more into the details of the printed paper, and not taken my impression so entirely from your own letter and the telegraph received at the same time.

Acknowledges
opinions in last
letter to have
been expressed
after insuffi-
cient perusal
of last docu-
ments received.

This will account to you for an apparent inattention of mine in overlooking things mentioned in the printed paper.

The whole of the proceedings of the Council are very interesting.

February 26, 1856.—On Sunday afternoon at 1 o'clock, the weather being dry, but somewhat cool, the infantry of the army was paraded in marching order along the high brow overlooking the plain of Balaclava. I was very anxious to do this, and to do it almost in winter: you will understand many good reasons, not merely military, for this; but these reasons fitted in well with the purely military ones,—viz., that the officers and men should see and realise their own and their comrades' health, strength, and efficiency; that the whole of them, side by side, should give a mutual conviction of power, that they should see and feel that 'there they were,' firelocks and bayonets, telling their own truth as to the care of the Government, the interest of England in them, and the present result of 20,000 men swinging along in high health and preparation. To none was the parade more at the right time and in the right place than to the men themselves.

Parade of
British
Infantry.

Though it was to be a question of form and parade on my part, I was not going to lose the part of the greatest

Description of
the Infantry
parade.

interest—the picturesque and fine movements of long thin lines, distant bands, open and quarter distance columns, the massive look and regular approach to their ground from the different camps. And it was very fine. There was no fuss—I had been with General Windham and some of the Staff the day before to point out the ground on the brow, to which the slightly-rounded and long valleys and hills lead from the camps. The Divisions took up their ground following the line of the brow, forming one obtuse angle about the centre, where there is a little rocky knoll; from right to left they were 1st Highland (one brigade), 2nd, 3rd, 4th Light, and in quarter distance contiguous columns of regiments. Marshal Pélissier came in his carriage, but did not come down the line; I had his carriage placed near the rocky knoll, where he got out. General Durando came with me. When the Divisions were all placed by the Staff, according to those previous arrangements which, on the ground, I left entirely to them, I went to the right, and banishing the usual forms of having this Staff officer here, and another there, I rode to the General in front of his Division and requested that the General officers would come with me, that Commander officers should place themselves between the intervals, and that we should see the whole front of the Division clear of every one. We then rode closely down the front. This happened with each Division in succession. One brigade only of the Highland Division was present—it had rained at the Varnoubtka Pass, the 2nd brigade was counter-ordered by Sir C. Campbell, but there being time to bring the 1st brigade, he ordered it. The brigade under General Warren at Balaclava was also absent. We forgot about its being Sunday, and that there was no work going on at Balaclava.

Inspection by
Codrington
and Pélissier.

After passing down the line of columns, the troops marched past in columns at half distance: it was beautiful to see the mass and succession of red coats and bayonets descending the inclined crest of the approach towards the centre point. All the space was cleared in front of Marshal Pélissier; the whole marched past with great steadiness, with good life and step, and showed them all in efficiency—

and you may conclude it was a fine and gratifying sight to every Englishman there. It took exactly an hour.

They were formed, after marching past, on one of the long brows facing towards the camp, in a mass of columns each Division, but Divisions contiguous; and having again cleared a good space for the centre, at which Marshal Péliissier and General Durando were, they marched by in quarter-distance columns by Battalions: all again very good. And so they separated from this centre back to the various camps.

I think you will be glad to feel in England that, almost in the winter, your army can show itself in strength and efficiency; and, with many foreigners, and many accounts that are published, this trifling parade is, however, somewhat of a parade for other nations besides our own. I showed our Enfield rifle to Péliissier and Durando as the arm of the whole infantry except one brigade.

Far-reaching
effect of the
parade.

You may imagine a pretty large motley crowd of officers, of all the Sunday population of Balacava and camp: the Russians will fancy we have a large body of cavalry, somewhat irregular in its movements.

Both Colonel Wetherall and myself imagined that Colonel M'Murdo, as Director-General in England, was directing the Land Transport; but we shall want extension, pray remember, for the Turkish contingent, the foreign troops, Sultan's Cossacks, etc., and I have authorised Wetherall to increase his purchase of animals, and I have authorised General Vivian to buy or hire at Baltchick whatever he can for his purposes: the supervision of contracts in England by Government seems defective; tools, waggon axles—how is it some one is not only called responsible, but *made* responsible for their examination, their goodness? It is better perhaps not to have a contract if it can't be examined—let a tradesman be well paid and have an order direct—let his name be known, responsibly—or let the examination be strict, and by some one who knows the sort of thing.

Land Trans-
port.

Defective
supervision of
Government
contracts.

Remember, notwithstanding what I have said in my letter to you last mail, that you will find me ready to put

Writer places
himself un-
reservedly at
disposal of
Government.

myself in the position which the Government settles for this army or any part of it. You may have more information, more motives, more necessities than I am aware of; and whether I might have differed in opinion or not, you may depend upon my acting with an ALLIED feeling.

A measure
to prevent
publication of
details.

You will see I have given a general order about the publication in newspapers of details. It is not, as you will see, written angrily or disagreeably; but as it is sure to be published in the newspapers in England, I think it will do good there, whilst I consider something of the sort a positive necessity here. Hornets, wasps, and gnats will come about my ears doubtless: I must make up my mind to this, but I mean to carry out what I think *necessary*, I say again, NECESSARY, in stopping the publication of such details. Look at that about the ditch, etc., at Kertch; though I say 'old and incorrect,' I have little doubt it is a correct and, therefore, most vitally important piece of gratuitous information to an enemy.

The French army is suffering from sickness—scurvy a good deal.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

February 25, 1856.

Effect of peace
prospects on
Commissariat
contracts.

Peace progresses apace, and from all we hear from Paris Russia will make no difficulties in acceding to our demands in everything. The only thing that boggles it is the large slice of Bessarabia demanded by Austria, which has given her more annoyance than all the other proposals put together. Under these circumstances, although I cannot feel myself justified in giving you official instructions to discontinue any expenditure which, if the war were to go on, you would necessarily incur, nor shall desist from my own preparations in forwarding your reinforcements, still you may quietly so arrange with the Commissary-General that, in the event of peace, we may not find ourselves burdened with large or extensive contracts. The course you have so prudently pursued in regard to the Land Transport horses is an example of what I mean. It is possible that

what now seems so fair at Paris may overcloud, and then we shall be in no worse position to open the campaign.

The report of M'Neill and Tulloch is giving us no end of trouble, and every attempt is being made to ruin Airey and Gordon; but I will uphold them as far as I can, for, though many things might have been better, I conscientiously believe they did their utmost to perform the arduous duties with which they were charged.

Sir E. Lyons will invest all those in the Crimea who have not yet got the order, both in our own service and in the French. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe will very likely apply to you for an officer to command at Erzeroum, should Omar not go there in person. You must give him the one who will maintain the credit of our name and arms, and you can do this without further reference home. He must be an administrator as well as capable of commanding men.

The conferences open to-day, and by Friday I shall be able to tell you whether an armistice or a suspension of arms, or what, is agreed to. I send you confidentially the instructions sent to Pélissier, but you had better not let him know that you have them unless he is so informed by his own Government and informs you. I sent to Lord Clarendon my despatch to you of the 11th inst., in which I communicated to you the plan of operations. Probably the French Government to whom it was transmitted may have sent this to Pélissier. You will of course make all your own arrangements for carrying out your own part of the expedition, but it will be consequent on his completing his portion first.

You are, I imagine, getting up your reserves from Malta, and all arrangements should be ready for bringing the Cavalry from the Bosphorus as soon as you can put them up in the field. I mentioned to you formerly that the portion destined for the Eupatoria expedition should go direct to their destination when wanted. The Queen has seen your trophies and has already found place for the two great bells, which took her fancy amazingly. The guns are poor things, but they are valuable as spoils of war.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

February 26, 1856.

The Conference not to relax warlike preparations.

I was in hopes to have had it in my power to give you some information on the state of things in Paris, but the Conference only sat yesterday, and we are not yet in possession of the results of its deliberations. You may rely on this, that, however probable peace may be, there are depths in these conferences in which the best formed expectations may founder in a moment. Our duty is, therefore, to keep everything in full vigour and activity, and you must reinforce your ranks from Malta, organise your troops for Eupatoria, and make arrangements for getting your cavalry once more to the front. I send you official despatches announcing the armistice, and intimating the early despatch of artillery. Unless I hear much more definitely from Paris, I shall despatch 5000 infantry reinforcements to Malta instantly, and in the course of March I hope to embark all the horses you require, and likewise some further regiments of Germans; there are from 2 to 3000 Italian legionaries will be ready for you very shortly, under British officers, and I hear a very good account of them. I have endeavoured to put the question of the Press on a proper basis in a despatch to you. We must leave it to the Commander of the Forces to deal with these gents, trusting to his discretion when to pull the strings tight or relax them. My own opinion is that it is quite possible to manage them, but impossible to ignore them. The public will go with you if the case is properly handled, and whether they do or not, the Government will stand by you.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

February 26, 1856.

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's note, and is certainly disappointed and annoyed at the decision of the Cabinet to have the Court of Inquiry open, as she appre-

hends that much mischief will result from it. She trusts Lord Hardinge and the Judge Advocate will be consulted upon the subject.

Disapproval
of decision to
have Court of
Inquiry open.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 26, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and is sorry to learn Your Majesty's annoyance at the course which the Cabinet have felt themselves constrained to take, in consequence of the certain conviction of not being able to withstand the pressure which, to their knowledge, is threatened on all sides should the precedent of 1809¹ not be followed. Lord Panmure has purposely avoided involving Lord Hardinge in the responsibility of this course.

If the Court had been made close, and public opinion and a vote of Parliament, or even a menace of such a vote, had forced its doors, Your Majesty will perceive that great damage would have followed to its prestige and dignity, which may be maintained notwithstanding it has been thrown open to the public.

As to the
Court of
Inquiry being
an open one.

PROPOSED SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
FOR THE EARL OF CLARENDON

The members of the Council of War, who have been deputed to repair to Paris on the part of Her Majesty's Government, having returned to England, were requested to attend at the War Department this morning, where they were met by Lord Palmerston and other members of the Government.

Appendix to
Correspondence of Feb-
ruary 1856.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge stated briefly the proceedings of the Council at Paris, and the general impression made on his own mind, and on those of his colleagues, of the feelings of the Emperor and the

¹ That of the Commission following on the Convention of Cintra.

French Generals in regard to the operations of the forthcoming campaign.

Lord Panmure laid before the meeting the various reports made by His Royal Highness of the proceedings at Paris, which contained the opinions of the Admirals and Generals, both English and French, on the character and direction of future operations, and concluded with a reasoned opinion of His Majesty the Emperor himself, founded upon a review of those above-mentioned.

After some general observations on the contents of these communications and documents, the meeting proceeded to discuss the project set forth in the memorandum of His Imperial Majesty, in the great principles of which they generally concurred.

They at once responded to His Imperial Majesty's opinion, that to abandon the Crimea in the face of the enemy, was an operation perilous at all events to a portion of the Allied Army, and equivalent to the moral disgrace of a defeat.

The only way to leave the Crimea with honour is to drive the enemy from it first; then it may be abandoned with calmness and dignity, as circumstances may dictate, and if it be thought to be on political grounds expedient to do so.

The meeting concurred in the expediency of forming two distinct armies, under the command of two Generals-in-Chief, independent of each other, and acting from different bases.

They agreed in the formation of an army of 140,000 men of one nation, with Eupatoria for its base, and of another of 116,000 men, with its present base.

The former of these armies may consist of 80,000 French, 20,000 Sardinians, 40,000 English = 140,000.

Of these 20,000 would form a reserve, and the remainder move as suggested by the Emperor.

The meeting concurred in the expediency of moving the French force of 80,000 to Eupatoria by degrees, and as soon as they have established themselves, the Sardinians and English should be suddenly thrown on the respective points assigned to them.

While, on the one hand, precipitation is unnecessary, and would be a great mistake, the meeting was earnest in the expression of opinion that to defer the movement till the 15th of May would be a serious waste of time. One great object of the movement is that it should be sudden, and so strike greater terror into the enemy.

No armistice can be declared for three weeks. Why should not gradual movements of a portion of the French army be made before that? The remainder could be transported immediately on its conclusion, which should in no case be later than the 31st of March. The meeting saw no reason why all arrangements might not be made so as to commence this movement against the enemy by the middle of April at the latest, being convinced that the 15th of May is, as before stated, much too late.

They have several grounds upon which they rest this opinion. In the first place, by waiting till the 15th of May, the Allies give much unnecessary time to the enemy to make preparations for resistance, and even to move troops from a distance to reinforce their ranks. Vegetation will then have commenced, and they will thereby be relieved to a considerable extent from the heavy burden of carrying supplies of forage for their cavalry and artillery horses, and thus they will be able to bring into the field a much larger force of these their two favourite arms. Again, the progress of vegetation, which will so largely benefit the enemy, will not give corresponding advantages to the Allies, who can convey hay and barley by sea to the point nearest the army, and thence by land transport along its line. Then it is of immense importance that the blow which is looked for from this strategic movement should be immediate in its effect, whether it lead to a trial of strength in the field or to the forced retreat of the Russian army.

The sooner a battle is fought, if such is to be the issue of the movement, the better for the Allies, whose army is in good heart, having been well wintered, while that of the enemy has been lying out, and, with all their skill in encountering difficulties, cannot but have suffered much hardship.

If, however, a retreat is the consequence, the sooner this is forced the better, before the rigours of winter are absorbed in the approach of spring, and while supplies are more difficult of carriage to an army retreating in despair than they will be to one advancing with hope.

But, whether a battle precede a retreat or not, every day gained in driving the enemy from the Crimea will be of importance. It will leave the Allies at liberty to discuss and to execute at leisure any plan for a partial or a total abandonment of the Crimea, should such be deemed desirable. It will leave them at liberty to direct their forces against other portions of the enemy's territory; and it will, above all, afford time before the heat of summer shall have rendered that country unhealthy to European troops for an English force to be thrown into Georgia, to act as a support to Omar Pasha, who might advance from Erzeroum to recover the fortress of Kars, and that portion of his Imperial Master's territories now in the hands of the enemy.

The meeting felt even more strongly the necessity of early and decisive action on this great flank movement than I have been able to express, and desired me to impress their convictions upon your Lordship, in order that they may be conveyed to His Imperial Majesty, and meet with his cordial support.

Should this view be entertained by our Allies, it appeared to the meeting unnecessary to suggest, as they would otherwise have done, the consideration of a movement into Georgia, contemporaneously with the advance from Eupatoria, as the calculation of the number of available troops would leave a sufficient force disposable for this object.

By an early movement, however, as above urged, the whole object of the Crimean campaign would be secured, if not finally effected, by the middle of May, the period at first fixed for the commencement of the work.

Having stated their views with regard to the army of Eupatoria, the meeting turned their attention to that of Sebastopol, which, according to His Imperial Majesty's calculation, would consist of 116,000 men.

The duty of this army will be of a double character. At first it will maintain a defensive position, so as to cover the lines and *place d'armes* of both armies, and this position will probably be from the head of the harbour round by the Tchernaya to Kamara, and thrown back so as to cover Balaclava.

For this 70,000 men would be sufficient, leaving 46,000 for a reserve, or disposable for reconnaissance by Baidar, and as a threatening or even attacking force on the enemy's left.

This army will, however, have to be especially vigilant of the movements of the enemy; for, should he weaken his force on the Mackenzie Heights, in order to meet the movements from Eupatoria, or show symptoms of retreat, the army of Sebastopol will then have to assume the offensive, and may very materially aid in converting the retirement of the enemy into a confused retreat.

Of the early success of the plan the meeting entertained no doubt, and desired me to convey their views to Your Lordship in this shape, for the purpose of being conveyed formally to the notice of His Majesty the Emperor and the French Government.

Should Her Majesty's Government receive the concurrence of the French Government in these views, they will be prepared to send out orders by the 4th of February, to hasten all military arrangements to ensure their success; and Sir Edmund Lyons will be instructed to have every means made available for the speedy transport of the army.

(Signed) PANMURE.

CHAPTER XV

MARCH 1856

At the beginning of the month, orders for the cessation of firing from advanced posts were issued by the Generals of the Allied and Russian Armies. But the provisions of the proposed armistice, as interpreted by General Lüders, proved objectionable to Codrington, owing to their restriction of the cruisers of the Allied Fleet from interfering with the movements of Russian troops, artillery, and convoys. (Codrington to Admiral Fremantle, March 3rd, and to Lord Panmure, March 4th.) Thus the actual signing of the armistice did not take place until the middle of the month. The picturesque and animated scene which followed is described by Codrington, March 15th.

As early as March 7th, Panmure, of whose caution in this respect we have had ample evidence, had advised Codrington of the probability of peace being concluded. Slightly later he adds that, as 'the Conferences are fast verging to a mutual agreement on all the main points,' he is himself 'drawing in all his horns, as speedily but as quietly as he can.' On the 17th of the month, he receives leave from the Queen to go to Scotland for a few days on affairs of his own—this being his first leave of absence since he had taken up office more than thirteen months before. About the same time a change in Codrington's occupation becomes apparent. The erection of military works at Balaclava, the dismantling and destruction of buildings on the South Side, and the removal of captured guns, had, so far, occupied the army in the Crimea; but

the Commander's attention now began to be turned to stopping reinforcements and to arrangements for evacuation and for sending home the army. His letter of March 29th sketches a plan for its embarkation.

During a good part of this month the weather was severe, and the French, who were ill-provisioned, suffered considerably in consequence. Nevertheless an offer of British surplus stores, at cost price, was refused. Throughout the armistice the relations of British, French, and Russian troops remained friendly.

On the night of March 17th a deplorable accident occurred, by which sixteen men of the Army Works Corps were burned to death in their huts.

On March 30th, the signing of the Treaty of Paris brought the war to an end.

Meantime, at home, Sir De Lacy Evans had brought up a Motion in the House of Commons for the Abolition of Purchase in the Army. It was strongly denounced by Lord Panmure, who, nevertheless, favoured the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the matter—a method of treatment which would have the advantage of 'preventing so important a subject being dealt with in a manner at all trenching on Her Majesty's authority.'

On March 13th, in bitterly cold weather, the Queen had graciously gone in person to Woolwich to welcome soldiers returning from the war.

Among other subjects treated of in the month's letters are, the Army Works Corps—never popular among soldiers of Codrington's period,—the cessation of the War Allowance and provision for soldiers thrown out of employment by the disbanding of the Foreign Legions, new fortifications at Portsmouth, and barracks at Dover, Gosport, and Colchester.

Owing to the manner in which the Foreign Enlistment Act had been put into practice, Britain's relations with the

United States had become strained; hence the sending of troops direct to Canada from the Crimea is considered.

SIR W. CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 1, 1856.

Protest against
recall of
Wetherall.

Just as the post goes, arrives the telegraph to send Wetherall home—this in the midst of most important organisation of the Land Transport. It is bad for the public service—it is most essential he should remain—who is to decide all the detail of organisation of the Divisions? We are in the middle of a total change—the executive has to go away!

I do hope you can telegraph to me that this need not be.

Your telegraph admits restrictions on the Navy of preventing convoys or even big guns moving along the Spit of Arabat or elsewhere: surely you do not mean this?—and to let us possibly see on the 31st of March such things safe out of our reach by our own giving in.¹

I shall maintain my view till I get contrary orders.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 3, 1856.

The Queen returns these samples of the Victoria Cross, having chosen the one, into the case of which she has placed a paper. She wishes later to have one to keep, and wishes that one should also be kept as a pattern at the War Office, as the Tradesmen invariably alter the original pattern agreed upon if they are not watched.

¹ Awkwardly expressed, but see for explanation Codrington's letter of March 4th.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 4, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the feeling in the House of Commons will enable the Government to resist Sir De Lacy Evans' motion,¹ and they intend so to do, but at the same time to hold out the expectation that Your Majesty will be advised to appoint a commission to inquire into the subjects, should such be deemed expedient.

This will prevent so important a question being dealt with in a manner at all trenching upon Your Majesty's authority.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON.

[Copy undated.]

I have two mails from you, but I am sorry to say that I am little able to notice fully your private letters which have arrived with them. . . .

The Peace draws slowly on. I believe we shall have it after a little more time spent in 'war of words,' still we must go on with our preparations. Your destruction gives satisfaction, and your getting the guns from Sevastopol is a good deed.

In regard to our own old damaged guns, you are right not to leave them for lamp-posts. Your best way is to put them on the deck of some of the vessels and throw them into the sea, where they cannot be recovered.

¹ For abolition of purchase in the army. It may be necessary to remind the reader that the Whig statesmen of the day, though they were Army reformers, held the opinion that the Army should be officered by men who had a stake in the country, preferring such to a purely professional class, of whom at that period it was still apprehended that they might in certain circumstances become a source of danger to the State. Hence such statesmen as Lords John Russell, Palmerston, Grey, and Panmure, supported the purchase system, believing it to produce the class of officers which on the whole was the most desirable. They also held that the Army should be governed by the Crown through the responsible Ministers, rather than by Parliament.

SIR W. CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *March 4, 1856.*

Protests
against addi-
tions made to
terms of
armistice.

If you had wished to leave the armistice, the terms of it, to be arranged by the Generals, you had better not have let any one else go into a detail of words that may cause, and may have caused, serious difficulty. I allude to the telegraphic despatch from yourself to me, and that from Sir Charles Wood to Admiral Grey.

If you had left it as we got it from Paris, '*convenez d'une suspension d'armes avec le Général en chef de l'armée Russe.*' '*L'armistice reste sans effet sur les blocus,*' '*les armées conserveront leurs positions respectives en s'absténant de tout acte agressif,*'—these terms are general and simple, and the details by land and sea would have been left to us on the spot.

But no; when everything would have gone well with this simplicity, there is sent to the Admiral, and subsequently to me, '*Our vessels are not to attack anything on shore.*' '*The naval forces are to abstain from any attack on forts or troops, or other persons on shore.*'

Objections to
which these
additions are
open.

Do you know to what my signature to such words would lead? Do you not see what it admits, and the places along the coasts where such admissions might be tolerably vital to us hereafter? Heavy guns, convoys of provisions, troops from Russia might come along the hard road of the Spit of Arabat the whole way to the fort: they might erect earthworks and arm them with those heavy guns whilst our vessels were within musquet shot, and they laughing at us under the terms of an armistice! The same might happen at the mouths of any river, or open spaces on the west coast. From the moment I read the words, I decided that nothing short of orders from England should induce me to put my name to it.

But then the Admiral had considered himself bound to issue his orders to the fleet not to fire upon anything on shore. Fortunately there is no Russian Admiral with whom an armistice has been made in those terms, and the

Russians may not hear of an order which I have suggested—if necessary to be given—might be kept secret to senior officers.

No armistice has been as yet signed by any one; proposals, discussions, only have been signed by the Chiefs of the Staffs, and General Lüders probably communicates by telegraph with Petersburg.

But, during the proposals and discussions, a cessation of fire *by the army* has been put in general orders by me, and similar orders have been given by French, Sardinian and Russian Generals. Cessation of fire by the Army has been ordered.

I have entered so fully, and sent copies of my letters publicly, that I need not refer further to it; but I enclose you a letter which I have written to Admiral Fremantle, and which will explain my view of the case.

A private letter from General Vivian, of the 27th February, says that, hearing of the enemy retiring along the Spit of Arabat, he had requested Captain Ryder, in command of the naval force, to send a gunboat:—he left Kertch with three gunboats the previous day. Letters of 2nd March from Vivian say nothing of their return, and I should not be at all surprised at these having been firing upon them.¹ Of course they would, if they had received no orders to the contrary; and this they could not have done, as Admiral Fremantle did not receive his telegraph till the 29th February.

But it is ludicrous to suppose that our blockade by the Navy is to be a question of Russian ships and boats only, on the sea: the main good of our blockade now is against the land, and we are to give that up by an armistice during a very important month of preparation! Surely this can never have been intended; but I suspect they know well at St. Petersburg the words, and the value of them; and I have no doubt that, after telegraph communication with his Emperor, General Lüders coupled dexterously (but unavailingly as far as my and Pélissier's signature went) the cessation of aggressive acts mentioned at Paris, with the power of continuing works and movements, mentioned Error of allowing blockade to be active only against ships.

¹ *i.e.*, the gunboats firing at the enemy.

by us here. The mention of the continuance of our operations against anything coming under our naval fire was received with a little wincing at the first conference at Tractir; and now we can understand why. Do not admit any such limitation to the guns of our fleet, for it will make the armistice a positive disadvantage to us, and of proportionate gain to the enemy.

I have ordered the troops up from Malta that are drafts belonging to this army, in order to take advantage of possibly the fleet coming up, and to make room for others which you may wish to send there.

I have your letter about the Artillery and the Horse Artillery. General Dacres tells me the H. A. has six-pounders: I feel glad of this, for the officers of experience, and Lord Hardinge himself, have seen on service the superiority in activity of pursuit of the six-pounder over the heavier nine-pounder.

Superiority of
the six-pounder
when in
pursuit.

You will see I have issued a general order here about the information in newspapers: it was a good opportunity for me to take advantage of; it was necessary, and I think will pave the way for your publishing, if so settled, the groundwork of it in the despatch which you lay before the Cabinet.

[Enclosure in the preceding.]

GENERAL CODRINGTON TO ADMIRAL FREMANTLE

March 3, 1856.

The telegraphic despatches which you have received, as well as myself, contain words, which, if acted upon, or coming to the knowledge of the Russians, will put the Allies to a very great disadvantage.

Against re-
stricting naval
forces of the
Allies during
the armistice.

I cannot believe it to be the intention that the Naval Forces of the Allies should be put in a worse position by an Armistice, and give a better position in proportion to the enemy.

Such will be the case, if, during the whole of this month,

the cruisers of the Allied Fleets, which possibly the season may allow to enter the Sea of Azov, are restricted from interruption to the assembly, the movements of troops, or heavy guns, on spots which hereafter it might be essential for future success to find unoccupied—and this to happen also in sight and in the range of our guns.

The Despatch to me states that the Generals of the Armies are to arrange the Armistice: it is in the sense that the Naval Blockade is to be maintained. I consider that the Naval Blockade does not refer merely to the enemy's vessels at sea; it refers to the power of the Allied cruisers—the most essential and valuable power of interruption and command on the low coasts and exposed shores, a command which might be vital to success hereafter, and which might be marred by our voluntarily giving it up for a month just previous to the commencement of hostilities.

I therefore, in the communications with Marshal Pélissier and to General Lüders on the part of the Allies, have positively refused to agree to any such surrender of our power over the movements of troops, artillery and convoys, on any part of the enemy's coast coming under our Naval fire. Codrington
has refused to
agree to this
surrender of
naval power.

No Armistice has as yet been signed:—a cessation of fire from the advanced posts has been merely ordered on both sides. You mentioned to me the necessity you were under to give orders to the fleet for no attack or firing to take place on anything on shore.

I can only represent to you the possible consequences of a restriction which I cannot think is contemplated in its effects by the Allied governments.

If you consider yourself bound to give the orders, perhaps you might consider the policy of at all events letting the Senior officer on stations keep them secret until instructions may be received from England.

It cannot possibly be intended that hostilities are to cease in such a manner as to give this uncalled for advantage to the enemy.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

*March 7, 1856.*Peace more
probable.

I am in receipt of your last note, and am sorry to perceive that you are not reconciled to your position in event of the war proceeding and the two armies being formed. Your determination to follow the views of the Government in spite of your own personal feeling makes my regret all the stronger. Looking at the operations as a whole, I assure you that I regarded the chances of your being the assailant of the enemy to be fully equal to that of the French Commander. But I will not enter into further argument, as it is pretty clear now that peace is about to ensue, and your first movement will be homewards. I have telegraphed to you to pull in your horns, and you may tell your Commissary-General to put some measure on his future arrangements for supply. It will be a serious affair sending home your army, and I wish you would arrange your order of march in your own mind and give me a guess of the time which it will require to evacuate the Crimea and our other positions in the East. I have robbed you of Wetherall, but he really was absolutely necessary to Airey for his defence. My notion of the Land Transport Corps is that, immediately on peace being intimated, you should return all the officers and men to their different regiments, and then I can break up the Corps and remodel it at home at leisure, when you and others will be here to aid me with your experience and advice.

We are all surprised at the condition of your troops, and John Bull is wonderfully reconciled to his expenditure when he sees such results. Do all honour to the French baby when it arrives.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

*Private and Confidential.**Between March 7 and 14, 1856.*

I give this note an extra heading of privacy, as it expresses more forcibly than I have hitherto done my impressions that peace is now inevitable. The conferences are fast verging to a mutual agreement on all the main points, and, when these are defined, I think no differences on minor ones can be made an excuse for interrupting the peaceward course of events. Under these circumstances I am drawing in all my horns here as speedily, but as quietly, as I can. I shall send out no more troops beyond the artillery now under orders, and these you distribute among the Mediterranean garrisons and at Gibraltar in place of men who have been in the war, and who are entitled to come home. You can relieve Sir George MacLean's mind on the subject of stores, as I am quite convinced that you will find a ready market for all you have to spare, and that if you think it prudent you will get a good price for all your Cavalry horses, instead of being at the trouble and expense of bringing them home. You will turn in your mind the question of sending the 10th and 12th back to India, and let me know your opinion thereupon.

Writer's impression that peace is inevitable.

You would do well to curtail your railway expenditure as soon as you can get definite information of peace, and we can give the necessary notices to all our civil employés, many of whom will, I have no doubt, be glad to take employment abroad with Turkey, Austria, or Russia herself, rather than be brought home, and so we may get them off our hands without payment of bounty. However, this is of course only surmise.

In sending your troops home, I think the least invidious way will be to observe the order in which they went out, and to lay down the rule, 'First out, first home.' I am concocting a plan so as to bring the men home through

Plans for bringing home troops.

France. It will save money and time and all the discomfort of the Bay of Biscay voyage, and we shall have quarters prepared for them by the previous disembodiment of the Militia. Some of the last regiments which joined you will have to go to Malta to take up the duties now done by the Militia.

The principal regret I feel in this sudden peace is that our foreign levies have had no trial in the field, but it cannot be helped. You will of course not betray this free communication to you of what are strictly Cabinet secrets, but I could not think of keeping you uninformed, as you will have much credit in retiring your army, and it would be unfair not to give you every opportunity of thinking over it.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 8, 1856.

Improved
regulations
in Barrack
Department.

I return your Memorandum on the Works in the Barrack Department, which I have read with the very greatest pleasure, as it ensures a better state for the future. The allowing each Commanding Engineer the free expenditure of small sums, without entering into a correspondence, which costs the country more in labour, stationery, and postage than the whole expense is worth, and prevents that 'stitch in time' which is 'to save nine' to be given, is an immense improvement; equally so the purchase of stores on the spot.

I hope that the rule about plans, and the vigorous prosecution of the works sanctioned, will be extended also to the Fortification Department.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *March 8, 1856.*

Rather a bitter additional winter is come suddenly upon us; snow on the ground still, and the thermometer, with a cold northerly wind, is at 22°. It came down a real fall of

snow again on the 27th February, again on the 28th, but with thawing weather, and everything in a mess ; then hard and cold, then, on the 4th, a regular deep snow-storm, which, continuing at intervals, with a gale of wind, gave us the drifts and *poudré* of a Canadian winter ; the earth, however, was warm, the gale from the S.W. was thawing everything rapidly, when, yesterday and to-day, some more sleet, with a northerly wind and thermometer at 22°, have made us feel that winter has not yet given up its hold of the Crimea. With this weather it has been impossible to do anything but preliminaries of work ; a company of sappers is encamped on the west of Balaclava, tracing out the works of the batteries and lines ; but to camp many men there at present would necessitate probably as much work, to take care of themselves in this severe weather, as would be obtained rather later for the main purpose when the climate is more to be trusted.

A return of
winter weather
—impedes
progress of
works at
Balaclava.

I have requested Colonel Staunton, R.E., to be placed in communication with Sir Colin Campbell as to the maintenance and improvements of the lines or batteries in front of, and to the east of, Balaclava. I have about 40 Russian guns here on the plateau, and shall probably have 70 retained altogether, for replacing our own now in position. In order to move the Russian guns both from the gun wharf and creek batteries on the level of the water, and from the Redan and Barrack batteries, the Woronzoff road was repaired by a detachment of the Army Works Corps, and openings were made through the rampart and across the ditch of the proper left face of the Redan. The greater part of the Artillery horses have been daily employed during decent weather in this : it is a heavy business, but 406 guns or carronades have already been put on board of ship for England : the detail of what they are will go home, of course, to Woolwich. There are many of the Redan guns which, with their carriages, showing the knocking about of shot upon them, I thought might be interesting ; and one or two big mortars also.

Removal of
captured guns.

I hope you do not let them forget at Paris that we hold power over the quay and buildings of Fort Paul : don't let

Captured buildings of the South Side, and proceedings with regard to them.

us be bound *not* to destroy, unless we get an equivalent. There is any quantity of timber inside them; for the interior is made with timber supports for the great weights of stores above, and they [there] are two stories of them. Very likely the Russians will prefer the pride of having entirely excluded our flag; *bon*; if so, do not let us be bound not to have our command over them: they will make the destruction on our side pretty complete. The *inside* walls of the large barrack buildings at which poor Major Rankine was engaged are all down, and thus, taking the support from one side of the whole roof, it has fallen, inside the outer wall, upon the mines. The outer walls all round form a shell, a screen, for our collection of the wood, which being deal, and all of course squared, may be of use for many things in case of hostility from this side. I keep it as religiously as I can from the purloining habits against wood of every soldier.

The outer walls of these buildings are all prepared for loading the small chambers with powder, and blowing down when they have answered our purpose. I have not prepared the mines for Fort Paul quay and buildings, though the *plan* is ready.

Application of Lüders' proposed armistice to these buildings.

These buildings—the whole of them—and the gun wharf, being under the fire, and in sight of the batteries on the north shore, you see how completely the wording of Lüders' proposed armistice might have prevented our doing even as much as we can now do in spite of any fire; for we should have bound ourselves not to attempt it.

Britain's surplus stores offered to France.

There is no doubt the French troops are suffering much from scurvy, and are in want of many things. I fancy that the authorities must be hampered by not incurring expense: we have given them lime juice, we have offered them our surplus stores, of which we have so much:¹—30,000 rugs, 20,000 blankets, 10,000 waterproof blankets, 100,000 pair of socks and stockings, 10,000 pair of gloves, 6,000 waterproof capes, 100 gutta percha tent floors, 18,000 great

¹ The contrast in staying-power between the French and British troops was very marked. At the beginning of the campaign the advantage was entirely on the side of the French, before its conclusion (as shown above) this had been entirely reversed.

coats (over), 5,000 ditto, 10,000 pair of ammunition boots, 5,000 pair of sabots, 2,500 pair of thigh boots, 1,500 pair of knee boots, 10,000 horse rugs—at the price charged to the Government.

I have not got Pélissier's, or rather Martimprez' answer; for you will understand the object was not to make a public show of such offers, but to be of real service without offence to *amour propre*. You remember they would not take the huts which we offered to them before sending them away to Constantinople.

The *Imperador* arrived at Kasatch with 800 men from Malta.

I just hear that the 'Intendant' of the French army does not wish for any of the articles offered by us. The offer rejected.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 10, 1856.

Nothing could give the Queen greater pleasure than to receive her gallant and noble soldiers, and she will make a point of going to Woolwich to receive them if she knows when it will be. It will be a fine and interesting sight.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 10, 1856.

Having read Mr. Fergusson's republished book, I asked Colonel Foster to call upon me to ask him some questions. I find that Fergusson is quite wrong in his measurements with regard to the distance of the proposed new forts, particularly Elson, from the Gosport Lines, which will be 3000 and not 800 yards.

With regard to Portsmouth and the works to be undertaken this year, I find that for Gomer Fort it requires to have the contract executed before the works can be commenced; up to that point all preliminaries are completed. New Forts in the Portsmouth District.

ELSON FORT; all the drawings and plans have gone in

to your department, and it is required to get the contracts advertised.

The purchase of Land for the great enceinte round Gosport ought to be put at once into the hands of the Land Surveyor. I am afraid that the Lawyers will take a long time about it, as they do about everything, and the sooner begun the better.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 11, 1856.

Queen to go to Woolwich to receive soldiers.

The Queen has informed Sir Hew Ross¹ that she will be at Woolwich at half-past three on Thursday, and wishes only to be told by telegraph if the vessel arrives, or if she is delayed, in which case the Queen would be equally ready to go there on Friday or Saturday.

Sir Hew Ross will communicate with the Admiralty so that everything will be arranged.

Provision for the German Legion after the war.

As (the Queen fears) peace seems now pretty certain to be concluded, she is very anxious to press upon Lord Panmure the question of the German Legion; she trusts that there is no doubt that they will be provided for in the Colonies in the manner he mentioned, as these poor men have many of them lost their nationality, and the Queen is certain that it would be very bad policy to act ungenerously towards them. It would greatly add to the unpopularity in Germany which we owe to our Press, and, on the other hand, if we treat them well, it may have a very good effect on the Continent.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 11, 1856.

The mail this instant arrived brings me your private letter up to the 25th February, and some telegraphic messages. . . .

¹ Lieut.-General of the Ordnance, afterwards Adjutant-General of Artillery.

You will know that I ordered up all drafts from Malta—
 it was quite time if they were to be available by the begin-
 ning of April: you must counter-order from England—on
 second thoughts I will write to General Pennefather to-day
 to hold his hand as to these;¹ for of course if the fleet and
 transports come up full, they will only have to take down
 the same number again—a great loss of transport.

Drafts from
 Malta ordered
 up, on second
 thoughts
 ordered to be
 in readiness.

Your probabilities of peace are so strong that I think
 you will approve of this. . . .

I send you officially the account of our last decision for
 armistice: no answer has yet been received: if peace is so
 probable, I should think the directions to Lüders will be to
 agree to it. I think the French are now glad that we did
 not give in—or rather that I did not give in. The French
 are suffering much, very much, from sickness, arising, I
 think, from want of liberality as to food, and appliances of
 all sorts. A marked contrast to what England has done
 for its army this year, and which would have shown true
 economy if we had had to open the campaign early next
 month.

New decision
 as to armistice.

French Army
 suffering much
 from sickness.

I look upon the attack of England, if it is to be con-
 sidered so, upon General Airey as a 'set for a victim'; I
 think it ungenerous, as it will turn out unjust. Supposing
 there were errors, deficiencies, during a time of great trial
 and difficulty, and under a sudden resolution of necessity
 that we were to pass the winter here: is that to be the
 ground of ruining, for the sake of catching at some victim,
 an officer who served well in other things besides road-
 making, boots or flannel shirts? Is every other service of
 importance with Lord Raglan to be forgotten, his constant
 presence, his constant and intimate work with him on the
 most confidential subjects?

Defence of
 General Airey.

¹ *i.e.*, as to sending up drafts from Malta.

MAJOR-GENERAL WINDHAM TO GENERAL CODRINGTON

(Memorandum.)

HEAD-QUARTERS, *March 14, 1856.*

In accordance with your orders I went with General de Martimprez and Colonel Pettit this day to the bridge of Traktir, where we arrived at 1 P.M.

General Timacheff and M. Ozéreff met us on the part of the Russians, as on the previous occasion.

General Lüders having, as you are aware, consented to our terms as forwarded to him after our receipt of the counter-propositions, we had nothing to do but to make the articles agreed upon binding upon all quarters as regarded the Ottoman forces in the Crimea.

This we did, and then signed the papers.

After the public business was transacted, General Timacheff asked me if I thought the allies were now entitled lawfully to destroy the hospitals, etc., in Sebastopol. I replied, 'Certainly; I do not know that it will be done, but we certainly have the right to do it.'

Although the weather was extremely cold, the meeting passed off most amicably, the younger ones of both sides seeming to think the champagne sent down by Marshal Pélissier and you particularly good, and the cigars by no means to be despised.

The Russians came in more state than on previous occasion, and towards the end of the conference a great many soldiers (say 1500) came down to have a look at us and say good morning to their enemies. They behaved very civilly and well.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 14, 1856.

In a letter from Lord Clarendon received by the Queen yesterday, he says that the Medals for the Queen's army¹

¹ *i.e.*, the French medals.

will be sent off the moment that Colonel Claremont receives the number required from Lord Panmure. As they were to be given at the rate of 10 for every 1000 men, the Queen does not think it would require much time to give the number. The selection of the men had best be left, the Queen thinks, to the Regiments themselves. Would Lord Panmure consult Lord Hardinge with respect to these points at once, and let Marshal Vaillant have the number as soon as possible?

*When will the Lists for the *Légion d'honneur* be finally ready for the Queen to see?*

With respect to the subject of the German Legion, which the Queen mentioned to Lord Panmure the other day, she wishes to add, that it is the officers whose cases are the hardest, and who she trusts something may be done for. They have gone to great expense, and probably will find themselves in a very painful position in their own countries for having ventured to enter the Queen's service. If, therefore, they were not considered or treated with generosity, the effect on the Continent would be most mischievous as regards this Country.

German
Legion.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 14, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that he has decided to ask for 500 War Medals, to cover 50,000 combatants—non-commissioned officers and men.

On the question of selection of men to receive these medals, Lord Panmure will consult with Lord Hardinge and communicate the result to Your Majesty.

Selection of
men to receive
medals.

Lord Panmure is of opinion that Your Majesty, with your wonted capacity, has named the best mode.

The lists for the Legion of Honour are now preparing for submission to Your Majesty. The Emperor has kindly given the few decorations required to reconcile the lists of Sir James Simpson and Sir William Codrington. Lord

Panmure will do all in his power to carry out Your Majesty's views in regard to the officers of the German Legion.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

PARIS, *March 14, 1856.*

As to the Peace
Conference in
Paris.

. . . I suppose we may look upon peace as settled, though I expect trouble to-day at the Conference about the matter of ships to be maintained in the Black Sea. I have had more trouble in fighting Walewski than Orloff.

I must know clearly what conditions to make for facilitating the withdrawal of our troops. Palmerston wants the Russians to withdraw to Perekop, but they are not likely to agree to that, nor do I see that it is necessary.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

14th March 1856.

Since I last wrote you I have received heavy mails from you, and I am sorry to find you are at issue with me on the position selected for you had the war gone on. It is of no use to disguise the approach of peace in writing confidentially to you, and this renders unnecessary any argument on the question, otherwise I think I could have given you good reasons, and as strong prospect of activity, to reconcile you to remaining before Sevastopol. Mind I do not for a moment suppose that you would have failed in one tittle to carry out the instructions of Government, whatever they were.

Prospects of
peace set aside
controversies.

For the same reason, namely the impending of Peace, I forbear from answering some of your public confidential despatches, as I see no good in controversies, although amiable, and much writing—which is always to be avoided. We are all proud of your review and the condition of your men, and we feel grateful to you and all your officers for your application of the means placed at your disposal.

Your press order has only roused the *Times*, and his bark is now worse than his bite. . . .

I have written you a short despatch approving your order, and thereby making myself a partner in any responsibility that may attach to it. The selections from the Siege train landed yesterday at Woolwich, and the Queen went down to receive them.

It was a bitter cold day, but all went off well.

I may possibly miss the mail of Monday week, the 24th, as I am going to look after my own affairs for the first time since 1st February last year.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 15, 1856.

Although your last private letters tell me to keep on preparing to the utmost, yet your telegraph of the 6th of March enables me to hold my hand in many things.

The increasing the amount of troops, particularly horses, in the Crimea, is such a disadvantage—such an useless occupation of transport, not so much in coming up as in going away, that I thought it right to stop the large reinforcements coming from Malta just now, but requesting, or suggesting, that the transport should remain there in readiness to bring them up immediately upon orders from England, or from any known continuance of the war by information from hence. . . .

No doubt you will let me know, when you can give me a hint, of what becomes of the army. If to remain anywhere in the *voisinage* of present events, the nucleus of all establishments will have to be kept up. I only wish to know from a desire not to extend establishments that, as sure as England is England, and railroads exist, will cease with the immediate necessity which created them. Perhaps you might think of Ireland as the place where a Transport and commissariat corps might be maintained—for I imagine movements of troops there depend somewhat upon 'Irish cars.'

I am able to send the copy of the terms of the armistice

War preparations to continue, but reinforcements to be suspended for the present.

Inquiry as to ultimate destination of the Army.

Anticipates discontinuance of Land Transport and Commissariat Establishments.

the yesterday at the Tractir bridge.¹ It was very cold but interesting. I remained on the Fedouchine Spur myself, out of the way or mixing officially in it, but ready in case of any reference being required: and when the conference broke up, I crossed over and joined the mixture of troops of all nations which accompanied the Russians across the plain to the rising ground right of the Tchernaya. Tartar Cossacks, in scarlet and yellow, the usual Cossacks in grey, Russian uniforms of all sorts, helmets, plumes, prancing horses, many of our own and the French varied uniforms, crowds of Russian soldiers—unarmed—(got up for the occasion, I think), all were mixed in the swaying crowd across the plain: some champagne and cigars sent down by Pélissier and myself had had all attention paid to them, and intimacy and 'eternal friendship,' 'au revoir,' and even to kissing became the wind up to the 'good-bye' of the day. All passed off very well.

^{ngs}
^{ol} The remark to Windham² about the only remaining buildings on Fort Paul quay shows the Russians value them: although I am somewhat tempted on my own authority here to say what condition I could make for saving them, yet, having left it so long ago in your hands, I have been debarred. It is very possible it might have, and might still turn the balance in favour of our use of the harbour. And had I to do it, I should have openly told General Lüders that it was for the sake of the sort of bargain that I had not previously destroyed them. I leave you at Paris to make the best of it. They are the only buildings of any size existing in the whole South side of the harbour, and therefore valuable to them as the shelter for the first military re-occupation of Sebastopol.

Our winter is not gone: the cold wind of yesterday brought some snow in the evening—not much—but a

¹ See *Correspondence relating to the Military Expedition to the East (Confidential)*, Pt. viii. pp. 2168, 2169.

² General Timacheff, representing Russia at the signing of the armistice, had asked Windham if he thought the Allies were now entitled to destroy the hospitals, etc., in Sebastopol.—Memorandum of Windham to Codrington, 14th March 1856.

bright sun does not prevent the cold being great to-day from the northerly wind.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 16, 1856.

As the ground for the Military Hospital has been acquired, and a sum of money voted for its erection, the Queen would wish soon to lay the first stone of it herself, and would propose do so when we are in the Isle of Wight during the Whitsuntide holidays. This would leave nearly a month for the completion of the plans and other preliminary proceedings, and would put an end to further delays. The Queen would therefore wish Lord Panmure to give orders to this effect, so that everything may be ready by the middle of May.

The Queen sends Lord Panmure two of the pins which she mentioned to him the other day as a good plan for attaching the Medals or Crosses to the recipients' coats.

She has tried it herself and found it answer extremely well.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

March 17, 1856.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received this morning, and readily grants him leave to go to dear Scotland, which he must be so anxious to do.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 17, 1856.

A conversation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday has convinced me that the notion exists in some quarters that the sum of money taken this year for works

(Barracks, Fortifications, etc., etc.) is too large, and that it may be desirable not to spend it, and to reduce the works!

This renders it the more necessary to go vigorously ahead in your Department.

^{of} I wish to remind you that the Queen has not yet had ^{ith} submitted to her the plans for the new barrack at Gosport, nor of that for Dover. This is the proper season for the works, and it is very important to push them.

The Queen has also not had submitted to her the plans for the completion of Gomer Fort, for Elson Fort, and for the new works at Dover.

^{at} I have not been able to go to Colchester, but on inquiry I find that, although a camp for 3—2000 men has been erected there, there is not drilling-ground there even for a complete Battalion. On whose recommendation was this spot selected? The Horse Guards disclaim all knowledge of it. You will not suppose that I put this question in fault-finding spirit, but merely to assist in guarding against mistakes which must defeat the object the Government, and you in particular, have in view.

^{at} The Queen has had submitted to her the proposal to sell 210 acres of waste land in Carmarthenshire for the sum of £425, therefore at £2 the acre!! The Queen will not sign the paper before knowing whether the Ordnance may not want it. To obtain for £400 what sometimes is quite impossible to find. This might be made the place for training the Welsh Militia.

A couple of thousand pounds would get up the Hutting necessary to keep them, and thus a good deal of money might be saved to the country.

You will see that the land is quite square, with stream flowing through it.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 17, 1856.

^{at} There is no drilling-ground attached to the Colchester encampment but 20 acres; an addition of 13 is, I believe,

contemplated; this together would be useless, and the ground is not level enough for a parade!! A field of 140 acres adjoins the camp on the opposite side, and could have been had at a rent of £300 when the camp was formed. It would be quite necessary to try to obtain this on a sufficiently long lease, if the whole expense of the camp is not to be thrown away.

Gas could be supplied (and is much wanted) at an outlay of £1,500, which would save £250 a year according to the Engineer's statement.

The General and his staff are most anxious for both these measures.

It appears but just and fair that Sir W. Codrington and Sir Colin Campbell should be promoted to the rank of Lieut.-Generals—having commanded whole armies, and that the Colonels who have been made Brigadiers to command Brigades, but have since commanded Divisions, should, on resigning their Commands, be made Major-Generals.

Promotion of
Codrington,
Colin Camp-
bell, and
others.

They are Colonel Garrett, Colonel Cameron and Lord W. Paulet. I should add Colonel Storks, who has commanded in Chief at Scutari.

Now the war is closed, the objection entertained by the Queen to the appointment of Generals Barnard and Lord Rokeby to K.C.B., originally recommended by Lord Panmure, no longer exists.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 17, 1856.*

I am as yet unable to write you officially on the subject of the Peace, but you will gather from my various telegrams that it is coming on very rapidly. You had better turn in your mind the easiest mode of withdrawing your force, and I am in hopes to secure the facility for so doing from both the quays of Sebastopol and those of Balaclava. Do you think you could in any way find a fair market for our Cavalry and Artillery horses, for, if this could be done,

As to with-
drawing British
forces from the
seat of war.

much trouble and expense might be saved, as there is nothing which costs so much to move as horses do? All the heavy and serviceable siege guns can be packed at Malta and Gibraltar, and I venture once more to suggest to you that all unserviceable iron ordnance should be carried in lighters outside the harbour of Balaclava and there consigned to the deep.

War allow-
ance.

Soldiers
beards.

I hope you will now finally put an end to all purchases of Land Transport horses as far as you can, and that the agencies may be speedily paid off. Any large contracts for hay or barley should be avoided, except so far as necessary to keep a sufficient store in hand for present service. I think you will find, in reference to the shipment of our stores, it will be far more satisfactory to have them all given to Captain Gordon, and let him be responsible for their embarkation or disposal, as the case may be. There is one point to which I would especially draw your attention, and that is the extra 6d. per day. As soon as peace is proclaimed this will cease, as the warrant only extends to a period of actual warfare. I am not quite certain whether a previous armistice might not affect the issue, but the men shall have the benefit of the doubt. Can you by any means bring your men home without beards? You will do a great service if you can, because we cannot allow them here, and for this among other reasons, that it is a cover for desertion. A man with a beard deserts and immediately shaves. He cannot be recognised, and we shall lose a vast number of men. This is no fancy, we have experienced it in the German legion, and therefore I am anxious on the subject. Moreover these beards are not pretty at home, though I dare say they may be useful abroad.

Of course all your Balaclava works are now unnecessary, and I shall send you no more railway horses or plant.

There was an idea of asking the Russians to withdraw while we were retiring, but this has been abandoned as an unworthy request to make.

I presume they will be required to keep their positions. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 18, 1856.

St. Patrick's Day will have its celebration in most places ; and it has been attended with a very sad result last night to the Commissariat branch of the Army Works Corps, among whom sixteen men have been burned to death in their huts, and with good reason to suppose that they were lost in consequence of intoxication.

Burning accident to men of Army Works Corps.

There having been no time to get a real and correct report—for the bodies are in a shocking and undistinguishable state—I would not telegraph the loss, in order that anxiety might not be kept alive for so long previous to the arrival of correct details. I have sent you an official letter subsequent to my seeing personally Mr. Wakefield, the superintendent.

The weather has been bitterly cold ; a strong northerly and easterly wind, with the thermometer well below freezing—13° last night, and at 20° and 25° to-day with a bright sun.

On the 16th, the letters came from General Lüders with his signature to the armistice, consequent upon the previous interchange of the terms signed by the respective Chiefs of the Staff at the Tractir bridge.

On Sunday the 16th, three Divisions, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 4th, were ordered to march from their camps with their Artillery and Land Transports, take up a position near the Monastery of St. George, cook, and return to camp after I had seen them about 2 o'clock. The day was fine, but the cold wind increasing, the cooking and parading was cut short. I went out with them, as they passed by Headquarters about 9 o'clock ; General Barnard commanded the whole ; the movement of troops, always a fine sight, and interesting, as they passed up valleys, or across ridges, converging to the high ground between Balaclava and the Monastery. None of the Land Transport of these Divisions is complete : there is the foundation of each Department of it, the first, reserve of ammunition,

Peaceful march of three Divisions of the Army.

Incomplete Land Transport.

the ambulance, and the camp equipage; but the old carts and waggons are not yet replaced in these Divisions, nor have I thought it advisable now to take more men than are necessary from the ranks. I had desired that the 3rd Division should be completed as much as possible; and men, and horses, and *matériel*, are all nearly up to the field mark in that Division. I had also desired the Highland Division to be completed in a similar manner: they are so pretty nearly as to animals, but they have only 81 men taken from the Regiments at present, the L. T. Corps making up the remainder, and Colonel Wetherall did not wish to send the whole of the animals to them at Kamara till the weather was more decidedly fit for it. Nor under present circumstances shall I think it worth while taking more soldiers from their ranks.

General La Marmora is returned; we exchanged a few words on the road yesterday, as we had missed each other at our respective quarters.

Trophies for
the Sardinians.

I have asked by telegraph as to our giving to the Sardinians a share of the trophies and guns from Sebastopol. There seems to have been no order to my predecessor to do so; but the Sardinian army was added to the English army to make up our right to the one-third proportion, and it seems fitting that that army should have its proportionate benefit. I wish you could have got for us the use of the harbour by our fleet, even by open boats and coasting.

Recommends
warning rather
than force in
the Sea of Azof
during the
armistice.

Captain Osborne, R.N., will go to-morrow to command at Kertch and in the Sea of Azof. At present it is not navigable from ice. He called upon me by desire of the Admiral, and I was glad to have information from him relative to some parts of the coast. I suggested that, in maintaining the naval power over the shore movements of Russian troops, it would be as well to avoid firing during an armistice, and that a previous warning of any troops might probably induce them to return or desist; but that the terms insisted on left our navy full power over everything coming under their guns, except unnecessary attack upon towns and coasts.

Sir George Maclean goes home at once. . . .

Coupling your telegraph of the 6th March with the probable date of embarkation of the troop and batteries of Artillery for the period between the 2nd and 10th March, I imagine you will have counter-ordered them for the present.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 22, 1856.

This month has been as uncomfortable in point of climate as any period of our year and half residence here. But it is not unhealthy—on the contrary, there is the same continued freedom from disease, the same continued smallness of numbers on the sick-list. Therefore we will say nothing about the *misère* of a low thermometer, with as strong and as bitterly cold a N.E. wind as ever twinged faces and ears.

I am sorry to hear of the French losing men and suffering much from sickness at Constantinople as well as here: at Constantinople, however, they have accepted, and I wish they had done so here, some little assistance in port wine, arrowroot, and essence of beef. But with their sick here lying on the ground under canvas, they did not some time ago accept the offer of huts, or more lately of hospital trestles, which are sent to Scutari to prevent encumbering our stores at Balaclava. . . .

I did not get any telegraph from you by the last mail—my latest date being of the 6th March, in which you mention the probability of peace, inducing your advice to check increase, though to undo nothing. But you must be quite aware that, as far as Land Transport goes, not increasing and not completing is, in fact, not being ready. And I am loth to take more bayonets from the ranks, or to make that Corps permanently a source of expense, though its efficiency is impaired by my not doing so.

The Russians and ourselves and French are all very good friends in the place of contact, the borders of the

Continued cold.

Independent spirit of the French.

Unless increased, the Land Transport Corps cannot be looked on as prepared.

Slackness of
French
sentries.

Tchernaya. But it is very curious that the French, nominally, and sometimes very apparently, strict, and even disagreeably so in the matter of their sentries, should be so slack as that many of the Russians have been up on the heights into the French camp, and two Russian officers were asking the way about on the plateau. I wonder what would have been said had 'les Anglais' been in charge of outposts and such things happened.

Amenities of
the armistice.

On Easter Monday we are to have some races on the flat—steeplechases and hurdle-races, etc.—on our side of the Tchernaya, below the Fedioukine: I have sent some printed 'cards of the races' to General Lüders, in case any of the Russians should like to come and see what is going on. General Timacheff was mentioning their absence of news, which enabled Colonel Blane to send him, at his request, some *Galignan's* and other newspapers. The accounts we have, from information, are that their communications are difficult, their rations somewhat reduced, and that there is a great extent of sickness in their army, and their stores of provisions very much reduced. . . .

I have suggested to Count Zamoyski that Varna should be his Headquarters, in preference to Scutari: it is easier to move his infantry there than his cavalry to Constantinople from that place, and his guns can go more easily to his horses at Varna than his horses to the guns now at Constantinople.¹ Besides this, it will give room at Constantinople, and General Storks is overcrowded even now.

The Army
Works Corps
—its weak
points.

It seems to me a stretch of imagination, and a considerable one, for any one to say in Parliament that the army would have been as badly off this year as last had it not been for the Army Works Corps. This is 'un peu fort.'

I wonder of what use the 800 men of that Corps have been, or likely to have been, whom Mr. Doyne is now on the point of sending to England from the various causes of inefficiency which he is to detail to me?

¹ Zamoyski's infantry were encamped at Scutari, his cavalry cantoned at Varna.

A very long time was occupied, as indeed we all expected, in making themselves comfortable with their huts, and the etceteras of a camp: I do not mean that they, as well as others, are not made more efficient by this means; but, to read what is said of them, one would fancy the curious belief that they started at once working for the advantage of the army, which could not have got on without them. A very great mistake; and the very sauntering way in which I see, and plenty of others see, their work done on the roads, the very small inducement that makes a knot of them lean on their spades in conversation on the road which is their special care, all this has not given to these expensive and easy-going gentlemen the character of great energy or activity in work. I think your lordship would be somewhat surprised at the cost, from departure from the shores of England to return thereto, compared with the real amount of work done for the army. Hence we certainly do not believe in much of what people persuade themselves in England.

Costliness of
the same.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 25, 1856.

[After complaining of the slowness with which news is brought out by the mail-packet, Codrington writes:]

Slowness of
communication
by mail-packet
and import-
ance of its
being acceler-
ated.

All news as to peace, all directions from you as to the destination of troops, and particularly of Cavalry, Artillery, and siege *matériel*, should come as soon as possible; for instance, the *Candia* arrived with Artillery to-day, I keep the horses on board, for the mail may bring the advisability of their return immediately to England or Scutari: I have written to General Storks, to stop what I can at Scutari; but I hope you will telegraph to him direct on such subjects. Perhaps it would be well for the Admiral at Constantinople to have the means of some small and fast despatch-boats for telegraph and instructions from you, now that the electric wire is not continued to us. The destination of troops, either to Mediterranean or to England direct, is a know-

ledge which may facilitate arrangements very materially as to the sort of vessel in which to place them, and whether for two short trips such as Corfu or Malta, or the whole voyage home.

Reverts to drawbacks of the plan of campaign.

. . . I cannot help feeling that the English army would have been in an inferior national and military position in the plan of campaign;¹ and remember that that part of the army would have had to be kept up from hence, that in case of loss, sickness, attack of the Russians, diminution of the French or Sardinian armies, it might have been necessary for me to send the greatest part, or a most efficient part, of the English army to carry on operations on the vital point of the campaign, and yet that it would have but been considered a detachment of the army under French Command. And I say nothing of the personal position in which I should then have been placed by the orders of the Government.

The French prince² was saluted with 101 guns by us, at the same time as the French, and 80 guns English marched past us, in file, in good order afterwards.

It is said by information that the Russian horses would not be able to transport their Artillery in case of the Allies having to advance at the end of the Armistice.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

March 27, 1856.

As to disposing of foreign forces in our service.

Liability recommended in regard to them.

. . . I am most anxious that a right decision should be come to about the Turkish Contingent, the Irregular Cavalry, the Ottoman Cossacks, and the Swiss, Italian, and German Legions. Let me beg of you not to be in a hurry in letting go our hold upon any of them. I hope there will be no disbanding as yet, and above all that we shall behave liberally to our foreign legions,—our name and fame in Europe will depend upon it, and liberality will not be bad

¹ This refers to the plan made in view of a continuance of the war, and alluded to by Lord Panmure in his letter of March 18th.

² The Prince Imperial, news of whose birth had just reached the Crimea.

economy, for I cannot bring myself to believe that this peace will be of long duration, and if war breaks out again we may want foreigners in larger numbers even than we have now procured, but our recruiting will be easy or next to impossible according as we deal with the men at present in our service.

You cannot too soon, although in an unostentatious way, put Malta in a complete state of defence and Gibraltar too. It will be easy, as well as natural, to deposit at those places the guns, so necessary for their defence, that you will be bringing home from the Crimea.

Counsels putting Malta and Gibraltar in a complete state of defence.

I expect that John Bull will turn up his nose at our peace, but we must swear till we are black in the face that he has got as good conditions as he was entitled to demand.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

March 28, 1856.

I have just arrived from a week's run in Scotland, and I find plenty of grouse and shall be glad to give you a turn at them, since we have so scurvily robbed you of your sport against the Russian bear. You have done your armistice well, and you have been quite right in declining, as Windham has done, your power over the buildings at Fort Paul. I have mentioned this subject to Lord Clarendon some time since, and I hope your abstinence from destruction may be attended with good results to ourselves. You have judged very prudently in staying your Reserves at Malta, and I will send word to the General to detain them from encumbering you for the present. I feel quite confident that you require no instructions from me in guiding you to economy of the public resources, and, when peace is definitely signed, I anticipate with satisfaction as cordial assistance in the recall of our Army as you have given the Government in its organisation and preservation. Your enclosure of the parade of Sir W. Eyre's Division, as reported in a note from him to General Windham, gave me great satisfaction,

Abstinence from destruction of Russian buildings.

and will, I am sure, do the same to the Queen, from whom I could not withhold so interesting a document. I can only say of the treaty of peace that it is progressing to a final signature, but many little hitches will arise, and I fancy a diplomatic conference uses as much ceremony to remove a molehill as they would devote to a mountain. We shall have to renew our armistice by telegram. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

PARIS, *March* 28, 1856.

As to arrangements for evacuation of territory.

As soon as Peace is signed, which I expect it will be on Sunday (if not on Saturday, though I don't think that possible), we must have a supplementary convention with both the Russians and the Turks about evacuation of territory, and I will beg of you, therefore, to let me know in detail what I am to stipulate for.

By our Treaty with Turkey we are bound to evacuate in 40 days, or sooner if possible, and the French are bound to do so equally with ourselves, but they say they cannot quit Constantinople until their last man comes away from the Crimea, *i.e.*, in six months, and I think they are right, because they ought in the first instance to remove all their troops from the enemy's country, for which all the shipping they can obtain will be necessary. I suppose we had better pursue the same course, and give ourselves elbow-room for quitting our different positions in Turkey, though none of our Establishments are upon the enormous scale of those of the French at Constantinople.

I was alarmed late last night by a telegram from Hammond, saying that there was a doubt as to whether orders had been sent to Codrington not to renew hostilities without further instructions. I feel quite sure that you must have sent orders, but to make certain of no untoward event happening I have telegraphed to Codrington.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

Private.

March 29, 1856.

We have agreed to the following points to-day with reference to proceedings on the conclusion of peace.

Lord Panmure on agreement as to proceedings on the conclusion of peace.

1. That we must have six months to evacuate Russian territory, and withdraw our troops, material, etc. We will do it sooner if we can, of course.

2. In consideration of our having abstained from destroying the quays and storehouses at Fort Paul, that we should be allowed to introduce such vessels as we can into the harbour of Sebastopol for the purpose of facilitating the embarkation of our *matériel*.

3. The same time will be required for evacuating Turkish ground.

4. If you could coax Ali to give us one of the large brass ordnance, either from Dardanelles or Smyrna, as a memento of our war alliance, it will be gratefully received.

5. Say something about protecting the graves of our gallant soldiers at Sebastopol.

I think you need not be afraid to sign your treaty on Sunday, even a rigid Presbyterian must admit it to be a work of mercy.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, March 29, 1856.

I wrote to you last post officially about omissions in despatches; I forgot to refer to it in my private letter, and to explain my feelings on the subject. It may not be of consequence in such things as those mentioned in my official letter. . . . But I do not think it should be considered in the power of any one to omit part of a public despatch, if it is published, unless showing that there is such omission, either by saying it is an extract, or by asterisks. It is not that an

Objects to omissions, not noted as such, in despatches.

officer is at all to judge of whether a despatch or information is to be published or not ; but if it is,—as conveying facts, or opinions on those facts,—he is entitled to his own full representation, or to the knowledge of its being an extract only. . . .

It must depend on Lord Hardinge to settle the stations of particular regiments, after the Government has settled what is the political destination, or the military separation of the army. It is no use my attempting anything, or holding out hopes, for England or elsewhere, which other necessities of the service or arrangements might immediately alter.

If you were to leave the business to me, irrespective of the destination of regiments, I think the following would be the course I should take in succession of embarkation.

Sketches a plan
for embarking
troops, etc.

First to embark all siege train and stores and impedimenta of every description, sending them to Malta or Corfu or to Scutari, and getting the vessels back, if the whole vessel was necessarily occupied by such stores, so as not to delay for long the embarkation of troops. If troops have to go to Malta, or Constantinople, or Corfu, to remain, then these vessels should take partly stores, partly troops.

If the Turks wish, and our Government consents, I would sell to them cavalry horses, the Land Transport and whole of its *matériel*, and many of the Engineer and Artillery stores : the whole of these I should then assemble at Sinope and the Dardanelles, the shorter voyages to which would allow quick return here for embarking troops.

Considerations
to be kept in
view in parting
with horses.

The horses of Artillery are not easily replaced, and any disposal of these, and of cavalry horses, must be viewed in reference to the inefficiency created in both arms by disposing of them, compared to the percentage of loss, and time occupied in paying transports, on the voyage.

The *Candia* lost 9 out of 189,

The *Jura* lost 4 out of 205,

The *Argo* lost 14 out of 190,

in their voyages of about 16 or 18 days from England lately.

Continues plan
of embarkation.

Then, as soon as the Siege train and stores, and Land Transport, and cavalry and Artillery field batteries are gone

from hence, I would send the infantry, or possibly one or two divisions simultaneously with them, to their destinations. I should not care about moving the siege train and stores from Scutari, if it occupied transport that could be employed in the evacuation of the Crimea.

Then, again, you might have some political advantage in keeping the whole of the infantry of the army together in light marching order, and letting a fleet of men of war and fine merchant steamers show that the same power of simultaneous and rapid removal shows a future facility for disembarkation in any given locality.

All this outline, and indeed the detail of the disposition of regiments, must be settled in England. All the rest you may throw upon me in any quantity of work or responsibility you choose.

I think your passage through France of troops is questionable as to time, and possibly in other points. If your five steamers can bring cavalry or artillery out here in 16 days, do you think you can economise time or money by their landing at Marseilles? I should doubt it. The *entente cordiale* between the nations and armies is very good now; you might or might not improve it by a passage of many troops through France. . . .

As to proposed passage of British troops through France.

Colonel M'Murdo dined here yesterday; of course the whole arrangements for completion of the L.T.C. are at a standstill; if the animals are to be disposed of to the Turks, I think there will be sufficient men of that Corps, and of natives, to take over, and care for the animals at Sinope and at the Dardanelles—thus letting me bring all soldiers back to the ranks. The officers put to the Corps, 'pending H.M.'s pleasure,' are I think entitled to their commissions, after having done the duty, and under such a pledge as that given in the General Orders of this army.

Disposal of L.T.C. horses.

The armistice is renewed indefinitely by us. I have not received Lüders' signature, but I think it is by this time with the French. . . .

There are many disappointments indeed in the hopes to which I had looked forward in this fine command; it need not be said, but can well be felt by every one, with what

Disappointment of military aspirations.

feeling of pride the whole army would have made its effort for England, which had been looking forward, and would have been looking on; and whether here, or in Asia—under whatever difference of opinion as to my own position or the locality of the war—my efforts should have been given to doing all in my power in return for the command in which I had been placed. You may reckon upon my not wishing quitting, though with many inducements to do so, this country till the hard work is over.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., *March 30, 1856.*

Force to be
sent to Canada
from the
Crimea.

I conclude that the four Regiments which you are going to send to Canada from the Crimea will take up at Malta their additional Companies and their Drafts, and that they will go on at a strength of nearly a thousand each, but I think we ought to send five thousand men at least and some good Staff Officers and a good General to command. This American dispute¹ may, and most likely will, end in smoke; but we must be prepared for the case of its ending in gunpowder smoke, and as Peace is now signed, and our troops are disposable, we should be greatly and justly blamed if we lost a day in properly reinforcing the garrison of our North American Colonies—we ought also to send a sufficient supply of artillery-men.

What sort of troops would you choose for sending to N. America? Should they not have, as a portion, a Rifle Battalion?

¹ After the passing of an Act (December 1854) authorising the formation of a Foreign Legion for service in the war, the United States of America had made a serious complaint against the excessive zeal displayed in the enlistment of her citizens. England apologised, but our Minister was dismissed from Washington, and some time elapsed before the friendly relations of the two countries were restored.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD PALMERSTON

*Private.**March 30.*

The Commander-in-Chief fired away at 10 last night¹ as you would hear, instead of 10 this morning, but it does not matter as we have several precedents.

In regard to sending more troops to Canada, I have seen Hardinge, and there will be no difficulty in sending immediately from the Crimea 5 regiments of 800 rank and file each, which will be 4,000, and a field battery of artillery, as well as two Companies from home for the works out there. I proposed to him to constitute the force in British North America into a Division of two brigades, and to send a Lt.-General from the Crimea with the 5 Regiments. This would give you a reliable Officer in case of necessity, and Major-General Horne in Canada and Sir G. Le Marchant in Nova Scotia will fall into the command of the two Brigades. The name of Sir William Eyre is here mentioned as under consideration for the command. We will have some good staff-officers sent out to put things in order, and the munitions of war will be ready to ascend the St. Lawrence as soon as the ice will fairly permit them. I think you will do well to have one rifle regiment among the troops selected, and you cannot go wrong with any now in the Crimea—I am not afraid of any filibustering inroad, or even of a regular set to, but for the latter we shall and ought to be better prepared.

Troops for
Canada, and
prospects
there.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *March 31, 1856.*

The Queen would wish to see Lord Panmure at 6 at Buckingham Palace to-morrow. Lord Palmerston has

Sanctions send-
ing of troops
from Crimea
direct to
Canada.

¹ A salute fired in honour of the conclusion of peace. A military rule prescribes that no salutes be fired between sunset and sunrise, and Lord Panmure was compelled to enter a protest against the infraction of this rule.

written to her about Troops being sent direct to Canada from the Crimea, which she has sanctioned, but at the same time has stated her wish that these Troops should be sent out organised as a division, with their complement of Artillery and Transport ready to take the Field. If this is not done, we shall be directly falling back into all our old ways, which we have all so strongly condemned.

The Queen has not a doubt that Lord Panmure will concur in the obvious necessity of this.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *March 31, 1856.*

Contrast of
French and
British Army.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter. The good accounts of her Army are very gratifying to her, and a great contrast to the melancholy picture of the state of the French Army.

But let us keep one thing well up, and well organised, at Home, so that we can never be found again as we were in '54!

The Queen wishes to repeat to Lord Panmure that plans for the new Barracks at Dover and Gosport, as well as of Fort Elson and the Casemated Barracks of Gomer Fort, have not yet been submitted to her. To-morrow we shall already enter the month of April, and these matters do not advance! Have the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot been begun, the plans for which the Queen approved at Christmas?

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

March 31, 1856.

Peace signed.

The Park and Tower guns have announced that Peace is signed, and I only regret that you have not had an opportunity of proving the sagacity of the advice which placed you in command of the army by taking it into the field.

You will now set about bringing it away. I have sent you a despatch authorising you to use full discretion, and to dispose of everything you can which it would be useless or cumbersome to bring away. I have no doubt that much economy may be achieved in that way, and I think we owe it to the country to save every penny we can creditably, in return for the lavish hands with which they loaded the army with comforts of every kind. I shall order home the Militia regiments immediately, and make room for some of your regiments in the Mediterranean, which we mean to keep strongly garrisoned. You will have to send five regiments direct to Canada, and one of them must be a rifle battalion and the others well trained to the Minié. On this head you will receive official orders, but you will of course keep your own counsel on their destination till they sail.

The fact is we have denuded N. America too much, and Jonathan is bumptious; but our hands are empty if he wants a trial, and I think he would come second-best off. The regiments which had longest home service before the war will be those to go to America, I presume. We shall have some corps in the Mediterranean, and more in proportion than existed before the war. Six months will be quite long enough for you to have for evacuation, but you must not bring your best men away before the French. I think your sick should begin to voyage homewards as soon as you can find good ships for them. I am quite clear for your selling every mule you have at any price you can get, and it will also be infinitely more economical to dispose of all your Cavalry and Artillery horses than to bring them home. You should make known to the Turkish Government and to the Austrians your willingness to sell them, and a very low figure may be accepted. We can soon remount our cavalry in this country, and we have a great many fine artillery horses on hand.

As to evacuation of the Crimea.

We have terrible accounts of the state of the French army, and on the whole I am not sorry to see peace signed, as I feel convinced we could not have carried out our plans of campaign with our Allies in their present condition.

CHAPTER XVI

APRIL 1856

THE April correspondence consists mainly of letters of Lord Panmure and Sir William Codrington relative to the winding up of the campaign.

It was not till April 29th that the exchange of ratifications enabled peace to be formally proclaimed, and hence effective evacuation of the Crimea was proportionally delayed—Codrington's labours being meanwhile limited to the embarkation of the Sardinian troops, Army Works Corps, siege train and superfluous stores, and to endeavours to sell off huts and transport animals, together with all but the best of the Cavalry and Artillery horses.

Lord Palmerston's characteristic attention to detail is well illustrated by his contributions on the disposal of the latter.

The evacuation of Kertch had already begun.

Owing to the smallness of the harbour of Balaclava, a concession of the right to use that of Sebastopol for the purposes of evacuation was of great advantage to the British.

Details as to the projected return of troops from the East, and the disembodiment of the Militia, will be found in Lord Panmure's letter to Her Majesty, dated April 25th.

Meantime the relations subsisting between the recent enemies in the Crimea continued to be of the most friendly character. Civilities in the form of banquets and reviews were exchanged between the Allied and Russian Generals, and these functions, as well as some evolutions on a large

scale by the infantry of the British Army, are well described by Codrington. The latter are of great significance, as showing the splendid condition of our army at the conclusion of the war. And it may be noted in passing that, at this time, a French Commission had obtained leave to inquire into the causes of this superior well-being of the British Army.

Less satisfactory, strange to say, than their relations with their late enemies were the relations of the Allies themselves—of which an outrage perpetrated by French marines upon a British sergeant may serve as an illustration.

At home the composition of a Commission to inquire into the System of Purchase in the Army engaged attention, the Commission having been proposed, in Panmure's words, rather in deference to the opinion of the House of Commons than from expectation or desire of change.

In reference to the prospect of an attempt to reduce the army, now that war was at an end, Panmure writes, April 14th, 'All I can say is, I'll oppose the current till it sweeps me away with it! Of course, *some* reduction must take place, but we must maintain our army in a proper organisation, and in its reduced establishment ready to be built upon at any moment.'

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *April 1, 1856.*

The final destination of regiments is that which will enable me to use the transports for the army with the best economy of time and means. I cannot settle their future stations, which depend upon political arrangement, and a military roster at the Horse Guards. Therefore I trust to your letting me know all this as soon as possible; the same about the 10th and 12th going back to India; the roster in England must settle that, and you will hear from Con-

Desires to be informed of final destinations of regiments.

stantinople, or at all events I will send you when I get it, the account I have asked for of losses and the time occupied in the bringing them to the Crimea. There can be little doubt of its not being worth while taking their horses back.

As to Turkish
Government
acquiring our
horses.

Lord Stratford will let me and you know the result of his inquiries as to the Turkish Government taking our horses, both of Artillery, Cavalry, and Land Transport. I must have your sanction for such disposal of these; for, remember, Artillery horses are not got in a day, and it renders inefficient for the time 120 guns.

I have long ago given directions to stop all purchases of animals; and, by a letter from General Storks, three of the transports with the additional artillery will remain at Scutari; the shortest way to be to send them straight home again if the horses are in tolerable health, unless it is wished to let the Turks buy them.

Thanks for
adoption of a
general order
affecting the
press.

I have to thank you for the adoption of the general order about the press: I do not think that it is otherwise than right; and, as you know, I made up my mind to abuse, which I see is begun, accompanied by distortion of facts and much personality. . . . By the bye, how is it that you publish the strength of the English army yourself in Dr. Hall's report—that part surely can be left with asterisks. However, all these things are but of little consequence now: our embarkation, and that of the Sardinians depending on us, will occupy all one's thought and time, though not quite in as engaging a way as a forward movement. I think Sardinians ought to go first, so as to relieve them from expense, as they have been so true and so quiet in their assistance, and are so little gainers by the result. However, they gain in morale and *renommé*—no trifling gain for any country, and particularly for a leading state of Italy. . . .

Thoughts are
now turned
to embarkation.

Services of the
Sardinians.

I have a telegraph from Lord Clarendon, of the 28th March, 'that peace would be signed shortly,'¹ and that the armistice had better be renewed. It had already been done.

¹ The Treaty of Paris was signed on the 30th March.

Although I may differ in my views of what is the best course, and although I think it right to give my opinion to you officially on such subjects, yet you must not think I am unmindful of the assistance and support which I have received ; and I shall adopt and carry out any views on which the Government wishes me to act.

Writer's
loyalty and
gratitude to
Government.

Many of the spaces of burial grounds are enclosed ; timber fences would be no use, stone has in many cases to be brought some distance, and you have no idea of the extent of some of the places. . . .

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., *April 3, 1856.*

Lord Combermere spoke to me to-day at the Council about the Cavalry Horses in the Crimea. He strongly recommended bringing home the good and efficient horses, and selling the bad ones on the spot. He said that a certain number of made horses would be of the greatest value to the Regiments on their return home, and that without such a foundation the Regiments would not be fit for any duty, and would not be able to train recruits. I was glad to find a good and experienced Cavalry Officer held the same opinion which I had been led to form.

Cavalry horses
in the Crimea.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 4, 1856.

I have sent you an official despatch on the subject of sending five Regiments to N. America, as we consider those parts to have been too much denuded of troops on the outbreak of the War. . . . The regiments will embark at once on the shipping being ready, and we are particularly anxious that nothing should be known of their departure till they are on the point of embarkation. They may be warned for service without saying where. We are desirous that this should not appear as a menace in any way, but merely as

Sir W. Eyre
to command
N. American
division of the
Army

the natural mode of dispersing an army gathered from all quarters. I think you should send them away complete in all things, but I would leave them to provide carts and animals for Land Transport in the countries whither they are going. The Sardinian medals are gone in the *Resolute* to General Marmora, but you may do every honour you like to his army by presenting them.

Superfluities
to be disposed
of.

I grieve with you over your sad conflagration, and though I cannot agree with you that the Army Works Corps have not done a great deal to promote the comfort of the army, I have no objection to your making any arrangement which you think right for sending it back to this country. We wish everything to come back to us as light as you can manage, and if we can get any price of even a moderate figure for ALL our horses of every description, I would at once sell them rather than reconvey them back to this country. All other stores which are superabundant may equally be dispensed with; I find that there is a great deficit of muskets in Canada, and have telegraphed to Storks not to serve out 1851 pattern to Cossacks of the Sultan, and I think you should send them on in the transports with the Canadian troops, consigned to W. D., Storekeeper there. You have been lecturing me for not giving your despatches in full to the Gazette. I take it very quietly, conceiving myself to be a better judge of what the public should hear than you can be out there. I take care that the departments know all the facts of the case, and I think you had better leave these matters in my hands and trust to my discretion. I don't think you have suffered by it.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

SEBASTOPOL, *April 5, 1856.*

Embarkation
commences.

It has been necessary to begin sending stores and siege train away from hence. There was some order to Captain Gordon not to send anything to England direct; but I have given him authority to break through this, for delay won't

do this now ; and waiting for knowledge of arrangements for stores in England might delay our doing anything, and cause an accumulation of ships at Balaclava, which the size of the harbour will not allow—therefore you must trust me to do the best for the service. If I do not hear soon, I shall probably order the embarkation for England of those troops of Horse Artillery and batteries that have the first claim by their service out here to go home.

I should myself continue to send home the horses and batteries until I hear that any troops are to remain (say a Division) in Turkey, or elsewhere. If one or two Divisions were settled, as possibly a sort of army of occupation, I would give them a larger proportion of Artillery than usual—perhaps even four batteries to a Division of Infantry.

As to retention
of troops as
Army of
occupation.

But no doubt you will telegraph to me some outline by which I shall be enabled to act.

I should like, as due to them, to send home the Sardinian army first, in steamers—which steamers would return for our longer voyages to England.

Army all well : better weather up to yesterday. On the 3rd as nasty a snow-storm, with heavy squalls, as I have seen this winter ; but to-day sun, and mild.

General Lüders has just sent a Colonel Offenbergl (I think his name) to Marshal Pélissier, myself, and General la Marmora, to regulate the admission of officers or men past the respective lines. We print some passes for him at once—to take back with him ; and we print some others, also for him to take back on approval, for us to issue, in order to be valid with Russian sentries.

I am sorry to say that the 13 field guns¹ stared Colonel Offenbergl in the face just in front of this house.

Colonel O. talked unhesitatingly about the difficulty of transport.

¹ Captured from the Russians.

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[illegible][illegible]

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1033-1034

been submitted to her by the Commander-in-Chief, nor does she recollect having signed a Warrant on the 20th of January ordering the pattern to be sealed which is now proposed to be superseded. If, moreover, a new pattern was to be adopted, it should be for all Rifle Corps and not for the Rifle Brigade only. The Queen had hoped that this new Rifle, which was approved by her about Christmas if she remembers rightly, would soon be ready for distribution.

New Rifle for
the Army.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 7, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and regrets that Your Majesty should have had so much trouble *respecting* the Warrant submitted by him for sealing the pattern of 'the short musquet' for The Rifle Brigade.

Lord Panmure transmits for Your Majesty's information the following documents: 1st, the Warrant of 21st January, from which it would appear that the arm then sealed had been submitted to Your Majesty, and is doubtless the same which Your Majesty mentions as having seen at Christmas. 2nd, Copy of a memorandum from Pall Mall, in which the alterations now submitted are described.

These alterations, though trifling in detail, are important in effect on the arm, and Lord Panmure certainly thought that they had been submitted to Your Majesty by Lord Hardinge, as his approval of them was notified to Lord Panmure; but as Your Majesty's commands were explicit, that no alteration whatever should be made in any pattern sealed by Warrant under the Royal Sign Manual without Your Majesty's approbation, Lord Panmure refused to sanction the changes proposed until he had submitted a Warrant for Your Majesty's signature.

As to alterations in
patterns submitted.

Lord Panmure fully concurs with Your Majesty that all Rifle Corps should be armed with the same musquet, and should Your Majesty on this explanation consent to

have the Warrant resubmitted for signature, Lord Panmure will have it so worded as to carry out Your Majesty's views.

Lord Panmure has desired the two rifles referred to in Memo. No. 2 to be sent for Your Majesty's inspection with this letter, trusting to Your Majesty's excusing a course somewhat irregular.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 7, 1856.

Disposal of
Turkish
Contingent.

I write you to-day on the subject of the evacuation of Kertch, which is pressed on us by Russia, and there is every disposition to give it up on our part. But we must see where the Turkish Contingent is to go, and I think you should immediately communicate with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and see whether he can make any arrangement with the Porte to send them to some quarter where their final redelivery to the Turkish Government could be effected.

It will be necessary to dispose of your heavy guns at Kertch, and these might be sent to Malta if they are in good condition.

There is a company which mean to establish a railway from Joppa to Jerusalem, and who are likely to become bidders for our rails and plant at Balaclava, and I dare say there are many other things which might suit them. I am making inquiries. I hope you will get the Sardinian medals, by the *Resolute*, before any part of the Sardinian army leaves the Crimea, which, however, will be soon.

I think you should send me home some plan of your own for evacuating the Crimea, as it would lead to definitive conclusions more easily.

We shall require some ten or twelve regiments to remain in the Mediterranean, perhaps more.

But we are cutting and carving on our peace establishment, and you shall hear more fully when we see our way with it.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

April 8, 1856.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter of yesterday.

His explanation is quite satisfactory, and the Queen approves the Rifles, which she returns. She will sign the proposed Warrant as soon as Lord Panmure sends it to her.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 8, 1856.

The necessity of getting ships away from Balacava, which would only encumber the harbour, has rendered it necessary to load them at once—in some cases for England direct. . . .

Process of
'clearing out'
begun.

I am making arrangements to finish all the gun and shot business by the rail, and shall then take up whatever portions are not required for the transport of provisions, etc., to the Forts.

The Sardinians will have given to them now, in consequence of your telegraph, about 200 iron guns; they will embark them for Genoa.

I hope you will approve of my giving to La Marmora the six guns, iron position pieces and carriages, which did such good service for them in the battle of the Tchernaya; they swept the plain to the Tractir bridge, and, hearing from Count Lilita that they would be very glad to have them as part of their share of the Russian guns, I thought it much better to offer them from the English Government as a souvenir to them of the Alliance.

All the brass field guns—our share, that is, and having had no division for the Sardinians,—will go home. The division will have to be made in England for the Sardinians—which, I suppose, will deprive us of one-third of those we have. I will ask, when in England, that Sir W.

Division of
captured guns.

Codrington may have the option of one for his place in Gloucestershire, and I have mentioned in my public letter about a gun and a howitzer for the family of Lord Raglan.

Russian
drunkenness.

The system of passes proposed by Colonel Offenbergh, by Lüders' desire, seems all nonsense; it is certainly not worth while as far as we are concerned, and is not the least attended to by the Russians themselves. I never saw such a scene, such a line of drunkenness descending the quarry valley of Inkerman, from the French and English camps, to the Tchernaya — on their men and N.C. officers returning from the 'hospitalities' of their late enemies. They came across by the causeway and the posts and rails in the river, and two-thirds or three-quarters were reeling drunk on their return; I rode up as they were coming down, and was glad to see but very few English in the same state.

Friendliness of
the recent
enemies.

General Lüders was gone to Simpheropol, so that our communications were not as rapid as could be wished. We shall probably meet him, but the Russian officers talk of typhus fever at Simpheropol, etc. No doubt there is much sickness among them, and great difficulty of communication and supplies. Some of General Lüders' staff came here to Headquarters, and remained on very easy terms with General Windham. They return some day to dine with him. Plenty of similar intercourse is going on with the French.

Paying off of
Army Works
Corps.

We certainly feel the loss of the telegraph much just now; nor does the 'rapidity' of the mail-boat keep pace with our necessities just at present. I presume you will not be sorry to pay off, by my sending them to England, the Army Works Corps, as they are a tolerably expensive force, and have not any very important occupation.

Disposal of
Artillery
horses.

I have ordered Boards in the Artillery to estimate what horses are worth taking to England, and what selling here. I cannot suppose that you would wish to re-establish the Russian Artillery with English horses, and some of the fine and good horses at their prime will be worth maintaining. Besides, until I know the destination of the troops, and their Artillery—whether you mean to have a

Division or Corps in Turkey, or the Mediterranean—I cannot decide as to selling.

Report says that the Marseilles people don't wish to have the French army come home until their typhus fever is gone—they are afraid of an epidemic. That does not surely apply to Toulon.

I have written to Lüders that I wish to repair the broken bridge over the Tchernaya at the causeway, in order that we may pass freely to the north side of the harbour, and have prepared everything for this temporary purpose.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 11, 1856.

I have communicated to you by telegraph that we shall have permission to use the harbour of Sebastopol, and you will be repaid for your considerate abstinence from destroying the wharves and landing-places. This will save wear and tear of your horses, and enable you to remove the iron Russian guns if worth the expense. You have already received from the Horse Guards the detail of the five regiments destined for North America, and the sooner you make arrangements to get them away the better.

Permission to
use harbour of
Sebastopol.

The battery of Artillery in the *Jura* will have gone on to Halifax, I expect, before this reaches you, but I think the other Artillery should be sent back without disembarking to England.

We shall require seventeen regiments to remain to garrison the ports of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar when the dépôt is withdrawn from Malta and the militia brought home. You will probably receive the details of these reliefs from Lord Hardinge by the next mail, but I understand that he means to select them according to their turn for Foreign Service had the war not occurred. You will have a guess at the particular corps, and will be able to make your arrangements. I shall soon be justified in giving you my views in an official shape upon the

evacuation, but until we receive the ratifications of peace it would be premature. I may mention my views, however, in this shape.

The writer's
views on
evacuation.

It is my opinion that you should immediately get together your hospital ships and send as many of your sick as you can, and in every possible way reduce your hospital establishment. Next, you should, as soon as you can, send your reliefs for the Militia and let us get them home. Thirdly, you should get rid of all transport animals which you may be able to spare. Fourthly, you may draft down your Cavalry and Artillery horses to as low a figure as you can, retaining the good only.

Fifthly, I would discharge as many of the natives belonging to the Land Transport Corps as you can. Sixthly, as soon as you can spare the Army Works Corps, send them home and we will get rid of them. For the timber of the huts you are welcome to make any bargain you can on the spot, and for all your Land Transport animals and inferior cattle I see no reason why, if the Russians want them, they should not have leave to purchase them. I would not sell any of our artillery or cavalry horses in the Crimea.

I will speak to Sir C. Wood about having some express steamers to facilitate the conveyance of messages and postal arrangements. As your troops diminish in number you will be able to spare some generals and their staff, and you can send them home if they choose. I like your idea of coming home in a fleet, and I will endeavour to bring you in triumph to England. I think if the weather prove fine we may have 20,000 men home at once—*i.e.*, at one time. I must set about disembodiment of the Militia to make room for you. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 12, 1856.

I hope to get some telegrams soon to help our embarkation of troops, for until I know destination much is delayed.

Next week, I think the 5 or 6000 Sardinians will be sent off, about whom the Admiral has a telegraph; and when I find he has partly steam and partly sailing vessels for the conveyance of the Army Works Corps, they had better be the first—as being the most expensive corps, and a temporary one—to have their discharge. To-day about 500 of them embark in the *Cleopatra*—many from inefficiency from health, many from inefficiency by bad conduct, and many from a reduction of the Corps in numbers. But in the return I called for from Mr. Doyne I observed that many of the whole, indeed I think scarcely an exception, have been fined for various faults. Some of them, I see, pretty heavily. The fact is that the motives here for work are different from those having an influence in England: when bread, beef, vegetables, and 5s. a-day are secured to a man without effort, what is his particular inducement to work? You will think that I am prejudiced about them: I am not so; but none of us could be blind to what we saw, and see every day along the road—a leaning on the spade, in groups, in conversation over their barrows and hammers; for one in anything like work, ten in easy idleness; an overlooker that was much more of a looker on; the very early break up from work,—all these things under our eyes are not the mere fancy of myself and one or two others.

Against the
Army Works
Corps.

I telegraph to you about the entry of our vessels into the harbour, as well as write to you officially. Though I have no answer to my letter to General Lüders on this point, I wish to be prepared for the possible difficulty. I shall know immediately that any Russian ship enters the harbour, and shall either ask the Admiral *then* to send one of ours in without asking, or *demand* the right from General Lüders, saying that, if not granted, Russian ships will be equally prevented from entering by our Navy until instructions are received from both Governments. It is possible that no difficulty may be made, but if there is, such will be the line I shall adopt. All the intercourse between the Armies is cordial and easy. I have had the bridge over the Tchernaya, at the causeway below In-

As to right of
war-vessels to
enter Sebas-
topol Harbour.

Cordial inter-
course between
Armies.

kerman, repaired and made passable for horses and for carriages. It will facilitate our communications to the North side much, and be of agreeability to the English camp from not having to go so far round to cross as the Tractir Bridge. I rode out beyond Tchorgoun the other day: the country high, rocky, looking down on to the Tchernaya much as in the Highlands. I have not yet had time to go up the heights myself, but shall do so to-day, after post, by our new bridge.

Meeting of
Allied Generals with
General
Lüders.

To-morrow we meet (the 3 Generals) General Lüders at the Tractir Bridge, and then go with him up to Mackenzie Camp where he gives us our breakfast. Stars, cocked hats, feathers, and all that sort of thing: the French have a guard of two regiments, and a salute of 17 guns, to receive him at the bridge. Pélissier very properly sent to say all this in order that we others might also have a guard if we thought it right. I said no; as he came to the French outposts and French lines, I thought it right that he should be received by French only.

Our Engineers gave a dinner to the Russian Engineers to-day at 6 p.m., but the main body of their Engineers are gone from hence, and the remainder are soon going.

The French
desire to learn
of us in respect
to hospitals.

General Espinasse called upon me yesterday with another French officer, requesting that he might go into our hospitals, etc., as he was commissioned to inquire into the cause of the *bien-être* of the English army in comparison to what they (the French) had suffered this year. Of course I gave him every facility, and mentioned to him that he had better also go into our regimental camps and huts, etc., at the time of dinner, and see the quantity and quality of bread, meat, vegetables, etc., which was one principal reason of our health being good. And General Windham gave him a note to show to any regimental commanding officer, requesting him to give every information, and allow him to see things at any time he might wish to enter huts and hospitals.

Supplying
medicines to
Russian sick.

The French have typhus fever about, and the Russians have much of it also. I offered General Lüders, in case of his not having medicines for their sick, 'as water carriage

1856] FROM SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON 191

has been comparatively easy to us to Balaclava,' to send some over for his hospitals: we have ample supply. Perhaps they may be more sensible, and less sensitive, than the French, and accept.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 14, 1856.

We are still without our ratifications.

It seems we are to move some Sardinian Troops immediately, and it will be as well that all 'Trophies' should be made over to them, so that they may return to their country bearing the *spolia opima* with them. . . .

We are anxious to get your sick out of your way, and are prepared to receive as many as you can send with due attention to all humane treatment. You will see that they asked me about the horses in the House of Lords, and I am inclined to the opinion that you should pick the best out of each Regiment, and sell all the rest.

I see there is going to be a strong attempt to reduce the Army. People disclaim it, but it is impossible not to perceive the turn of the tide. All I can say is, I'll oppose the current till it sweeps me away with it. Of course some reductions must take place, but we must maintain our Army in a proper organisation, and in its reduced establishment ready to be built upon at any moment. . . .

Writer's views
as to proposal
to reduce the
Army.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 15, 1856.

Although post day, I can write but little, as General Lüders comes to breakfast with Pélissier at 10, and there are races, etc., afterwards. On Sunday, General Lüders invited the three Generals to meet him at the Tractir bridge, and breakfast with him afterwards on the Mackenzie heights. . . . They [the French] saluted him with 17 guns on his arrival. We then joined in as curious and interesting

Lüders entertains the Allied Generals.

a procession as could well be seen ; for there were uniforms of every variety, from the Cossacks to the Cuirassiers, the Chasseurs d'Afrique to the feathered hat of the French generals, and then the variety of nondescript dress, also, which appertains to Englishmen and English officers of all ranks. The British subaltern gave by far the largest proportion of the mounted extra officers. We wound up the heights of Mackenzie, partly by the road by which we had first descended on the flank march in Sep. 1854, and partly by one since constructed behind one of the shoulders of the hills. A salute of artillery as we ascended, with the long string of horses, helmets, plumes, and dusty coats,—for the breeze sent the white dust flying about,—but it was very curious to look down upon. We stopped in a house a short time, and then went on to an open space where some close columns were drawn up ; they were the troops garrisoning that part of the position ; we went down the line, they marched past, with some peculiarities that were curious ;—they were about 5 or 6000 men, and one light battery of Artillery.

Inspection and
banquet.

A large double marquée, lined with scarlet, was the place of eating : nothing could be more nicely done, with the ornamental show of arms, colours, drums, guns, etc. We sat down about 50 or 60 in it ; every luxury—caviare, bottled porter, roast beef, any number of dishes in succession, and last of all two large sturgeon. General Lüders proposed the healths of the Allied Sovereigns, and Pélissier made a short, pithy, and very good answer : then hurrah, then another toast to the Allied armies, and other hurrah, Champagne, Sauterne, Sherry, all sorts of things—the Russians most attentive, so entirely without the slightest apparent feeling of annoyance or recollection. Lüders accompanied us down the hill again, and took leave of us at the foot of it. Pélissier got into his carriage, and I for one was glad to get a good gallop across the plain to the Tchernaya, with all our own people and many French. It was all remarkably well done, this breakfast and reception, the troops were in new dress—not the grey coat—and looked well ; many, but front ones particularly, were good

old soldiers. I am sorry to hear that the Turks do not want the Land Transport; they say they have too many of their own now.

The day after the last post went, the answer came from Lüders that there was no objection to any vessels of any size going into the harbour. Accordingly the Admiral went in with his flag in the *Banshee* yesterday, and the *Minna* and a tug went in also. I rode down, met him in the Dockyard, and then went all round the harbour in the steamer, first on the S. shore and then on the North, lastly landing at Fort Constantine and going all over it without any hindrance.

Sebastopol
harbour
thrown open.

A very unpleasant business with some French Marines at Kasatch, in which they . . . killed by firing, and knocking his head with the butt of a musquet, one of our Sergeants of Marines, wounded seriously the Lieutenant of the Navy, sent on shore on duty, and fired four or five times at Captain Budgen of the 82nd, who is employed there on the staff for the mails. . . . Our Marines behaved well indeed, Captain Budgen had their guard out, and loaded; but without firing a shot, or wounding a man, they took right off the French prisoners, and their arms, some of which just had been fired and all loaded. The investigation is in the hands of the two Admirals just now; and upon receiving the detail, I must write to Pélissier officially about it.

Outrage on
British troops
by French
Marines.

General Lüders will come over again, and the English army will probably be under arms for him in the plain. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 18, 1856.

My despatch to you to-day will be very meagre, as I have nothing to tell you as to the arrival of ratifications. The departure of the five regiments for Canada will relieve you, and I hope that, with the Sardinians on¹ your hands first, you will be able to relieve the Militia regiments in the

As to bringing
home of
troops.

¹ Off (?).

Mediterranean and Gibraltar so as to let me get them home. As soon as you have disposed of your force at Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar, I shall try and bring home a large fleet of transports with a heavy body of the army, to show our friends our power of moving. I am preparing to disembody the Militia to make way for the line.

I have just got yours of the 5th. You will have received a telegraph to send home the last artillery ships which went out with batteries, without landing their freights. I think you are quite right in sending home as much out of your way as you can, but pray sell all you can which will be of no service,—especially get rid of your Land Transport animals as soon as you can and economise forage. We are to have the grand naval review on Wednesday. Your turn will come next. I saw your brother leading his red squadron of gun-boats a day or two since in great force.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 19, 1856.

Things supposed secret in England are known at the seat of war.

. . . You think things are secret—you mention how desirable it is that the destination of the regiments for Canada should not be known till they embark; why, the probability was discussed to me in conversation before I had your letter. These things are not secret in England; you must not think they are betrayed here. . . .

Four thousand Sardinians and 2 squadrons of Cavalry (Sardinian) have embarked. I believe it is understood that the vessels do not remain subject to quarantine, but land the troops at once. It will be as well to telegraph and make sure of this.

I have written privately to General Niepotoititchsky (there *is* a name) about the mules and horses of the Land Transport.

1200 first-class mules or horses at £25 to £30.

2000 second-class mules or horses, about £10.

3000 inferior mules or horses, at £2 or £3 each.

Huts, about 3000 in all—a total price of about £60,000.

We shall see, but I doubt their taking anything unless they mean to begin at once and actively to rebuild Sebastopol. I have also offered barley, as the animals would not be of much use to them without. The Turks have declined the purchase of the Land Transport animals, having too many of their own. I have no answer from them about the railway; but I should think the Russians might wish to buy that. I shall most probably think it better to send some of the carts and waggon and harness, if they can be taken sufficiently to pieces to stow well, to Canada with the Regiments. Although, for six months in the year, in Lower Canada, sleighs are used, yet in Upper Canada, and in the summer they may be wanted. And they do not eat. But the sending any will depend upon the facility of stowing them without taking up other transport for the purpose. . . .

Disposal of
horses, mules,
railway, etc.

I must differ with you about the Army Works Corps: very good people in their way—capital fellows in England, I dare say, with no work no pay before them, and superintendence which exacts, by being interested, the work being done.

You will see a strong General Order, rendered necessary by their gross inactivity in preparing, and their equally gross conduct on embarking the first detachment. And you will not be able to prevent each of those fellows, some of whom are sent home for total inefficiency and positive misconduct, from receiving their gratuity of £12 each on landing. If we have another war, I think you will let them be enlisted soldiers for three or four years—you will then have a better chance with them.

Army Works
Corps again—
proposal
regarding them
in the event of
another war.

You speak of the firelocks of 1851 going with the transports to Canada. You are aware the Enfield is that of 1853. We have about 5000 or 6000 of these latter to spare here; and, unless I hear to the contrary, I presume you would wish *these* to be the arms to go. . . .

Arms for
troops going
to Canada.

Their [the Russian] troops have been fast leaving the Crimea: the communications have been very difficult, everything very dear, and Balaclava and Kamiesh merchants find ready purchasers.

Russian troops
leaving
Crimea.

General Lüders came over to breakfast with Marshal

Pélissier on the 15th, myself and La Marmora met him there, and all went afterwards to the races, and a *carrousel* by the Chasseurs d'Afrique near the Monastery.

Review of
French Army
in presence of
Lüders.

On the 17th, Lüders came over to the review of the French army, which took place near the Monastery. I went out early to see the best part of such things, viz., the first assembly, the moving from all sides of columns and masses to take up their ground. From a high hill, commanding a sort of curving crest, we overlook the whole of ground intersected by ravines towards Kamiesh, and on the other side the plain of Balaclava, containing the front and reserve lines of French camps upon the Zedionkine and other mamelons. These movements were beautiful to look at, as infantry, artillery, and cavalry came winding over the brows, or threading the valleys below us, taking their different lines in the position extending along the crest to some distance beyond the Monastery.

Review of
French Army,
arrangements
not good from
point of view
of effect.

At 11, I went to the Col de Balaclava, meeting General Lüders in company with Marshal Pélissier. A still more numerous assembly of officers of all nations, we rode up the high hill I have referred to, and struck upon the right of the French line of columns, extending, but at very open order, about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Rode down the line, and then in front of their artillery, which made a second line. The French regiments were not strong in numbers: some of their army is embarked, some are being selected for the Guard; but their arrangement had diluted their apparent force: they made a mistake, I think, in doing so, for it was apparent, and had not half the appearance that a more concentrated mass of columns would have had. They consequently took more than two hours, and dusty hours (for we were at last yellow as from Epsom), to defile not more than 88 battalions of an average strength of 350 men—30,800 Infantry, 1650 Cavalry, 2640 Foot Artillery Siege, 504 Sappers, and 198 guns, horsed; but we will not say much about the horses thereof.

At 3 o'clock Lüders came to this Headquarters. Made him and Pélissier wash their faces, and with as many Russians, French, Sardinians, and our English Generals of

Division and Brigade, sat down and stood up for luncheon as best we could: the Admiral sent his flags, and though but at short notice, we did good honour to all the party. I made bold to talk French in presence of Frenchmen, proposing the health of Lüders and the Russian army. About half-past four got on our horses and passed between a broad street of Highlanders from this house, through the line of our infantry columns, drawn up at quarter distance. Riding through to the front, and thus giving time to the Highlanders to form in their place, we turned round and faced the line. Salute, and all that sort of thing; we then rode down the front—the Horse Artillery, 2 troops and batteries, 6 in number, on the right of all; then the six Infantry Divisions, the whole front clear, and then on the left 5 batteries and the 2 heavy batteries.

Visit of
Lüders, etc.,
to Codrington's
Head-
quarters.

The troops then all marched past. Nothing could be better; everything went well, easily, and steadily—the Artillery horses in high appearance, and the admiration, probably the envy of all.

We were 49 battalions, Siege Artillery, Battery Artillerymen, Sappers—198 Sergts., 44 Drummers, 3179 Rank and file.

Total of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, all ranks, 36,166.

Guns, 86.

Horses, 2003.

Land Transport Corps, 2 regiments besides. Nothing could do better, and England was complimented for its army.

Two regiments were at Balaclava for the duties, and one at Kertch.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

April 18, 1856.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday. . . .

She is anxious to remind Lord Panmure of the Plans for the Military Hospital, which she is very anxious to see.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

*April 20, 1856.*Commission on
Purchase.

The Queen has only now found time to answer Lord Panmure's letter submitting the names of the persons whom he proposes to form the Commission to inquire into the system of purchase in the Army.

They are, as a whole, hardly such as to inspire her with confidence. The Chairman seems not to be pointed out by any peculiar fitness for the subject, and the Military members still less so.

Men like the Duke of Richmond, Lord Rosslyn, Sir Harry Smith, Sir James Simpson, Sir George Brown, ought to be upon it.

Who ——— is, the Queen does not know, and without any explanation on his merits or peculiar fitness, has no means of judging why she should appoint him to recommend to her what the system of promotion in the Army should be. ~~Lord Panmure will perhaps reconsider the names to be submitted, and also let the Queen see the terms of the warrant, upon which much must depend.~~

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

*April 20, 1856.*Commission to
inquire into
the System of
Purchase in
the Army.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's note upon the subject of the Commission to inquire into the system of purchase in the Army. Lord Panmure cannot help fearing that Your Majesty's views of the names of the proposed members of the Commission are so unfavourable from his not having given a sufficiently detailed reason for their individual selection. The Commission was proposed rather in deference to the opinions of the House of Commons than from any expectation that any change could or ought to be made, and in constituting it, the object is to select men in whom the House of

Commons has confidence, and in whose hands as a body the system of purchase is safe. In proposing the Duke of Somerset as Chairman, the main ground for so doing is that he presided, with great advantage to the establishments of the Navy, Army, and Ordnance, over a Committee of the House of Commons which ran over three sessions, and he is, moreover, sound upon the question to be referred to the Committee. In the civil and financial affairs of the Army he has great weight in the country, and his opinion is of consequence, as, when pronounced, it will tend to settle men's minds on this point for some time at least. Mr Ellice and Mr Herbert,¹ as former Secretary at War and also members of former Commissions, naturally suggested themselves to the Cabinet. To complete the average members it seemed essentially necessary that, on a Commission so important to the interests of the commercial portion of Your Majesty's subjects, a member of that body should be found representing it. By no means a small proportion of the officers of Your Majesty's army come from this class, and their only hope of entering into, and promotion in, the Army rests upon the maintenance of the present system. Mr. Glynn, who has been recommended to Your Majesty to represent this class, is the well-known banker, and was for many years Chairman of the London and North-Western Railway Company. He sees the vitality of the question to his class, and great reliance will be felt in his opinion. Mr. Glynn is the M.P. for Kendal. The only other civilian is Lord Stanley, and he was selected because he is thought to hold opinions somewhat, though not entirely, adverse to the present system, and thus the balance in the Commission is more fairly preserved. Lord Panmure, at the risk of wearying Your Majesty, will now proceed to explain the reasons why the civil five members of the Commission were fixed upon.

The Cabinet thought it extremely desirable to have among them an officer of either Artillery or Engineers, in neither of which Corps is the system of purchase pursued. Sir H. Douglas was selected as an officer conversant with

Proposed
personnel of
said Com-
mission.

¹ Mr. Edward Ellice, a former Secretary at War, and Mr. Sydney Herbert.

inquiries of all kinds, and well known for his scientific attainments. He is, however, Lord Panmure learns, in such a state of health that he cannot attend to any business, and Lord Panmure was about to submit to Your Majesty the name of Sir H. Jones instead. With regard to Sir D. Evans, Lord Panmure submits his name to Your Majesty as a matter of necessity rather than of choice. He moved for the inquiry in the House of Commons, and his omission from the Commission would do much harm, while his presence on it can do none. He represents those of the line who object to the system of purchase.

Sir H. Bentinck represents the Guards, and has, moreover, been a member of former Commissions.

Colonel Wetherall was selected as a young officer on purpose, and Lord Panmure thinks that Your Majesty may rely on his appearing with advantage in whatever situation he is placed. The name of the Duke of Richmond did not occur to Lord Panmure, but, as Your Majesty has confidence in his rendering service upon the Commission, there can be no difficulty in placing him there.

Sir H. Smith has other duties to perform . . . and Lord Panmure would with great deference ask Your Majesty not to press his selection.

The names of Sir J. Simpson and Sir G. Browne were both canvassed, but the former is not in strong health and the latter is at Nice, and even had he been here, he was considered, though a fine gallant soldier, as too blunt for an inquiry which is to be managed with all the moderation that can be brought to bear on it.

Composition
and authority
of Commission.

The Commission is certainly issued by Your Majesty's authority, but it is so upon an expression of opinion by Parliament, and if its composition be such as to secure the safety of the system of purchase and to give no excuse to the House of Commons to cavil at its members, great advantage will accrue to the Army. Such is the spirit in which these names have been submitted to Your Majesty, and Lord Panmure is much vexed with himself for having sent an incomplete explanation of them.

Lord Panmure has the honour to enclose for Your

Majesty's perusal a copy of the Commission as prepared to be submitted for Your Majesty's signature.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

April 21, 1856.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter, which certainly removes to a great extent her apprehensions respecting the composition of the Commission. She thinks Sir Harry Jones a very fit person, and rejoices to hear that the Duke of Richmond is to be added.

The Queen entirely approves the Draft of Commission.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 21, 1856.

I have sent you a despatch to-day as to moving material and horses, but you will use your discretion in these matters, as I have such confidence in your powers of management. Only let me know what you do, and desire Storks to telegraph to me every ship as she passes the Bosphorus from England. The Sardinian Minister here has been complaining that he has not had a proper share of the trophies, and I have desired his letter to Foreign Office to be sent to you. From the good feeling you have expressed in all your letters towards the Sardinians, I am quite sure you have dealt fairly with La Marmora, and I await the result with confidence.

A Sardinian
grievance.

I hope you will contrive to get rid of the Indian horses of the 10th and 12th, as they will never do in England, and will appear like cats beside our other cavalry horses, besides giving infinite trouble in every way. I hope our Admiral has by this time opened up a way into Sebastopol harbour, and that you may be able to get many of your heavy things transferred from the quays you have so prudently spared. We expect our exchange of ratifications in a week, and we shall then commence our reductions.

The first thing to stop is the extra 6d. of field-allowance, as there will be no enemy to face and certainly no longer any occasion for extra pay. I presume none of the cavalry or troops at Scutari have ever received it.

PS.—I see by your general orders you have already stopped the 6d. per day from the 2nd April.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 22, 1856.

. . . The Sardinians are many of them gone, and others embarking at this moment, both infantry and cavalry. The medals are not come for them: I should have been very glad for them to have received them in the Crimea—for it is the spot connected with their service and with the medal. The senior officers, amounting to ten, with General La Marmora, dine here to day.

Evacuation of
Kertch
proceeding.

Kertch has for some time been prepared for evacuation by previous orders: all the main part of the Artillery of position and stores are gone; the cavalry (English) is gone; there remain the 71st Regiment, which I shall bring here to the huts vacated, I hope soon, by the Army Works Corps division, near Balaclava. And I have written to Lord Stratford about the destination of the Contingent. But you had better use the telegraph to General Storks freely. It loses no time for him to receive your orders and have a knowledge of your intentions. I shall not send any Artillery from here to America, as, of the batteries detailed for this duty, one is gone home already, and the other in the *Jura* on the point of going. . . .

Until destina-
tions of regi-
ments are
known, only
preliminary
steps can be
taken.

I have no further plan of evacuating the Crimea than the various details which have long been begun, viz., that until the destination of regiments is known, I have only to facilitate the embarkation of all stores, siege train, spare shot, Army Works Corps, Sardinians; to sell, if possible, all huts and transport animals; not to sell at a very great loss all our fine artillery horses; but to at once dispose of all the less good ones from both Artillery and Cavalry.

Unless you give me orders, I do not think it right to set up the Russian Artillery and Cavalry in the East, and in tolerable neighbourhood of Turkish Asia and Persia. As soon as the *matériel* is away from hence, I should disperse the personnel of the Army, for there is always liability to disease in the hot months of this part of Europe.

I think I shall very probably put off the embarkation of the last division of the Sardinians till the Turkish contingent is gone to its destination : if the Sardinians can dispose of many of their animals, so much the better that we should not have the necessity of transporting the worst of them, as well as the best, to Spezia.

The French are embarking fast : I do not know exactly ^{Evacuation.} what you mean in your public despatch about conferring with Pélissier as to the final evacuation of the position held by us. We are doing so now ; but I presume you merely mean as to some formal notice to the Russians that they can re-occupy the country now held by the Allies.

That was a nasty row at Kasatch. I make out no provocation beforehand. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

April 24, 1856.

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's letter with the enclosures. She much regrets the Duke of Richmond's refusal, and wishes some other military man of high standing could be found capable of competing with Sir De Lacy Evans. . . .

The Queen entirely agrees with Lord Panmure with respect to Sir C. Campbell, but thinks that either Lord Gough or Sir H. Smith might be sent to invest French officers. She also thinks that Lord Rokeby and General Barnard might now get their K.C.B. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

*April 25, 1856.*Disposal of
Militia.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the Committee of Cabinet, aided by Lord Hardinge, have had a long discussion on the following points relative to the disposal of the Militia and the return of the Army from the East.

MILITIA

Proposals
regarding the
Militia.

It has been decided to commence the disembodiment as soon as may be practicable, taking for that purpose first those regiments which are in billets; second, those regiments which are partially in billets and partially in barracks; third, all other regiments as they can be spared from the different posts and garrisons in which they are quartered. For this purpose of disembodiment, Warrants will be submitted for Your Majesty's signature, and copies of the official circulars, which will have to be addressed by Lord Panmure to the Lords-Lieutenant of the different counties in Great Britain, will be previously laid before Your Majesty.

2. It was decided that, as the service was short, no permanent disembodiment allowance should be given to the subaltern officers, but that a gratuity of three months' pay should be recommended to be voted by Parliament.

3. That, inasmuch as the Surgeons and assistant-surgeons lost their practice by moving with their regiments, it was thought right to ask Parliament to assign them a gratuity of one year's pay, to give them something to live on till they could regain their practice.

4. It was decided to maintain the Quartermaster as part of the disembodied staff in addition to the Adjutant, as he will be useful in looking after the clothing stores, while the Adjutant takes care of drill and the arms.

5. Lord Panmure was instructed to represent humbly

to Your Majesty that it would be a just recognition of the services of the regiments in the Militia who have served in the Mediterranean if they were permitted to have the word Mediterranean inscribed upon their colours, and if Your Majesty is graciously pleased to approve of this suggestion it will be submitted in the usual manner.

6. It was decided to not call out for training and exercise during 1856 any regiments now embodied, but all others to be trained unless some strong reason exists to the contrary.

The committee next proceeded to discuss the return of the troops from the East.

1. It having been decided that a division consisting of five regiments of Infantry and two batteries of Artillery should proceed to North America, the Commander-in-Chief has told off the regiments, and they will be the first moved from the Crimea.

2. The batteries of artillery have been countermanded, and will be sent dismounted from this country to avoid ostentation. The Crimean Batteries will therefore return home direct, and the *Jura* sailed on the 20th, and another battery follows this week.

3. The 8th Hussars and 17th Lancers are on their way from Ismed, which they were obliged to leave from sanitary precautions, and therefore come directly home.

Return of
troops from
the East.

4. As we have been compelled from financial considerations to give very extensive aid to the Sardinians, it has been deemed advisable to transport their infantry at once, and to get the vessels back with the greatest speed.

5. The next operation is to relieve and send home the Militia regiments, and for this purpose it will be necessary to send to Corfu, Malta, and Gibraltar, thirteen regiments at least. These have been told off from the Horse Guards roster, and will be the first considerable move from the Crimea.

6. Having accomplished this movement and got back the ships sent with the Sardinians, the main body of the army will then be moved.

1st Division, including the Guards—next, the Light Divi-

As to reception
of the Guards.

sion ; 3rd, the Highland Division ; 4th, the second Division, and so on in turn, taking advantage of all our horse transports to bring home cavalry and artillery as they may be disposable for the service ; but it is impossible to arrive at any guess about these arms until we can ascertain the number of horses to be cast as unfit.

7. It is proposed that every regiment should come home ready to encamp on its landing, as Dr. Smith is of opinion that, even for sanitary objects, it may be prudent not to put the men immediately into barracks.

Lord Panmure must apologise to Your Majesty for this long minute.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

April 25, 1856.

Order of
march.

It seems now that we have been obliged to undertake more for the Sardinians than I calculated for, but I grudge nothing to them, though I fear it may delay us in our own arrangements. I send you a telegram of the order of march, and I think you should try and avail yourself of every horse transport to send away your Cavalry and Artillery, without reference to any regularity of order, as they will have to go to their different ports of disembarkation, and we cannot review them in a body. It is different with the Infantry, and we shall endeavour to assemble them in as large a number at Aldershot as we can. You will see that we have decided on the 1st Division, the Light do., and Highland Division home first, and after these are shipped, and all the work done that will be achieved by that time, I almost think that you could come away, and by running over to Marseilles and taking sail, you could be here ready to join the Army on its arrival, and command it when reviewed by the Queen. However, this is a matter for further decision, and I only mention it to put your own mind on it. You have done the very right thing in giving the Sardinians the battery, and it is highly approved here and valued by

Azeglio.¹ I have promised him his share of brass guns, but I can give him no bells. I shall be curious to know if Lüders accepts your physic; he didn't like your pills.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

April 26, 1856.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letters of yesterday, and will answer them one by one.

1. She approves of General Wynyard being appointed one of the members of the Commission to inquire into the system of Purchase in the Army. The Commission may then now be finally appointed.

2. With regard to the Militia, the Queen has just reviewed them all at Aldershot, and had a general order issued praising their conduct and appearance, and will again see them on the occasion of the laying of the first stone of the Wellington College. General Knollys said that they would not like being seen alone as much as being reviewed with the regular troops, as they were the other day. This being the case, the Queen does not think it necessary to review them again just now, and, moreover, would not wish to have her short stay of a fortnight in the Isle of Wight (where she has not been since December) interrupted by a visit from there to the Camp. But on our return, the Queen would be happy to review the Militia at the camp if they should be there still. She thinks Lord Panmure should not be in a hurry to disband them or to send them away from Aldershot, as it must take some months before any number of troops return from the Crimea, and it would not be well to disband the Militia when we had no troops to replace them with.

3. Regarding the laying of the first stone of the 'Victoria Hospital,' the 12th would suit the Queen very well, if Lord Panmure will ascertain whether the tides will serve.

First stone of
Victoria
Hospital.

She will think of a program, but it strikes her that

¹ Sardinian Minister.

any one should be in uniform that the Horse Guards and Lord Panmure himself should allow; and that the Garrison of Portsmouth and perhaps a portion of that of Winchester, and if possible some invalids who would be well enough to bear the exertion, should be present.

Disembodiment of Militia.

4. THE MILITIA. The Queen sanctions the arrangements proposed for their gradual disembodiment, the proposed gratuity to the subaltern officers, the pay to the Surgeons, and the maintenance of the Quartermasters.

She also readily sanctions that the word 'Mediterranean' should be borne on the Colours of those Regiments who have served there.

Lastly, she would very strongly urge the necessity and importance of training all those not embodied.

5. THE ARMY IN THE EAST. The Queen has already given the orders for the Regiments to be sent to Canada and the Mediterranean.

The Camp at Aldershot, the Queen thinks, would be by far the best place to receive the returning gallant Army; it is healthy, a convenient distance from Portsmouth, and ready to receive troops, and therefore preferable to any other encampment.

Reception of returning troops.

The Queen will be anxious to have early intimation of the arrival of any of her troops, as she would wish to receive them with all honour and glory!

The Queen has still one more answer to give Lord Panmure—viz., relative to the poor late Lord Cowper's request, that the title of Royal should be granted to the East Kent Mounted Rifles, which she grants. But she wishes Lord Panmure to write a Minute, laying it down as a rule that these constant applications must not be granted except for any particular reasons, as unless some check is put to this for the future, there will be no reason why any application should be refused, and we may have all the Militia and Yeomanry Regiments of the country called 'Royal.'

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 26, 1856.

I am glad to find that you have been forestalled by us in your directions as to our arrangements for the evacuation, and perhaps it is as well that I did not wait—we shall have quite enough to do at last. With regard to stores, the accumulation here was so great, and the accumulation was similar at Scutari, that, if we had waited for a classified arrangement before beginning to melt away, you would probably have had to detain the army here, or part of it, for the sake of the stores.

Arrangements
for evacuation.

I see you approve of the Artillery having been sent home without disembarkation: as they are gone, I shall send no Artillery from hence with the troops to Canada. The troop of Horse Artillery was disembarked at Scutari, and therefore will be subject to any of the arrangements affecting the rest of the Army now. . . .

The hospital establishment is reduced here: the permanently sick, and those to be positively invalided, are many gone, and all can go, to England; but the casual and temporary sick must remain with their Regiments, and therefore cannot be cleared out until destinations are fixed.

Arrangements
regarding the
sick; also
horses.

The reliefs for the Militia regiments must also wait till I know the roster from home; except that I understand the Admiral to have ordered some transport which took the Sardinians to Spezia to go to Corfu to remove some Militia to England.

The transport animals 'to get rid of': this is a heavy job. I have authorised the turning out, to take their chance, of many now sick and useless in the valley and woods about Baidar. There is now grass for them and they may recover; but they are not worth at present their two or three days' forage.

I have no answer about the whole of them being taken by the Russians.¹

¹ In the event the Russians did take a good many over.

The drafting down of the Artillery and Cavalry horses began some time ago—I mean the preparation, for the means of disposal are not quite so easy. I thought it would never do to set up the Russian Artillery by the disposal of our horses here, but, if we can give them, or any one else, the pick of them from the wrong end, that will do no harm.

The weakly and permanently sick and disabled.

I shall desire, when I know the destination of regiments, that all sickly and weak people, who by the pressure of war have enlisted, but who are positively an encumbrance in future—that these men should be inspected regimentally and by staff, and detained here in the General Hospital, for transfer to England and discharge by separate ship. It is much better to relieve regiments at once that are to remain away from England. Those going to England will probably have this weakly class still with them, liable to your arrangements there. Orders have been sent to Scutari to miss no opportunity of sending away all permanently sick and disabled.

Disposal of Artillery horses,

The drafting down the Artillery horses here—preparation, that is—is going on, but the disposal of them must depend on the price to be obtained, and also that I have not thought it right, and shall not, to dispose of any large quantity by which the Russian Cavalry or Artillery in the South and East may be materially set up. If Omar Pasha, who I hear will take some of those at Scutari, wishes to take those marked out as disposable here, he shall have a liberal number; for my impression is that it would be the wish of the English Government to establish the Turkish Army, particularly towards Asia, in everything which might conduce to its efficiency.

The discharge of everything possible of the Land Transport Corps has been going on for some time.

The Army Works Corps is being embarked, about 800 sail to-day. . . .

You will see I had already proposed the sale to Russia of the L. T. animals—no answer yet. . . .

Although I know Naval officers well enough, and the temporary detriment it is to their habits of discipline, etc.,

to have a multitude of troops on board, yet it is not every day that there is a Crimea to evacuate ; and I mistake the man much if Sir E. Lyons would not make it a pride—Naval officers proud of bringing home the Army. notwithstanding all the naval feelings of which I am well aware—to show his flag at the Main with a fleet bringing home in a mass the Army which he was so instrumental in conveying to its fighting destination two years ago, and I shall laugh very much at my brother if he has not somewhat of the same ideas.

We can beat your military show—here : on Thursday the 24th, the whole of the infantry, about 30,000, marched in Divisions from their camps on the plateau to be massed in the Balaclava plain—a sort of broad hollow, three-quarters of a mile flat, between the Fedioukine heights to our left and the Turkish redoubt heights to our right. The marching across the plateau itself, all tending towards the steep brow from which they were to descend, was beautiful ; and the concentration as they came down was beautiful, and the assembly where they met and got into position (the Highland Division coming towards them across the plain)—all was beautiful. They were formed just under the steep, near the Woronzow road, in contiguous columns of regiments. We advanced together along the plain, halted the rear line of two Divisions (the Guards and the 4th Division), let the next line get to about 500 yards, did the same with the front line.

Changed the whole front to the right, forming one line of contiguous columns under and facing the low range to our right (which just hides Balaclava), and on which the 2nd line of French Army is encamped.Military evolutions by the infantry of the Army.

Passed through three intervals in that camp in successive columns, for the purpose of deploying on the slope into two extended lines and a reserve facing Balaclava. . . .

The whole then advanced in line for about 500 yards or more : a fine sight indeed—many Russians, many French, nothing to be afraid of showing, all to be proud of their seeing.

General Wassiliffsky, commanding at Inkerman, came along the line, and then the troops marched home. I had

not mentioned to any of the troops what was intended to be done, and it all went very well; and was indeed a fine sight both in the advance and at the halt. The lines extended almost across the whole space in front of Balaclava—say a good two miles. I wish many of you in England could have seen us—a brilliant sun and sky and peculiar scenery besides.

Evacuation of
Kertch.

The evacuation of Kertch as to material has long been going on: the personnel of English troops has begun. The French are withdrawing from Yenikale.

The affair of the Kasatch disturbance is now in the hands of Vice-Admiral Trébouert, a *conseil de guerre* is to *juger les coupables*. All the French express very proper regret at what has happened.

We have beautiful weather.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, April 28, 1856.

Reports ex-
change of
ratifications.

The Ratifications are exchanged and peace has fairly superseded War. I shall notify this officially next mail in a formal despatch. I am glad to see by yours of the 15th that you have been enjoying the Russian hospitality, and that all went off so well and in so friendly a spirit. The *entrée* of our flag into the harbour is a great event, and you are entitled to be proud of it, and I trust you will soon have the passage cleared for larger ships and the quays in full operation. Whenever we are clear of the Sardinians, and the sick are diminished, we must get our reliefs to the Mediterranean accomplished, as it will be well to have some of our Divisions home by the beginning of July if possible. . . .

We *proclaim* peace to-morrow, and have illuminations on the Queen's birthday, 29th May.

CHAPTER XVII

MAY 1856

THE evacuation of the Crimea by the British proceeded slowly.

By May 7th the last of the regiments destined for Canada had been embarked, the arrangements for embarking them being found to work well and expeditiously. The Sardinians and the Turkish Contingent were also being repatriated. Yet, as late as May 31st, Codrington reports no less than 41,094 of all ranks of the troops under his command as still awaiting shipping.

'You have missed a good opportunity of showing Europe your power,' he writes, 'I mean as to the removal of the Army in a body.' And long ere this he had been urgent in representing the danger involved in detaining that army on an infected area whilst the hot season was fast approaching.

A prejudice, however, existed at the Admiralty against the use of warships for transport, and it was not until the eve of an outbreak of Asiatic cholera in camp that this prejudice was over-ruled, and that Sir Houston Stewart was instructed to use the ships of the fleet under his command for bringing the troops home, whilst several additional line-of-battle ships were sent out for the same purpose.

Ere this the Queen herself had intervened in the interest of her soldiers—a further instance of her gracious consideration for whom will be found in her letter of May 5th.

Circumstances had denied to Codrington an opportunity of justifying the choice which had placed him in command

of the British army in the field ; but his letters of this period display a magnanimity and self-abnegation which won the warm commendation of Panmure. For example : ' Never mind about me,' he writes, ' and my turn coming. . . . I do not care much for the show—the reality has been here, and I am thankful and proud to have had to do with this latter part of it, though the work has not been as real as I hoped to see it, viz., in the field. I have had my turn here ; it has given me much work, now and then some anxiety, a certain quantity of experience, and much pleasure in finding things go on well, and, still more, a fair feeling of pride in seeing myself associated in a high position with such an army. Therefore, in any arrangements for any fair possible compliment to others who have sacrificed position and feelings for me, I hope both you and Lord Hardinge will believe I shall be much more gratified by their being put in the most ostensible position than that I myself should be consulted or cared for.'

In the meantime the Balaclava railway had been sold to the Turkish Government, to whom it had also been decided to sell certain artillery horses—these being the only horses of good quality which were to be parted with.

Among other subjects alluded to in the month's letters are, the division of war trophies, with special reference to the Turks and Sardinians ; the consideration to be shown to officers who had commanded brigades or battalions during the war ; the laying of the foundation-stone of Netley Hospital by the Queen ; the fireworks in London in honour of the Peace, the case of the Tartar servant of a British officer who had been forcibly detained by the Russians, and the migration of Tartars from the Baidar district of the Crimea.

Before the end of the month the French war medal had been presented to those soldiers of the British Army who had been selected to receive it.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

May 2, 1856.

I have just received your letter by the mail. We will drop our amicable discussion on the subject of publishing despatches,¹ as, having once ascertained your feeling, I took care that you should have no further cause of complaint.

The Queen and the Government have a horror of our passing any of our animals into Russian hands. I confess I do not see the force of the arguments used against it, viz., that the said Russians would parade them through Russia as trophies of war. However, we must bow to this opinion, and I have telegraphed to you to sell as few as possible in the Crimea. The huts and Railway I can see no possible objection to letting them have.

Objection to
selling horses
to the Rus-
sians.

I congratulate you on your exhibition of your troops.

I send you the Treaty and complimentary despatches.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 3, 1856.

The Russians are not very active in their answers. I suppose they wait for everything from St. Petersburg. I have no answer about their taking huts, or bat animals. . . . I shall send a reminder in a day or two. I have telegraphed about your succession of bringing home Divisions—there will remain after the Canada and Mediterranean departures, 30 Battalions, which I understand are for England. . . .

I Evacuation of
the Crimea.

There are many senior officers to whom it would probably be considered a compliment to be put at the head of considerable portions of this army as they arrive, or are put together, in England. Never mind about me, and my turn coming. I consider my duty to be here. I do not

Self-abnega-
tion of the
writer.

¹ *i.e.*, on the subject of publishing them without indicating omissions.

care much for the show—the reality has been here, and I am thankful and proud to have had to do with this latter part of it, though the work has not been as real as I hoped to see it, viz., in the field. I have had my turn here; it has given me much work, now and then some anxiety, a certain quantity of experience, and much pleasure in finding things go on well; and, still more, a fair feeling of pride in seeing myself associated in a high position with such an army. Therefore, in any arrangements for any fair possible compliment to others, who have sacrificed position and feelings for me, I hope both you and Lord Hardinge will believe I shall be much more gratified by their being put in the most ostensible position than that I myself should be consulted or cared for. There is a very good reason for it too, for there will be plenty to arrange here to the last—even at Smyrna, perhaps, and at Scutari—and I shall not be the least indisposed to go quietly to my home when I get away.

as-
ch. Lord Stratford has sent up despatches intimating the desire of our Government for the evacuation of Kertch. . . . Although 2500 men of the contingent will go to Varna soon, yet I have desired General Michel not to evacuate Kertch districts entirely, without communication with me; and to take care that all those compromised by relations with us be facilitated in their departure; and that no hindrance is to be put in the way of others wishing to leave the district, though no encouragement is to be given by us to their removal.

The arrival of the Tartars from the Baidar district here was quite unexpected by us: it was necessary to get them away at once, and most of them are gone. It was apparently a complete 'flitting,' bag and baggage: the curious homely Arabas, in a line all along the street; heaps of beds, tables, cooking things, men, women, and children, covering the available space of our wharf, and gradually melting away on board: never were people more quiet and resigned-looking, many of them well to do: they packed all their women and children together in some native small vessels to be towed across. I shall not encourage them, or

further assist them in their migration, than permitting them to come in and remain till they choose to embark in any vessels but those employed by our Government. You may, in case of Russian objection and complaint, consider the assistance given them yesterday by me as exceptional—it was necessary to get them away.

I suspect the Tartars have some good ground or fair suspicion of Russian intention to deport them into the interior of Russia ; they must have so, to induce them to quit Baidar—a beautiful and rich valley. It is said that the Russians never have restored to them the original titles to their land, of which they obtained possession on some excuse of registration : I refer to long time ago. I have let the *Bruiser*, Commissariat vessel, take away some Russian black bread and meal, from the Sebastopol store in Dock Yard, to deliver to the Tartars at Baltchick. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

May 5, 1856.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of this day's date with the Victoria Cross. She would wish this Model of Sebastopol to be brought here on Wednesday morning at 10. . . .

The Queen has been told that the two Cavalry Regiments now on their way to Ireland from the Crimea would be much hurt if they were not seen by the Queen, as all her other brave soldiers who return from the Crimea will be ; the Queen does not know whether it would be possible, or at least easy, to enable them to land in England, so that the Queen might just see them. Will Lord Panmure perhaps just mention this to Lord Hardinge, and consider it with him ?

Consideration
for two Cavalry
Regiments.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pv., May 5, 1856.

The question
of India not
involved in the
causes of the
war.

. . . As to India, we began the war in conjunction with France to defend Turkey, and not to defend India. How could we have expected the French to go to war with Russia for the purpose of securing our Indian Territories from danger? If India is attacked or put in danger, we are quite able to defend it without help from any body else; but we should have been practising a fraud upon France if, after engaging with her in war for the defence of Turkey, we had left her to take charge of Turkey, and had gone ourselves upon a roving expedition for the future protection of India.

As to Circassia, what you say is unanswerable; moreover, it would have been unfair in us to have excited the Circassians to partial revolts as a diversion in our favour, and then to have left them to the resentment of the Russians, and this we must have done until the course of the war had enabled us, after driving the Russians out of Crimea, to make Georgia and Circassia the real seat of important operations.

A similar reasoning applies to the Forts on the east coast of the Black Sea. We had not military possession of that country, and could not therefore impose conditions about it. Moreover, those Forts are merely defensive Posts for small garrisons, and so [do] not, like the naval arsenal of Sebastopol, constitute a threatening danger to Turkey. Therefore, while on the one hand we had no right to insist on their demolition, on the other hand their demolition was in no degree necessary for accomplishing the objects of the war.

As to India, what would Ellenborough have said to a Protocol by France that we should go to war in order to protect French Algeria? Would the people of England pay for such a war, and would they not say, let France defend herself and her own possessions? So would the

French naturally say, let England bear the charge of fighting for British India.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 5, 1856.*

We have some discussion on the Peace to-day, and as I am more than likely to be swept into its vortex, I write a few lines early and in a hurry before I go to the House. I find that we must pause as to parting with our Railway, as there is a Company forming to make a line to Jerusalem, and they may very likely not only take our plant, but some of the men who work on it may be induced to join the Company.

Topics connected with evacuation.

Ali Pasha is to be here to-morrow, and will in all probability decide the question of permission so far as to enable the Directors to make me a definite offer for the whole.

I have published your official despatch of your visit from Lüders, and I am as proud of the Army you showed him as you can be yourself. I only trust we may get the greater part away before any epidemic gets in amongst them.

You will not relax your sanitary vigilance I trust, and the possession of the harbour of Sebastopol will greatly facilitate your operations in embarking.

I am glad to see the Turkish Contingent already beginning to disappear. It will give me infinite trouble to wind up all these various details, but the release from responsibility as to the prosecution of the War is an unspeakable relief. . . .

We have fixed no time for a vote of thanks to the Services, but I dare say it will be next week.

I see that you have got off some Regiments already for America. The storm is blown over there, if indeed it can be said ever to have threatened at all.

The Kars affair is nearly forgotten, all except the majority of 127, which was a great discomfiture to the Opposition.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 6, 1856.

Your mail of the 21st April is just in. I think you will see we are doing all we can, and indeed have for some time been doing everything in accordance with your views in England.

Delay in embarkation and risk attending it.

The French all ask where are your ships? How is it you are not going? What prevents your embarkation? I suppose I must point to magnificent naval reviews at Spithead as an answer. You will see in Dr. Hall's report to-day that we are all healthy; but as you have seen the wise remark in Lord Dalhousie's answer to the Calcutta Address, that no one in that country can reckon with certainty on peace whilst surrounded with so many elements of war, so you may consider Dr. Hall's remarks about disease in this climate, and with an army in the field, approaching the hot season, and on ground containing nearly as many bodies beneath as above it. The remaining regiments for Canada embark to-day and to-morrow, and will sail at once. I have not been able to send more than one million cartridges in all the vessels put together. Are you aware that a million cartridges weigh about 45 tons? There is not magazine room in the vessel for more, and I shall not think it necessary to take up a sailing vessel purposely for the conveyance of the remainder.

Partition of war trophies, etc.

The partition of the guns, trophies, etc., had been made, and the greater part carried out as between the French and English here, before the arrival of instructions as to the Sardinians and Turks to have a share. This depended, if I remember right, upon Treaty. . . . However, the brass guns, bells, etc., were all gone to England, if I remember right, before Sardinia joined *that* Treaty, though she subsequently became entitled to the back share from our stock. But that back share must now go from England, and so must the back share (our part of it) for Turkey. . . .

The Sardinian and Turkish shares of the spoil.

General La Marmora himself does not personally feel

as the Ambassador does, for I think he is rather ashamed of the demands of his Government on this head. . . .

I think you will agree that our arrangements for embarking infantry—which were contemplated for war as well as peace—would have been tolerable; for the regiment to-day (about 600 strong) was on board, the ship ready to move away, and the men stowing their things in 19½ minutes. I am so sorry that the mail day prevented my seeing the practical carrying out of these earlier theories.

The 6d. a-day¹ has long been stopped, as you see. There ought to be some consideration shown for the General Officers who have commanded Divisions and Brigades. As a rule, for instance, General Garret would join his regiment, General Cameron would join his regiment, and I see Brigadiers are to do so; and really, without reward, or a good word, old officers who have served in high commands are almost 'reduced to the rank and pay of a private' Commanding Officer of a Battalion.

Consideration
to officers
having com-
manded
Brigades and
Battalions.

General Barnard I hear accepts Corfu: both he and Lord Rokeby will be delighted to hear of the K.C.B. for them. I hope for consideration of a similar kind to many, be they of the Guards or of the line, who have commanded Brigades and Battalions, whilst they have done the duty in the Trenches of Sebastopol, and had the responsibility there of General Officers.

You will of course have heard that our ships (or rather ship) are in Sebastopol harbour. I am making arrangements in readiness for walking Cavalry and Artillery horses on board at the Dockyard quay, if we find it advisable; but the Mediterranean reliefs will absorb, with their further voyage to England, a large quantity of transport: it cannot be less than six weeks from their time of leaving this that we shall have the pleasure of seeing them² again; and that six weeks is easily extended by accidents or repairs to two months—that is to the beginning of July.

¹ Field allowance. It had been granted with the view of encouraging recruiting, but had the unfortunate result of increasing drunkenness.

² *i.e.*, the transports.

I have given orders for selling the horses of the 10th and 12th.

You will also have seen by my letters that I had not intended to set up the Russian artillery in horses.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pr., May 8, 1856.

Thanks to the
Militia.

I think the thanks to the Militia should be for their 'zealous' and meritorious services, instead of 'prompt and meritorious,' and that it should run 'for the zealous and meritorious services which at home and abroad they have rendered to their Queen and Country.'

That is to say that 'at home and abroad' should follow 'which' and not 'Queen and Country.'¹

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

May 10, 1856.

In returning this paper relative to the removal of a Tower in Pevensey Bay, the Queen wishes to observe that, while she sanctions it, she would not wish the land itself to be parted with. The Queen hopes that Sir William Codrington has received very positive instructions not to part with any good Artillery and Cavalry horses, as she thought he was in great doubt about it in his last letter. However, in the one Lord Panmure sent the Queen last night, dated 26th, he says:—'The Drafting down of the Artillery and Cavalry horses began some time ago. . . . I thought it would never do to set up the Russian Artillery by the disposal of our horses here, but, if we can give them, or any one else, the pick of them from the wrong end, that will do no harm.'

¹ Lord Palmerston's habit of correcting despatches circulated in draft would sometimes prove a little trying to his colleagues, and to Lord Clarendon in particular.

The Queen supposes by this that he will not get rid of the good ones.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 10, 1856.

Lord Panmure has written to the Queen that whatever horses are fit to be brought home shall come.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 10, 1856.

The telegraph of 4th May to Admiral Fremantle seemed to be so decided as to the removal of the Sardinians, coupled with some expressions in your letter to me received on the 8th May, that I have suspended the embarkation of the Mediterranean reliefs, except one Regiment, the 3rd Buffs, which was under orders for a particular vessel, and sails to-day. . . .

Change in order of embarkation of troops.

I repeat, however, my anxiety to see the main body of the Army away from this as soon as possible—stores can wait; they don't get fever or cholera: animals can wait in preference to men, though they are a cost for forage and maintenance. But your men, in good health now, may be decimated by the first breeze of unaccountable malaria, or fever. Think what hurry of orders, what despatching of ships, even of the Navy, there would be if you got a telegraph of cholera or typhus in this camp, amongst 30,000 fine Infantry.

A plea for haste.

Do not think of saying anything about my going overland before the army is well away from this: there are many officers to whom it would be a compliment to show half the army together to the Queen. I beg you will not consider me for this, much as I should like to see the Light Division march past the Queen anywhere; but I repeat my duty is here, the Queen will allow me to stick to it—even though it were to gratify the little feeling of pride I might

have in continuing the real duty, which it must be confessed is here, though not quite of an agreeable sort. But you have Sir C. Campbell, General Barnard, Lord Rokeby, each of whom might probably feel gratification in showing part of the army; and, by the bye, you must remember what just strikes me—that beyond the Dardanelles they all become my seniors at once. I shall do very well to bring up a rear-guard-place of honour in retreat; and you may be pretty sure that no time will be lost in getting it home if it depends upon my wish of quitting the East. . . .

Embarkation
of Infantry and
Artillery.

As soon as the Sardinians are completed and that we get back the steamers, the Mediterranean reliefs will go on; at the same time that these begin (being infantry only) the artillery will begin from hence, and probably from the Dock Yard quay of Sebastopol, by means of the horse transports from Spezia. The only horses of the Artillery sold here will be cripples and useless for our purposes: some that would be turned loose, as not worth their forage, will be given, if the Turkish employé chooses to transport them, to the Tartars at Baltchick.

I shall take all precaution about nothing happening at Kertch: General Michel assures me that he has no apprehension of anything happening. . . .

I think I mentioned to you that there will be about 1100 horses to be got rid of here from the Artillery; they will go in all sorts of ways, and to all sorts of places, and will not be trophies to the Russians,—at least, even in Parliament, a committee would probably agree that some of the very old cripples of animals might be left behind—they cannot be made lamp-posts of.

The cavalry now in the Bosphorus will be in one brigade, under Colonel Parlby of the 10th¹—keeping, however, General Lawrenson as superintending the whole: they are now all together, with much to do in casting and embarkation.

We are rather amused here at the disasters attendant upon the sight-seeing journey of Lords and Commons from

¹ Hussars.

London to Spithead *in peace*, at Headquarters of the railway world, of the Navy of England, etc., etc.¹

May it not teach some little consideration for Balaclava during a state of war, without appliances and means, and in an enemy's country?

A lesson in consideration to be learnt from experiences at home.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 12, 1856.*

The Army Works Corps have begun to arrive and are being speedily absorbed in the labour market, which is as glad to get them back as you seem to be to get rid of them. Paxton is annoyed at your General Order, for, though they have in some respects given you trouble, still they have done service. . . .

Return of the Army Works Corps.

I am glad to find that you are sending off your sick, as I have got 1900 beds ready for them, and shall have Haslar Barracks fitted up for them in case they come on me in any great numbers.

Your description of your Infantry field-day with 30,000 men throws all we can do here into the shade; one cannot help regretting that we had not opportunity to use them. Still you quit the field with great prestige, and we are all well pleased that Lüders should have seen your efficiency. I have ordered an encampment for 4000 men to be prepared near Portsmouth, as a resting-place for the men on landing before we pass them on to Aldershot, where the Queen will see all the Army, I believe, at least all the Infantry, as soon after their arrival as possible. After that they must, I presume, have furlough to some extent. Lord Gough leaves on Thursday to invest the G.C.B. and K.C.B. in the Camp. You must give the old Veteran a warm reception, and help him out with 'French,' of which he says his stock is small.

¹ The allusion is to a break-down of railway arrangements, which delayed the return of some of the sight-seers until the small hours of the next morning.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 13, 1856.

We all continue in good health, and I hope shall remain so. But I hear of three deaths, by typhus fever, of camp-followers in the General Hospital of Balaklava.

These might
be prevented or
risk to health
by delay.

I repeat again, do not risk the health of a large body of troops by any delay, or the omission of all disposable means of transport. I believe half the French Army is already embarked, and probably with less than half the means of transport that England has. The hot weather may begin at any moment—indeed the thermometer has been already at 70°, and to-day is a summer's day of clear and powerful sun. Remember what is underground and close in the neighbourhood of our camps: we are very healthy still, but a breath in this country may convert prosperity into disaster in the way of disease. I cannot but feel anxious that you should avoid any chance of this, for the sake of the lives and efficiency of the army and the credit of England.

I am getting some horses, cast horses only, of Artillery sold here by the officers in command of batteries; and an auction is arranged to take place at Kadikoi under an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, who will have the sole direction of the arrangements, and pay the money into Commissariat, where a separate account will be kept for future reference.¹

A letter from General Michel assures me he has no fear of anything improper happening as between the Turks of the Contingent and the Russians of the place. I have told him that I would send a brigade rather than risk any such discredit.

He proposed
act of the
R. Genl.
authorities.

The Russians have taken by force a Tartar inhabitant, who was with a Lieutenant of Engineers as servant, whilst he was travelling on the South coast—far out of our lines. The Tartar was from Eupatoria, had been a year and a half

¹ Worthy of note in connection with the relations of the Butler Commission.
JMS 1905

with the officer, was not a soldier or deserter, but simply a Tartar. I write about this. But if this is their policy, what wonder that the Tartar fears are well grounded?

Some more steamers are come, but I send off all the Sardinians I can, that that job may be completed first; and then we have the contingent from Kertch to arrange early, and I think you wish that carried on next. . . .

The railway—that part of it at least beyond the ‘forts’—will be taken up now that all shot is pretty nearly gone down to Balacava. That part of it to the ‘left siege train’ is already begun: I have kept part of the Army Works Corps for this purpose: the rails, etc., will remain in readiness for embarkation at Balacava.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *May 14, 1856.*

. . . As Codrington has agreed with the Turkish Government about the Balacava Railway,¹ Sir Culling Eardley and Co. must get theirs from England. I conclude the Turk gives a good price.

Balacava
Railway.

We must consider what can be done for the Officers who served at Kars with Williams. The House of Commons and the public expect, naturally, that they shall not go unnoticed and unrewarded. Pray turn the matter over in your mind, and see what can be done for them without regard to rules or precedents.²

Officers who
served at Kars.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 15, 1856.*

. . . The Queen has received and signed several Warrants for sealing patterns of Military Accoutrements. She would wish for the future that the date on which the patterns had

Military
accoutrements.

¹ *i.e.*, as to the sale of the same. Sir Culling Eardley had wished to acquire it for use in Palestine.

² In deference to the supposed prejudices of the Austrian Government, the services of one of the bravest of the defenders of Kars, the Hungarian patriot, Kemety, remained unrecognised by the British Government.

been submitted by the Commander-in-Chief to the Queen should be mentioned, as she otherwise cannot remember when she saw them and which they are.

In a despatch from Sir William Codrington which Lord Panmure forwarded her this morning, there is one relative to quarantine, in which he speaks of the wish of the Tartars to emigrate. Lord Panmure should consult with Lord Clarendon on this subject. These poor people should be allowed to do so, and Turkey should be urged to facilitate it. We ought not to abandon them.

When will the *Légions d'honneur* be at last given to the Queen's Army? And what has Lord Panmure done with respect to the Emperor's military medals? Have the men to receive it been selected?

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

May 16, 1856.

Recognition of
Sir William's
self-abnega-
tion.

I have received yours of the 3rd this morning, and I am sure if your comrades in arms could read the sentiments expressed therein, and the abnegation of self which they contain, if any spark of jealousy still smoulders, it would be speedily extinguished. Whatever your own wishes may be, I could not do anything which is to throw you into the background, for there are too many who would be willing to seize on such an act and turn it to your disparagement; moreover, it would be base ingratitude on my part.

It will be for me to judge when you can leave your post, and be assured that I will neither hasten the moment from any desire to inflict an ovation on you, nor delay it till there remains only such work to do as your staff can fully accomplish.

You have done quite right with the poor Tartars, and, though of course you must not let them crowd inconveniently into your camp and outposts, any facility for emigration which you can afford them will be fully recognised on this side of the water.

It is abominable on the part of the Russians to begin with their vile quarantine again. It is a cloak for other designs, and I trust that this may not be permitted.

I will consult with Lord Hardinge as to a re-formation of the army into Divisions, etc., preparatory to its coming home, but my own impression is that it had better come home in regiments. When the new organisation is made in this country, you may be sure the Crimean officers will not be overlooked in the new arrangements.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 17, 1856.

I have nothing particular to say, or much time to say it in.

But I beg you to send us out what steam transport you can, and as soon as you can. I shall be ashamed of the fleet if their objection to come out for us is to be allowed any value: it surely would have been a fine thing for twenty sail of the line to have come into Sebastopol harbour and got us away handsomely. You must not think that the fear of disease is merely liable to be imaginary: it may come at any moment.

I mean to insist, as you will have seen by my telegraph, upon the restoration of the Tartar servant of Lieut. Leahy; I am sure Kertch will frighten them into it, as it frightened away their quarantine. I think, from what I hear of Count Strogonoff,¹ he will settle that, as a Russian subject, he will not give up the Tartar; but he will be frightened out of it by my retention of Kertch.

Measures to ensure the release of a Tartar wrongfully seized.

General Michel tells me he means to hold as hostages liable to punishment the Turkish soldiers who committed some violent acts against Russians. He has no fear of anything disagreeable. The embarkation from Kertch is going on.

¹ Civil Governor of the Crimea.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 18, 1856.

Disposal of
horses and
mules in the
Crimea.

With reference to Codrington's private letters of the 22nd and 26th of April, I should be inclined to say that, rather than let the Russians have a great quantity of horses and mules at an almost nominal price, it would be good policy to give those animals to the Turkish Government as a present, if they were not disposed to buy them.

PS.—I see by Stratford's Despatch of May 1, of which copy has been sent you, that the only reason why the Turkish Government objects to buy the horses and mules in the Crimea, which we do not mean to bring home, is that they have no means of conveying them to Turkey. If that is so, it would be better that we should take them across to Constantinople rather than hand them over to the Russians.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 20, 1856.

Russia gives
up the Tartar
servant.

Last night, about half-past eleven, arrived a Cossack with his lance, and another Cossack with a Tartar with a rope round him, who probably had been towed all the way from Bakshi Serai to make sure of him, or to give him a little pleasant recollection of Cossack habits; he was the Tartar servant of Mr. Leahy of the Engineers. We put them all to bed in the stable, gave them something to eat, acknowledged the receipt 'per bearer'; and thus ends the little characteristic episode by the safety of our *protégé*, after a certain quantity of bullying, which seems the usual practice of the under-officials of the Russian Government.

I think the 'Kertch lever' would have been a powerful one, had the use of it been necessary.

I need not repeat to you what I hear from General Storks, who telegraphs to you as he sends people home; but I write to him that Artillery horses from hence are of even more consequence to get home than Cavalry from

Scutari, unless in occasional ships and from particular destinations. . . . In return for your remark about Sanitary vigilance *here*, remember the sanitary vigilance from home for us—get us away from hence—no sanitary vigilance will *prevent* cholera or disease, which may overtake us at any moment, even in the freshest camp of this country. . . .

Speed in evacuation urged on sanitary grounds.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 23, 1856.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 21st, and entirely approves of the allowance of the subaltern officers of Militia being increased on disembodiment from three to six months' pay.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

May 23, 1856.

You would be surprised to find a mail arrive and with it no bag from me, but I was called out of town to assist at a most interesting ceremony which the Queen performed with her own royal hands—viz., the laying the foundation-stone for a fine hospital on Southampton Water.

It is intended to move the whole establishment from Chatham, and to give up that place to the Corps of Royal Engineers. We had a fine day and everything went off very well, but I could not get back to London in time to write by the mail. The communications by telegraph can now make up for such omissions.

I am happy to say that the Admiralty have been persuaded to send out six men-of-war for troops, and you will do well to fill them as full as you can, for I quite agree with you that the sooner we fly from the chance of pestilence the better. I will try and induce Sir C. Wood to give me some more of his ships, though, with the prejudices that exist against carrying troops in men-of-war, it is not easy to do so. You must do exactly as you please as to

Six men-of-war to convey troops.

coming home. All I will say upon the subject is that hitherto everything you have done has met my full approval, and I feel myself bound to take care that you are not laid on the shelf should you desire to be employed. You will be made a full Lieutenant-General, and as we mean in the new organisation of our peace establishment to have divisional commands, I hope one may suit you. You will consider this as confidential, of course.

Partition of
spoils.

There is no fear of anything occurring at Kertch, but you have done quite right in leaving part of 71st regiment there to prevent accidents. The partition of spoils is a pretty affair. . . . Both Sardinians and Turks shall have what they want.

We shall take care of those who have commanded brigades, and means will be taken to prevent them falling back to their Corps. There is a brevet promotion in preparation, which will do something for your meritorious officers.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 24, 1856.

As to men-of-war not having been employed to bring home the Army.

Sir H. Stewart arrived here on the 22nd, and came to camp yesterday. I do not know how it comes that you have all allowed England to miss so good an opportunity of showing her maritime power, both of mercantile and military marine. You have missed a good occasion of showing Europe what you could do . . . I am afraid that you have all gone into the opposite extreme to the French, whose constant and habitual use of their men-of-war as transports may be unadvisable for us to copy, for we have a magnificent mercantile marine which they have not. But we certainly might gracefully, and perhaps gratefully to this army, have asked the Navy to descend from their high horse; for it is not every day that you have to evacuate a Crimea after a siege of Sebastopol, and it is not every day that you can show to Europe what power of hostile movement is within our means. Twenty screw line-of-

battle ships in Sebastopol harbour, with 20,000 Infantry on board, with 30 or 40 magnificent merchant steamers under their convoy with a second 20,000 men, how came you to miss such an opportunity! I only hope the hot weather and its possible consequences may not give reason for greater regret; we are all well, however, as yet.

I send back the two companies of the 71st to Kertch. Letters from General Michel detail another murder of some 2 or 3 Russians; it is as well to strengthen his hands, particularly as having good excuse and convenience in assembling the whole Regiment for eventual and direct transfer to Malta by the *Sidon*, which Sir H. Stewart will place at my disposal for this purpose. I hope to go to Kertch before or at its evacuation.

Desirability of
strengthening
authority at
Kertch.

We are getting on tolerably with our sales of cast horses and animals here: the huts you must put down as a dead loss most probably, though I move several down to Balaclava. I am just going to the assembly of the remaining part of the army before Balaclava, for salute, etc. on Queen's birthday.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 25, 1856.

I should think it not unlikely that the Russian Government would have no objection to the emigration of the Tartars from the Crimea. The departure of these people would render it more easy for the Russians to fill up the Crimea with thoroughbred Russians, who could be more relied upon than the Tartars in the event of any future invasion of the Crimea.

Regarding
suggested emi-
gration of
Tartars from
Crimea.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

May 26, 1856.

The Queen has been reading Sir William Codrington's three last letters, and must say that she thinks not another

moment ought to be lost in sending out sufficient ships to bring home the troops. The Queen cannot allow the lives of her noble and gallant troops to be exposed to the risk of disease, and she cannot believe that the Admiralty would let the possible inconvenience arising from the conveyance of troops by ships of the Navy weigh against the possibility of the Army becoming attacked by illness. If anything were to happen after what Sir William Codrington writes, the Queen thinks the Government would incur a heavy responsibility if they lost another day in bringing the Army home. They would have to answer for lives, as much as the officers who have been so much attacked for the sufferings incurred from want of foresight in '54.

As the Queen cannot write to Lord Palmerston, perhaps Lord Panmure will show him this letter.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

May 26, 1856.

As to return of
the troops.

I have received yours of [*Blank in copy*] inst. this morning, and I fully participate in all your anxiety to get the troops away before the hot weather sets in. I will urge Sir C. Wood to give me as much transport as he can, and, if you consider it urgent, I will give you authority to move troops directly home, instead of immediately relieving the Mediterranean garrisons. I hope, however, before you get this you will have got the Sardinians moved, and then use every available means of sending away your own gallant fellows. I trust Dr. Sutherland is using all his endeavours to keep up his sanitary system, and that you will find no inconvenience from the quantity of buried animal matter all around you.

I am glad to learn that General Michel anticipates no disagreeable consequences between the Turks of the Contingent and the Russians, but your precautions are nevertheless quite satisfactory. Your telegram has announced the return of the Tartar whose abstraction from his master was most unjustifiable. Should disease threaten

your army, you have my full authority for exercising your discretion as to the expediency of giving the Contingent precedence in departure from Russian territory. We must not be made a prey to disease, either to gratify our late foes by a speedy evacuation of Kertch, nor to send back [Turks] immediately to their own ranks.

By the term holding troops in readiness to embark, I by no means imply that you are to await for orders so to do. Your instructions are to embark whenever you have an opportunity, and to be ready to avail yourself of opportunities whenever they arise. The lifting of the railway sounds like business and leave-taking, and you are quite right in keeping some of the Army Works Corps for this business. The Turks are to have it, and I hope they will transport it. We are to have our fireworks this week for the peace.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 26, 1856.

From what I hear you had a symptom of the good discipline of the Army Works Corps on their arrival at the Waterloo station. They have given me very little trouble—do not imagine that it is on that account that my opinion has been expressed about them. I do not pay their bill. But I certainly have my own opinion as to the work they have done for their money; and although I do not deny their having been of use, at least some portion of them, I utterly deny the idea of their having been of such advantage to the army, that it could not have done very nearly as well without them. I do not say that they have not done some work: I only say it is utterly out of proportion to their enormous cost, the inefficiency of many of them (*sic*), and I suspect to the trouble they have given to their more immediate employers. I cannot help Sir J. Paxton's annoyance: they may work very well in England, where their wages depend on their work; and very possibly he may be able to quote the good conduct and hard work of many of them on railways in England, to show how wrong the General

Value of the
Army Works
Corps.

Order was in the Crimea. We have not the least doubt that, if it is put in print, it will all be believed—but that won't alter facts here.

'Favourite
Chargers.'

I hope and think there is latitude enough given as to horses; but, if I were to publish your mention of any officer having a favourite charger, there is not an animal in the Crimea that has been ridden off his legs that would not go home as a favourite charger, and many a baggage pony would go at Government expense to the quiet parsonages of England, or inundate your intended camp at Aldershot. I am preparing a little for Lord Gough;¹ but what a pity for any one to come for such a job as this and not speak French! Verandahs, flags, thrones, and all that sort of thing are beginning in the rear of this house; and we will do all we can for Pélissier and the other French Generals, as well as for our own: there are Rokeby, Barnard, Dacres, and Sir H. Rose, I think, also Sir Houston Stewart is all for doing what he can to help us, and his fleet here has no such feeling as that supposed by us to be held in England. He sends a steamer of war to-day to Kertch, to order another to assist with her in taking the Contingent to Constantinople, and this will help us considerably.

Sale of horses
to Turks.

General Storks tells me he has sold a great many horses, and well, and that the Seraskir wants some of the really fine English Artillery horses, and I write to General Storks to suggest some Turkish officer coming up here, if he wishes to have some, in order that he may see them, and not have to take any out uselessly at Scutari. But they are not the class of horse to suit them, unless they want the mares, to give a greater size; but they will not be able to mix these big horses with their small ones.

The Army Works Corps have, I think, about 800 remaining here, and are employed in taking up the railroad, which I hear from Lord Stratford is bought positively by the Turks—the Saw mills at Sinope the same: I shall send away more of the Army Works Corps when I can. You must understand my remarks about them refer to the *men*

¹ Who was going to the Crimea to hold an investiture of the Order of the Bath.

of the Corps—not the officers, who seem, with Mr. Doyne himself, to have been always willing to exert themselves; but with little power in themselves, and absence of any particular inducements to the men, no wonder they did not come up to the mark which the imagination of many people in England had put upon their exertions. We have all of us some ‘motive’ for work, and you had not quite hit upon motive enough for the men of such a Corps, highly paid, certain of food and clothing and pay, and not having punishing power beyond a fine which they cared little about. I have told Mr. Doyne that, having received the new Mutiny Act, I can try any heavy faults now by District Court Martial, composed of the officers of the Army. The French have sent away about 56,000 men, their siege train, and almost all their artillery of the field. We have moved altogether about 32,000, including Sardinians. . . .

Causes of
failure of
Army Works
Corps.

The French medals are done: we paraded on the 24th on a slope just below the Col Balaclava—a fine day—quarter distance columns in line, artillery on the right and left. At the signal of a gun, the different Divisions formed a square of their columns, the Generals giving the *médaille* and reading out loud the services in detail of each man. Marshal Pélissier came out with me to the First Division, to take part in it; after this the line was reformed—a salute from 21 guns from each flank—then the salute of the troops, Pélissier being in front and saluting with me. Then there were three cheers given. We rode to the right and went down the front—about 1000 yards; the troops then marched past, and so home. 44 guns and 26,000 men were out; all went very well and a good show; the ground was a slope of a hill and favourable. I say again you have missed a good opportunity of showing Europe your power—I mean as to the removal of the army in a body. However, it is somewhat of the same sort of thing as the removal of some Sikh guns—sent I think to be trophies for Windsor—by Pickford’s Van, or railway, instead of by Artillery horses and some sort of show.

Presentation
of medals by
the French.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

May 30, 1856.

Writer's high
estimate of the
Army.

I am obliged to employ another hand in writing to you by this mail, as the gout has laid hold of me and is persecuting me so that I cannot write comfortably. I see by the last telegraphic despatch from Marseilles that I have failed to give satisfaction to the Army in some speech which I have made, and which I presume to be that in which I proposed a vote of thanks to it. I am sorry for this, but don't exactly know wherein I have sinned, as I am sure nobody has felt more proud of, nor spoken more highly of the Army, on any occasion on which I had to refer to it, than I have.

I am happy to say that the Admiralty is now fully alive to the necessity of bringing away the troops as quickly as possible. Sir Houston Stewart has received instructions to use any ships of the fleet in sending them home, and several line-of-battle ships and steamers are on their way out for the same purpose. I received your public despatch upon this subject this morning, and I highly approve of the manner in which you have written on this important subject, as it not only strengthens my hands, but sets yourself right before the public should any evil arise from unnecessary delay. You will see by the papers that our fireworks went off with great *éclat*, but our weather is cold and ungenial.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

May 30, 1856.

Approval of
the fireworks.

The Queen must write a line to Lord Panmure to tell him how very much we all admired and enjoyed the Fireworks, which were magnificent, and truly worthy of this country. The showers of rockets and the Bouquets and the finale were really the most beautiful things ever seen, and this was the opinion of those who had seen the celebrated Fireworks at Nantes (?), 'the Girandola,' etc.

Would Lord Panmure say all this to Captain Boxer, who has taken so much pains with them? She is now anxious to know that no accident occurred in letting off such multitudes of rockets. The Queen concludes that Artillery men let them off?

Nothing could be more successful. We were on the balcony the whole time.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 31, 1856.

I thought it right that you should know in cypher, of the decided case of cholera in the army: as I mention in my official letter, there had been one or two somewhat suspicious cases, but in which were wanting some extreme symptoms of Asiatic cholera. But in this case Dr. Hall tells me there was no doubt; the man, however, is getting better. But—but—I need say no more of possibilities: I hope they are not even probabilities—they certainly are liabilities, and of a serious nature. Two regiments of the Mediterranean, the 31st and 2nd Battalion Royals, are the only ones remaining here: the 71st remains at Kertch till the final evacuation of the place: this regiment is provided for by the Admiral's letting the *Sidon* take them to Malta when the time comes.

Occurrence of
an undoubted
case of cholera.

There remain now in the Crimea for embarkation:

1,852 Officers.

36,758 N. C. Officers and privates.

1,100 Army Works Corps.

1,384 Natives.

Total, 41,094

500 Staff and Infantry Chargers.

7,934 Horses.

60 Guns.

1,048 Carriages.

Disposal of
horses.

I have desired to have, and have begun with, two steamers, which take mules, etc., regularly to the South and East coast of the Black Sea for Colonel M'Murdo: I shall soon have some good, but not first class, steamer, to take the least valuable of the Artillery horses to Constantinople (after extracting and selling the cripples), landing them at once for sale, and returning for a similar cargo. I have suggested that the Turkish Government should send up an officer to choose and buy here, we conveying them if necessary, some horses and mules of the Artillery. I gave General Storks power to sell, as a whole, the heavy horses of the heavy batteries of 18 and 32 pounders; but not to sell them piecemeal, nor allow any delay by taking out a few. The sales of horses by auction here, which took place at Kadikoi, were almost entirely cast or inferior horses: those who bought them took them into the interior, and are not returned; consequently sales have languished, and the sending to Constantinople is my remedy for this.

You may consider still my line of conduct in sales to be, both here and at Kertch, that nothing of *really* warlike stores be sold; that provisions will be sold if a price can be got (but which cannot at Kertch); that the horses sold here will be none of the best, but will be only cast, and inferior; that I have sanctioned General Storks' sale of some good animals of Artillery for good prices, but it must depend upon price. . . .

12 *Mid-day, May 31.*

Increased
facilities for
embarkation.

I have just received letters from Sir H. Stewart at Kasatch, with letter that 10 sail of the line are to leave England to help the embarkation of the Army; and that he has permission by telegraph to employ his own fleet and take out their lower deck guns for the purpose. You will not be surprised at my anxiety to get away the troops, as you will have learnt by a second telegraph from me to-day that another decided case of cholera has occurred. . . . Though a decided case, Dr. Mouatt says it is mild, and he hopes an accidental one. These two cases—this hot weather—for the thermometer is from 81° to 86° in the shade—are

warnings. The Admiral is all anxiety to assist in every way. . . . I have had no hesitation in telling him to-day that we have had practical warning; that I do not hesitate to say the sooner the troops are moved the better; that it would not do to wait the possibility of any disease coming, the exposure to which would not then perhaps be fair to the ship's companies; that the men were very healthy now, and that the more he could assist us the better. . . .

'The sooner
the troops are
moved the
better.'

CHAPTER XVIII

JUNE 1856

THROUGHOUT June the evacuation progressed rapidly. On the 10th of the month Codrington reports that the 88th Regiment and the Second Battalion of The Rifles have sailed, the Light Division has begun its embarkation, and the 7th and half of the 19th, 23rd, and 33rd Regiments have been told off for particular ships. 'We do not delay an hour in sending men away.' Meantime the Balaclava railway was being taken up, and the remainder of the Army Works Corps shipped off. By June 17th, but nine British regiments remained to be sent home, and the camps had begun to present a strange contrast to their former busy appearance. On the 20th, Kertch was handed over to the Russians. At home, Militia regiments were fast being disembodied.

Fortunately no fresh cases of cholera had occurred among the troops, whose excellent appearance, as successive instalments of them kept landing, drew a compliment from the War Minister.

Among questions arising out of the conclusion of the war, were that of the reduction of the Army, of which Lord Panmure submits a rough scene; that as to the provision to be made for Crimean Brigadiers; and another as to the allowance (if any) to be paid to privates of Militia on disembodiment. It was decided that the Brigadiers should be placed in command of brigades, with the pay and allowances of Major-Generals, and the prospect of promotion to

that rank ; and that the Militiamen should receive fourteen days' pay. It was also determined that the Guards should make a triumphal entry into London.

The recruiting of members of our disbanded Foreign Legion for the Dutch Indian Service was approved.

Codrington received promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

In a spirited letter to Lord Panmure he describes an Investiture of the Bath, for the purpose of holding which Lord Gough had been sent to the Crimea. In another he returns to his old complaints against the Army Works Corps, and the want of driving-power afforded by the regulations under which its members served.

The strained relations with the United States which had arisen out of the manner in which the Foreign Enlistment Act had been put in force had by this time reached an acute stage, the British representative at Washington having received his passport.

But, whilst observing his usual caution in respect to readiness for defence, Lord Panmure correctly gauged the significance of this demonstration and the chances of further complications arising from it.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 3, 1856.

I am glad to say to you to-day by telegraph that there are as yet no additional cases of cholera—nor, indeed, of any other illness : I am quite sure that ships will now come out as quickly as you can send them, and therefore I will say no more of what might have been. . . .

In a letter dated June 4th, Lord Clarendon announces to Lord Panmure that the British Minister in the United States has received his passport.

No additional cases of cholera.

British Minister in the United States receives his passport.

MR. ABERCROMBY¹ TO LORD CLARENDON*Private and Confidential.*

THE HAGUE, June 2, 1856.

As to enlistment
of members of
our Foreign
Legion in
Dutch Indian
Service.

When speaking this morning to Baron von Hall² on the subject of the Foreign Legion, I found that he had been nibbling to get recruits from it, when disbanded, for the Dutch Service in India, and that it suited his book very well that the disbanded men should pass through Holland, where he hoped to pick up the men he wanted. Finding this to be the case, I suggested that Bentinck³ might possibly be instructed to concert with you and Lord Panmure as to the practicability of entering into some concerted arrangement by which an opportunity should be afforded of allowing such men as were disposed to volunteer for the Dutch Service, and to accept the Dutch offers, the extent of which I do not yet know, before they were finally cast loose from our Service.

I do not know whether such an arrangement would meet the approval of Lord Panmure, but perhaps you may think it worth while to let him know what has passed here upon the subject, in order that he may consider what answer should be given in case Bentinck should make any proposal. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 7, 1856.

There has been no additional case of cholera, nor anything of consequence in fever. I hope, therefore, the two which I reported were only casual. I have telegraphed to you on this subject in order to quiet any apprehension you may have had—not that I can consider the army safe from any such visitation in this climate; and the sooner we get the

¹ Afterwards Lord Dunfermline, British Minister at the Court of the Netherlands.

² Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.

³ Netherlands Minister in London.

big ships the better. Sir H. Stewart is all good-will and activity, and I say the same with great pleasure of Admiral Fremantle, who has long had plenty of onerous detail on his hands.

Lord Gough arrived on the 4th. I met him in Sebastopol harbour, into which he went in a steamer from Karsatch. The Investiture took place yesterday on the garden side of this house. I thought it better to confine it to our own arrangements and troops entirely. At 11 A.M. the whole of remaining troops assembled—say 16,000 men: the ground has a short slope down from the house of about 80 yards, and a similar slope up opposite to it, with a French road running about parallel to slight valley thus formed. Beyond the road the ground still rises, and on this was placed the artillery, some siege trains, some guns. I went with an escort to the French Headquarters, and came back with all the troop of French officers, escorting them as it were to our lines. Entering the path which approaches from the French road, and which runs up across the little valley to this house, Marshal Pélissier and all of us got off our horses and sent them out of the way.

An Investiture
of the Bath.

The regiments were formed in quarter distance columns, the majority of them opposite the house in a line of columns, the remainder echeloned about, as the confined nature of the ground and the huts of Headquarters permitted: all the bands were joined in front of the centre of the troops—about 400 of them.

The ceremony.

On Pélissier getting off his horse, we gave him a salute with '*Partant pour La Syrie*,' the Artillery salute having preceded his arrival. We all went up to the sort of throne, of the canopy over which we will not lay bare the secrets of rough scantling—it was all well swallowed up in externals,—viz., naval flags and ensigns (the great stand-by on such occasions), an union jack at the top, the French and English flags on what you in England would irreverently call scaffold poles. There is a sort of verandah at the front of this house, which we cut about, and made steps down from the house to the 'throne'; some hospital rugs

Investiture of
French and
British officers.

made the carpeting; the chair of state was made up of some very funny-looking deal boards whilst it was naked, but which some odds and ends of cushions, and signal flags over all, made into a wonderful representative of a royal chair. The front of the house, the windows, the sort of balcony, were all occupied by officers, travellers, etc., etc.—the day beautiful, breezy but sun bright. We had no velvet cushion, but we had a scarlet cloth, one whose everyday occupation is more undignified than carrying the insignia of the Bath. All was done in fair propriety, I think; Lord Gough read the English address. I read the French translation to the French officers, the knighting took place by Captain Baillie's sword, each officer in succession.

The
subsequent
luncheon.

Marshal Pélissier made a very good short speech in return to Lord Gough's. The French, I am glad to see, had their real stars given to them; it looked a little awkward to see our own officers getting the spangled affair at the same time put into their hands¹; but 'vive la politesse' to the 'étrangers.' We made the best of it, though I must say it looked a little economy for a great nation at the time. The 'God save the Queen,' with all the bands, was very fine: of course we all saluted by our hats off. We rode down the troops, though it was by much passing in and out; and, returning to the slope opposite them, Lord Gough received the salute from myself and the army, saying subsequently some complimentary things, the greatest part of which are placed in a General Order to-day. We gave the Veteran three cheers, which were well and heartily given. One of the principal parts of the performance then took place after sending the troops home, —viz., eating and drinking: of course the house stretched, the table stretched, the hunger and thirst stretched; but what with champagne cup, and salad of all sorts of things, we were all in good humour, some short speeches and healths took place, we made room for a second edition of guests at the table, and everything went off very well and heartily with the smoke of cigars. I rode back with

¹ At that period it was usual to present the star in tinsel, and allow the recipient to supply himself with one of more costly material.

Pélissier and the French officers; I think they were much gratified with their forenoon.

I am getting a little abuse, I hear, about the 'charger' order: pray send us out magnificent *Simlas* and *Himalayas* for 14-hands ponies if England wishes. I am sure I don't care; but I think you had better leave me, and those who act with me, to use our discretion (or our indiscretion, if England thinks it so); you had much better pay something in the way of compensation after some 'violent representations' hereafter in England; throw a little blame on me, but let us use the transport we have for the purpose of taking men out of the Crimea, and real good horses if necessary.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

June 9, 1856.

I have only got one hand but it is the right one, and I am able to run you off a few lines though with very little to say. I am glad to see that you are melting away at last, and though we have lost an opportunity of grand display, still we shall get our troops home in reasonable time, and many of them before Parliament rises. I am not afraid that we shall have occasion for their services in America, as I consider all the bluster on the part of the U.S. Government as merely intended to make political capital and then end. I am glad to be able to congratulate you on your permanent rank of Lieut.-General. We have not yet seen Sir Colin in this country, and though I hear that Sir Wm. Eyre has arrived, I have not yet had a call from him. He goes to Canada as soon as his affairs here are settled. The Militia is disappearing and room is making for you in our various camps.

Bluster on the
part of the
U.S.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

*June 10, 1856.*Embarkation
begun.

The army is all well and nothing of disease has crept in to follow the individual cases which were telegraphed, and I telegraph again to-day that we are all well. The Light Division has begun its embarkation; the 2nd Battalion Rifles and the 88th having sailed; and the 7th, half of the 19th, and 23rd and 33rd being told off for particular ships. The weather is beautiful—though hot, it is healthy and not really oppressive yet, and we do not delay an hour in sending men away. If we had waited for the Turks to take away the rail, we should have delayed long indeed: we begin the last part of it to-day or to-morrow, by means of the remainder of the Army Works Corps. Since my last letter to you, I have received your official letter enclosing Mr. Doyne's to Sir Joseph Paxton. I will answer it officially, though the Engineer Records and many others are gone home, which might have confirmed my knowledge, and that of other officers who were at Headquarters before me, as to many circumstances of this Corps.

Misconduct of
the Army
Works Corps.

I look upon it as a gross imposture of an establishment, comparing the real work done with the enormous cost and the pretence that it saved the Army. I have an official letter and other eye-witness knowledge that there was scarcely ever seen a greater instance of general drunkenness and misconduct than the embarkation of that part of the Corps, which caused the General Order. Are these things to pass without notice, without that public notice which would have been visited upon any regiment? The facts are even admitted in the very letter of the superintendent. It was not necessary for the well-being of the army, for its discipline or its safety, that I should take upon myself to do any number of positively illegal acts towards the Army Works Corps; and, if I am to judge by the result of even a General Order consequent upon open and proved misconduct, I think I am very lucky in having avoided many more serious reproaches and much more

serious consequences. For I certainly could not have shown the necessity of my trying deserters or others by Courts Martial. It might have been very convenient for Mr. Doyne or Sir J. Paxton for me to take the illegality upon myself in order to remedy such gross defect in organisation. I did what was necessary for the Army—viz., punished summarily those who brought themselves under the fair terms of the Provost Marshal's authority; but it was not necessary for the army that I should look for, and arrest and try, the said offenders, who were, for instance, deserters on board of ship at Kamiesh, and in many other things that did not influence the discipline of the Army. However, I need not trouble you with further detail in a private letter. I do not think the same error of want of power of punishment will happen again: it is better to enlist people for two or three years than have such clashing of system and authority. The Army may be very great 'bunglers,' I dare say; but I think some of the Engineers could have laid out a road from Balaclava notwithstanding, had they been left to their own resources, on an average of 4000 men a-day for three months. . . .

Error of want
of power of
punishment.

The Light Division will soon be under way—it has borne its full share in all the events of the campaign and the siege, and I hope you will do it honour if you can.

We shall scarcely be able to sell a hut. Some have been sent to Malta; the Russian Government take none, but no doubt will seize every one of them on our quitting. And were it not for the undignified dog-in-the-manger proceeding, what a magnificent bonfire the whole camp would make!

I think it would be a compliment to Pélissier if the C.B. were given to his brother, who deserves it.

The investiture
of the Bath.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *June 12, 1856.*

The Queen and Prince had intended to take their visitors down to the Camp on Monday next—the only day

which we shall have for a fortnight, free from other engagements, and hears to her utter astonishment that all the troops (except a very few) are gone, not only the Militia, but the 3rd Battalion of the Rifles!! and this without the Queen's hearing one word of it! The Queen is the more astonished and annoyed, as Lord Panmure had promised that the Militia Regiments should not be disembodied until there were other troops to replace them, which will not be the case for some little time. What is the cause of this sudden determination?

The Queen is much vexed, as her Visitors will not stay long, and are very anxious to visit the Camp, and it is of much importance that Foreign Princes should see what we have, and in what state of efficiency our troops are.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

June 13, 1856.

Prospect of
early convey-
ance of troops.

I have received two bags from you since I last wrote you. I am perfectly satisfied with your disposal of all the extraneous material of the Army, and between you and General Storks I expect to get a good deal off hand and make reasonable bargains. I am glad to hear that Houston Stewart has got his telegraphic message as to the use of his fleet, and the announcement of the one on its way from England. Whatever happens, the prospect of immediate, or, rather, early conveyance will keep up the men's spirits and make your own mind easy.

Your telegram informs us of the Investiture. Though old Gough may not speak the thing, I am sure he would look like a fine old Warrior, and Pélissier will appreciate the compliment of his being sent.

We are disembodimenting our Militia fast and making room for our Regiments as they come home, and in a few days they will begin to drop in. Sir Colin Campbell is come. I have not seen him, but I hear he has grievances. Sir G. Brown has come from Nice and for a wonder has no grievance.

You will see by the papers that Jonathan has sent our Minister his passports, of course amidst a thousand professions of peaceful intentions. Our Consuls have likewise had their 'exequations' withdrawn. What our course may be I cannot say, but we have plenty of means at our disposal whatever these fellows may compel us to do.

You will be sorry to hear that Captain Thomson, one of the Kars heroes, died shortly after his arrival in England.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

June 14, 1856.

The Queen cannot say how grieved she is to hear of the death of poor Captain Thomson, one of the gallant heroes of Kars. Nothing can be more tragic than to return from suffering, danger, and captivity to your native land, and your home, to die! His poor Mother, who was so proud of him, had frequently sent her son's letters for the Queen to read.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 14, 1856.

Lord Gough sailed on the evening of the 12th, having been along the South coast. We rode across the country on the 11th, breakfasting on the Belbec, to the field of Alma, in the whole of which he took the greatest interest: we came back in a gun-boat sent up to the mouth of the river for us by the Admiral.

We are losing no time in embarkations; the Light Division and Highland Division have their ships here and are named, the 72nd going to Balaclava: this will leave twelve regiments of infantry, the 11th Hussars, the siege-train companies, about 500 men. Horses and mules not taken with the batteries (which are all gone or settled for ships) are transferred to Colonel M'Murdo. I shall send some by a steamer to Constantinople as soon as I get a

*Progress of
embarkation.*

middle class one, and keep her going for this purpose, besides sending to Trebizond and Samsoun.

I think Kertch will be clear of all but the 71st on the 18th inst. I shall go there on the 17th, after the mail home, and either a ship of war or a contract steamer will then, or a day or two afterwards, take the 71st to Malta.

I have to thank you for your telegraph notifying for me the rank of Lieut.-General. I am only anxious that others who have done the service with me here should not find me put above them; and, although I feel superior-command necessarily carries its weight, yet I should have anxiously wished it to have been the result of work in open campaign rather than of command in this plateau, although it has brought with it responsibility and work.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD PALMERSTON

June 15, 1856.

Gradual
reduction of
the army
contemplated.

I would have sent you an answer sooner, but had not the necessary papers at hand. It is not intended to interfere with the number of men voted by the House of Commons and sanctioned by the Mutiny Act, so that the power of the Crown to keep up the full number remains intact till 31st March '57. The Cabinet, however, contemplate a gradual reduction of the Army. If you will refer to page 11 of the Estimates originally prepared and laid before Parliament, you can follow the arrangements which I understand to be in contemplation, but which must be arrived at by degrees. In fact the actual Peace Establishment will not be fixed in all its details until we prepare our Estimates for next year, and there are many circumstances which render rapid reductions undesirable and inconvenient. They are undesirable, because I do not think our political horizon is sufficiently clear to warrant our hurrying to a reduced Establishment in any arm of our Military Service. They are, or may be, inconvenient because we cannot tell how the ten years' Enlistment Act may operate, or how

many men may slip away from the ranks next year, when it comes into operation as affecting discharges.

We settled at our last meeting, before I was ill, that our Infantry should eventually come to 105 Battalions of 1000 rank and file, organised into 12 Companies each. We are yet undecided whether our Cavalry shall consist of 8 Troops per Regiment, as proposed by Lord Hardinge, or of 6 Troops. If, as is proposed by Lord Dalhousie's minute of 1854, and now seriously urged by the East India Company, our Cavalry is to be permanently removed from India, the whole of that arm of the Service will be confined to England, and I anticipate great difficulty in persuading the House of Commons to maintain it in proper efficiency. I think we can manage to get more dismounted men attached to each Regiment, but I am of opinion that we must curtail the officers and horses to the narrowest limit that we can.

Proposal to
remove cavalry
from India.

Eventually, as far as I can see, the reductions for the present year will be to the following standards; but we have got sufficient means to accomplish them gradually.

	All Ranks
1. Life Guards as they are	1,311
2. Royal Horse Artillery as they are	1,678
3. Cavalry of Line, exclusive of two Regiments in India—a high calculation	11,700
4. Riding-Horse Troop	35
	<hr/>
	14,724
Present strength voted	18,554
	<hr/>
Reduction	3,830
5. British Foreign Cavalry	1,518
	<hr/>
	<u>5,348</u>

INFANTRY

Proposed reduction.	1. Royal Artillery	18,000
	2. Royal Engineers and Sappers	4,000
	3. Foot Guards, eventually	6,000
	4. Infantry of Line, exclusive of 22 Regiments in India—a moderate calculation	93,000
	5. Medical Staff Corps	500
	6. Commissariat	120
	7. Medical Staff	300
	8. British Foreign Corps <i>by autumn</i>
	9. West India Regiments as they were	3,414
	10. Colonial Corps as they were	5,154
	11. Land Transport Corps, to be reduced to a skeleton, and reorganised, say	1,000
Total Infantry in British pay		131,488
Add in Service of E. I. Co.		24,784
		<hr/> 156,272
Cavalry		14,724
And in India		1,579
		<hr/> 16,303
Total Queen's Army		172,575
Deduct India—		
Infantry		24,784
Cavalry		1,579
		<hr/> 26,263
In pay		146,312
Voted for War		246,716
		<hr/>
Reduction proposed		<u>100,404</u>

This is a rough calculation, but it will show the Queen the main features of the proposed reductions, and we shall have money enough voted to accomplish these gradually,

and without more disturbance than the transition from a state of War to one of Peace must entail.

I cannot say that the numbers which I have mentioned will form the permanent Peace Establishment to be proposed to Parliament next year, should things be settled; but our object is to maintain the *whole* army in such numbers as shall sustain a well organised force, capable of immediate development into an efficient army, without having recourse to the wretched expedient of breaking up one Regiment to set up another. We go, too, on the principle of maintaining a complete Artillery and much improved Engineer Force. The former I hope not to see below 140 or at least 130 well-equipped Field Guns, and the latter to embrace a large body of men who shall do the part of an Army Works Corps under proper discipline and complete Military control.

I fear this paper has been written hurriedly for your information, but the calculations roundly taken are sufficiently correct for use.

The money struck off from the whole vote is in round numbers 14,000,000.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 16, 1856.*

I hear that you are more speedily evacuating, and I have become more easy as to the troops getting away before disease sets in. You have had a most able coadjutor in Sir Houston Stewart.

I do not think we shall want our Army to punish Jonathan, as we have decided not to send away Mr. Dallas, nor to get out of temper. . . .

The Londoners are crying out for a triumphal *entrée* for the Guards. . . . I foresee our Crimean heroes will be kept in a very respectable state of drunkenness and show in many defaulters' books on their return, but it cannot be helped, and we must make the best of it. They have done their work well and deserve some licence. I don't know

Proposals for
dealing with
Crimean
brigadiers.

whether Lord Hardinge has mentioned to you the manner in which it is proposed to deal with your Brigadiers. It would be difficult even under the Warrant of 1854 to promote them to be Major-Generals, as it would so overwhelm the list that it would stop the regular promotion of the Army for many years. It is intended to give them commands of Brigades in different parts with Major-General's pay and allowances, and, after a certain number of years' service, then give them rank as Major-Generals. This will ease down the list and admit of the promotion meanwhile of many officers whose misfortune it was, and not their fault, to have missed service in the field.

I mention this to you in confidence, because I am sure you will like to know that those whom you have had in command of Brigades are not to return to Regimental duty.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

June 17, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that notice is to be given in the House of Commons of a question as to the reception of Your Majesty's Guards on their return from the Crimea. The object of this movement is to give the Guards a triumphal entry into London, similar to that given to the Imperial Guard into Paris.

Any such arrangement should be the result of Your Majesty's pleasure, and ought not to be decided by the House of Commons.

As far as Lord Panmure can learn, it is desired that the whole Brigade should enter London simultaneously and not by regiments at different periods.

Your Majesty will learn from Lord Hardinge better than from Lord Panmure the feasibility of such an entry in a military point of view, and all the previous arrangements and precautions which it will require; but Lord Panmure feels it to be his duty to point out to Your Majesty other considerations which strike him. The

Considerations
in view of
same.

probable strength of the Brigade will be not under 2000 of all ranks. Suppose this body to move from Aldershot, where they have been previously collected as they arrive in succession from the East, Lord Panmure is not aware of any place in the vicinity of either the Vauxhall or the Waterloo Station of the London and South-Western Railway where so large a number of troops could be assembled, as the trains from Aldershot delivered them in London. But suppose this difficulty overcome, and public notice having been duly given of the entry of the Guards at a particular hour, all London would be wild with enthusiasm, and no precautions which even the numerous and experienced police could take would prevent such a pressure that, not only would accidents occur which all would regret, but in spite of all that their officers could do, and the anxiety of the troops themselves to preserve their formations, Lord Panmure fears that these would inevitably be lost, and the whole order and decorum of the scene destroyed. The injury to property would, on the line of march and without the smallest evil intention on the part of the people, be inevitable, and therefore the question is one which requires the gravest consideration.

Lord Panmure feels assured that Your Majesty will give him credit for a sincere anxiety, not only to do all honour to the gallant Guards, but to every arm of Your Majesty's forces which have so nobly vindicated the honour of their Queen and country in the theatre of war, and that while he submits the matter for Your Majesty's consideration, his duty impels him to point out what appear to him to be the obstacles in the way of accomplishing that which would otherwise be gratifying to Your Majesty and to the country generally.

Lord Panmure cannot, he fears, prevent the subject being agitated in the House of Commons, but he has succeeded in getting the question delayed till Monday, when Your Majesty's pleasure can be stated in reply.

It may perhaps be convenient for Your Majesty to confer with Lords Hardinge and Panmure before her pleasure is finally notified.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 17, 1856.

I am sorry to see the return of your gout. I have no idea what is meant about the army being discontented with some speech of yours; but you must not believe all that is put in newspapers from the collection of stray remarks in camp. '*Faire son devoir advienne [ce] que pourra*' is one of the old mottoes which may make us disregard nonsense, though that nonsense is printed so many thousand times in a paper.

I send you the official answer about the Army Works Corps. I am afraid I do not mean to be driven out of my opinion: if you inquire of most of those who have seen their usual sort of working, you will find there are grounds for it; but no doubt there is plenty written down in books, of men employed here and there and everywhere, with timekeepers named, with foremen, etc. etc. Let me see the works DONE, exclusive of their own huts, streets, wash-houses, etc., and then let me see the cost of the Corps to the country, from its starting to its return home—I cannot say I have the impression it would show worth while.

Cost of Army
Works Corps
to the country,
and work ac-
complished
by it.

The camps are deserted, absurd-looking places now: to ride through them is half ludicrous, half melancholy—the ridiculous appearance of places that have long been of such vital interest. There are now nine regiments remaining—principally at Balaclava.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 23, 1856.

Troops in the
Crimea melting
away.

I have just received yours of the 10th, and am glad to find you are melting away so fast. I imagine that by the end of the month you will scarcely have anything in the Crimea at all. If the Russians do not buy our huts, or have the decency to ask for them civilly, I really see no reason why a farewell bonfire might not be made of them.

At all events I would use them up for every possible purpose. I presume you will not leave the *iron* stores.

I have sent your information in regard to the anxiety of the Russians to repossess Kertch to Lord Clarendon.

The cloud in the West has emitted no flash, and I foresee no employment for troops or ships in that quarter. It is satisfactory not to find the kindred races in contention. . . .

It has been determined to give the Guards a triumphal entry into London, and it will be a grand affair.

I wish you could ship us over some of your fine weather, for our summer has hitherto been dull, cold, and wet.

I am glad to hear that your installation went off so well. I was sure Gough would look the part well, though he was deficient in his French. I have sent your proposal to make Colonel Pélissier a C.B. to Lord Clarendon, and, if his own Government do not object, I see no reason why your recommendation should not be laid before the Queen.

I suspect that this letter may find you on the move yourself.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *June 23, 1856.*

This moment, on my return from the House of Lords, I find your letter giving to me the very delightful announcement that the Queen has been graciously pleased on your recommendation to sanction the appointment of myself as Inspector-General of Infantry. I cannot sufficiently express to you my gratification at this. You know that I have long felt the greatest anxiety for employment, and the momentary severance from the active duties of the Army was painful to me in the extreme. I owe it to your kindness that I am again to find myself actively employed, and the gracious manner in which you say that Her Majesty has at once acceded to your recommendation cannot be otherwise than most gratifying to me. I trust that the exertions I shall make to become useful in the new post for which I

Returning
thanks for his
appointment
as Inspector-
General of
Infantry.

have been selected will be such as fully to justify your recommendation, and hoping that I shall have *plenty to do*, and that I shall have opportunities of furthering any plans you may suggest for the new organisation of the Army. I am, etc.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 24, 1856.

Against
admitting right
of discussion
as to spoils of
Sebastopol.

I hope you will not admit of a doubt about our right to take anything in war, or armistice, or peace from Sebastopol; you will open a wide field for cavil and discussion if you do. I have not admitted on any occasion, either with the French or with Russians, that there need be any question. And yet the telegraph from Sir C. Wood to Admiral Stewart seems to throw doubt on the propriety of men-of-war assisting in the removal: anchors, shot, guns, everything, may come under the same doubt.

I wrote down what I should myself have answered, and took it to Pélissier, with whom I had some conversation, in which I said that we ought not to admit the right of questioning the operations of any sort within our own lines. Though I do not think our joint letter is well worded, it has the main points in it, and does not enter into detail, for which we certainly are not accountable to any Russian authority. I think something has passed at Paris about it, which may have embarrassed the French, for Lüders says the French Government agree in his view—but they have got half the guns, which is an awkward commentary on the principle of thinking it wrong.

Kertch
restored to
the Russians.

Kertch is given over to the Russians. It took place I believe on the 20th, but Colonel Reade and the 71st went direct to Malta. I had nice trip along the coast: we went to Anapa, found that all remaining houses were in flames by a wild lot of fellows, the remains of the occupants of the place since the Russians quitted. They had heard of the Russians coming and were off, doing all the destruction they could.

Four regiments only will remain in a day or two: the 50th, 72nd, 82nd, and 56th.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

June 25, 1856.

I return you the accounts from Aldershot, which have given both the Queen and myself much pain. I am particularly shocked at the behaviour of my Rifle men. It is to be hoped, however, that the officers will succeed in preventing any continuance of the quarrel.

Military disorders at Aldershot.

The account of the wrought-iron gun of Messrs. Horsfall is most interesting. I should much like to see it fired with you at Shoeburyness.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

June 27, 1856.

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday evening. The reports which he sends her of the proceedings with respect to the building of the Barracks are so far very satisfactory, but the plans of those to be built at Kensington this year have not even been laid before her, and are most necessary, for the Guards have actually to be sent out of London on the return of the others from the East, as there is no room for them. The money has been voted, and therefore there ought to be no further delay.

Building of Barracks in London.

It will give the Queen great pleasure to give one of the Bells to Lord Panmure and one to Lord Hardinge.

It is very strange that no telegraph has been received respecting the arrival of the Guards!

The Queen has heard nothing further from Lord Panmure about the Chelsea Barracks, and sees nobody at work upon the new wing of the Wellington Barracks.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 28, 1856.

Cessation of
'field allow-
ance.'

I understand that the ordinary field allowance is given at Aldershot, as I think it was given at Chobham. I put in orders, according to your telegraph, that all field allowance ceases on the 30th June here. Thus it seems that the 'inconvenience and expense' of camping in the United Kingdom is greater than in the Crimea—a point that we may perhaps be allowed to doubt.

I shall wish to go home with my brother in the *Algiers*; but I must say I should not have been sorry to have a vessel like the *Banshee*, a quick-going one, somewhat at my disposal, to visit the Swiss Legion, or any hospital establishment at Smyrna, as well as Sinope, where we have the remains of Land Transport, and Trebizond, Samsoun, etc., to see how things are getting on for final wind up. I could then have got to Malta, so as not to delay the *Algiers*, and done some service perhaps in meantime.

I am going to Odessa, probably on the 28th. This is not so much a matter of duty as of pleasure, although there may be some matters of final detail to arrange.

I may probably have to leave some commissariat officer behind us, for we have 2000 head of cattle and 8000 sheep remaining.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 28, 1856.

On the
selection from
the General
Orders of the
Crimean
Army.

The selection from the General Orders of this Army has been published; but, as a book of official reference, it has been comparatively useless from its not containing the whole. There will be several complete copies of the sheets issued to the Army—both in the Adjutant's and Quarter-General's offices—and but little compilation even would be required. But it might be a great advantage to add copies

The gazetted Despatches,¹ either according to their
 es, or collected for reference at the end of the volume.
 e book of the size of the War Office Regulations
 ould contain the whole, and be an authentic record for
 erence.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., June 30, 1856.

Lansdowne said to me on Saturday that, on Shelbourne
 being called up to the House of Peers to be under-Sec.
 to Chrendon, he should like to propose Sir W. Williams to
 succeed Shelbourne at Calne—where the Lansdowne in-
 terest rests upon personal influence and not upon property,
 and where it is necessary, therefore, that the person to be
 proposed should be either a member of the Borwood
 Family, or a man in some way or other distinguished. I
 advsed Lansdowne to consult you on the subject, as it
 seemed to me on the first mention of the matter that the
 duties to be performed by Williams at Woolwich would
 require an amount of residence and of personal superintend-
 ence that would be incompatible with attendance in the
 House of Commons, and it would be undesirable to spoil a
 good Commandant of Woolwich by making an uncertain
 Member of Parliament—I mean uncertain as to his ability
 to be a regular attendant.

As to a parlia-
 mentary
 candidate for
 Calne.

Admirals Commanding at the Out-Posts are required to
 go at of Parliament if they happen to be in it before ap-
 pointment, and there might be danger of having the
 Woolwich appointment damaged in House of Commons'
 discussions if the person who held it was not able to
 give his whole time to it, but you can best judge of all
 this.²

¹ Despatches and Papers relative to the Campaign in Turkey, Asia Minor,
 and the Crimea, during the war with Russia in 1854, 1855, and 1856, compiled
 by Capin Sayer, was published by Harrison, London, in 1857.

² Sir W. Williams was duly elected, but did not shine as a Member of Par-
 liaments he had done as a soldier. The failure of his first speech was at the
 time allied to as the 'Fall of Kars.'

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

June 30, 1856.

I have great doubts whether this will find you in the Crimea, and I think if it does I may congratulate you on being on the eve of bidding it farewell.

We are now daily hailing the return of our troops, and their appearance speaks volumes for the care you have taken of them.

I have no news of any kind.

CHAPTER XIX

JULY 1856

ON July 12th the last of the British troops embarked from the Crimea, thus completing the evacuation by the Allies, for the French had preceded them by a week.

Codrington had held on to the dockyard of Sebastopol till the last, but on the above date the Russians were permitted to re-occupy it, together with Balaclava and the ground lately occupied by the British camp.

Previous to this, all stores remaining unsold, which were worth moving, had been removed.

By July 21st the great bulk of the army was back in England. The Guards had made their public entry into London on the 9th. The Queen inspected her troops at Woolwich and Aldershot as they arrived.

Arising out of the now peaceful state of affairs is a correspondence between Lords Hardinge and Panmure as to the rank and pay of Colonels selected to command brigades, and the degree in which their appointments should affect the junior Colonels of their corps. (See Letters of July 2nd, 4th, 6th, 15th, 21st.)

The Cabinet, having considered the Peace Establishment of the Army, had decided upon the advice to be tendered to the Queen on this subject (see Lord Panmure's letter of July 26th), their endeavours being directed to combining due economy with avoidance of relapse into the inefficient Military Establishment of 1852 and 1853, and to placing each arm of the service on a basis which would admit of ready expansion when required.

The state of Lord Hardinge's health having decided him to resign his office of Commander-in-Chief on the conclusion of the war, the Cabinet recommended the Duke of Cambridge as his successor. The Duke's letter to Lord Panmure on this recommendation is of special interest, (July 12th).

The Board of General Officers appointed to consider statements contained in the Report of the Crimean Commission laid their report before the Cabinet and thereafter were dissolved.

Recommendations for the Victoria Cross, the settlement of the German Legion at the Cape of Good Hope, the erection of a memorial to the heroes of the *Birkenhead*, the construction of barracks and fortifications, and the small-arms factory, form the subjects of other letters of the month.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

July 1, 1856.

Marshal Pélissier tells me that he gives up his part of Sebastopol to the Russians on the 5th, and that on that day the last of the French troops and he himself will embark.

Sebastopol
Dockyard will
not be given
up before em-
barkation of
the British.

I have decided, and told the Russians to-day, that I do NOT give the Dockyard posts of our part till our army embarks.

All our troops are withdrawn from it, however, and from the plateau, except those at Headquarters. There is a Marine Guard at the Dockyard buildings, and though the Russians wished to have all delivered to them at the same time, I said I should not deliver the Dockyard till we embarked.

I have allowed them to send a Russian officer to see the quantity of bread, etc., in the Fort Paul Buildings. It will be given over to them. And so

will chopped straw and what fuel remains at the Col in Balaclava.

General Juchowski and Colonel Ahmatoff were here yesterday after my visit to Bakshi Serai. The General is Civil Governor of the Crimea. The merchants at Balaclava will have six weeks' time, after our evacuation, to move away if they prefer it. After that time they will have to pay duties on their stock and importations and exportations. Not many likely to remain, I should think.

As I thought, there is plenty to do at the last; and it certainly would have suited me personally if the 'cashiering' with which I am threatened by a brother officer had come two or three months ago. The 'great horse question': I am afraid you will have to make me the scapegoat of an order, or a practice—somewhat obnoxious, indeed—but by which, nevertheless, you will profit. Perhaps you will estimate the number of chargers in this army, and see what would have been the result of an indiscriminate notice of a compensation of £30 for each.

The 'great horse question.'

You had better have your Board in England, and compensate upon good cause shown: you will thus do what is right, and will not have felt the result of the other plan.

LORD HARDINGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *July 2, 1856.*

With reference to my confidential memorandum of the 17th May last, in which I submitted a proposal for the employment of Colonels as acting Major-Generals, to command the Brigades to be assembled at the several encampments in the United Kingdom and at the Stations in the Mediterranean and North America, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that, on a full consideration of the subject, I am of opinion that upon the whole it would be more advisable that these officers should hold the rank of Brigadier-General while so employed, as in the Crimea, than that they should at once be given the temporary rank of Major-General.

On a proposal for the employment of Colonels to command Brigades to be assembled at encampments in United Kingdom, and the rank they should hold whilst so employed.

I do not consider that there need be any technical difficulty in consequence of the wording of the 9th and 10th clauses of the Royal Warrant of 6th October 1854, in afterwards promoting these officers to the rank of Major-General, after they shall have completed 5 years' service as Brigadier-Generals, computing in that period the time they held it in the Crimea, should they conduct themselves to Her Majesty's satisfaction, and it should be deemed proper then to confer that promotion upon them; but this is a point that it will be desirable to establish, and to place the decision upon record.

Pay of Major-Generals.

Should this proposal meet with your Lordship's concurrence, it will be necessary to fix the footing upon which these Brigadier-Generals are to be placed in point of pay and allowances.

Proposes that Colonels appointed Brigadier-Generals be retained on the full pay of their regiments.

[The writer then enters into particulars of the pay and allowances of Major-Generals on the Staff, of Colonels placed on the Staff as acting Major-Generals, etc. He concludes:] Under these circumstances, therefore, I am induced to recommend for your Lordship's sanction that Colonels selected to command Brigades be appointed Brigadier-Generals, and remain on the full pay of their Regiments, and that for the time they may be so employed the 2nd Lieutenant-Colonel of those Regiments should be retained.

I should hope to receive your Lordship's decision on this question as early as possible, as the appointments must immediately be proceeded with.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pr., July 6, 1856.

The return of the Guards.

There are a good number of officers and men of the Guards in London who have served in the Crimea and have got medals, but who do not belong to the Battalions recently returned from the Crimea; on the other hand, there are a good many officers and men in the Battalions just landed who have had no great share in the toils and

dangers of the wars. The first-mentioned officers and men will feel some mortification that they should be merely spectators on Wednesday of an ovation enjoyed by others who do not deserve it as well. Would it not be possible to gather together the officers and men now in London who have served with the Guards in the Crimea, but do not belong to the Battalions just landed, and to let them march up from the railway station with those who have now landed.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pv., July 8, 1856.

I was told yesterday in the House of Commons that a question is to be asked me on Friday whether some Tablet or other Memorial might not be put up in Chelsea Hospital Chapel to record the names of the brave men who went down in the *Birkenhead* Transport,¹ after having sent off in the boats all the women, the passengers, and the sick. It certainly was an example of heroical self-devotion, and unless there is some good reason to the contrary one should be inclined to say yes.

Memorial to
the heroes of
the *Birken-
head*.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

BALACLAVA, July 8, 1856

I have only time to say that I think we are pretty sure of evacuating on the 12th, leaving nothing whatever behind.²

¹ The *Birkenhead* steam troopship struck near Simon's Bay, Cape of Good Hope, February 25th, 1852. Four hundred and thirty-eight officers, soldiers, and seamen perished in her.

² The last of the British army quitted the Crimea in H.M.S. *Algiers* on the 12th.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

July 10, 1856.

The Queen sends Lord Panmure the Report of the Chelsea Commissioners, and would wish when it is printed to have one or two copies of it. As she has not had time to read through the evidence, she would wish him to send that back to her as soon as it is done with.

The Queen will expect to hear the opinion of the Cabinet on the Report, and to receive their advice as to what is to be done with respect to it.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

July 11, 1856.

The Queen will have the Review at Aldershot on Wednesday next, the 16th, at 4 o'clock.

She has settled to go on Monday to Woolwich, to see the Artillery which have returned from the Crimea, at 11 o'clock. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

BALACLAVA, July 11, 1856.

Evacuation at
last.

I have given notice to the Russians that they can occupy Sebastopol Dock Yard, the ground of our camp, and Balacava to-morrow, and that a Guard can come in to relieve our main Guard at 1 P.M.

The Russians have not answered my letter about transferring to their Government the huts which cannot be sold: I presume they will take possession of them, and I hope they will devote them to the assistance of the immediate inhabitants who have suffered.

All the stores at all worth moving have been either sold or removed. No military store of any sort is abandoned, except some chopped straw and charcoal and wood on the

plateau—none of it certainly worth moving, and not much discredit attaching to its abandonment.

In Balaclava district some of the huts have been sold, but I have generally excluded any sale of huts or property known to belong to individuals. A Russian Officer and Guard came to the English Headquarters as we left it, and I subsequently saw it undisturbed. A tablet is put up in the room where Lord Raglan died, and a stone with an inscription is placed under one of the trees near the house. This was done by Colonel Curzon.

We shall all sail from the Crimea to-morrow before sunset.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE,
Sat. evening, July 12, 1856.

On my return home this evening I find your letter with the to me most important and gratifying announcement that the Cabinet had decided upon recommending me to the Queen as Lord Hardinge's successor. I hasten at once to assure you that I am deeply sensible of this mark of their confidence, and I am specially indebted to you for the handsome manner in which you have conveyed to me this decision, and the great interest you have, I know, taken in bringing about what must be to me so important a result. At the same time I cannot disguise from myself the difficulty of the task about to be confided in me, from which I should shrink, were it not for the conviction I feel that I shall be supported in every quarter and by nobody more so than yourself. My best energies shall be devoted to the great task, of that you may be assured, and Her Majesty and her Government will not have a more devoted servant. More of this, however, when we meet.

On receiving news that the Cabinet had recommended him to succeed Lord Hardinge as Commander-in-Chief.

My present object is to request of you to let me know, the first moment at which I may notice to Her Majesty the decision at which the Cabinet have arrived, in order that I may not appear remiss in her eyes in acknowledging to her the honour and favour conferred on me by the Sovereign. . . .

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., July 14, 1856.

Hints for a
Parliamentary
pleasure-
party.

I have been thinking over your arrangements for Wednesday.¹ When one means to do a handsome thing, it is best to do it handsomely. You mean to give the Members of the two Houses a holiday and a show. Do not mortify their wives and daughters, but make yourself as popular with the fair sex as you deserve to be. The expense of more seats in the special train, and a few more vehicles to convey the ladies to the ground, will not be much, and I will answer for the sanction of the Treasury. Those who may not like to send down their own carriages, or who may have none to send down (and consider how many trucks and horse-boxes would be required for the purpose), might easily be taken about the ground in the omnibuses which brought them from the station, if they have not legs and feet enough of their own for the purpose. Members might be asked to put down in a list to be taken for the purpose at each H. of Parliament this evening and to-morrow morning, the names of the wife and daughters they wish to take with them, and you would be able to make your arrangements accordingly.

The Sovereign is a lady, and it would be hard to shut out her female Legislators, besides there are not the same difficulties in this case which there were in the Water Party to Spithead. Let me know in House of Commons whether you think this can be managed.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 15, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty. He has been informed by Lord Palmerston that Your Majesty has been pleased to command that H.R.H.

¹ July 16th, when the Queen reviewed troops at Aldershot, inspecting those which had returned from the Crimea since her last visit.

The Duke of Cambridge should succeed Lord Hardinge in the chief command of Your Majesty's Forces, and Lord Panmure now proceeds to take Your Majesty's pleasure as to carrying out the appointment.

Lord Panmure would humbly suggest for Your Majesty's consideration whether H.R.H. might not be gazetted this evening, as by so doing the current of business between Your Majesty and the Horse Guards would immediately run in its proper channel.

Lord Panmure would further submit to Your Majesty that it may be advisable to confer upon H.R.H. the rank of General, and that he should be gazetted as 'General Commanding-in-Chief of Your Majesty's Forces.'

Lord Panmure encloses for Your Majesty's approval the arrangements with regard to the reinforcements for the Cape of Good Hope, which the official authorities at the Horse Guards are most anxious to have confirmed by Your Majesty's approval, that due warning for service may be given to the respective troops detailed for it. Lord Panmure has desired all lists for promotions and appointments to be suspended until they can be submitted for Your Majesty's approval in the usual manner.

As soon as Lord Panmure receives Your Majesty's commands as to the denomination of the Duke of Cambridge's position, the commission shall be prepared for Your Majesty's signature.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

July 15, 1856.

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's letter and approves that the Duke of Cambridge should be this evening gazetted as 'General Commanding-in-Chief,' and for that reason be made a full General. The Queen likewise approves the enclosed memorandums respecting the troops to be sent to the Cape, but should have preferred any other Battalion than the 3rd of the Rifle Brigade should have been sent, as she understands that three Battalions of the

The Duke of Cambridge to be gazetted General Commanding-in-Chief.

Rifles will require to be drilled together for some time to bring them into a proper uniformity of system. But the difficulty of finding another Battalion may be great.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 16, 1856.*

Clearance from
Constantinople
in progress.

I have nothing particular to write about. We had a bad passage here from Balaclava, which made me late for a dinner given by the Sultan yesterday. Lord Lyons is gone up to the Crimea in *Caradoc*, expected down again, and very probably will return in time to let me use that vessel for Smyrna, catching the *Algiers* at Malta.

All is disappearing from hence under General Storks' good management.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 21, 1856.*

Distribution of
Victoria Cross.

Now that the Queen's Crimean Army has almost entirely arrived in this country, the Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure of the 'Victoria Cross'; these distinctions always have the most effect when they are given without delay, but the Queen feels that the selection will be dreadfully difficult, and possibly may cause many more heart-burnings than satisfaction. It can evidently not be given to all those men who have received the Medal for distinguished conduct, for that would be an immense number. Lord Panmure will be so good as to consider all this with the Duke of Cambridge, and then inform her what course it is intended to pursue.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 21, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty

that he has, in obedience to Your Majesty's commands, laid before the Cabinet the report and proceedings of the Board of General Officers whom Your Majesty appointed to consider the statements contained in the report of Sir John M'Neill, G.C.B., and Colonel Tulloch, in so far as it affected the conduct of Major-General the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B., Major-General the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B., Major-General Sir R. Airey, K.C.B., Colonel the Hon. A. Gordon, C.B., and Commissary-General Filder.

Your Majesty's servants, after due consideration of the said report, do not find it necessary to advise Your Majesty to take any steps in this case further than to express through the General Commanding-in-Chief Your Majesty's gracious approval of the diligence and patience with which the Board has performed the duty assigned to it, and to issue directions for its immediate dissolution.

Report of the
Board of
Inquiry.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 22, 1856.

Lord Panmure wrote to the Queen on the subject of the 'Victoria Cross,' and informed Her Majesty that H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge and himself concurred in advising that, as soon as Sir William Codrington had reached home, he, Sir J. Simpson, and some third officer of high rank, to be recommended by H.R.H. to the Queen, should consider the claims, or rather the merits, of the officers and men, and recommend them.

Recommendations for the
V.C.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 26, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the Cabinet have considered the Peace Establishment of the Army, and, having decided upon the advice to be tendered to Your Majesty upon this subject, they have desired Lord Panmure to submit it to Your Majesty.

Your Majesty's servants, while they do not lose sight of economy on the one hand, feel on the other that a relapse into the inefficient Military Establishment of 1852 and 1853 would be a most mistaken and culpable policy. They propose to place each arm of the service on a basis which admits of ready expansion should necessity arise.

Peace Estab-
lishment of the
Army.

Lord Panmure will have a return prepared of the amount of force which was maintained during the war, and the amount proposed to be maintained as a Peace Establishment. In this communication he will only touch upon general heads.

CAVALRY

The Life Guards will remain the same. The Cavalry of the Line will consist of 23 regiments, 4 in India and 19 at home.

The 1st Dragoon Guards will consist of 8 troops, and all the rest of 6 troops each. There will be 6300 horses and 11,340 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.

FOOT GUARDS

The 7 Battalions will consist of 10 companies each, and will be 800 rank and file strong, and the total number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, will be 6254.

INFANTRY OF THE LINE

The Infantry consists of 105 Battalions of the Line, of which there are 24 in India and 81 in England or the Colonies.

Each of these 81 Battalions will consist of 1000 rank and file divided into 12 companies, and the total number will be 3645 officers, 6237 non-commissioned officers, and 81,000 rank and file, or 90,882 of all ranks.

Peace Estab-
lishment of the
Army.

Eight companies of each battalion will form the service corps, and 4 companies the depôt.

The Colonial Corps remain as hitherto.

HORSE ARTILLERY

It is proposed to keep up the whole 8 troops raised for the War, and the Establishment will be 1076 horses, 49 officers, 113 non-commissioned officers, and 1361 men, or 1523 of all ranks. The Riding Horse Troop will be the same.

ARTILLERY

It is proposed to maintain this important arm on a much more extended scale than in 1853, viz.: 3730 horses, 704 officers, 1466 non-commissioned officers, 17,045 rank and file, or 19,215 of all ranks.

This will furnish 28 batteries of 4 guns each, or 112 guns and 7 small arm ammunition reserves, but if the reserves are dispensed with, and each battery reduced from 8 horses to 6, then 2 more guns can without increased charge be added to each battery, giving a total of 168 guns.

Re ENGINEERS

This arm it is proposed to keep at its present establishment of 365 officers, 303 non-commissioned officers, 3724 rank and file, or 4032 of all ranks.

By this proposal Your Majesty will have an army of 143,541 of all arms and ranks, exclusive of 24 regiments of Infantry and 4 regiments of Cavalry in India. Lord Panmure has had drawn up a comparison of the present War Establishment and the future Peace Establishment, which he has the honour to enclose for Your Majesty's use.

The figures may not be exactly accurate, but they are sufficiently so to enable Your Majesty to judge of the sufficiency of the proposed Establishment, which it will take some little time to work out in precise detail.

Lord Panmure has much satisfaction in informing Your Majesty that despatches have been received from the Government of the Cape of Good Hope, announcing the arrival of Major Grant, who was sent out to confer with Sir G. Grey as to the settlement of the German Legion.

Horse
Artillery.

Artillery.

Engineers.

As to settle-
ment of Ger-
man Legion
at the Cape of
Good Hope.

The Colony is most grateful for the offer of these settlers, and at once voted a sum of £40,000 to prepare for their reception. Major Grant had gone into the interior to inspect the localities of the future settlements, and will be here with more full information in about three weeks.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 27, 1856.*

Sultan's Gift to
Miss Nightingale.

The Queen returns this letter of Miss Nightingale's. She had already heard of the gifts of the Sultan's, through Lord Stratford, who communicated with Lord Clarendon on the subject, and asked the Queen's permission for Miss Nightingale to accept the bracelet, as well as the sum of money for the Nurses and Hospitals. The Queen entirely approves of the intended distribution of the money.

The Queen most gladly grants Lord Panmure permission to go to Edinburgh, as she rejoices to think of his being able to enjoy his native air.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 30, 1856.*

War Office
Departmental
Reports (com-
ments on).

With regard to the Reports of the different departments for the quarter ending 30th of June, the Queen wishes to remark that in the Barrack Department she was glad to find that Lord Panmure remarked on the small progress made with the Cambridge and Gosport Barracks; in the Fortification Department, she would draw his attention to the Forts at Gosport and Elson, for which £35,000 have been taken in this year's estimate, and not a penny has been expended yet; also to the deepening of the Channel between Langston Harbour and Portsmouth, which seems to be suspended during a correspondence with the Admiralty, and to the small amount of work done at Portland.

The other Departments show good progress, and the Queen hopes soon to hear that the Small-Arms Factory will begin to turn out some Arms,—at present it does not return a single musket as finished.

CHAPTER XX

AUGUST 1856

THE letters of this month are almost exclusively concerned with questions as to the Peace Establishment of the Army and the details of its administration.

The newly appointed Commander-in-Chief zealously opposes any large reduction of the army, which he declares to be at present in 'a most efficient state,' towards the realisation of which much money has been spent. 'It would be a pity to throw this efficiency away hastily' (August 15th). In particular he is opposed to Lord Panmure's proposed reduction of two troops in each regiment of cavalry. He likewise states his opinion that, in every separate command, there should be a senior Staff Officer in addition to the General Commanding, and urges the desirability of keeping up an efficient staff, 'for if we have not a very efficient staff during peace, we cannot have a really good one during war. The staff must learn their duty, and how can this be done if the staff is too much reduced or kept at too low a mark?'

In reference to the organisation of the Land Transport Corps, he recommends that the Colonies be included, arguing that at the Cape, in Canada, and at Malta, the corps might be made of great use.

In addition to the formation and organisation of this corps, and of the Army Works, Medical Staff, and Ambulance Corps, other questions touched on are those of the quartering of Garrison Artillery, numbering of Divisions,

of an Inspector-General of Infantry and his duties, of the appointment of a Superintending General Officer for the Guards, and of the attendance of British officers at Foreign reviews, for the sake of instruction, and to report on Foreign armies.

The disposal of the German and Italian Legions is further discussed, with a proposal to provide for the Italians by sending them to the Argentine Republic.

THE QUEEN TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

OSBORNE, *August 3, 1856.*

The Queen on the submission for the distribution and organisation of the Army at home.

The Queen has received and approved the submission for the distribution and organisation of the Army at home, which she trusts will be of lasting utility to the Service.

She only wishes to remark that she thinks there ought to be a battery of Field Artillery in the Camp at the Curragh, and that, with the exception of Aldershot, she sees no Sappers and Miners attached to the other Stations. The Queen misses likewise an account of the Distribution of the Artillery at home, which is told off for garrison duty or may be left in depôt at Woolwich, and the same with regard to the Sappers and Miners. These omissions should be supplied to make the whole Scheme and Record complete.

When complete, the Queen would wish to have a fair copy sent to her to keep. The Distribution and Organisation being decided on, the Queen now expects to receive a complete scheme for the Staff appointments and commands of these different Corps. She supposes that the two Divisions at Aldershot will have their Generals, besides the Brigades of which they are composed.

The Queen suggests the propriety of numbering the Divisions now to be established, which would tend to impress the public mind with the permanency of the arrangement.

The Land Transport Corps, being under consideration

cannot of course yet be attached to the Divisions, but the Queen trusts that this may soon be the case.

The Medical Staff and Medical Staff Corps ought at once to be so attached and form part of the Scheme. It would likewise be necessary to apportion the Commissariat.

Unless all these things be done, and *be done now*, we shall never rise to the possession of an Army.

The Queen confidently recommends these subjects to the particular care of the Duke of Cambridge.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *August 5, 1856.*

Having yesterday received a reply from the Queen on the suggestion I made to her, relative to the future quartering of the Army, I deem it right to send you a copy of Her Majesty's observations, in order that you may see yourself what the Queen says, and assist me in the ultimate reply that I am to make to some of the points alluded to.

As regards the quartering of the dismounted or Garrison Artillery Companies, I have sent to Osborne a rough sketch of what I propose to do, but much must depend on the establishment upon which you decide, and upon which at present I have not got any positive orders from you. The same answer I must give relative to the Sappers and Miners.¹ Undoubtedly some portion of this force ought to be attached to all the Divisions of Troops about to be formed, but at the present moment we know not what your establishment is fixed at, and the men are in general so lately raised that they have not as yet completed their training at Chatham, and then very few are actually available for the purpose of detachment. Should this force be intended to be kept up at the establishment proposed by my predecessor, as many as 1000 men will have to be raised, the force being incomplete to that extent. There are great facilities at this moment for obtaining this amount

As to future
quartering of
Garrison
Artillery
Companies.

¹ The old designation of the Royal Engineers.

Engineers,
Land Trans-
port Corps,
Medical Staff
Corps.

As to
numbering of
Divisions.

As to main-
taining two
Divisional
Generals at
Aldershot.

of men from the number disposable, not alone of the Army, but some probably from the discharged Land Transport men, etc. I quite agree with Her Majesty that it would be very desirable to settle the formation of the Land Transport Corps at once, as well as the Medical Staff Corps, and attaching portions of both to the various Divisions and Brigades of the Army. As regards the Medical Staff Corps, I shall with your permission make some proposals to you of my own as to its future formation, and I certainly think it ought to be placed on a very different footing from what it is at present. The same is to be said for the future Land Transport Corps. This should be composed of men to be allowed to volunteer from the Army, and I really think it would be well to consider the question of employing portions of it in the Arsenal and various Dockyards, in addition to such portion as can be employed with the several Divisions of the Troops. With reference to the numbering of the Divisions.¹ I am rather doubtful as to the possibility of such a measure. Militarily I see no objection to it, but I fear the number might attract public notice, and make it more difficult to keep up the force of troops we are desirous to maintain. The question of the two Divisional Generals at Aldershot is one that must rest chiefly with you, as it is a matter of finance. Militarily I can have no objection, but I do not see any positive necessity for two Generals as stated, as I hold that the troops at Aldershot will always fluctuate as to numbers. At the same time the difficulty might be met, and be settled satisfactorily for all parties, if, during the dull season and summer months, the General Officer in charge of the Guards in London were to be ordered down to Aldershot, and assume the command of one of the Divisions there, which would include the Brigade of the Guards detached from London to that station. The question of the Commissariat Officer is a very large and a very important one; I agree with the Queen as to the principle of the answer,

¹ The Duke, who was always opposed to the reduction of the Army, feared that the new arrangement of numbered Divisions would bring its magnitude too prominently before the public.

but as this department is entirely in your hands, I must leave it to you to give the necessary reply to Her Majesty's suggestion. I think I have now touched upon all the subjects entered by the Queen in the paper as enclosed. Some other points require your decision, which I must now request of you to give. . . . I am sure you will permit me to remark that it is really essential to the new formation that we should have a thoroughly efficient staff, for it was in this point we formerly failed so much, and it is necessary that Staff Officers should have opportunities for studying their professional duties, and how can they do so if a certain increased number to the old establishment be not appointed? An official letter shall be written to you on the subject of the Inspector-General of Infantry. Such an officer will be quite indispensable. He will have the entire organisation and management of the new Consolidated Depôt both in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and I understand from you that, in addition, you would call upon him to look after the Militia Staff when disembodied, and possibly he might further inspect portions of the Militia Regiments when out for their usual training. Sir Colin Campbell is just the man for such a post, and I have reason to think would delight in having the appointment. He must have an assistant Adjutant-General, as it would be impossible for him to get through his work without such an officer, and would naturally be a Lieut.-General on the Staff with two Aide-de-Camps. . . . The Queen has expressed a wish that some of our officers should attend all large foreign reviews for the sake of instruction, and in order to report upon other armies. I approve highly of the idea, and hope to have your sanction for the expense to be incurred. I have privately written to Clarendon to request him to find out what reviews are likely to take place this year.

As to an
Inspector-
General of
Infantry and
his duties.

Proposal that
British officers
shall attend
foreign
reviews.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *August 6, 1856.*

. . . The news from the Cape is again not good. The 85th have gone there from the Mauritius. Would it not be well to send out the German Cavalry Regiment *at once*, as one Corps to be permanently kept up if found useful and required as the guardian of the Frontier? I wish you would think of this and do it at once, for no time should be lost about it.

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

INVERMARK, *August 7, 1856.*

Her Majesty's
views on the
Memo for the
organisation
and distribu-
tion of the
troops.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness's letter of the 5th inst., in which you transmit to me H.M.'s views on the memo for the organisation and distribution of the troops.

1. As regards the quartering of the Garrison Artillery, I observe in the papers which accompany Your Royal Highness's note that there is a scheme for such a distribution of these Companies as appears to me to be well defined. The Cabinet have decided to maintain all the present number of Battalions and Companies in the Artillery, and, though the latter may vary a little from time to time in Rank and File, the organisation will remain the same and the distribution will not be much affected.

2. In reference to Sappers and Miners, I propose to maintain a considerable body of this Corps, and eventually would like to see them divided into two classes, one of skilled artificers of all kinds, and the other of good stout workmen, versed in the use of the spade and more ordinary departments of labour.

I am not aware what the present numbers are, but I have submitted to the Queen a Peace Establishment of 365 Officers, 303 Non-Commissioned Officers, 3724 Rank and File. I would have both officers and men well trained

at Chatham before you allowed them to go on detachment, but, as soon as they are fit, then each of the great Camps of Aldershot and Curragh should have a strong detachment for instruction of the Troops in field works, and our extensive works will I think absorb most of those not under instructions.

If the Corps is below the Establishment I have named, it had better be made up from the Army or those Corps in process of disembodiment.

3. Land Transport Corps is a question for discussion.

4. Medical Staff Corps we must arrange to suit the Hospitals which are permanent Establishments, and likewise the Divisions and Brigades of the Army; but I think this will not press for some little time, and I should like Your Royal Highness to see Dr. Smith on the subject, and make him prepare a scheme of distribution of this Corps.

Notes on the Memo for organisation and distribution of the troops.

5. I quite agree with Your Royal Highness that, though numbering Divisions would be a more regular course of proceeding, it would give a handle for the ignorant to pull at, and it will be prudent to avoid it.

6. I trust that Her Majesty will agree to have only one Divisional General at Aldershot, as it will show our desire to study economy, and it is really not necessary. The General of the Division of Guards could repair to the Camp in the drill season and take a division.

Notes continued.

7. I shall see to the maintenance of a proper Commissariat, but the supplies for the Army at home will have to be obtained in the most economical manner in order to keep John Bull in good humour.

8. [Refers to the position to be occupied by the General in command of the Guards.]

9. Inspector General of Infantry. I shall be prepared to admit this arrangement as soon as Your Royal Highness writes on the subject. I presume he will be Lieutenant-General on the Staff, with two A.D.C.'s and an Assistant Adjutant. His duties will be severe, and my opinion is that he will be obliged to live more in the centre of England than London.

11. I think that H.M.'s views in regard to some of our Officers seeing Foreign Reviews are quite right. They

should be Officers of rank, and in actual command at home, so that they might apply any improvements that struck them.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *August 9, 1856.*

Proposed
Peace Estab-
lishment
(remarks on).

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure that she has not yet received the paper on the Peace Establishment, with the reasons in support of the proposed arrangements, and she hopes that the organisation of the Land Transport Corps, Army Works Corps, and Ambulance Corps will not be lost sight of.

She understands that the discharging of these Corps is going on uninterruptedly. Now some of the best will have to be retained, and the position of the officers requires consideration.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *August 15, 1856.*

Inadvisability
of reducing
much at the
present
moment.

Various ap-
pointments.

I have to thank you for your letter. I have not yet heard from your Secretary, but will give the subject of the new establishments my best attention whenever I get it. I trust you will have been moderate in your reduction, for, depend upon it, we must not reduce much at the present moment, and until we see our way more clearly as to the state of Europe, which at present still appears very unsettled and uncomfortable in many quarters. At present the Army is in a most efficient state, and much has been spent on arriving at that point. It would be a pity to throw this efficiency away hastily, and I doubt not you have given the subject your most serious attention. I have heard from Her Majesty to-night, She approves privately of Sir Colin Campbell's appointment as Inspector-General of Infantry, and I shall therefore proceed with it officially. . . . She expresses a wish that Sir William Codrington should have the offer of the Dover Division in succession to Sir Colin. . . .

We have a Regiment vacant at this moment by the death of General Gordon of the 54th. I intend submitting the name of Sir William Codrington for the vacancy, as I think him fully entitled to a Regiment from the services he has performed and the position he has filled. . . .

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

August 24, 1856.

. . . Codrington having expressed a wish not to be immediately employed, on account of much private business he has on hand, I sent for Barnard, who has accepted the Dover command.

I regret you could not accede to my request to allow the Staff Officer at Corfu to have the rank hitherto held by him as a *Deputy Q.M.G.*, for I think there ought in every separate command to be a senior Staff Officer in addition to the General Officer commanding the troops. It gives an Officer thus situated more right and authority to have the higher grade, and in a military point of view this is a great advantage, and it is absolutely necessary that we should have such gradation in the Staff appointments, that we may at all times have the means of putting forward those men who do well in the inferior grades of the several Departments. . . .

Recommends
a Senior Staff
officer in
addition to a
General in
command.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, August 25, 1856.

Labouchere has just been with me, and his account of the arrival of Italians and approaching departure of Germans show that these important arrangements cannot be effected without your personal superintendence, and it is very essential that no time should be lost in determining where the Italians are to go, and in sending them thither, and also in making arrangements for the departure of the Germans for the Cape. Labouchere is much for your send-

Disposal of
the German
and Italian
Legions.

ing Stütterheim¹ with them to settle them, and I am inclined to think that Stütterheim as a German would have more influence over them, and be more likely to arrange matters satisfactorily for them than an English Officer would.

If you determine to come up, which I think it is desirable you should, you will probably settle with the Queen that George Grey should take next turn at Balmoral, and that you should relieve him as you would have settled the Two Legions before G. Grey's turn would be over.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

GORDON CASTLE, *August 31, 1856.*

. . . Your letter of the 27th has reached me. Parliament no doubt criticises all Staff Appointments severely, but it shall be my endeavour to give them as little chance for finding fault as possible in this respect, and though I quite feel with you the necessity for not having more Staff Officers than is absolutely necessary, I still hope you will not give in too much to the cry against the Staff, for, believe me, if we have not a very efficient Staff during peace, we cannot have a really good one during war. The Staff must learn their duty, and how can this be done if the Staff is too much reduced or kept at too low a mark? The great thing is to appoint good men, and it will be a matter for consideration before Parliament meets again as to how this can be best accomplished. I shall give the subject my best attention, and will confer with you upon it when we meet.

Desirability
of keeping up
an efficient
Staff.

Recommends
inclusion of
the Colonies
in forming
the Land
Transport
Corps.

In forming the L. T. Corps I think we should not overlook the Colonies. At the Cape, in Canada, and at Malta, the Corps might be made of great use. I have had a private letter from Pennefather, who is very strong on this point, and I think him right. It would really not be any additional expense, for much money is at present spent for transport by the Commissariat Department, and even in the Engineer Department there are a thousand works that

¹ Baron Stütterheim, commanding German Legion.

could well be supplied by the L. T. Corps. Pray turn your attention to this point.

I have read your paper about the future establishment of the Army. It is very satisfactory as a general whole, but I object to the great reduction in the Cavalry. I know how much the want of it was felt when the Army embarked for the East. The same thing would occur if we have another war. An Army cannot take the field efficiently without a due proportion of Cavalry, the numbers for which must be kept up in time of peace. The reduction of two troops will, I fear, prove a great misfortune, and as to the unfortunate officers of Cavalry, what is to become of them I do not know, for we shall never have a chance of bringing them back to full pay. I am glad you have not reduced the number of Regiments at all events, for it would have caused much inconvenience and great hardship upon many officers. Even now, if you cannot keep up 8 troops, I should be almost disposed to your trying 7. This would always keep three efficient squadrons and a Depôt Troop, which would on the breaking out of war be easily converted into a fourth Squadron. By this means at all events some officers would be saved from reduction, and the 7th troop might be composed of dismounted men, or of young men and remount horses, to be in Barracks in these Regiments which are quartered in the various Camps and stations of exercise. I wish you would think the matter over again, if not too late. You have not told me what you intend to do with the supernumerary officers. Are they all to be placed on half-pay, or do you intend a certain number of the Subalterns to continue on with their Regiments with a view of being absorbed? . . . I hope, when you make the arrangements for the Cape, that you will make it worth Stütterheim's while to accompany the Legion. I think that much of the success of the measure will depend upon his going out with the Legion. . . .

Urges keeping
up the
numbers of
the Cavalry.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*BALMORAL, *August 31, 1856.*

As to sending
the Italian
Legion to the
Argentine.

. . . I was in hopes that an agreement had been come to about three weeks ago between Colonel Hudson and a certain M. Buschenthal, the agent of General Urquiza, the President of the Argentine Confederation, for sending the Italian Legion to that country. The men would be welcome there, which they would nowhere else it seems, the climate is beautiful, and they would get land assigned to them.

I encouraged Buschenthal not to lose a moment in procuring such excellent Colonists for the Republic, and if the agreement was concluded, the arrival of the men here won't so much signify, as they can be shipped off more conveniently than from Malta, *i.e.*, if [they] will go. . . .

I am already better for the delightful atmosphere of the Highlands, and much disposed to throw over foreign affairs, and not to resign my place¹ to you at the end of a fortnight.

¹ As Minister in attendance on the Queen.

CHAPTER XXI

SEPTEMBER 1856

As in the previous month, reductions in the Army and the disposal of Foreign Legions continue to be the chief subjects of discussion.

Writing with respect to Army Organisation and Staff Appointments (September 8th), the Queen lays down the principle that 'the House of Commons ought to keep free discretion to reduce or increase the forces in men, but the "cadre," without which an increase of men at the time of war, or apprehension of the same, cannot produce an efficient army for the field, ought to be permanently maintained.' It is in this, Her Majesty adds, that we as a nation have formerly so much failed. She also urges the retention of seven as against six troops to each regiment of cavalry, and, failing this, the maintenance at least of the officers of the seventh troop. This scheme is, however, found to be impracticable—Lord Panmure stating, in reply to the letter of the 8th September, that the reasons for deviating from Lord Hardinge's proposals as to the Peace Establishment may be summed up in the one word 'economy.'

As to the settlement of the Foreign Legions, Lord Clarendon, who was in attendance at Balmoral at the time (September 12th), discusses the details of the scheme for settling the German Legion at the Cape, and suggests the creation of a reserve class of officers for the same.

Recommendations for the V.C., Supernumerary Lieuten-

ants, Substantive Rank, and the Lieutenant-Governorship of Chelsea Hospital are the remaining subjects treated of.

On September 24th, the illness of the late Commander-in-Chief ended fatally.

In Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's *Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville*, it is stated, vol. i. p. 219, that 'Panmure had killed Lord Hardinge.' This statement, which is conversational, and of course avowedly hyperbolical, is not merely disproved, but deprived of all foundation by the letters of Lord and Lady Hardinge, which are given as an appendix to the correspondence of this month.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 1, 1856.*

As to Belgian subjects who have served in the Foreign Legion.

The enclosed from Howard de Walden¹ indicates that the best course for Belgian subjects who have served in the Legion will be to slip home quietly, and not to raise any question about their having been denationalised; it might be tried by one or two of them, in order to see whether any documents are required by the authorities upon their entering Belgium.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 6, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty's information copies of the various papers connected with the mission of Major Grant to the Cape.²

The result of this mission is very satisfactory, and Lord Panmure has appointed a Committee, in which War Department, Colonial Office, and the German Legion are

¹ Lord Howard de Walden, British Minister in Belgium.

² In connection with the settlement of the German Legion.

represented, with the addition of Major Grant, in order to draw up the conditions which are to be offered to the officers and men of the B.G. Legion.

The Swiss Legion are disappearing by degrees and returning to their own country, and Lord Panmure hopes to be able soon to report to Your Majesty the disbandment of the Italians. These men have conducted themselves very well at Portsmouth, and proved that General Breton's alarm was unfounded.

Disbandment
of Swiss and
Italian
Legions.

Lord Panmure has seen Sir William Codrington on various subjects, more especially as regards the Victoria Cross, and he has addressed an official communication to H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge, calling for an early return from the different Generals of Division of the names of those officers and men who may be deemed worthy of the decoration.

Lord Panmure has authorised the Commander-in-Chief to select certain officers to attend the Reviews on the Continent, and has no doubt that H.R.H. will submit their names to Your Majesty.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 8, 1856.*

The Queen has not yet answered Lord Panmure's letter enclosing his more detailed statement of the proposed Peace Establishment, although she told him when she saw him on her journey that she had received the same. This paper, although going into full detail with regard to the Scheme, does not more than the former state the reasons which induced the Government to deviate from Lord Hardinge's well-argued proposals.

Peace Estab-
lishment.

The main points of difference are two. As the 1st, the reduction of the Battalions of Infantry from 1200 to 1000 men, is based on financial grounds, and by no means infringes on the new organisation, the Queen feels bound to sanction it. The 2nd, being the reduction of the Cavalry from 8 to 6 Troops, the Queen regrets extremely, but feels

also that economy and the fear of the House of Commons may plead in its favour ; whether it would not be possible to keep the officers of at least as seven Troops, she would wish the Government to consider.

The 'cadre'
of an army.

With respect to the organisation, the Queen hopes that Lord Panmure will not hesitate to carry it out to its full extent, particularly with reference to the Staff Appointments, upon which it entirely depends. The House of Commons ought to keep free discretion to reduce or increase the forces in men, but the 'cadre,' without which an increase in men at the time of war or apprehension of the same cannot produce an efficient army for the field, ought to be permanently maintained, and it is in this that we have formerly so much failed.

Men can be made good soldiers if placed into well-organised cadres, but the organisation cannot be given in a hurry, and the result must be lamentable where those who ought to teach and direct the new men and young officers, suddenly added, have themselves everything to learn. As this country will always keep a much smaller Army than its position in the world demands, its efficiency and honour in time of need can only be saved by keeping the organisation in Regimental Orders and staff organisation complete in time of peace.

Should not now,—when it is agreed that 3000 men and 1000 horses are to constitute the force of the Land Transport and Medical Staff Corps,—their organisation be made over to the Military Authorities, and previously to the reductions of officers in the Line, as both might usefully be worked together?

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

ST. LEONARDS, *September 8, 1856.*

A scheme
for bridging
the Channel.

I am glad that you see your way to a settlement of the arrangements about the German and Italian Legions. . . .

I send you a scheme for a bridge across the Channel between England and France. I have written to the Lieu-

tenant to say that his scheme seems to me liable to many and serious objections of various kinds. A good idea, truly, for a Lieutenant on half-pay, which I suppose him to be, to launch a plan which is to cost forty millions sterling. The proverb says you should make a bridge for a retreating enemy, but I never yet heard of making one for an invading enemy. To be sure a good battery at one end would sweep pretty clean the contents of the bridge for some distance, but there would be no impossibility in making an iron shield thick enough to stop any shot, and to be pushed on by a steam engine behind it, under cover of which a column might pass through the tunnel without damage, unless the tunnel itself was broken down. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 9, 1856.*

Many thanks for your letter, which affords the most satisfactory prospect we have yet had of getting finally quit of our Legionary plagues. It may be rather expensive, but I don't think the money will be ill laid out, 1st, by avoiding the bother we should have in Parliament if the foreigners were retained here too long, and 2nd, by sustaining our name and fame in Europe, which our press and our patriots have worked so hard to destroy. They have made Europe believe that we have neither Army or Navy, and if they could now show that we have cheated the men whom we decoyed into our service, it would be a *coup de grâce* to us.

As to getting
quit of our
'legionary
plagues.'

Your letters gave great satisfaction here, for there was a good deal of uneasiness in high quarters about the arrival of the Italians, and the Germans becoming unpopular by remaining here too long. I think that the Argentine Confederation is the place to look to for the Italians. They would meet there with what is congenial to their tastes,—fine climate, cheap provisions, abundance of land, and an unsettled Government, and we should have the advantage of an unpassable ocean between them and England. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 9, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's letter on the subject of the Peace Establishment of the Army.

The reasons which induced Your Majesty's advisers to deviate from Lord Hardinge's proposals as to the strength of the various arms of the Service during peace may be summed up in one word—Economy.

Economical
considerations
in relation to
proposed
Peace Estab-
lishment of the
Army.

In arriving at the proposal submitted by Lord Panmure to Your Majesty, it was the object of Your Majesty's Government to maintain the Army in times of peace in perfect efficiency, observing at the same time the strictest economy consistent with such efficiency.

Actuated by a desire to submit no Military Establishments to Parliament which they cannot maintain, and considering that 1000 rank and file organised in 12 Companies would form an efficient force of Infantry for the service of Your Majesty and the Country, the Cabinet did not consider it necessary to adopt Lord Hardinge's suggestion of giving 1200 Rank and File to each Regiment, and Lord Panmure learns with satisfaction Your Majesty's concurrence and sanction of the arrangement.

In regard to the Cavalry, Lord Hardinge's organisation has been materially departed from on the grounds of finance and an impression, which the Cabinet feels to be well founded, that this is the arm of the Service which will be subjected to the strictest scrutiny of Parliament.

The Infantry is regarded as the working portion of Your Majesty's Army, while the Cavalry are looked upon as comparative idlers. It is true that they are as absolutely necessary to Military organisation as Infantry, but it is difficult to instil this knowledge into the minds of the men in the House of Commons who look to 'Service rendered for money voted.' Lord Panmure partakes of Your Majesty's feelings of regret at not being able on the part of

his Colleagues to submit a larger scheme for the organisation of the Cavalry.

Your Majesty desires that the Government will consider the possibility of maintaining the officers of a 7th troop, and Lord Panmure will lay before Lord Palmerston Your Majesty's views. But he considers it right to point out to Your Majesty that, even with 6 troops per regiment, the proportion of officers to men is only 1 to 16, while in the Infantry it is 1 to 27, and in the Artillery 1 to 26 men.

Peace Estab-
lishment of the
Army ; of
officers of the
Line.

In carrying out the organisation of the Army, Lord Panmure will pay due regard to Your Majesty's views as to the staff, so that the numbers and rank of the officers shall be sufficient. Here again, however, he feels it to be his duty to state to Your Majesty that no branch of the Service is more severely and critically scanned by Parliament than the Staff. The additions to this branch of the Service will be considered under the new arrangements, and some test of capacity must be applied to all Staff-Officers, and a system adopted whereby they will, after a fair period of service, give place to others, so that a general knowledge of their profession and a general participation in its advantages may pervade the whole Army.

The Staff.

The Land Transport Corps and Medical Staff Corps will be entirely under the Military authorities.

The reduction of the officers of the Line will take place from the 1st of October. Lord Panmure calculates, as nearly as he can, that there will be about 150 Ensigns liable to reduction, all of whom will have to be brought back. If sent away from their regiments, they would be put to unavoidable expense in rejoining, they would be burdens on, and in many instances, nuisances in their families, and would rejoin Your Majesty's service deteriorated in many ways. The expense of keeping them supernumerary in their respective regiments, until absorbed, will be small, and if Your Majesty approves of such an arrangement, Lord Panmure will apply for the necessary sanction for the expenditure to the Treasury.

Reduction.

Lord Panmure begs to apologise to Your Majesty for so long a letter.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 11, 1856.*Transfer of
German
Legion to the
Cape.

The Queen returns to Lord Panmure the papers on the arrangements made for the transfer of the German Legion to the Cape,¹ which she has read with the greatest interest and pleasure. Sir George Grey² is a most able public servant, and Major Grant seems to have done his business remarkably well. This will be a very difficult and delicate matter well settled, in a manner useful to the Colony and Country, financially not improvident, fair and advantageous to the Germans, and honourable to us in the eyes of the Continent, to which we cannot attach too much importance. The great point to attend to will now be speed, and great care that the men should not only thoroughly understand the proposal, but also have entire confidence in its being fully carried out. For this purpose, as well as for that of command, during the first year, over an entirely strange force in our settlements, where their services may be required this very winter, the Queen thinks it absolutely necessary that their commanding officers, and particularly General Stütterheim, in whom they have entire confidence, should accompany them, at least for a time.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 12, 1856.*

Army Staff.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 9th. She quite feels the difficulty of the House of Commons with regard to the Staff of the Army, but thinks on the whole the different Governments more to blame than the House of Commons, for not explaining to them from conviction the necessity of these appointments. As long as it is a mere arbitrary matter to employ more or fewer of

¹ Where they formed excellent settlers; they also rendered material assistance to Great Britain in the Indian Mutiny and Kaffir and Zulu Wars.

² Governor of the Cape.

them, the House is quite right to ask for the fewest, but when a system can be shown which ought not to be broken into without destruction to the efficiency of the Army, it will pause before it interferes with it.

The Queen quite approves of the judicious proposal about the Ensigns.¹ She understands from Lord Panmure that the Organisation of the Land Transport and Hospital Corps is now to be transferred to the Horse Guards, and trusts that he will give directions to the Duke of Cambridge to proceed with it immediately, so that a scheme may be soon laid before the Queen.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 12, 1856.*

I think that all your arrangements for the foreigners are promising, and although they will be costly, yet it is of great importance to get these people soon and well off our hands. As to sending Germans to the Cape.

I have been reading with the Prince the report of Major Grant and the Memorandum of Sir G. Grey, etc., which are excellent, but it strikes us that one officer to 100 men is a small proportion; it would be enough for Colonists, but, as we mean to rely for a considerable time upon these Germans for the defence of the Colony against the Caffres along an extended frontier, surely it would be well to send out at first a larger number of officers,—the expense would not be materially increased, but the efficiency of the corps during the 3 or 4 first years might entirely depend upon it. The Prince also suggested that no provision seems to be made for Casualties in the class of officers, and one must expect them to begin immediately. Pray think of this, and let me have some answer for H.R.H. It would be a thousand pities to starve this admirable scheme upon a point which may be vital.

It appears also that the Colony will not be indisposed to receive a Reserve Class of Officers, *i.e.*, those not sent out by the Government in charge or command of the men,— As to a 'Reserve Class' of Officers for the Cape.

¹ See Lord Panmure's letter of September 9th.

and to give them land or employment,—if this is the case, I apprehend you would have no difficulty in complying with the suggestion by selecting officers really fit for duty, and who would not disappoint the Cape people. Such officers might perhaps supply vacancies in the Corps, but if you do not send out such officers how will you make good the casualties?

Shall you keep a list of officers discharged, and take their addresses in Germany, in order that you may call upon them when wanted? That would be better than a bare discharge, as it would give them hope, and I fear that the officers discharged will have but a sorry prospect before them, and they will be scattered about the towns of Germany, ill looked upon by their countrymen, and their distress will be attributed (most unjustly) to having been in the Queen's service.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 13, 1856.

Maintenance
of Officers of
a seventh troop
in reduced
cavalry regi-
ments.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's note of yesterday's date. Lord Panmure has communicated to Lord Palmerston Your Majesty's suggestion as to the maintenance of the officers of a 7th Troop in each regiment of Cavalry. With every disposition to adopt Your Majesty's views, the correctness of which they do not for a moment question, Lord Palmerston and Lord Panmure are of opinion that the maintenance of three supernumerary officers in each Cavalry regiment would make the proportion of men to officers so small as to be difficult of maintenance in Parliament.

Lord Panmure has pointed this out to H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge, who, with regret it must be admitted, appears to be reconciled to the Establishment recommended to Your Majesty. Under these circumstances Lord Panmure craves Your Majesty's sanction to this portion of the Peace Establishment, which is the only one in suspense.

Lord Panmure has had a long interview with the Duke of Cambridge this morning, and has informed H.R.H. that he will proceed to submit to Your Majesty the establishment of 'The Military Train,' and likewise that of the Medical Staff Corps.

Lord Panmure having placed matters in train regarding the disposal of the Foreign Legions, intends to return to Scotland to-morrow evening, and by the time Your Majesty receives this letter he will be at Invermark.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 18, 1856.*

The Queen has to acknowledge the two letters which Lord Panmure wrote to her before leaving London, the one on the proposed Peace Establishment, the other on the case of General Cannon.¹ Reduction of Cavalry.

As to the first, the Queen now gives her sanction to the proposal about the Cavalry, to reduce it to six troops.

She does not quite make out whether the organisation of the Army Train has been confided to the General Commanding-in-Chief?

General Cannon's case is most unpleasant, and the Duke of Newcastle's memorandum certainly very precise, and not to be set aside; as the 4th paragraph, however, distinctly states: 'such honorary rank to confer no privileges attaching to the British Army,' the Queen feels perfectly justified in not allowing General Cannon to assume either the title or uniform of a British Lieutenant-General.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

September 25, 1856.

I have this moment received the account of the death of poor Lord Hardinge, which has shocked me extremely, Death of Lord Hardinge.

¹ With whom the Duke of Newcastle had entered into an agreement on a question of military rank, which Newcastle's successor found difficult to fulfil.

and for which I was in no respect prepared, as I had heard that he was wonderfully improved in health. York writes me from London that he has just heard the account by telegraph, and that it was very sudden. I have written a line to the Queen, who will I fear be badly shocked when she hears of it. He was a very worthy good man, and I believe him to have been a wise, conscientious public servant. . . . I do not suppose that militarily this sad event will have any further consequences than the disposal of a Regiment. I also see by the paper that Sir Colin Halkett¹ is dead. I will write to you fully upon this subject in a day or two, as it involves some serious considerations and may lead to several Military changes, which must however be fairly and duly considered before any action is taken upon them. Your letter of the 20th has reached me. I am glad you approve of my having softened down our little friend, the Baron Stütterheim, who I hope will now soon be off with all his followers, for we are very anxious to get rid of them and to see them well cleared out of Colchester, which we want entirely as a station, now that the winter is rapidly approaching, so pray lose no time about it, as also about the removal of the Italians, who are all in this part of the world doing nothing, and who would be better on the high seas to their places of future location. We will devise something about Cannon's nomination in the *Gazette*, but it is no easy matter to dispose of this case satisfactorily. . . .

German and
Italian
Legions.

APPENDIX TO PAPERS OF SEPTEMBER 1856

LORD HARDINGE TO LORD PANMURE

July 17, 1856.

When I received your note of the 13th, I was unable from indisposition to answer the kind sentiments you expressed towards me, and I begged Yorke to tell you I would delay doing so until I should be stronger. I have

¹ General Sir Colin Halkett, G.C.B., Governor of Chelsea Hospital, had commanded a Brigade of the German Legion in the Peninsular War, and had served at Waterloo.

since read your speech in the House of Lords, in which you take an opportunity of expressing in the most gracious terms the good understanding which always subsisted between us, and your sense of my co-operation with you in times of great difficulty.

I can only respond most cordially to the sentiments of friendship you have thus publicly and privately expressed towards me. And it is only just that I should say that, at a time when the lines of demarcation between the offices of Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief were not very accurately defined, you were always ready to place the most liberal construction on the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with your opinions so clearly stated in your reply to Lord Derby early in the present session.

I have great satisfaction in the belief that, if your views then so ably expressed be adhered to by future Governments, the great constitutional principle which I know you have at heart, that the Queen should retain the command of the Army, will be maintained.

The broad outline of the relative duties of the Secretary for War and the Commander-in-Chief have been well marked out. There remain perhaps some minor points which will require more precise definition, among which may be the arrangements regarding Military Works which are the result of the incorporation of the great Ordnance Department partly with the War Department and partly with the Horse Guards. I am satisfied, however, that there will be no real difficulty, from the cordiality with which you will be able to work with my successor, and that the result of the new arrangements will, if carried out with the prudence with which they have been concerted at a moment of great pressure and public excitement instigated by the Press, redound to the stability of the just power of the Crown in Executive affairs.

I am very much better during the last 24 hours, and I beg to assure you that, if my restoration to health should be permitted, I shall be anxious at all times to render you every assistance of which you may think me capable, and

which may tend to our common object, that of rendering the command of the Army as efficient as possible within the boundaries of Royal authority which you have so safely traced.

LADY HARDINGE TO LORD PANMURE

BELSHANGER, *October 4, 1856.*

Most gratefully, most sincerely would I acknowledge the consolation that in the midst of my affliction I have derived from the warm-hearted and friendly tribute you have paid to the public services and virtues of him over whose career, so long and unflinchingly devoted to the service of his country, the grave has now closed.

The expression of such sentiments from one with whom the latter part of his public life was so closely connected, and to whom such constant opportunities of forming a just estimate of his character were afforded, is for me and his family so much the more precious that I know how cordial was the understanding maintained between you, through times of great difficulty, and how high a value in his lifetime he attached to your friendship and good opinion. In the visitation, therefore, of this dreadful blow, the anguish of my own sorrow is soothed by the assurance that his untiring exertions in the administration of Military affairs, have been fully appreciated by one who laboured in common with himself for the public good, and that the loss I deplore as irreparable meets with the sympathy of all who mourn in him a private friend or a public servant.

I can only add my fervent prayer that your own health may not suffer from your arduous public duties, and that I shall ever entertain a grateful remembrance of the kind letter you have written.

CHAPTER XXII

OCTOBER 1856

THE few letters of this month are chiefly concerned with the German Legion, whose continuance in this country had given rise to troubles and disturbances, and with the selection of a Lieutenant-Governor for Chelsea Hospital and of a General to go to India.

The retention in the service of the Supernumerary Lieutenants is decided on, and the means for absorbing them considered. In submitting a Memorandum on arrangements for bringing the Militia into closer touch with the Army, the Duke of Cambridge observes that 'the great thing we want in this country is a Reserve Force for the Army, whence the latter can be easily and quickly recruited in time of war' (October 25th).

Perhaps the most interesting letters of the month are those in which the Queen expresses her regret for the loss of Lord Hardinge, and Codrington pleads for consideration for Crimean trophies.

The Shah of Persia having transgressed the terms of a treaty made with Great Britain in 1853, by marching an army on Herat, the Governor-General of India had declared war, and was fitting out an expedition against him at Bombay.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 4, 1856.*

The Queen has to thank Lord Panmure for his letter, with the very interesting medical reports.

Lord Panmure's kind and true eulogy on the death of our valued friend, poor dear Lord Hardinge, was gratifying to her feelings. A nobler, braver, more loyal, or more fearless public servant never served his Sovereign and Country. These qualities, as well as his great experience in all military matters, are an irreparable loss in all times, but particularly in these. The Queen thinks that he may like to read this beautiful letter from poor Lady Hardinge, to whom this blow must indeed be a fearful one.

Miss
Nightingale.

Lord Panmure will be much gratified and struck with Miss Nightingale—her powerful, clear head, and simple, modest manner.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 6, 1856.*

As Lord Panmure did not appear to know the particulars of poor Lord Hardinge's death, the Queen sends him, for his perusal, a letter from his eldest son and Colonel Phipps, which gives the sad and touching details.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

F.O., *October 6, 1856.*

Murkiness
of the Political
Horizon.

. . . The political horizon is almost as murky as the aspect of London to-day, and there are many breakers ahead. Our great Ally, or rather his entourage, is so completely Russianised that we no longer get on well together.¹

It gave me heartfelt pleasure to read what you said about Newcastle the other day, and you made use of exactly the right word, 'clamour,' at which I see the *Times* takes offence, but you won't mind that.

¹ The result of a revival of the former rivalry between France and Great Britain at Constantinople.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

October 6, 1856.

In the answer sent to Sir C. Yorke from the War Department about the guns, and of which a copy is sent to me, it is mentioned that the Queen has selected two large bells, and 'that none of the other trophies are of much value.'

As to the
Crimean
trophies.

This does not portend much consideration for them; and, as I have had so much free communication with you, I hesitate not in putting in a word as to the value of these trophies. We who were engaged in the Crimea may naturally feel that they were of value—that they are not lumbering old stores—and that there is something more in them than the metal of which they are composed. There must have been more than 30 brass pieces of ordnance—our share of what was taken at the fall of Sebastopol; and there were besides 12 field-pieces and their carriages recovered from below the water. Although these were not taken in the actual field of battle, they are, at all events, trophies of the successful siege.

But there are—or there were—two brass pieces of a very different character, viz., a long 16 pounder gun, and a 32 pounder howitzer, both of which were taken in fair fight in the Battle of the Alma. They formed part of the armament of the 12 gun battery which the Light Division attacked. I remember riding in by the embrasure of the howitzer myself, and I then saw the long gun towards the further end of the battery, limbered up, horsed, and a Russian mounting in order to move it off, when he was threatened or shot by an officer of the 23rd, the horses' heads were turned by him down and round the flank of the breastwork beyond our line, and the gun secured.

Capture of
guns at the
Alma.

At the time of our not being able to maintain our hold of the battery, the brigade of Guards came up in support, and passing over and round this breastwork, secured the ground in their position, and the howitzer with it.

These two fine pieces of brass ordnance were part of

those which swept the vineyard and ground on both sides of the river as we advanced to the attack, and they were taken in fair and direct fight. I saw them in front of Lord Raglan's quarters the day after the battle, though I do not see that he mentions them in his despatch. Every soldier must hope that these at all events will not be classed with old stores, and got rid of or melted. We may feel pretty sure that the Russians will cherish the possession of the seven English siege guns¹—although of iron—which they took in the Redoubts of Balaclava.

Some of the Russian Officers—and intelligent ones, too, of their staff, and long in the Crimea—denied to me that they had any guns of position at the Alma, and were quite incredulous of our having taken any at all, till I mentioned the fact of having them in our possession.

Let us at all events keep—we might even honour—these tangible trophies of the first and brilliant fight of the campaign; nor, indeed, need we be ashamed to park the guns and carriages of the others, as long as the wood and green paint will hold together.

True value of
the Crimean
trophies.

There was a bell belonging to the 77th regiment, of which I had (to their great disgust) to order the surrender, that it might be sent home with the others; it was obtained by them from the French, and, if possible, I myself would willingly pay the value of it, could I have the pleasure of restoring it; indeed there is not a regiment, or a corps, that would not gladly have, or buy, some such trophy, if there is any idea of their being melted or disregarded.

You may feel that all this is none of my business now, and possibly the expression which I have quoted may mean only a money value; I risk writing to you, however, in the hope that you may agree with me, and with many others, that they have much more than a money value, and are worth retaining in their present shape.

¹ It will be remembered that these guns had been in charge of Turks.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

BALMORAL, *October 10, 1856.*

The term 'value,' as applied to the Trophies, referred to their 'money value,' and not their 'national' value, which is beyond my computation.

As the proofs of the valour of our troops they shall be duly cared for, and you need be under no apprehension of their being treated 'as old stores' or 'melted down.'

I am averse to follow the French fashion and to parade the fruits of our conquest, and so keep open the sores of war after the healing hand of peace has been applied.

On the other hand, no trophies should be destroyed, but carefully preserved as National Mementos. The Alma 16 pounder and the howitzer were both in the Arsenal at Woolwich when I was last there, and the place of their capture inscribed on them.

The Queen desired the two large bells to be sent, the one to Osborne and the other to Windsor, and she graciously gave Lord Hardinge and myself permission to select a small one each. The rest are in the Arsenal, and I dare say if you could point out which belonged to the 77th, it could be restored to them.

The final disposal, either in the Tower or Woolwich, or some public place, of all our guns is yet to be determined, but rely on no dishonour falling on what has cost the Army such exertions to earn.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *October 11, 1856.*

Your letter from Balmoral has just reached me, and I am extremely glad to find that you share my views on the points I brought to your notice in my letters from the country, especially in regard to the appointment of our friend Brown to the appointment now vacant at Chelsea. By to-night's post I have written privately to the Queen

General
Brown.

on the subject, recommending Brown, and should you have an opportunity of putting in a word in his favour I hope you will do so.

General
Windham.

Recommends
General
Knollys for an
appointment
in India.

The Queen will probably have told you that Windham has, for private reasons connected with his late brother's property, of which he has been left the manager under his will, requested to decline the appointment intended for him on the Staff in India. I do not know what Her Majesty will say to it, but he seems very positive about not going out, so I do not see how he can be positively ordered out against his will. Should the Queen, therefore, consent to his relinquishment of the post, we must select another General Officer for India, and it occurs to me that the best selection I could make would be that of Major-General Knollys at present at Aldershot. He is intelligent and deserves to get on in his profession, and a turn of foreign service would be very useful to him, the more so as his present position at Aldershot is somewhat difficult, from the fact of all the troops composing the command having seen much service in the field, an advantage of which he has been most unfortunately for his own sake deprived. In India he has a great opening, and being a poor man, and the appointment on the Indian Staff a good one, I think he might be desirous to go, though I have in no respect named the subject to him. Should this arrangement be acceptable, I should propose that Sir Frederick Lowe¹ should succeed General Knollys in the command at Aldershot. He is a first-rate officer, most active, most energetic, of great experience and a perfect gentleman; in fact, he is the very man for the post, and depend upon it he would do it to perfection. I would further suggest that Major-General Eden, recently deprived of the Kilkenny District, which he had only held for a very short period, should succeed Sir Frederick Lowe at Jersey. Eden is an excellent man, but would do better in a quiet place than for active command. He is, moreover, a very poor man with a large family, so that Jersey would be the very thing for him, and his loss of the Kilkenny district has been very

¹ He had rendered good service in the Crimea.

seriously felt by him. If you could, during your stay at Balmoral, assist me a little in these views, I should feel very much obliged to you. At present I have not named the subject to the Queen further than informing her of Windham's determination not to go to India.

What about this expedition to Persia which is fitting out at Bombay? I never heard from you one word about it. I shall be very glad to see you back in town, as there are many questions that remain to be settled and that must await your return.

Inquiry as to Persian expedition.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *October 17, 1856.*

The Queen gave a very gracious assent to the Lieut.-Governorship being offered to Brown, but our friend, who I saw yesterday, has respectfully declined the offer thus made. He was much pleased at the consideration shown him, and moved to hear of it, and evidently felt that it was a very high compliment, but he said that as a matter of personal feeling he could not bring himself to say that his career was over, which would be the case, according to his views, if he were ever to lay down his head within the precincts of Chelsea Hospital. He has written a very proper letter, which I have sent to the Queen, who I hope will be satisfied with it. Who shall we now select? . . .

Brown declines offer of Lieut.-Governorship of Chelsea.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *October 25, 1856.*

I have been waiting in the hope of seeing you here, and myself handing to you the enclosed memo., which I have drawn up on the general state of the Army, and the future arrangements necessary for bringing it more immediately in connection with the Militia. As, however, I do not yet hear of your coming southwards,¹ I will send this paper for

Submitting a Memo. on arrangements for bringing the Army into closer relations with the Militia.

¹ Lord Panmure's term of office in attendance on the Queen had recently expired.

Retention of
Supernum-
erary Lieuten-
ants decided
on Appoint-
ments,

your consideration, and hope you will generally agree with me in the views I have taken on the subject. I think it well to send it in now, as, if adopted, it may to some extent influence the estimates which you will have to prepare for the Militia services of the year, and you may also like to let Palmerston see it before your Cabinets meet, which they generally do during the month of November. Something of the sort I have proposed must be done if the Militia force is to be made really useful, and the great thing we want in this country is a Reserve force for the army, whence the latter can be easily and quickly recruited in time of war. I hear that the case of the Supernumerary Lieutenants¹ has been decided upon, and that they are to be retained. I am very glad of it, but I am at the same time very anxious to know what you will decide as to the mode for absorbing them. Pray bear in mind that it will be necessary to give some commissions from time to time, otherwise I fear the efficiency of the Army may in time suffer by a total stop being put to all first appointments, and a large list of candidates for commissions will be altogether disappointed in their hopes of ever getting into the service. What I should be disposed to suggest would be that every alternate appointment should be given to a candidate, and by this means we should be going on appointing and absorbing at the same time.

Trouble with
the German
Legion.

. . . I shall be very glad to see you in London, for I fear matters are not going on very well with the German Legion for the Cape, and I fear our friend the Baron has made rather a mess of it and disoblged all parties. Your presence is, therefore, much wanted to put matters right, and I hope you will do your utmost to hurry the departure of these Colonists, who are becoming daily more turbulent and disagreeable, and if this state of transition is to last much longer, I confess, I fear serious mischief may come of it. Stütterheim has managed to offend the officers I am afraid, and they have consequently not worked kindly for him. Had he got them on his side in the first

¹ Supernumerary in consequence of the recent reductions in the army.

instance, which he might have done with a very little management, I am certain all would have done well, and many men here would have accompanied him to the Cape. There has been much rioting at Colchester, which has now passed away, but at Brown Down there has been a most unpleasant occurrence, and hence my great anxiety to get the Colonists away and the rest of the Legion disbanded. Pray press this matter on. I want Colchester sadly for the Depots.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *October 31, 1856.*

Our friend Knollys has been *sounded*, with the Queen's permission, as to going to India, and Yorke has this day received a letter from him to say that he declines going, and prefers remaining at his present post. This is very unfortunate, I think, but we must make the best of it, I fear. We have been looking over the list to-day, and find it no easy matter to make a good selection. However, the following General Officers have occurred to me as the most eligible, Major-General Arbuthnot, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Henry Barnard, or Major-General Gascoigne. . . . Would you let me know, as soon as possible, which of these you are most for, as certainly somebody ought to be sent out without loss of time, the post having already been kept too long vacant, from circumstances which could not be avoided? . . .

Choice of a
General to go
to India.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *October 31, 1856.*

The German Officers of the Legion are inundating me with letters and petitions. I have just had one, signed by a very numerous body of officers, representing to me their hard fate in very respectful terms. I forwarded this petition, as I do all those I get, to Kinloch, and I enclose his

Troubles of
Officers of the
German
Legion.

reply and some remarks from Stütterheim on the same subject. There can be no doubt that legally these men have no claim on the Government, but certainly the whole thing has turned out most unfortunately for them, the peace having come upon us before the Legion had an opportunity of doing anything. Had the war lasted, I doubt not the Legion would have done good service, and in that case the country would doubtless have done something permanent for the officers. It was with this hope and prospect that so many were induced to come, and now these poor devils are literally starving. I am afraid they will be a constant source of annoyance to us, unless they can be somehow got rid of. The three months' gratuity is not sufficient to draw many of them from debt, and get them out of the country. Do you not think that this gratuity might be somewhat increased to meet the circumstances of the case, and in order to get rid of all claims, or would you give a larger proportion of these men a free passage to the Cape, even though they cannot go out as Military Colonists? I think it would be well worthy of your serious consideration. The sooner we can get the Military Colonists off the better, for the long delay in their shipment is most inconvenient, and only gives rise to more discontent, as all sorts of agents are at work to prevent the men from going to the Cape, and to induce them to enlist in other services. I trust your gout is better, and I shall be glad to see you in London, when I hope you will resume your duties, arduous though they be, and will not think of retiring into private life as you hint in your note to me, as we cannot spare you from the important post you fill, and I should be personally *very much* grieved to see any change.

Suggested
remedies.

CHAPTER XXIII

NOVEMBER 1856

THE principal subjects dealt with in the correspondence for November are the reconstitution of the Cabinet Committee on military matters, especially defences; the Militia, the German Legion, and the Order of the Bath.

In announcing the reconstitution of the Committee, Panmure states that endeavours are to be made to repair, 'without public scandal,' the serious evil of the 'general absence of all plans for the different works at home and abroad' (November 4th); to which the Queen replies by laying down the principle that 'there should exist a well-considered general scheme for each plan, supported by a detailed argument; this, when approved by the Government, should be sanctioned and signed by the Sovereign, and not deviated from except upon re-submission and full explanation of the causes which render such deviation necessary.'

In the same letter (November 7th), Her Majesty criticises the departmental returns in respect to barracks and fortifications, drawing from her correspondent the admission that 'the more the old system in regard to our defences both at home and abroad is probed, the more difficult becomes the task of remedying past neglect, and adapting to works long in progress the very proper rule set forth.'

In commenting on the inadequacy of the Militia (November 25th), the Prince Consort states his belief that it will never be kept efficient unless it be made a little more

military, and placed under permanent military inspection and supervision.

The trouble caused by the German Legion was not yet at an end, but by November 10th Panmure is able to report the embarkation of a thousand of its members, who are speedily to be followed by others. A liberal treatment of the officers is again urged by Lord Palmerston.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 4, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the photographs taken by Corporal Mack of the Royal Engineers, while in attendance upon Lord Granville,¹ are now waiting Your Majesty's pleasure, and Lord Panmure will despatch Corporal Mack to attend Your Majesty as soon as he learns the time which may be most convenient to Your Majesty. The photographs are intended as additions to Your Majesty's collection.

Lord Panmure has the honour to forward a state of the British German Legion, and to inform Your Majesty that two ships will be ready to embark these troops on Thursday, and the remainder in the course of a few days.

Lord Panmure regrets that the favourable terms offered to the Germans have not induced more of them to go out to the Cape, but he fears that underhand means have been used to stem the tide of emigration in that direction, and that the men have been misled by designing people. In fact, various addresses have reached Lord Panmure's hands, and on one of them he desired a legal opinion to be taken whether he cannot proceed against its author.

Lord Panmure transmits to Your Majesty the Quarterly Returns, which are later than he could wish.

The Committee of Cabinet upon Military matters, and

¹ As representative of Great Britain at the Coronation of the Czar.

more especially on defences, will be reconstituted next week,¹ as will also a Committee upon Coast defences.

¹ Cabinet Committee upon Military defences about to be reconstituted.

The question of the general absence of all plans for the different works at home and abroad will occupy the early attention of the Committee of Cabinet, and means still further be adopted to repair this serious evil without public scandal.

Since writing the above Lord Panmure finds that he cannot do more than furnish a memorandum of the state of the German Legion, as the officer in charge is gone. The state shall be sent to-morrow. No time shall be lost in expediting the despatch of the ships with the military colonials, and Lord Panmure thinks that before the close of the year all our foreign auxiliaries will have been honourably disposed of.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 7, 1856.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's two boxes of the 4th.

She is glad to hear that the Military and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet are to be reassembled. The absence of all plans for our Defences is a great evil and hardly creditable. There should exist a well considered general scheme for each plan, supported by a detailed argument; this, when approved by the Government, should be sanctioned and signed by the Sovereign, and not deviated from except upon resubmission and full explanation of the causes which render such deviation necessary; no special work should be undertaken which does not realise part of this general scheme. The Queen trusts that Lord Panmure will succeed in effecting this.

It is very much to be regretted that so few of the soldiers of the German Legion should have accepted the liberal terms of the Government. Those should, however, be made to sail soon.

¹ An anticipation of Mr Balfour's scheme.

Criticisms on
departmental
returns, etc.

The returns of the different departments for the last quarter show a lamentable deficiency in small arms—52,322 for the whole of the United Kingdom is a sadly small reserve to have in store; we should never be short of 500,000.

The Queen was struck also with the little work done at Enfield. It appears that, during the whole quarter, this new and extensive establishment has completed only three muskets.

With regard to some of the Barracks, the tenders have not even yet been accepted, although the year is nearly drawing to a close. The Queen hopes soon to receive the returns for the Fortification Department, which are fully two months in arrear.

The photographs from Moscow will interest the Queen very much. She will be ready to receive them any day about two o'clock, if Lord Panmure will despatch the Corporal who made them with them.

Distribution
of honours.

With respect to the lists for the Bath, the Queen is somewhat startled by the large number. Before sanctioning it, she thinks it right to ask for an explanation of the services of the officers, and the reasons for which they are selected for the honour. She returns the list for that purpose to Lord Panmure, who will perhaps cause the statement to be attached to each name. This of course does not apply to the Foreigners. Amongst the Sardinians, however, the Queen observes the absence of the names of the Military Commissioners attached first to Lord Raglan and afterwards to General Simpson. . . .

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

November 10, 1856.

Restoration of
the Tower.

I have received your letter respecting the Tower. The Queen had ordered last year exactly what you intend to do with regard to the Fortifications, viz.—that Mr. Salvin be directed to prepare a general plan for the future restoration of the Tower of London; this is not yet com-

pleted, but the rooms you wish to appropriate as an Armoury certainly belong to those to be first taken in hand. Mr. Salvin tells me that your object may, with great advantage, be united with the Queen's intentions, and it will now only remain for you to put somebody from your department into communication with him, to consult how this may be best carried out. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 10, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of yesterday.

In obedience to Your Majesty's commands, Lord Panmure forwards a statement of the grounds on which His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief recommends each of the officers in the lists for honours at Your Majesty's hands.

Lord Panmure has the satisfaction to acquaint Your Majesty that 1000 of the British German Legion embarked yesterday afternoon, in good order, on board the *Culloden* and *Sultana* transports, which went out immediately to Spithead. About 800 men will be disposed of to Germany and Nova Scotia during the week, and in a few days the remaining settlers will sail.

Embarkation
of 1000 of
British Ger-
man Legion.

The report of progress on the home fortifications will be forwarded to Your Majesty immediately. The more the old system in regard to our defences both at home and abroad is probed, the more difficult becomes the task of remedying past neglect, and adapting to works long in progress the very proper rule set forth by Your Majesty. Lord Panmure will make every effort to get things in this respect into the proper channel.

With regard to any new works, they shall be started upon the right system.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 11, 1856.

As to eligibility
of Sardinian
Military Com-
missioners for
Companion-
ship of the
Bath.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that he finds that the names of Count Litta and Count Revel, Commissioners to the Head-quarters of the British Army, were in the list of Sardinian officers transmitted from Lord Clarendon for the companionship of the Bath. The rank of these officers was only that of Captain in the Sardinian service, and, as no officer of that rank in Your Majesty's service is permitted to receive the Bath, except under some most extraordinary circumstances, Lord Panmure felt that, if he recommended to Your Majesty to confer on these Foreign officers an honour well earned by many Captains in Your Majesty's Army, but withheld on account of their rank, a grievance would be established which could scarcely be defended.

These are the grounds on which neither Count Litta's nor Count Revel's names appear in the list submitted by Lord Panmure to Your Majesty.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

November 25, 1856.

I return you my best thanks for the papers which you have sent me the day before yesterday.

I hope you will urge the Admiralty to furnish their part of the answers to the questions.

The Militia gives us a very small available force for the expenditure and trouble it costs. 50,000 men out of 120,000 which the law provides for is a very poor proportion, and I am glad that you mean to appeal to the counties by a circular.

My belief is that it will never be kept efficient unless it be made a little more military, and placed under permanent military inspection and supervision. It has been allowed too much to rest on the voluntary principle, which it is im-

possible to rely upon. Taking out of the force of your grand total 60,000 men for Ireland would leave but 91,000 men of all arms for the defence of Great Britain, which, scattered as it must be, would hardly be capable of resisting an invading force of 50,000 men, picked troops! This will become very clear to you when you begin to consider the plan of defence. You will remember that in the Crimea also, when gross numbers were counted, there appeared to be sufficient force to undertake almost anything, but when a specific plan was to be executed, both Armies, French and English, never had the men required for it.

Your store of powder seems admirable. That of muskets is still low, but better than the quarterly return showed.

The Queen still claims the quarterly return of the Fortification Department, which is sadly in arrear.

I had some conversation with Colonel Owen the other day, whose opinion on the reorganisation of the Engineers' Department and the Fortifications appeared to me extremely sound. I suppose you have that whole question under your consideration. It is a most important one.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., *November 30, 1856.*

I hope your gout is better. Miss Nightingale has, I understand, been in communication with you about the proposed arrangements of the Hospital on the Southampton River; if her suggestions are good, it will be worth while to alter our intended arrangement of the building rather than have an imperfect Hospital.¹ Nothing was said to me at Windsor yesterday about Army matters.

Miss Nightingale and Netley Hospital.

¹ Miss Nightingale's view was in favour of the 'Block System' in hospital building. This was not adopted at Netley.

CHAPTER XXIV

DECEMBER 1856

THE strength and command of the Persian expeditionary force, and the possibility of Russia mixing herself up in the Persian quarrel are alluded to in the letters of this month, which, for the rest, are almost exclusively concerned with questions of reductions, barracks, and fortifications, and other details of military organisation.

The strength of the Army for the year 1857-58 had been fixed at about 140,000 of all ranks, exclusive of troops for service in India, implying the concession to economical prejudice of a reduction of 7000 men. The sum provided by the Army Estimates amounted to £13,000,000.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *December 3, 1856.*

Against winter-
ing troops at
Aldershot.

The present state of the weather has again made me feel most anxious about the position of the troops at Aldershot. I confess I do not think that it is at all desirable that a large body should be there assembled during the winter, and I should greatly prefer to send them into winter-quarters by Brigades, assembling them again when the spring sets in.

There are, however, two difficulties which present themselves to me in making such an arrangement. In the first place, I do not like to disturb the new system of concentrating our troops by Brigades and in Divisions, fearing that if ever infringed upon, it may be altogether abandoned. I should much regret; and in the next

place, I know not what you will say to the additional expense that must be incurred by the moving of the troops into winter-quarters now, and bringing them together again in a few months. If you can give me any satisfactory assurance on these two points, I should have no hesitation in writing to the Queen on the subject, but without such assurance I can hardly venture to do so. Upon making full inquiries, I am happy to find that the health of the troops has, at all events up to the present time, not suffered. But I know that the officers dislike Aldershot very much, a feeling which I believe is further shared by the men. The want of occupation during the long winter nights is the great drawback, and I should not wonder if it led to some unpleasant attacks and observations in Parliament, which it will not be very easy to meet. What Her Majesty may think about it I do not know, but I think it is a subject well worthy of our most serious attention.

An objection to
Aldershot.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *December 12, 1856.*

As regards our conversation last night on the subject of Aldershot, what I suggest is as follows :—

1. That Aldershot should in future be occupied to the extent of the permanent barrack accommodation provided for that station.
2. That during the winter months the troops that cannot be thus accommodated be sent by *Brigades*, with their Brigadier and Staff, into winter-quarters in the various barracks of England.
3. That during the summer and autumn these troops be again concentrated for drill at Aldershot, the barracks they have occupied during the winter months being temporarily used for the Militia regiments that are called out for their training.
4. That advantage be taken of these periods to make the annual reliefs of regiments—those

Suggestions as
to troops being
stationed at
Aldershot.

regiments going to Aldershot replacing those that have been there for the preceding winter.

5. That the same rule should to a great extent be applied to the station on the Curragh.

I think such a plan would work well. I would like much to go over some of your new barrack estimates with you before your final decision upon them, if there are any about which you are at all in doubt.

It will also be well to consider the question of hut barracks as compared to permanent ones. I do not speak of Aldershot or the Curragh, as I look upon those as exceptional stations, but I allude to Shorncliffe, Colchester, Pembroke, etc.¹

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *December 17, 1856.*

Remissness of
Fortification
Department.

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure that we are now approaching the end of December, and that she has not yet received the report from the Fortification Department for the September quarter. She hopes that Lord Panmure will be able to stop this continued remissness of the same Department, of which she has to complain every quarter.

The Queen wishes also to hear from Lord Panmure how the preparations for giving the Guards new barracks at Chelsea are going on. The advantage which Lord Panmure described as arising from the giving up of the purchase of ground near the Thames, for which the money had been voted by Parliament, was the immediate convertibility of the Chelsea School this year to that purpose, which would give the Guards accommodation before new barracks could be built on the other site. The Queen understood that no time should be lost in the transfer and the preparation of plans. The year is now drawing to its

¹ In the event it was arranged that only that number of troops for which there was barrack accommodation should remain at Aldershot during the winter.

close, and the Queen has heard no more about it. Having for years seen plans adopted for the Guards' barracks and abandoned again for better ones, which were again abandoned in their turn, the poor troops remaining all that time in Lord Portman's old mews, the Queen is anxious to hear from Lord Panmure on the subject.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 19, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's note of the 17th inst., which has just reached him.

Lord Panmure would have written to Your Majesty sooner, but he is only just recovering the use of his hand, and he trusts that this may plead his apology.

Lord Palmerston promised to acquaint Your Majesty with the proceedings of the two last sittings of the War Committee, in which it was decided to confine the operations of home defences next year to Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Dover, as the main points of outlay, reserving smaller sums for some minor though important points. The Cabinet, before separating, came to the conclusion that the strength of the Army for 1857-58 should be about 140,000 of all ranks, exclusive of the troops in India. The reasons for this reduction of 7000 men are purely of a financial character, and Lord Panmure regrets to have to state to Your Majesty that the limit of the estimates under his control is confined to 13 millions, which will restrain him from undertaking much that he would readily have gone into, inasmuch as £1,200,000 is about the extent of the sum which can be devoted to both fortifications and barracks.

Reports pro-
ceedings of War
Committee.

By the middle of January Lord Panmure will be prepared to submit to Your Majesty a detail of the manner in which it is proposed to distribute the 13 millions. In the meantime, as soon as Your Majesty shall have signified to Lord Panmure Your Majesty's concurrence in this pro-

Prospective
reduction of
the Army by
7000.

spective reduction of 7000 men, H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief will submit to Your Majesty a scheme by which such reduction can be carried out without deranging the system of organisation or the principle of expansion, which Your Majesty has already sanctioned and appointed.

It must be borne in mind that the Army will start on the commencement of next financial year at its full establishment, and can easily be maintained at such, and will after all afford a good force for immediate service both at home and abroad.

Having stated thus much as to the future establishment of the Army, Lord Panmure has now the honour to address himself more particularly to Your Majesty's letter. He cannot understand why the Fortification branch seems so determined to neglect its duty in delaying to furnish its last Quarterly Return, but he has addressed to Sir J. Burgoyne¹ a letter intimating Your Majesty's surprise and dissatisfaction at its non-production. Lord Panmure has desired a circular to be sent to all Heads of Departments to be ready with their reports at the close of the year.

With respect to the barracks at Chelsea, Lord Panmure has to inform Your Majesty that the Treasury could not consent to the appropriation of the sum of £33,000, voted for the purchase of the site near the river, either to the alterations necessary at the Asylum or those at Kneller Hall. Both are included in the forthcoming estimates, and the barracks will be proceeded with immediately. The plans are nearly ready for submission to Your Majesty, and subject to the consent of Parliament, of which Lord Panmure entertains no doubt, the works will be immediately proceeded with.

Barracks at
Chelsea, Port-
man Street, and
Kensington.

The lease of Portman Street Barracks only endures for another year, and will not be required to be renewed. Lord Panmure has, however, the satisfaction of knowing that, though in an inconvenient locality, the Portman Street Barracks are even more healthy than St. John's Wood, or any other barracks in London. Lord Panmure has the satisfaction to inform Your Majesty that the small barrack

¹ Inspector-General of Fortifications.

at Kensington is progressing satisfactorily. There has been, and will be, great clamour from the neighbourhood of both Kensington and Chelsea in the next session on account of these works, but it must be faced resolutely.

Lord Panmure begs to apologise to Your Majesty for such indifferent writing, but the weakness in his hand will let him do no better.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *December 24, 1856.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 19th. She is very sorry to hear that the Cabinet think it their duty to advise a reduction of the Army of 7000 men, as the state of our relations with many countries, the general state of Europe, and our war with Persia, which it will be quite impossible to carry to a successful issue with the miserably small force which has been allotted to it (5000 men), hardly appear to justify such a measure. If upon financial grounds, however, the Cabinet should find it impossible to propose an alternative, the Queen will sanction the reduction. She sees that Lord Panmure counts men of all ranks in his communication; in all official documents, the Queen thinks the established rule of counting only rank and file ought to be adhered to, as having been found practically to give a more correct appreciation of the disposable force. Thirteen millions is a very respectable War Budget, however, and ought to give us the proper means of defence if properly distributed and applied. The Queen looks forward with anxiety to Lord Panmure's plan.

Against reduction of Army as proposed by Cabinet.

She is glad to hear that the plans for Chelsea and Kneller Hall are progressing.

The only explanation the Queen wishes to have on the Fortification Report is about the 'Purchase of land for Rowner Fort and to connect Gomer, Rowner, and Elson.' Against that is written: 'In the hands of the Solicitor of the War Department.' Now, this may mean that the purchases are completed and that the money voted can be

on Fortification Report.

'Lawyers like
delay.'

paid within the quarter, or, that the money will again be lost and the Solicitor keep the business in his hands for years. As it is most important that so large an item as £100,000 should be taken out of next year's funds, the Queen is anxious to know what progress the Solicitor has made, and what hope he sees of concluding his business within the financial year. Under the Defence Act there ought to be no difficulty in it, but lawyers like delay.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *December 25, 1856.*

New candidates
for the Bath.

The Queen was very much surprised to receive for signature a new list of Crosses of the Bath without her pleasure having been taken upon the subject, or its having been previously mentioned to her in any way that there was an intention to extend the rewards still further. With regard to the Queen's own officers and the French, this is most likely an addition found necessary on further examination of the lists; but with regard to the Turks, it introduces an entirely new subject, which will require very mature consideration. . . .

The Queen trusts that Lord Panmure has been cautious not to communicate with these officers beforehand. She has signed the four lists and retained that of the Turks.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *December 27, 1856.*

Apprehensions
in regard to the
expedition to
Persia.

I have received your confidential note of the 24th instant, and I confess that the contents of it have made me feel more than ever anxious about the expedition to Persia.

From the first I was afraid that it was a much larger undertaking than we bargained for, and that the force employed was not nearly sufficient for what was required, if the whole thing were to be more than a mere demonstration. I very much fear that, having gone as far as we now have, it will be impossible to draw back without loss of

prestige and honour, and so it is as well to be prepared for all contingencies, and I am obliged to you for the early warning you have given me on the subject, even though the whole thing may come to nothing. I shall take care to keep the matter as secret as possible, by not saying a word to anybody till I hear something positive from you. I very much fear that you will find Russia mixing herself up in the quarrel . . . and in that case we shall be in for another great war, an event much to be deplored. Is it prudent, with this staring us in the face, to go on with our reductions of 7000 men? I hardly think so, and I would suggest to you the propriety of staying this measure till we can see a little more clearly into the future. As regards the force to be employed, 10,000 men is not in any respect too large a number of troops, and I will take care to have them in hand. I apprehend that the four regiments of Infantry destined for India may form a portion of this force, as well as the two regiments of Cavalry intended for India next year, as a relief for the 9th and 14th Dragoons. I quite agree with you as to the propriety of sending some batteries of Artillery, as well as a troop of Horse Artillery. There is nothing like sending a complete force from this country if it is to act with effect. As regards the command of these troops, I cannot help thinking that Sir Colin Campbell would be the best man to send in charge of them, and he would be assisted by several Brigadiers, to be selected hereafter according to the numbers that are to go. . . .

As to the force
to be employed
and its
Commander.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 29, 1856.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's two notes of the 24th and 25th instant.

In reference to the first of these, Lord Panmure regrets the necessity for the reduction of 7000 men from the ranks of the Army, but trusts, as the reduction will not take place till the close of the financial year, that our relations

with foreign countries may be on a more satisfactory basis. If operations are to be carried on in the interior of Persia, Lord Panmure quite concurs with Your Majesty that the force at present engaged is far below what is necessary for the maintenance of our honour and prestige, and he is glad to see that Lord Canning¹ is duly impressed with the same views.

The reason why, in giving Your Majesty a review of the strength of the Army, Lord Panmure mixed all ranks is that it represents the Vote submitted to Parliament and inserted in the Mutiny Act.

£13,000,000 for
defending the
country and
maintaining the
Army.

As soon as the various demands for Military Services for the ensuing year are put in order, Lord Panmure will transmit a fair detailed copy to Your Majesty, which will exhibit the proposed allocation of the sum of £13,000,000, given for the purposes of maintaining the Army and defending the country.

The Vote of £100,000 for the purchase of land to form the advanced lines and defences at Gosport will be all expended before the close of the financial year, with the exception of £30,000, for which provision will have to be made next year if it cannot be settled in time.²

With reference to Your Majesty's note of the 25th inst., Lord Panmure has the honour to represent to Your Majesty that the lists of the Bath were submitted for Your Majesty's approval preparatory to Warrants being prepared or any official step taken in regard to them. The honours conferred upon Your Majesty's own officers and the French is nothing more than the final completion of the rewards in this branch, earned by the war, and contemplated in the exchange of honours with the French.

To the Turks no communication will be made until Your Majesty's pleasure is known. This list has been pressed upon Lord Clarendon by Sir W. Williams, and Lord Panmure will immediately communicate to Lord Clarendon Your Majesty's doubts upon the subject.

¹ Governor-General of India.

² In allusion to the law which exacts that money voted for a specific purpose and not spent within the financial year must be revoted.

pride and honor as
for all contingencies
told warning you
though the whole thing
take care to keep
saying a word
from you. I
mixing herself
be in for another

CHAPTER XXV

JANUARY 1857

Is it prudent
with our
I would agree Lord Panmure the proposed establishment of the
measure of the Office for 1857, the clothing of the Army, the
future. Quarterly Reports on progress of Fortifications and
is not in tracks at home and abroad, the distribution of the
will take Military Estimates, the new small-arms factory at Enfield,
the for commendations for the Order of the Bath, and the
form a proposal of Russian trophies. (Letters of January 17th,
the 20th, 21st.) Lord Panmure addresses Lord Palmer-
the question on the subject of Military Education, and submits a
scheme for reducing his Estimates. The Duke of Cam-
bridge expresses his satisfaction that Cavalry regiments
in India are to be kept at their old establishment of 700
sabres, and Lord Palmerston criticises, by the light of
a conversation with Miss Nightingale, the plan of the
Hospital in course of construction at Netley, Lord Panmure
replying to said criticism. The reduction of regiments of
the Line is stated to be for the present suspended; and,
in pursuance of the 'Lorcha *Arrow* incident' of the pre-
ceding autumn, a despatch of troops from India to China
is ordered.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 8, 1857.*

The Queen returns the report of the Solicitor of the
War Department on the purchases at Gosport, which she

thinks quite satisfactory. She trusts, however, that Lord Panmure will urge the Lawyer not to lose any time in the negotiations, which lawyers in general very frequently do.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

January 15, 1857.

Expresses satisfaction at the keeping up of Cavalry in India.

I have received your two letters and, in reply to the last, I can only express my satisfaction that we are to be permitted to retain the old establishment of 700 sabres for the Cavalry in India. I am confident that this is the best establishment we could have, and seeing the distance these regiments are from home, and the large amount of territory to be defended and protected, beside the constant preparation for war of some sort or other in India, I think the Court of Directors have come to a very wise determination. . . . I shall desire the Adjutant-General to make up the two Cavalry regiments intended for India to 700 sabres.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, January 17, 1857.

The Queen desires that, before Lefroy's appointment as Inspector of Military Education is completed, there should be a meeting, on the subject of Educational Arrangements, between the Prince, the Duke of Cambridge, you and me, and I have told her that this shall be done. This seems the best way of finally settling these matters.

Miss Nightingale and the plans for Netley Hospital.

I had the other day a long conversation with Miss Nightingale about the proposed arrangements of the Military Hospital now building at Netley, and I am bound to say that she has left on my mind at present a conviction that the plan is fundamentally wrong, and that it would be better to pull down and rebuild all that has been built there than to finish it upon the present plan. She brought hither the ground-plan and elevation of the proposed Netley Hospital and the ground-plan of the last new

Military Hospital at Paris, which she says has been adopted as the model for the Hospital at Aldershot.

It seems to me that at Netley all consideration of what would best tend to the comfort and recovery of patients has been sacrificed to the vanity of the architect, whose sole object has been to make a building which should cut a dash when looked at from the Southampton River. This might be vastly well for the glory of the architect, and for the gratification of the ladies and gentlemen who go yachting on the Solent, or who fill the passage steamers between Southampton and the Isle of Wight. But when we are laying out a very large sum of money to build a Hospital to hold a thousand invalids, surely the first and main purpose kept in view ought to be to make a building which should to the greatest possible degree be calculated to promote the cure and recovery of patients. The general and leading faults of the Netley plan are that the wards look to the north-east and into a confined courtyard, instead of being turned towards the sun, and opening into free space; that they have no cross ventilation, and that they all open into one long passage, which would serve as a conduit-pipe to carry the bad air of the wards from one end of the building to the other. The Paris plan is free from these faults, and seems to me far better calculated to the restoration of health. Miss Nightingale explained to me why three stories are in her opinion objectionable. She said that the bad air and exhalations from the two lower stories could not well be prevented from getting into the upper one, and that if the Hospital were built on the French plan of separate blocks the greater height of the three stories would keep light and air from those below.

This matter seems to me to be one of the greatest importance, and the lives of thousands of our soldiers may depend upon the nature of the arrangements we are now making.

If we were building a temporary hospital for a purpose, it would not so much signify, but as this building is to last for a century, and is to be filled by hundreds

at a time, any sacrifice of money in correcting errors in its intended construction would be better than a deliberate perseverance in arrangements demonstrated to be bad. Pray, therefore, for the present stop all further progress in the work till the matter can be duly considered.

These warlike operations in Persia and China may require that we should send reinforcements to India and China;¹ it would be well therefore to suspend for the present the discharge of any men who are fit for service.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 17, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty the Quarterly Reports up to the end of the year.

Lateness of
Reports on
Fortifications
and Barracks.

The only observations which Lord Panmure has to make are, first, to draw Your Majesty's attention to the absence of the Quarterly Reports of the progress of Fortifications and Barracks at home, and to the fact that the report of progress abroad is a quarter in arrear. Sir J. Burgoyne¹ states that he finds it extremely difficult to furnish these home reports as correctly as is desirable for a month after the expiration of the quarter, and those from abroad must always be a quarter in arrear. Lord Panmure has agreed to this arrangement, and will insist on its being punctually observed.

The factory at Enfield requires some additional machinery before it can begin to turn out perfected arms of its own manufacture, but the store of small-arms from the contractors is steadily and satisfactorily increasing.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a rough statement of the probable distribution of the Military Estimates, which, though not quite correct, will give Your Majesty a general view of the manner in

¹ In consequence of the 'Lorcha Arrow affair,' October 8th, 1856.

² Inspector-General of Fortifications.

which the whole amount of the vote is proposed to be apportioned.

Lord Panmure further transmits to Your Majesty a list of all the Russian guns, etc., received at the Royal Arsenal. Suggestions are made for the disposal of many of these trophies, but Lord Panmure does not at present propose to Your Majesty to give any sanction to them.

The Cabinet is of opinion that small numbers of iron ordnance may be granted to such cities or towns in Great Britain and Ireland as have proper public places to put them in, and make application for them, and to this extent Lord Panmure craves Your Majesty's concurrence.

The four bells already appropriated are the two selected by your Majesty, and those of which Your Majesty was graciously pleased to sanction the appropriation by the late Lord Hardinge and Lord Panmure.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 17, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to submit for Your Majesty's approval the names of two officers for the third class of the Bath, which H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief has forwarded with a pressing recommendation. Lord Panmure would also humbly submit the name of Captain Gordon, who had the charge of the multifarious stores of the Army at Balaclava, as a candidate for the Civil C.B. Lord Panmure forwards Captain Gordon's own statement of his services, and Sir W. Codrington's letter in forwarding them, in order that Your Majesty may form a judgment on the case.

Recommendations for the Order of the Bath.

There is one more case, which Lord Panmure, after much consideration, thinks it right to lay before Your Majesty for consideration. It is that of Major-General Vivian. This officer has gained no rank by his service in the East. He was Major-General when appointed to the Turkish Contingent. This large force, consisting of 20,000, was of all arms. Major-General Vivian organised

and trained, and, by his prudent management, reconciled the Turk to the rule of his English officer. With his force he held Kertch, which he entrenched and fortified, and while senior officer in command, he had under him a body of Your Majesty's troops, as also of those of the Emperor of the French. His conduct in the responsible position which he held received, as it merited, the approbation of Your Majesty's Government, and Lord Panmure humbly submits that it will not only be conferring honour upon a meritorious officer, but likewise be a gracious compliment to the Turkish Contingent, if Your Majesty will consent to confer upon Major-General Vivian the second class of the Military Order of the Bath.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 19, 1857.*

The Queen sanctions the proposed addition to the Bath, but regrets that this distinction should have been conferred now in two instances where it has not been earned in the field, as it must lessen the value of the Order.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 19, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 17th with the quarterly returns.

Remarks on
Departmental
Returns.

She was glad to find them so much earlier this time, and quite approves the plan of the Barrack and Fortification Departments sending in their report, one month after the expiration of the quarter for the works at home, and one quarter later for those abroad; but she trusts that they will then be punctual. The Queen hopes that Enfield may soon be in a state to be able to turn out entire arms; would Lord Panmure let her know when this is expected?

In the return of small-arms in store, and ordnance stores generally, she thinks that it would be a great improvement if one column were added at the end, showing the comparative state with either the preceding quarter, or

the same quarter of the preceding year. This is done with the Revenue Returns of the Treasury, and affords important points of comparison. Perhaps it might be added also to the factory returns.

The Queen has perused the rough statement of the distribution of the Army Estimates. Does 'Land Forces,' for which five and a half million are set down, include the Militia? The Queen finds this force alluded to nowhere.

She thinks the clothing of the Army set down at too low a figure; it would not give more than £5 a man on the proposed strength of the Army, for which he can hardly be efficiently clad for a year. Are accoutrements included in this sum also? They are not referred to anywhere else. The Army has been so ill-clothed that it would be a pity to make the first estimate under the new arrangement so low as to make it impossible ever to improve; it will be easy to cut it down another year, if found possible, but very difficult to raise it hereafter.

The Queen sanctions Lord Panmure's proposal to give some of the small iron ordnance to different towns applying for them, and having room to contain them.

The bells might be distributed between the Tower of London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, and some of the bronze ordnance might be so distributed also; Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, and Dover Castle might also contain some. Perhaps Lord Panmure will have a list made out accordingly.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD PALMERSTON

WAR OFFICE, *January 19, 1857.*

I have done nothing in regard to Colonel Lefroy's appointment as Director of Education, in consequence of the Queen's observations upon it; and until some definite arrangement is arrived at on the whole of the difficult question of Army Education, I have left matters exactly as they stand at present. I am in communication with the Duke of Cambridge and Mr. Gleig upon the subject, and I hope to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to Her Majesty and such as can be defended in Parliament. I see

the reasonableness of giving the Commander-in-Chief a large measure of control over the officers who administer the system, and my only difficulty is to preserve a controlling power in the Executive Government, who must be responsible to Parliament for the money placed at their disposal for this important object.

With respect to the Hospital in Southampton Water, I must see you before I can carry into effect your instructions to stop all further progress—in fact, it will require very serious consideration, as such a step would involve us in great difficulties, as it would entail a rupture of all our extensive contracts, not to mention the reflections which it must cast on all concerned in the planning of those designs on which we are working.

Netley
Hospital.

Miss Nightingale's objections apply to the site as well as to the whole fabric. Now the site was selected after much consideration, and after inspection by Military and Medical Officers. The plans were prepared with great care, and, I think, not until we had sent our Officer abroad to see the best hospitals on the Continent. Of this, however, I will assure myself before we meet. Many of Miss Nightingale's suggestions in the report signed by herself and Dr. Sutherland can be carried out by alterations, but the total abandonment of the plan will, as I said before, be a most serious affair.

Reductions.

You may remember that the last decision of the Cabinet was to reduce seven thousand men of the Army below what I was prepared to submit to Parliament as the establishment for the ensuing year, and, before that is reversed, I think that we had better discuss the question again on our first meeting. I will give the Commander-in-Chief a hint not to carry on his discharges till he hears from me again, but as the Estimates are all prepared on the lower Establishment, and as I have already officially announced to him the strength of the Army for 1857-58, if any increase is to be made it must be done without delay.

I may inform you that four regiments of Infantry and two of Cavalry are under orders for India. Two of the Infantry regiments are for reliefs, which in emergency can

be left in India for another year, and the other two to replace that number of regiments which we abstained from sending out during the war. The Cavalry regiments (700 sabres each) are for relief also, and the regiments coming home may also be detained should the war with Persia render this necessary.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 20, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty. He has signified to Sir J. Burgoyne Your Majesty's approval of the future arrangement for forwarding the Quarterly Reports of Fortifications and Barracks at home and abroad, and impressed on him Your Majesty's expectation of punctuality.

To Your Majesty's question as to the time when Enfield will turn out complete arms, Lord Panmure will send Your Majesty an answer from Lieutenant-Colonel Dixon, who is down at Enfield, and who has been desired to furnish the requisite information.

The comparative columns required by Your Majesty in the returns from Enfield and the Arsenal have been ordered. The same system may hereafter be adopted with respect to stores, but at present they are too scattered.

In reference to Your Majesty's remarks upon the Land Force Vote, Lord Panmure has the honour to inform Your Majesty that this vote only includes the Militia when in an embodied state and under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. In its disembodied state, the Militia forms the subject of a distinct estimate, which is generally submitted later in the session.

In reply to Your Majesty's observation on the clothing rate, Lord Panmure thinks he can best answer them by asking Your Majesty to look at the enclosed paper, which is the estimate prepared in the Clothing Department, and shows precisely the manner in which the whole sum is distributed. The accoutrements are provided for in the vote for *stores*.

*Clothing of the
Army.*

Lord Panmure can confidently assure Your Majesty, in the first place, that no restrictions have been placed on the Clothing Department in framing their estimate, and that Your Majesty's Army will appear a very different body in the clothing which this estimate is calculated to provide than they have hitherto done. The sum voted in 1853-54 was, for 114,395 men, £302,787, giving an average of £2, 13s. a man. The present vote gives an average of nearly £5 a man. . . .

Distribution
of trophies.

With reference to the distribution of the remaining trophies, Lord Panmure regrets to say that the remaining bells are small and, some of them, a good deal bruised, and would answer no useful purpose anywhere except to exhibit as curiosities. As Your Majesty suggests, the Armoury at the Tower, that at Edinburgh Castle, and some similar military depôt at Dublin will be the fittest places for them. Lord Panmure will duly attend to Your Majesty's views as to the brass ordnance, and have lists made out for their distribution to the different forts of importance.

As it will be necessary to fix the establishment of the War Office for 1857 at the next Council, Lord Panmure transmits it to Your Majesty, with some observations on a separate sheet, in order to obtain Your Majesty's approval.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 20, 1857.

Proposed
establishment
of the War
Office for
ensuing year.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to submit for Your Majesty's approval the proposed establishment of the War Office for 1857.

The financial arrangements have received the sanction of the Treasury, and, on receiving that of Your Majesty, will be finally submitted for Your Majesty's approval in an Order in Council.

There are two alterations in the list now submitted. The officer denominated in the former list as 'Comptroller of Army Finance,' and on whom the duties of the Deputy

Secretary at War will fall, is now proposed to be called Assistant Under-Secretary, for which there is a precedent in the Colonial Office, and under which appellation he may, in case of the absence from sickness or necessity, do the duties temporarily of an Under-Secretary of State.

The other alteration consists in the omission of a 'Director-General of Education.'

In compliance with and submission to Your Majesty's views on this important subject, Lord Panmure leaves this appointment open until the question is more ripe and the future system of education both of the officers and non-commissioned officers and men is finally resolved upon. In the meantime the Chaplain-General remains, as he always has been, Inspector-General of Schools.

Lord Panmure cannot conceal from Your Majesty that it will be no easy task to invent a scheme in which the responsibility of the Secretary of State, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and the civil and military elements of education and examination shall be harmoniously blended. It is to be hoped that the difficulties will disappear soon, and Lord Panmure will take care to have a margin in the vote for Education and Science in the Estimates which shall leave no financial difficulty in the way.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR OFFICE, 1857

	Salary
Secretary of State,	£5000
Under-Secretary of State,	2000
do.,	1500
Assistant Under-Secretary,	1500
Secretary for Military Correspondence,	1000
Chief Clerk,	1200
Private Secretary to Secretary of State,	300
2 Private Secretaries to Under-Secretary of State, each £150,	300
Inspector-General of Fortifications,	1500
and two Deputy do., each at £800,	1600
2 Assistant do., each at £500,	1000
Director-General of Artillery,	1000

	Salary
Director-General of Army Medical Department, .	£1200
Military Superintendent of Pensions,	1000
Assistant do. do.,	300
Chaplain-General and Director of Schools, . . .	950
Director of Stores and Clothing,	1200
Assistant do. do.,	800
Director of Contracts,	1500
„ Commissariat,	1200
Accountant-General,	1200
with a personal allowance of	300
Solicitor,	1200
Examiner, First Clerk, £800 to £1000, increasing £25 per annum.	
15 Clerks, 1st Class, 1st Section, £670 to £800, increasing £20 per annum.	
33 Clerks, 1st Class, 2nd Section, £520 to £650, increasing £20 per annum.	
78 Clerks, 2nd Class, £315 to £500, increasing £15 per annum.	
217 Clerks, 3rd Class, £100 to £300, increasing £10 per annum.	
Surveyor, £450 to £600, increasing £20 per annum.	
Deputy Surveyor, £250 to £350, increasing £10 per annum.	
Two Draughtsmen	1, £400 to £500, increasing £20 per annum.
	1, £250 to £400, increasing £20 per annum.
Compiler of Statistics, £220 to £300, increasing £10 per annum.	
Office-Keeper, £150, and after 6 years' service, £200.	
Housekeeper, £200.	
13 Messengers, 1st Class, £100 to £120, increasing £5 per annum.	
13 Messengers, 2nd Class, £90 to £100, increasing £2, 10s. per annum.	
13 Messengers, 3rd Class, £80 to £90, increasing £2, 10s. per annum.	
5 Queen's Messengers.	

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 21, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's communication of yesterday. She returns the Report of the Clothing Department, which has quite satisfied her. The Queen has looked over the proposed establishment of the War Department, which appears to her a great improvement upon that of 1855 and 1856. She has not yet signed it, as she wishes to remark that the title 'Military Secretary' for the new office is likely to lead to confusion, as there is already an officer generally known by that designation in the Commander-in-Chief's office, and it may also mislead the public to believe that there are two officers appointed to do the same work. Perhaps the designation 'Secretary for Military Correspondence,'¹ or one like that, might be substituted.

The Queen returns the paper with the view of Lord Panmure making the alteration which he thinks best.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 22, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter. War Department affairs.

Lord Panmure admits at once the justice of Your Majesty's remarks upon the title of 'Military Secretary,' and adopts that suggested by Your Majesty as a great improvement.

Lord Panmure is informed by Lieut.-Colonel Dixon that his machinery is now nearly complete for all parts of the new arm of pattern 1853, and he relies confidently upon presenting finished arms by the 1st February.

At the meeting of the Cabinet yesterday it was resolved to suspend for the present the reduction of regiments of the Line, except where invalids and extreme cases of lost character may be found. . . .

¹ This was adopted.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 31, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty the quarterly returns of the Fortifications and Barrack Branch of the War Department.

Lord Panmure has given Lord Palmerston a paper showing the comparative strength of the Army in the years 1853-54, and that proposed for 1857-58. Also a statement of the expenditure for military purposes in the latter year. These papers will be communicated to Your Majesty by Lord Palmerston; they do not include the force in India, which consists of 24 regiments of 1000 rank and file each, 4 regiments of Cavalry of 700, all ranks, each.

Appointment
of a Secretary
for Military Cor-
respondence.

Your Majesty having approved of the new establishment of the War Office, it will be finally submitted to Your Majesty in Council on Monday. In that establishment Your Majesty has sanctioned a Secretary for Military Correspondence, and Lord Panmure, having consulted with Lord Palmerston, humbly submits the name of Sir Henry Storks as the officer best qualified for this responsible position. The manner in which Sir Henry Storks discharged his duties at Scutari, where he exhibited, not only capacity for command, but power of administration of no ordinary character, justifies Lord Panmure in selecting him for this office.

Despatch of
troops to
Hong-Kong.

The Cabinet came to the resolution to-day of sending orders to the Governor-General of India to despatch a regiment of British troops to Hong-Kong from such part of India as it can be most conveniently spared. This will render necessary the immediate departure for India of two regiments of the force destined for that country, and Lord Panmure has communicated with His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject. A ship has been taken up to convey munitions of war to Hong-Kong and the fleets before Canton, and it is proposed to send in her a small reinforcement of Artillery-men.

CHAPTER XXVI

FEBRUARY 1857

THE most important letters of this month refer to Military Education. 'The great question to be decided,' writes Lord Panmure (February 15th), 'in establishing a Board of Education which shall arrange and conduct the examination of youths who are candidates for commissions in all arms of Your Majesty's service, and shall also superintend the education of officers after they have obtained commissions, is to whom is that Board to be directly responsible: the Civil Department presided over by one of Your Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, or the Military Department of the Commander-in-Chief?' And he proceeds to give his reason for deciding in favour of the former of these two alternatives by stating that, 'The Horse Guards cannot be an office of account. . . . So long as it continues to be, which it now is, strictly a department of military administration and discipline, Your Majesty's authority may be maintained there, and all attempts to overthrow it be resisted; but, let Parliament once find that the Commander-in-Chief becomes the responsible administrator of funds voted by it, they will soon discover grounds for interference with his duties which it will be hard to resist.' At the same time, Lord Panmure proposes the separation of the offices of Chaplain-General and Inspector-General of Schools, which were then both held by the Rev. A. Gleig. He had also wished to place the education of officers and the elementary schools for the men of the Army under one Board or Department; but this latter wish he was led to abandon.

It was obvious that the reductions now being carried out in the Army—of which the method is detailed, February 13th—would give rise to a temporary slackness in recruiting, and hence it was decided by Lord Panmure, in conjunction with the Duke of Cambridge, to investigate the subject of recruiting, 'with a view to taking advantage of the new dépôt system and the permanent staff of the Militia for supplying the casualties of the Army.' There was likewise a proposal for a Royal Commission to inquire into the Medical Department of the Army; whilst, in reference to recommendations for the Victoria Cross, the Queen laid down the principle that decisions as to its award belong solely and entirely to the discretion of the Crown.

The reduction of the Army Estimates, and changes in the distribution of troops, are among the remaining details of Army administration discussed in the month's correspondence. A letter from Sir John Burgoyne gives the late C. E.'s view of the character of Prince Gortschakoff together with some strictures upon British public opinion as brought to bear upon military matters. Suggested alterations in the plans of Netley Hospital, and Italian legionaries in the Argentine Republic are also alluded to.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., *February 4, 1857.*

Embarkation
of British and
French troops
from the
Piræus.

The French ships will be at the Piræus, to bring away the French troops, about the 15th inst., and I have asked Wood to telegraph to Lyons to send conveyance there for our force¹—the two should embark at the same time, which time should be decided by the English and French Ministers at Athens.

¹ That is, the force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lockyer, with which Great Britain, jointly with France, had occupied the Piræus in May 1854. The occupation had been decided upon as a safeguard against the intrigues of King Otho, the sympathies of the Greeks—Court, Government, and people—being known to be with Russia.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., February 5, 1857.

Charles Wood has reported to me the result of his visit to you yesterday. It is grievous to have to reduce our Estimates still further, but necessity knows no law, neither will it listen to reason, and it is quite evident from what passed in House of Commons on Tuesday, and from what we gather from private communication with friends, that an aggregate of twenty-one million for Army and Navy is the very utmost we can hope to be able to provide for out of the revenue which we are likely to get. Charles Wood has squeezed £250,000 out of his estimate, and we must try to get the other £350,000 out of the Army. These further reductions must, of course, be settled in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, with whom it is desirable that we should have a meeting at your office to-morrow; but it would be useful that you and I and Charles Wood should meet this afternoon, or this evening, to talk the matter over. . . .

I continue to feel very anxious on the subject of Netley Hospital. My strong impression is that, if completed on the present plan, it will be a charnel-house instead of a sanatorium. All medical men conversant with hospitals will tell you that there are certain conditions indispensable for the cure of patients—sunlight, free ventilation by outward air to carry off those exhalations which are constantly poured out from the lungs and the skin of patients, and means to prevent the bad atmosphere of one ward from pouring into another. These conditions are wanting in the present plan for Netley; the wards will have no sunlight, there will be no means for thorough draft, and shaft ventilation is a poor substitute for it—better than nothing when applied to existing buildings, but not at all fit to be adopted by preference in a building the construction of which is at our choice, which is to be raised from the ground on a spot where we have no existing buildings to limit our arrangements, or to interfere with our discretion. For my part, I would rather pay for throwing into

Netley
Hospital.

Southampton Water every brick and stone that has now been laid than be a party to completing a building which would be likely to send thousands upon thousands to a premature grave. Pray stop all further proceedings about this hospital till we have had an opportunity of well examining and well considering the plan.¹

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE²

February 12, 1857.

I have read with attention Your Royal Highness' memo., and I entirely concur in the proposals therein set forth. The only thing which strikes me is that we have rather a small proportion of troops at home for some little time.

I see that you state that there are thirty-seven regiments at home at present; of these ten are under orders, leaving twenty-seven for home service. Your Royal Highness takes credit for only six returning, making thirty-three for future home service.

Have you not omitted two regiments from India, one from Hong-Kong, and two from Australia?

I think after the Germans are settled we may surely spare a regiment at the Cape, but that will depend on the nerves of the Governor.

Distribution
of regiments.

I have no objection to the moves taking place in the Mediterranean as soon as your Royal Highness pleases, and indeed the sooner the better. The 31st might go to Gibraltar, and the other two regiments from Malta. If you will cause the necessary communication to be made, I will write to the Admiralty, and instead of employing their men-of-war which they want to pay off, we might send two large transports to effect the changes in the Mediterranean, and finally bring the two regiments home from Gibraltar.

¹ It proved to be too late to stop building the hospital on the plan which had been already approved; but some time later, when out of office, Palmerston visited Netley and professed himself satisfied that the plans, after all, were good.

² Reply to a letter of February 11th, covering a memorandum on changes in the distribution of troops to be adopted in consequence of the proposed reductions in the Army.

I should like to have a copy of the paper which I now return. I think it would be well that your Royal Highness should send me a detailed statement of the distribution of the different corps at present, and the members of Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, and Infantry at each separate station. These will enable me to prepare a statement in case I am attacked by any one for neglect of our defences.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 13, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that he proposes, with Your Majesty's sanction, to transfer the superintendence of the Regimental and Garrison Schools of the Army from the Chaplain-General to Lieut.-Colonel Lefroy, without any change in the regulations in the administration of this branch of the War Department, which have existed since the first establishment of these schools. Lord Panmure proposes to leave with the Chaplain-General the supervision of the Garrison and Regimental libraries for the non-commissioned officers and men as heretofore. The above arrangements will greatly facilitate the disposal of business in the War Office, and enable Lord Panmure to give a wider scope to the services of Sir Henry Storks, which have already developed themselves in a very satisfactory manner.

Transfer of
superintend-
ence of Regi-
mental and
Garrison
Schools.

The subject of recruiting for the Army has engaged the attention both of H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief and Lord Panmure, and it is proposed to investigate this important question with a view to submit to Your Majesty a plan whereby, to a very considerable extent, advantage may be taken, not only of the new dépôt system, but likewise of the permanent staff of the Militia for the purpose of supplying the casualties of the Army.

The present appears to be a most convenient season considering this question, as there will be a lull in the recruiting service during the ensuing year, arising from the

decision at which the Government, with the concurrence of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, have arrived, of allowing the Army to fall down to its future effective state by gradually absorbing men now in the service as vacancies occur, rather than by a sweeping discharge at once down to the numbers to be voted in the Army Estimates.

As to
'casualties'
occurring in the
Army, and
means of pro-
viding for them.

The casualties are stated to average 12,000 in the year, but as care has been taken to discharge all men of delicate constitution, of bad character, of short service, as well as to let as many retire as wish to do so, and as far as this can be done consistently with the good of the service, Lord Panmure does not anticipate anything like the usual amount of casualties, and has agreed with the Commander-in-Chief that on the 1st April the Army shall start 5500 men above the numbers voted, so that he anticipates that it will be generally effective during the year.

Proposed Royal
Commission to
inquire into
Army Medical
Department.

Lord Panmure proposes further, with Your Majesty's sanction, to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the 'Medical Department' of the Army, with a view to placing the system on a wholesome footing, and to investigate into the various complaints made by the medical officers of the Army of the inadequacy of their pay, status, and retiring allowance.

The terms of and instructions to this Commission will have to be carefully considered in common with the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the composition of the Commission itself. All these preliminary matters will be submitted for Your Majesty's approval before the formal proposal is laid before Your Majesty.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 14, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday.

Medical
Department.
Education in
the Army.

She approves the plan of forming a Commission to look into the position of the Medical Department of the Army, and also the proposal of inquiring into the recruiting

system. With regard to Colonel Lefroy's¹ appointment, she must remind Lord Panmure that she has not yet received his views on the education in the Army generally. When the question was last discussed at Windsor, it was left undecided, and as Lord Panmure then argued that the education of the officers could not be separated from that of the men, and the Queen objected to the former being made over to the Civil Department, she thinks that she ought not to sanction the appointment of Colonel Lefroy without that point being previously arranged, and also the title being submitted to her which the proposed new officer is to bear. She has already, on a former occasion, objected to that of 'Director-General of Education,' as conveying with it an implied decision upon the point under consideration.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 15, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward for Your Majesty's consideration the list of officers and men of the Navy and Marines, and of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Army, who have been selected by the Lords of the Admiralty and His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief for the Victoria Cross.

Submitting lists
of candidates
for the Victoria
Cross.

The list for the Army is incomplete, but as it will take some time to receive the names from the regiments abroad, both His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Panmure think that it is better at once to proceed with this first list.

As soon as Your Majesty has considered the two lists, Lord Panmure will submit them formally for Your Majesty's approval.

The Crosses are prepared, and it is proposed to gazette the names as in the case of the Bath, and to lay the lists before Parliament, attaching to the name of each member

¹ Whom it was proposed to appoint as Inspector-General of Schools in succession to Rev. A. Gleig.

of the Order the services by which he has gained the honour.

Your Majesty will no doubt be graciously pleased to decide in what manner the members are to be decorated.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February [15], 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of the 14th inst.

Lord Panmure fears that he has imperfectly stated to Your Majesty the object which he has in view in desiring to have Colonel Lefroy's assistance in the management of the Army schools.

Lord Panmure can assure Your Majesty that what he proposes at present is simply a transfer of the superintendence of the garrison and regimental schools of the Army from one person in his office to another, and in no way determines the most important question of the education of the officers of the Army now under consideration.

At present Mr. Gleig holds the double appointment of Chaplain-General and Inspector-General of Schools, and . . . since Mr. Gleig's appointment as Chaplain, the duties of that department are greatly increased, and, with the supervision of the military libraries, will form enough for one person to attend to properly.

As to appointment of Colonel Lefroy to be Inspector-General of Army Schools.

It is on the ground, therefore, of the efficiency of this particular service that Lord Panmure has humbly advised Your Majesty to sanction a separation of the two appointments, without instituting a new office, or creating a new title, or incurring additional expense, as Colonel Lefroy's situation of a First Clerk will not be filled up on his becoming 'Inspector-General of Schools.'

Lord Panmure admits that Your Majesty takes most reasonable ground for doubting the expediency of accepting his advice, and he humbly craves Your Majesty's forgiveness for venturing to make any observations on the general question.

Your Majesty states most correctly that Lord Panmure has not yet submitted his views on the subject of Education in the Army generally, and the reason is that, upon discussing this important question at Windsor with H.R.H. the Prince, Lord Panmure found that his views unhappily differed from those likely to be entertained by Your Majesty on some very material points.

As to education
in the Army.

He likewise found that H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief was in full possession of Your Majesty's sentiments, and he has been endeavouring to strike out some middle course whereby the subordinate department of schools may be conducted distinct from the superior department of the education of officers both for and in the Army.

So far Lord Panmure is anxious to meet Your Majesty's views, and the more so as, if it should hereafter turn out that the body which is to be created for conducting the superior can also take charge of the inferior department of education, Lieut.-Colonel Lefroy can, as an officer of Artillery, be easily disposed of, and the union achieved.

The great question to be decided in establishing a Board of Education, which shall arrange and conduct the examination of youths who are candidates for commissions in all arms of Your Majesty's service, and shall also superintend the education of officers after they have obtained commissions, is: to whom is that Board to be directly responsible—the Civil Department presided over by one of Your Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, or the Military Department of the Commander-in-Chief?

The estab-
lishment of a
Board of
Education.

Your Majesty is of opinion that the Commander-in-Chief is proper head of such an establishment, and that it should form a part of his office and move directly under his control and by his orders. The Commander-in-Chief coincides with Your Majesty.

Reason against
placing the
Board of Edu-
cation under
control of the
Commander-
in-Chief.

Lord Panmure can assure Your Majesty that he has no personal interest in this matter, but seeks only to see it placed on such a footing as shall, on the one hand, secure Your Majesty's authority over the Army, and, on the other, receive the sanction of Parliament.

At first it may not be a very heavy charge on the

public finances, however the system may be initiated, but hereafter it will become more so.

The Horse Guards cannot be an office of account, as Parliament has on all occasions strictly guarded against such an event.

So long as it continues to be, which it now is, strictly a department of military administration and discipline, Your Majesty's authority may be maintained there, and all attempts to overthrow it may be resisted, but let Parliament once find that the Commander-in-Chief becomes the responsible administrator of funds voted by it, they will soon discover grounds for interference with his duties, which it will be hard to resist.

As to the
question of
education of
Army officers.

These are some of the difficulties which deter Lord Panmure from adopting Your Majesty's views. But he thinks some middle course may be taken, and for this purpose surrenders his original wish to manage the education of the officers and the Elementary Schools for the men of the Army by one board or department, and proposes that the charge of the schools should remain where it is, with the simple change of its local head.

Whenever Lord Panmure can, in concert with H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, adopt such a course as his colleagues will accede to, and he thinks Your Majesty can agree to sanction, he will take the liberty of again addressing Your Majesty on the subject.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 17, 1857.*

Conditions of
award of
Victoria Cross.

The Queen returns to Lord Panmure the recommendations for the 'Victoria Cross,' which she has most carefully gone over. The selections appear to her very well made and with a due regard not to make the distinction too common, and not to recognise the mere performance of duty to the satisfaction of superiors, but solely volunteer acts.

There is only one case which the Queen thinks had better be omitted, viz. : Private P. M'Gwire of the 33rd.

His deed, although publicly praised and rewarded by Lord Raglan, was one of very doubtful morality, and if pointed out by the Sovereign as praiseworthy, may lead to the cruel and inhumane practice of never making prisoners, but always putting to death those who may be overpowered, for fear of their rising upon their captors.

The Queen would wish the first notice of these rewards to be in the *Gazette*, and to have the explanations of the grounds upon which they are granted appended to each case as is done in the list submitted to her. To make such a report to Parliament by laying it on the table of the House would look like an appeal to its decision in a matter which clearly belongs solely and entirely to the discretion of the Crown.

The Queen would wish to confer this distinction in person on all those who are to receive it, but not till later in the season.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 17, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday. His explanations have quite satisfied her, and she accordingly sanctions Lieut.-Colonel Lefroy's appointment as Inspector-General of Schools on the footing explained by Lord Panmure. With regard to the larger question the Queen quite understands the view which strikes Lord Panmure; but she thinks that there is nothing in the intellectual training of the officers of the Army which takes it out of the general subject of military administration, and makes it especially a financial question. There is no more expense connected with it than with any other detail of the service, and it is not intended by the Queen to remove the education from the general supervision of the Secretary of State, which would be as complete in this respect as in regard to any other military matter, but to avoid breaking the unity of the command and taking out this important part of military training from the cognisance of the Commander-in-Chief, and thereby weakening,

Intellectual
training of
Army officers.

if we altogether destroy his authority and influence over his officers.

The ~~Lord~~ Lord Pammure will not delay a decision in this point as if Parliament were to take up the matter, finding the Government without a fixed plan or even a settled opinion, great mischief may arise.

LORD PAMMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 17, 1857.

ms. A.
B.1.1.

Lord Pammure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and thanks Your Majesty for your gracious letter which he has just received. Lord Pammure has had a long conversation with H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief this morning, and is happy to inform Your Majesty that the question of officers' education is assuming a clearer aspect. Sir Charles Yorke and Sir Henry Storks are to meet immediately and reduce to distinct propositions the basis of a system, and Lord Pammure will take such steps as he thinks will be effectual in preventing the question being stirred in Parliament.

GENERAL SIR JOHN BURGESS TO LORD PAMMURE

Confidential.

January 17, 1857.

I beg to return the extracts from the despatch of H.M. Consul-General at Warsaw, dated 1st November 1856, detailing remarks by Prince Gortschakoff on the Crimean campaign.

ms. A.
B.1.1.

I take quite a different view of those remarks from the impression made by them on General Mansfield. I consider them neither candid nor just; but, at the same time, precisely what I should have expected from the opinion which I had formed of the character of the Prince from some slight intercourse with him, when he was in England.

¹ This was finally settled by a compromise to the effect that the Department should be under the Commander-in-Chief, but subject to the general control of the Secretary of State.

a few years ago, when he appeared to me to be a man of experience, ability, and superior military knowledge, but, with a show of candour and almost bluntness of manner, to have adopted, apparently on system, a course of communication with others that should obtain the most useful information while imparting the least.

If the Allies lost opportunities, as so freely adverted to by him, the Russians under a similar scrutinising spirit will be found to have done so too; for where there are so many ways of acting, as in a campaign, it is usually not difficult to show subsequently, with a full knowledge *then* of every circumstance of both Armies, how proceedings might have been better conducted, but even then frequently with injustice.

It is only in England that no allowances are made, and the worst construction is put upon every act of its own officers; and this, readily adopted by enemies and rivals, causes the military reputation of the country to suffer very unduly. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 18, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that he has, with concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, removed the name of Private P. M'Gwire, 33rd Regiment, from the list.

It was Lord Panmure's intention, after gazetting the names, to present the list to Parliament by Your Majesty's commands, but he will take the course indicated by Your Majesty.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 27, 1857.

The Queen wishes me to acknowledge the receipt of the Army Estimates, which appear to her to be prepared with great care and lucidity. The comparison with the two Estimates of last year cannot but act beneficially, as

The Army
Estimates.

showing that reductions have been made, and that the present Estimates cannot be called War Estimates.

The Queen observes, in the list of items showing the sums passed to the credit of the Exchequer, the sum of £13,836 for lands and buildings *sold*. She does not remember any of the cases to have come before her, as Paragraph 6 of the memorandum of 1855 prescribes. As former Governments in times of reduction and money difficulty have swelled the income by making sales which at a later period were found to have been improvident and prejudicial to the country, this paragraph was to give security against their recurrence; the Queen therefore thinks it her duty to lay particular stress upon its rigorous maintenance.

Plumes for
Fusilier and
Light Infantry
regiments.

I am also to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum on the plumes for the Fusilier and Light Infantry regiments. The Queen would be sorry to make any alteration in the memorandum of 1855, in which Paragraph 5 quite protects the Secretary of State, but she certainly thinks it most useful that the Commander-in-Chief should practically act as you suggest.¹ A verbal notice to the Duke of Cambridge may, however, suffice, whom we have since seen, and who admits the propriety of this course, and thought to have followed it even in the present instance, as he had had communication with Sir Thomas Trowbridge, the proper officer, who ought to have communicated with you. As to the plume itself, your estimate must surely be too high. If it were to extend to 12,000 men, about the number of the Fusiliers, etc., the cost would on that estimate be 1s. for each plume, which I think is more than the difference between it and the present ball can possibly be; and if the plume can be made to last four years, like those of the Cavalry, the expense would be reduced to so trifling an amount that the Queen feels sure that you would not make any objection to restore a mark of distinction to these regiments whose pride is very much (and properly so) bound up with their distinctive character.

¹ A good deal of disagreeableness had arisen from the habit of the Commander-in-Chief of submitting such things as these to the Crown without consulting the Secretary of State.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

February 28, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Royal Highness' letter of yesterday, and I am glad to find that the Estimates are so drawn up as to meet the Queen's approval. I have looked into the point which attracted Her Majesty's attention, and have ascertained that the transactions were entered into mostly before the memorandum took effect, and though the sum appears large, it is composed of a great many items, which I have ordered to be taken out for the information of the Queen. I never was more satisfied of the wisdom of keeping a vigilant eye on the disposal of public lands and buildings than at present. The battle between parsimony and patriotic economy has commenced, and as soon as we get into Committee of Supply, your Royal Highness will fully comprehend its bearings. I hope we shall be able to convince the House of Commons of what is due to the honour of the country, but in the excitement which at present prevails it is impossible to foretell what that assembly may do.

'The battle
between parsimony and
patriotic
economy.'

I quite subscribe to Her Majesty's view as to the non-retention of Paragraph 5, and I will write a note to the Duke of Cambridge in the sense of your Royal Highness' suggestions.

I can assure your Royal Highness that in all things concerning the Army I am anxious to meet the Queen's views, and in the case of the plumes or any other I will study to do so, if I can find the 'means.' By making the plumes last for four years, the cost will be reduced, and £300 a year will cover the whole £13,000.

Since I commenced this letter I have received the enclosed return, which will fully, and I think satisfactorily, explain to the Queen and your Royal Highness the nature of the sale of lands and buildings.

CHAPTER XXVII

MARCH 1857

THE letters of this month are chiefly occupied with the military expedition to China.

The Commander-in-Chief recommends the immediate despatch of troops to reinforce the 'distant and hard-pressed colony of Hong-Kong,' urging that four regiments then under orders for India be sent out forthwith. This was agreed to. The composition of the force to be sent out is given in Lord Panmure's letter of March 8th. The command of the expedition had been declined by Sir Colin Campbell, and the authorities having reluctantly decided that Sir John Pennefather was too aged and infirm to be charged with it, it was entrusted to Major-General the Hon. Thomas Ashburnham. The Duke of Cambridge expresses himself as highly pleased with his inspection of the expeditionary force, and of the troop-ship in which it was to sail, but regrets that no Native troops are to take part in the expedition. Also, the Persian war having been brought to a successful termination, he suggests the sending on to China of one of the Brigades then at Bushire, and recommends the granting of an increased, or 'Indian,' allowance to troops bound for China. At the same time he insists on the necessity of increasing the Queen's troops in India.

In reference to Military Education, which is again under discussion, Lord Panmure suggests that the Commander-in-Chief be nominal head of the Board or Council,

and assures the Queen, who had expressed her interest in the subject, that, in future, certain qualifications will be insisted on in officers appointed to staff employment, and that examinations for first commissions will be made more stringent than heretofore. For the rest, the Duke urges that despatches of a decidedly military character, and in which any portion of Her Majesty's troops are concerned, be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief; whilst Lord Panmure, in his turn, remonstrates on the inconvenience arising from changes in the personnel of Engineer officers placed in charge of specific works.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 1, 1857.

I have received your letter of yesterday. The Queen is very much satisfied with the manner in which you settled the question of the plumes and express yourself about the sales of lands and buildings.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, March 5, 1857.

I have been thinking a great deal of the state of affairs in Hong-Kong since I saw you this morning, and it occurs to me that *no time should be lost* in sending reinforcements to that distant and hard-pressed colony. We have four regiments of Infantry ready to embark at once for India. Why not send them out *at once*? No additional expense will thereby be incurred to the public, as to India they must go within a very short period. It is a favourable period of the year, I believe, to make the long passage out, so do not let this necessary measure be delayed. If not required in China, direct them to India, to be there disembarked to replace other troops to come home. The matter is one of so much importance that I cannot remain silent on the subject.

Urges sending
troops to Hong-
Kong.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 8, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that the Cabinet finally resolved to send to China the four regiments at present under orders for India. Should the crisis in China have passed away, and affairs have assumed a more amicable condition, these regiments will go on to their respective destinations, and the military arrangements for your Majesty's troops will not be disturbed.

Composition of
force to be sent
to Hong-Kong,
and arrange-
ments for its
despatch.

It is proposed with Your Majesty's sanction to give Sir John Pennefather charge of the expedition, which will consist of four regiments of rank and file, 1000 strong, organised in twelve companies per regiment. These, in addition to the 5th and 59th Regiments, which they will find at Hong-Kong, will form a force of about 5000. To this body of Infantry it is proposed to add four companies of Artillery, and one of Sappers, with two dismounted troops of the Military train, and 200 Medical Staff Corps. These troops will form a Division, and be further divided into two Brigades, under the command of two of the best Brigadiers that can be selected, whose names will be submitted for Your Majesty's approval by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

It is proposed to despatch the first two regiments in a week, in the *Himalaya* and *Transit* troop-ships, which have been commissioned for the purpose, and in two or three weeks Lord Panmure hopes to have the whole Division on its way to China.

No horses will be sent, as the country is not adapted for their use, and any that are absolutely necessary will have to be brought from India.

On receiving Your Majesty's approval of the selection of Sir J. Pennefather, Lord Panmure will communicate officially with the Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile all the various, but very important, preparations are proceeding, viz. : Medical department, commissariat stores, etc., etc. In all branches of the force Your Majesty shall be

furnished with the most full and minute details. Lord Panmure intends to make such arrangements as will enable the troops to live as much as possible on board ship while in the Chinese waters, as every one concurs this will be the most ready means of avoiding sickness, so prevalent in hot seasons.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *March 8, 1857.*

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's letter of this day's date, with the proposal for the expedition to China, which she highly approves in all its details, and is rejoiced to see that it is being executed in all its details according to the new arrangements, which she thinks most essential.

Proposed
expedition
to China.

The Queen only hopes Sir J. Pennefather's health will be good enough for this undertaking.¹

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 9, 1857.*

. . . I don't know whether or not you have again heard from Colin Campbell. I was told yesterday that he was almost sorry he had not consented to go out, and that he was coming to see me about it, but he did not call. I cannot help thinking that, if a little pressure were put upon him, he would accept the post, and depend upon it he would be the best man to go. His very name would carry weight with it, both at home and abroad, and people would know that we were in earnest. Pennefather is an excellent man, a most gallant soldier, but I am sadly afraid of his health giving way. . . .

As to Sir Colin
Campbell going
to China.

I suppose you will take care in your despatches to India to give directions that any force sent to China from India (should such force have been sent meanwhile) must

The expedition
to China.

¹ This hope not being realised, the command was given to General Ashburnham.

be subordinate to the command of the officer going out direct from home. This is important, to avoid any slackening of authority from taking place.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 12, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the Cabinet, on reconsideration of the appointment of Sir John Pennefather to command the expedition to China, partake so much of Your Majesty's suspicion that his health is insufficient for so serious an employment that they have resolved not to call upon him for his services.

Substitutes
General
Ashburnham
for General
Pennefather as
proposed Com-
mander of
expedition to
China.

Lord Panmure therefore has the honour to submit to Your Majesty the name of Major-General the Hon. Thomas Ashburnham as an officer every way qualified by experience in the field in India, and likewise by his habits of command of a Division in quarters and cantonments, as the best officer to be employed in command of the troops about to assemble in China.

Lord Panmure has ascertained through a private source that General Ashburnham feels quite able for this or any other service, and the possession of many qualities which officers are sometimes deficient in renders him peculiarly fit to act with and under a Civil High Commissioner.

On receiving Your Majesty's sanction, Lord Panmure will communicate officially with H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 17, 1857.*

As to Native
troops accom-
panying
expedition to
China.

. . . From all I can gather from various quarters, there seems but one feeling of regret, that no Native troops are to form a portion of the China expedition. They say that certain duties must be performed by natives, which cannot be done by Europeans. I only tell you what I hear, and I think it right that you should know it.

I do not at all like the accounts from China I have just read in the newspapers. The colony of Hong-Kong wants immediate assistance. Would it not, after all, be possible to send off to China one of the Brigades at present at Bushire? Transports are ready at once to take them up, and Generals Ashburnham and Garrett could proceed at once to take charge of these troops, whilst the remainder of the expedition goes by long sea, and does not arrive till the operations can be commenced. I think it is well worthy the serious consideration of the Government, for if Hong-Kong or Singapore were to be hard pressed for want of troops, it would be very awkward. As regards the question of allowance, I cannot but think that, after all, you will have to give the troops increased if not Indian allowances. I hear, during the late war in China, a subaltern officer could not live for less than twelve shillings a-day, whereas his pay and allowances combined, as now intended, do not amount to more than 6s. 9d. This appears to me a rather hard case, and as all the four regiments going out are destined ultimately for India, I cannot help thinking that the correct thing to be done would be to let them have the Indian allowances during the period of war in China.

Details as to
China expedi-
tion.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

March 18, 1857.

You promised to send me the military despatches received from China, but I have not seen them, nor have I seen anything from the Persian Gulf, though you said you would speak to Vernon Smith on the subject. I cannot help bringing to your notice that I think it would be most desirable to make it the rule that all despatches of a decidedly military character, and in which any portion of Her Majesty's troops are concerned, should be communicated to the Commander-in-Chief. It can hardly be thought right that the only information the Commander-in-Chief at present obtains on these matters is either by private letters or by the public journals.

Urges that
despatches of
a military
character be
communicated
to the Com-
mander-in-
Chief.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 19, 1857.*

Termination
of Persian
expedition.

I return you the papers on Persia with many thanks, and am glad that you entirely agree with my view that the Commander-in-Chief should see all military despatches in cases in which the Queen's troops are concerned. The papers themselves are most interesting, and contain information which would undoubtedly have proved of great importance had the war lasted. It is quite clear that the force at present at Bushire would not have been of sufficient strength to have undertaken any permanently forward movement.

LORD PANMURE TO DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

March 20, 1857.

Remonstrates
on the incon-
venience caused
by a change in
the personnel
of Royal En-
gineer officers
charged with
specific works.

Inconveniences have occurred in the changes of Engineer officers in charge of works, and it is much to be desired that these changes should be made with caution, and with reference to the expenditure which is entrusted to the officer to be removed.

I would therefore suggest that all changes recommended by the Deputy Adjutant-General of Engineers, and sanctioned by Sir J. Burgoyne in his military capacity, of Engineering officers, should be sent to me through the Military Secretary by order of your Royal Highness. I can then report the position and employment of the officer, the works with which he is charged, and how far inconvenience will attach to the change proposed.

The present practice is that the Deputy Adjutant-General of Engineers reports personally to Sir J. Burgoyne the changes he proposes, without any consultation with the members of his staff, whose duty it is to look after the progress of the works, etc., and getting his assent, the change is submitted to me with Sir J. Burgoyne's approval attached. This leads to such inconvenience as the fol-

lowing.¹ Colonel Williams is removed from Bermuda, whilst still a member of a Committee for considering the defences of that island, and all has to be commenced *de novo*.

Colonel Freeth at Gosport is removed pending the execution of great works, both of fortifications and barracks, with which he has become familiar, and which he should be retained to carry out at all events to a point at which he could be relieved. I do not make any complaint, but merely point out these cases as giving rise to inconvenience and the risk of embarrassment to the public service.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 22, 1857.*

In answer to your letter on the subject of the change in the Engineer officers, which I received yesterday, I need hardly, I hope, assure you that I shall be only too desirous to make any arrangements in this respect which will facilitate the public service. I had always fancied, and so had Yorke, that these names were first submitted to you for your approval, before being finally sanctioned by me, and I think you will find that your concurrence has in every instance been asked for. I shall, however, see Sir John Burgoyne and desire him to ascertain in the first instance whether any inconvenience is likely to result from my proposed change, and after that is understood I shall send the names to you for approval.

As to a proposed change regarding Royal Engineer officers.

As regards the two appointments you allude to, it is not yet too late, and, if you like, they can yet be stopped. . . .

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ALTHORP, NORTHAMPTON, *March 25, 1857.*

Having been absent all day at Portsmouth on Monday, I had not time yesterday to call on you, as I intended to

As to despatch of troops to China.

¹ Officers of Royal Engineers were only under the Commander-in-Chief in the military capacity, but in respect to their other duties were under the Inspector-General of Fortifications, who in his turn was under the Secretary of State.

have done, in order to ascertain exactly what are your intentions on the part of the Government as to the despatch of troops to China. From what Yorke said he had understood from you, it would appear that you only intended one regiment (90th) to go in the *Transit* and *Himalaya*, besides a company of Engineers, a draft for the 59th, much needed with the regiment, and some of the Medical Staff Corps. That the rest of the troops are only to go in June. As regards the passage out, I am told that of all periods of the year this is the most favourable for a rapid passage, and in this respect the delay would almost be a pity. As regards the climate, the case no doubt is different, but should the troops be directed to rendezvous at Singapore, it would be unnecessary to push them on till they were required for active operation in the field, and no anxiety would have to be felt as regards their health. Under any circumstances, however, it would be most desirable to know for certain whether or not the regiments are to embark shortly, for there are many officers who might wish to spend some short time longer with their friends if they could be permitted to go away on leave. I was very much satisfied with my inspection of the troops on Monday. The three regiments are in excellent order and quite fit for work, and ready to embark at short notice. I went all over the *Transit*, and I really can report most favourably of her. She is a very fine ship, plenty of room between decks, and ventilation good; will carry with the greatest ease 750 men on a long voyage, and a much larger number on a shorter trip. Her engines, which are new, have worked remarkably well, and she went ten to twelve per hour. She has a charming captain, a very good fellow, who I know well.

Result of
writer's inspection of troops
and troop-ship.

I am sorry the Admiralty object to double awnings. You ought to insist upon having them, as everybody attaches the greatest importance to them. I wish you would also insist upon Charles Wood appointing the best man he can find as Superintendent of Transports, which he does not appear at all inclined to do. Depend upon it, the whole success of a combined operation depends on a

Importance of
appointment of
Superintendent
of Transports.

proper person being selected for this, the *most important* of all duties, as being the link of connection between the Naval and Military authorities.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 29, 1857.*

I return the papers you have sent me on the force of the Queen's troops in India. There cannot be two opinions as to the necessity for increasing this force, whether the war in Persia is concluded or not. I have minuted accordingly, and backed up your opinion as strongly as I can. This minute, however, refers only to three papers. What must not be lost sight of is that we are sending four regiments to India *viâ China*. It is possible that, after the last news from China, the troops will not be there required, at all events for any length of time. Suppose, however, that they are required there for some time, what are we to do then as to supplying their place in India, which is a possibility, or rather a contingency, which cannot be overlooked? . . .

Necessity of increasing Queen's troops in India.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 31, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that he had a conversation of some length with the Duke of Cambridge yesterday, and the accompanying general heads were the result of that conversation.

The next step is one of somewhat more difficulty, and that is to lay down the scheme by which these principles are to be worked out.

It is quite possible that the Director of Education may be junior to some officers with whom he would have to come in contact. For instance, Major-General Cameron would be junior to Major-General Sir Harry Jones. Lord Panmure would therefore suggest that the Commander-in-Chief should be the nominal head of the Board or

A new departure in education of Army officers.

Council of Military Education, and, in that case, all orders being issued in his name would remove any difficulty in regard to rank.

Both the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Panmure thought it essential to make a commencement, and H.R.H. is to issue a memorandum, with Your Majesty's approval, to intimate to the Army that after a certain date all officers appointed to Staff employment must be possessed of certain qualifications, and examinations for first commissions will be made more stringent.

Lord Panmure will proceed to give his assistance in drawing out the details of the new scheme, founding it as much as possible upon the memorandum on Military Education drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief.

CHAPTER XXVIII

APRIL 1857

MILITARY Education and the despatch of the Chinese expedition are the chief interests of this month's correspondence.

In regard to the former, Panmure submits his proposals for 'this important design to raise the professional character of Army officers,' which proposals include the inauguration of a Staff School at Sandhurst, and suggestions for the constitution of the Council of Military Education, of which General Cameron is appointed Vice-President under the Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile Lord Palmerston expresses himself caustically on the handwriting of officers, and the Duke of Cambridge is anxious to get the Council of Education definitely settled before Parliament meets, 'so that we may have a good case to go before the House, should any question be put' (April 30th).

In a letter of April 19th, the Duke seeks to hasten the departure of the remaining regiments destined for India or China; whilst on April 29th he expresses satisfaction that the Cabinet has decided to send four more regiments to India, in addition to those ordered to China.

The appointment of an Under-Secretary to the War Department, and the question of the eligibility of Turks for the Order of the Bath, are also dealt with.

On April 29th Lord Panmure submits the draft of a Royal Commission to inquire into the Medical Administration of the Army.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 1, 1857.*Military
Education.

The Queen returns the memorandum on the Military Education after having affixed her signature to it. She looks forward to an early second step, which will carry out the firm principle agreed upon. The Queen is inclined to concur with Lord Panmure that the Commander-in-Chief should be ostensibly the head of the Board or Council of Education.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

*April 3, 1857.*Inauguration
of the Staff
School.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to report for Your Majesty's information the further proceedings which passed yesterday between the Duke of Cambridge and himself with reference to Military Education.

Subject to Your Majesty's approval, it appeared advisable at once to initiate the Staff School by enlarging the senior department at Sandhurst to thirty students, and placing a Military Superintendent over it, with an efficient body of Professors to aid him in the instruction of officers for the Staff of the Army. The students are to be admitted by fixing a standard of acquirement, and leaving it to the Commander-in-Chief to select those who come up to that standard for admission into the School.

H.R.H. will submit for Your Majesty's consideration and approval the draft of a General Order which is to be issued to the Army, informing them of the necessary qualifications which will be required in all officers who seek for service on the Staff after January 1858.¹ Lord Panmure has seen this draft in the rough, and thinks that Your Majesty will approve of it as most creditable to H.R.H.

It is proposed to constitute the Board of Education by

¹ An Order was issued that officers who had not passed the Staff College should obtain a Staff appointment.

This was soon modified in practice.

making the Commander-in-Chief *ex officio* 'President,' and the working officer 'Vice-President' with two assistants. Major-General Cameron, to whom the Duke of Cambridge looks for assistance as Vice-President, subject to Your Majesty's approval, will be summoned to give his aid in further details of this important design to raise the professional character of Your Majesty's officers, and on Monday the consideration of the question will be again resumed, and Lord Panmure feels assured that every discussion will still further practically advance the object in which Your Majesty takes so deep an interest. . . .

Proposed
constitution of
the Board of
Education.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 3, 1857.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter just received reporting the further proceedings respecting the Military Education, and wishes to express her satisfaction at what he has reported.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 6, 1857.*

I believe that the Queen objected to giving the Bath to any Turks, from the fear that some Hungarian or Polish refugees under Turkish names might get it; but such an objection seems really to have no force, because if a man has done us real good service he ought to have the Bath whatever be his nationality, and if not, not.

Grounds of the
Queen's objec-
tion to giving
the Bath to
Turks.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., *April 7, 1857.*

This seems to be a very good and satisfactory arrangement; but I would add to the qualifications of an Aide-de-Camp the writing of a good legible hand, with the letters distinctly formed. I am sorry to say that the officers of the Army are apt in general to write like kitchen-maids.

Handwriting
of Army
officers.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

April 19, 1857.

Urges departure of
regiments for
China or
India.

. . . The more I think of it, the more anxious I feel that the three other regiments destined for China or India should proceed without delay. I have made inquiry and find that they could easily be disembarked and encamped at Point de Galle, where there are abundant supplies and water for the troops. From thence they could be directed upon whatever point might be required, and they could be at hand for any eventuality. We are now in the middle of April, and so the time is fast approaching for their regular embarkation. I hope, therefore, you will at once communicate with the Admiralty about taking up tonnage. . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 24, 1857.

As to appointment of an
Under-Secretary for the War
Department.

. . . Your Majesty has, Lord Panmure presumes, heard from Lord Palmerston that Mr. Fitzroy declines, for family reasons, the acceptance of a post likely to afford him so little relaxation in autumn as the Under-Secretary in this Department. After considering all possible persons who have seats in Parliament, no one presents himself as being sufficiently qualified to transact the business of the Department in the House of Commons, who has ever held office, and, as Lord Panmure is compelled to seek for a new man, he feels that he cannot place confidence in any one with greater prospect of satisfaction than in Mr. Thomas Baring,¹ eldest son of Sir Francis Baring. It is almost unnecessary to inform Your Majesty that, though new to Parliament, Mr. Baring is not new to business, inasmuch as he has been for seven years in different offices, and latterly discharged with very great satisfaction to Sir Charles Wood the duties of his Private Secretary in the Admiralty.

Mr. Baring's knowledge of military subjects has to be

¹ Afterwards Lord Northbrook and Viceroy of India.

acquired, but he is quick, diligent, and so courteous to those with whom he comes in contact that he will soon make himself master of the details of the Department, and Lord Panmure thinks that he will eventually prove a better representative of the Department in the House of Commons than Mr. Fitzroy.

To a certain extent any new appointment must be a lottery, but should Mr. Baring accept the charge when offered to him, Lord Panmure feels Your Majesty will not be disappointed in the result.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

April 25, 1857.

. . . The Queen had not heard a syllable from Lord Palmerston about Mr. Fitzroy's declining the Under-Secretaryship, nor indeed about Mr. Peel's resignation. She knows nothing of Mr. Baring either privately or publicly, and must therefore take him entirely on trust; but as you vouch for his efficiency for so very important a post, she is ready to sanction his appointment. She trusts that, under the circumstances, Lord Palmerston will give himself some personal attention to the passing the Army Estimates, which otherwise the Queen must fear would run great danger.

Appointment of
Mr. Baring as
Under-
Secretary.

The Queen has received the Departmental Returns for the last quarter, and I have carefully studied them. They are very well made out. The fact that Enfield still returned only 112 finished muskets in the quarter surprises me!

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 25, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty the instructions which have been drawn up for Lieut.-General Ashburnham, and likewise those issued for the guidance of the several departments, Medical, Commissariat, and Financial.

Submits instructions drawn up for General Ashburnham,

The memorandum defining the relative position of the General and the Admiral is, as nearly as possible, a copy of a similar document issued by the late Duke of Wellington on the occasion of the last war in China.

These papers are meant to be retained by Your Majesty, and Lord Panmure trusts that they will meet with Your Majesty's approval.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 25, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that, after careful discussion, the Cabinet have come to the conclusion that it will be too great a risk to call upon a new member, entirely unpractised in the House of Commons, to plunge at once into the details of conflict of the Army Estimates. Lord Panmure defers to the opinion of his colleagues without giving up his own as to Mr. Baring's powers.

Under-Secretary of the War Department.

Lord Palmerston will now submit to Your Majesty the name of Sir John Ramsden. He was in the late Parliament, and moved the Address in a somewhat remarkable speech, which elicited much praise from competent judges. He made another good speech on the subject of transportation, and is a country gentleman of high character, fortune, and position. He is an agreeable person to work with, and in the dearth of choice may be as good as any.

Lord Panmure will spare no pains to give him a full insight into his work.

In military affairs Lord Palmerston has signified his intention of giving all personal assistance, and Lord Panmure thinks that he will himself introduce the Army Estimates, relying for this Session upon the Under-Secretary of State to fight the details, assisting him when necessary.

Lord Panmure feels naturally most anxious in this state of affairs, but trusts that difficulties will disappear.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 27, 1857.*

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord Panmure's letter of the day before yesterday. She has since heard from Lord Palmerston on the subject of the Under-Secretary for the War Department, and has sanctioned it being offered to Sir J. Ramsden. Whatever Mr. Baring's merits may be, she thinks that a person accustomed to speaking and to the House of Commons is fitter for such a post than one who is totally new to both.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

April 28, 1857.

I return Colonel Dixon's letter, and am much pleased to see from it that he has better hopes for the future. Addition and attention to the comforts and well-being of the labourers in cottages, schools, Sunday-schools, playground, free library, savings-bank, etc., would do much to induce the best to come to Enfield, and would be an admirable example generally.

As to
inducements to
labourers to
settle at Enfield.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 29, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that a five brass gun on a suitable carriage has arrived from Turkey in Y.M.S. *Sphinx*.

The gun is a present from the Sultan to Your Majesty, in commemoration of the late war, and Lord Panmure would be glad to receive Your Majesty's commands as to its 'location.'

A present from
the Sultan.

The lower end of St. James's Water, within the railing, occurs to Lord Panmure as a suitable situation. It would not interfere with the Parade, and it would be seen by the public.

Until Your Majesty's pleasure is known, Lord Panmure has ordered the storekeeper at Portsmouth to take charge of the gun. Its weight will be about two tons, and the carriage three tons. It is about 160 years old.

Lord Panmure has the honour to forward in this box a submission of the name of Admiral Hamelin as a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath. This honour is in exchange for similar rank in the Legion of Honour already bestowed upon Sir James Douglas.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

April 29, 1857.

Royal Commission to inquire into Medical Administration of the Army.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to submit to Your Majesty the draft of a Royal Commission to inquire into the Medical Administration of the Army.

Many of the points referred to in this document might be dealt with at once by the hand of authority, subject to Your Majesty's approval; but they entail expense, and the opinions of such a Commission will weigh more with the House of Commons than any arguments of a Minister in favour of the increased estimate.

The names in the Commission which Your Majesty may not recognise are Dr. Alexander, Sir Thomas Phillips, and Dr. Martin.

Dr. Alexander is in the Army Medical Department, holding the rank of Local Inspector of Hospitals, and signalised himself as being one of the most efficient officers in the Crimea. Sir Thomas Phillips is the legal member, and is the gentleman who so distinguished himself at the Monmouth Riots as to receive his title at Your Majesty's hands.

Dr. Martin is an eminent surgeon and physician in the retired service of the East India Company, and well acquainted with all the diseases of hot climates.

When Your Majesty has approved of the object and instructions of the Commission, the formal steps will be immediately taken for its issue.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST JAMES'S PALACE, *April* 30, 1857.

. . . There are many subjects that require discussion between us, and none more so than that very abominable case of the Chaplain-General writing directly in his own name to the *Times* a sort of attack upon what we are doing, though why or wherefore he writes this attack I cannot imagine.

I am also anxious to get the Council of Education definitely settled before Parliament meets, so that we have a good case to go before the House should any question be put. I am very glad the Cabinet have decided to send four more regiments to India, in addition to the four ordered to China. This is as it should be. I sent Yorke to you to-day to make some proposals as to the regiments to be sent. I do hope you will insist on the Admiralty not permitting the *Transit* to go on to China. She will never get there, and it would be unjustifiable to sacrifice so many most valuable lives.

The letter from Outram¹ is most interesting, and I am much obliged to you for having allowed me to peruse it. It appears to me very fortunate that we have succeeded in making peace with Persia.

¹ Sir James Outram, lately in command of the Persian expedition.

CHAPTER XXIX

MAY 1857

MAY 10th, 1857, is memorable as the date of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. On May 23rd Prince Albert, writing to Lord Panmure, refers to the supposed immediate cause of it, and recommends investigation of the question to what extent the new rifle may be held accountable. On May 19th we have an instance of the vigilance and caution which characterised the Duke of Cambridge's military administration. 'We have now,' he writes, 'gone to the fullest extent of detaching troops from England. . . . If, therefore, you want to detach still further, you must give us an increase to our force, otherwise we shall be entirely denuded of troops at home and cannot give the necessary reliefs hereafter.'

On May 23rd Lord Panmure announces the introduction of the Army Estimates by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and three days later the Queen expresses her pleasure that they have so far passed satisfactorily.

On May 13th Lord Panmure had recommended the granting of a clasp for the affair of Bomarsund; but the Queen, having given the matter her consideration, decided that the affair had not called for sufficient exertion on the part of our troops to justify this.

The Notes of so eminent an authority as Miss Florence Nightingale upon Female Nurses in Military Hospitals are certain to be read with interest.

MISS NIGHTINGALE TO LORD PANMURE

30 OLD BURLINGTON STREET, *May 3, 1857.*

You directed me, last week, to make suggestions to yourself as to the organisation of Female Nursing in Army Hospitals. The Director-General, Army Medical Department, directed, last week, the expulsion of all female nurses but two, from the Woolwich Artillery Hospital, and the substitution of the 'Hospital Corps.'

Certainly this was not by your orders, nor did you contemplate, 'after this manner,' the introduction of female nursing.

I have a little pencil composition, 'to be dedicated, with permission, to your Lordship,' exhibiting the order emanating from the Secretary of State to introduce nurses, and a simultaneous order from the Army Medical Board to turn them out.

I enclose a memorandum (merely tentative and experimental) as to the duties of nurses. I cannot expect the Secretary of State to enter into the details. Perhaps I may ask to hear his decision as to the ultimate steps to be taken.

FEMALE NURSES IN MILITARY HOSPITALS

1. If their introduction is eventually commanded by the Secretary of State for War, it would be advisable to consider beforehand that their service admits of two distinct kinds.

2. 'Their chief duties' may be limited to 'taking charge of the linen and superintending the issue of extras.'

They will thus contribute materially to the comfort and the well-being of the sick; the real difficulties which undoubtedly beset the introduction of women into ward-service will be avoided; and (an important consideration, not lightly to be discarded) their exclusion from the ward-service will materially diminish the opposition of adverse masters, some of whom are also unscrupulous masters.

3. On the other hand, the experience of every woman

admitted to ward-service in hospitals where women were not before is that many lives are annually saved by such admission, which would otherwise, in all human probability, be lost. In time of war, some ciphers may safely be added to the many. So with any other great emergency.

That the experience of many surgeons is identical, their conduct has proved; no other testimony, under present circumstances, can rationally be expected from them.

4. It is often right to begin with the smaller and less-opposed good, and to introduce gradually, and as it pleases God, the remainder.

5. *Practically*, it is of little avail to 'superintend,' ever so carefully, the 'issue of extras' to the sick, unless there is permission and opportunity to pour the nourishment, often drop by drop, down the throat of reluctant suffering or torpor. And it is of little avail to have this permission, unless there be also that of raising the decent covering under which cholera, erysipelas, bed-sores, or the discharging wound, or the recent operation lie, and seeing to matters within.

It is a further question whether the painful cleansing of painful wounds, and the important minor dressings, as poulticing, etc.—which things, generally speaking, never have been done and never will be done by surgeons—are best left to nurses, orderlies; or the patients themselves.

6. At the same time nothing is more pernicious than to underrate the objections of opponents. There is no doubt that the admission of women to ward-service is beset with difficulties. Military hospitals are and must be essentially different in important details from civil hospitals.

'Sisters of Mercy,' as regards the ward-service, are decorous and kind, and sometimes inefficient and prudish. Nurses are careful, efficient, often decorous, always kind; sometimes drunken, sometimes misconducted.

Misconduct of women is far more pernicious in a military or naval hospital than in any other, as regards the result of things. The crime is, of course, equally crime everywhere.

7. It is desirable to simplify and condense, as much as possible, female service in these hospitals. Let there be as few women, and these few as efficient and as respectable as can be. Let all that can really be done by men be so done.

8. Head-nurses are alone desirable to be employed, *i.e.* persons of the character, responsibility, and efficiency of head-nurses in other hospitals.

9. The patients should be distinctly classified, though, of course, this is not the business of the nurses.

It is a question whether convalescents require nurses at all. But, if they do, of chronic or of convalescing cases probably one hundred would be efficiently served by one head-nurse, having under her orders orderlies.

Of acute cases, probably one nurse should take charge of not more than forty.

10. The nurses should be strong, active women, not less than thirty nor more than sixty years of age, of unblemished character, irreversibly dismissed for the first offence of misconduct, drunkenness, or dishonesty, or proved impropriety of any kind.

11. Their wages the same as those of head-nurses in civil hospitals—pensioned, after service, if possible.

12. Their rules should be simple, very definite; should leave them at the absolute disposal of the surgeon as to ward matters, and at the absolute disposal of the Superintendent in all other matters.

13. Their dress should be uniform.

14. Their duties should be strictly defined, in concert with and under the surgical authorities. And it should be provided that the scheme of such duties and the book of Army Hospital Regulations be consistent.

15. Give them plenty to do and great responsibility—two effectual means of preventing mischief.

16. The nurse's lodging in command of her ward renders her far more efficient; but this requires some special arrangement. It would not do to have the chance of the nurse being suddenly taken ill, with only patients and orderlies within immediate reach. Were the nurses'

rooms so arranged that two or more were on one floor (as is the case in all hospitals) so as to be entirely separate and yet, when so desired, easily accessible to each other, which might be contrived, this would probably answer all purposes.

17. Their food should be sent them cooked, and their dietary should be fixed according to modern sanitary authorities on this subject, which give variety in food as an essential element of health, and fix the proportions and nutritive values of different kinds of food in their best combinations for health.

18. The powers and responsibilities of the female Superintendent must be absolutely fixed.

19. 'Confidential reports' must be so modified, as far as women are concerned, that the humble boon, granted to pickpockets, of being informed of accusations laid to their charge, must be extended to the Superintendent of the nurses.

20. 'The training of the Hospital Corps has been so defective that the material remains now almost as raw as it was at the beginning' (opinion of an eminent army surgeon). And so will it always remain in respect of the niceties of nursing if it be not tutored by skilled female nurses in these. The principle of the 'Hospital Corps' is excellent. And it should be trained in those hospitals where female attendance is possible for the occasions in the field where it is not.

21. '*Fuss*' has been and is equally injurious to nurses as regards the opinion of the surgeons, their own, and that of the people who are neither surgeons nor nurses. The more quietly we are allowed to do our own work the better.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 4, 1857.

Destruction of
the flour stores
at Hong-Kong.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty's perusal the official account of the destruction of the flour stores at Hong-Kong, and the opinion of the Director of

Commissariat, Mr. Petrie, that no inconvenience will arise to the troops in consequence of this act.

The despatches having been sent by the general mail, and not *viâ* Marseilles, only arrived this morning.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

May 12, 1857.

I write to back up a petition for some cannon metal, which I know the Brigade of Guards to have made to the Government for their monument in Hyde Park.¹ If it can be complied with, it will be a great object to them, and will ensure a better work of Art for London than would be possible if the means are too much stinted.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

May 13, 1857.

The official application for six tons of gun-metal has reached me. The cost of this at the rate of £124 per ton, which Colonel Wilmot states to be the market value, is £744. I do not feel justified on my own responsibility to give away so much public property, but have written to the Treasury to procure their sanction, and have recommended a compliance with the request. As soon as their consent to the financial arrangement is made, it will be my duty to obtain Her Majesty's sanction to give prize or captured metal which can easily be spared.

We are looking anxiously for Cape news, and I very much apprehend that the Kaffirs will not long remain quiet.

The plan of sending out the Germans will yet bear fruit enough to satisfy the most captious.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 13, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty

¹ It was originally proposed to place the Crimean memorial in Hyde Park.

A clasp for the
affair at
Bomarsund.

that application has been made by Sir Harry Jones for a clasp for the affair of Bomarsund. It is rather late to raise the question, but as the French have permitted their troops engaged on the occasion to bear the word Bomarsund on their colours, Lord Panmure does not see why Your Majesty's seamen, marines, and troops, who were present on, and took part in, the capture, should not have some distinctive mark of their services.

The only troops engaged were Your Majesty's Sappers and Miners and Royal Marines, and should Your Majesty see no objection, they might be granted a clasp, and if Your Majesty is disposed to add to this act of grace, they might bear on their appointments the word Bomarsund.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *May 19, 1857.*

Opposes de-
taching any
more troops
from England.

I send you the extract from Anson's¹ private letter to me which you wished to have in order to communicate it to the Cabinet to-morrow. I am certain it is well worthy of the gravest consideration. I would only beg to make one observation, that we have now gone to the fullest extent of detaching troops from England, after we have embarked the regiments and drafts now under orders for various parts of the world. If therefore you want to detach still further, you must give us an increase to our force, otherwise we shall be entirely denuded of troops at home and cannot give the necessary reliefs hereafter.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

May 19, 1857.

The Queen wishes me to say in answer to your letter of yesterday, that she does not think Bomarsund an event having called for a sufficient amount of exertion on the part of our forces to grant a special clasp to it. The case

¹ General Anson, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India.

had been fully investigated before the Baltic Medal was granted ; we should soon have to give a clasp for Kinburn, for Kertch, etc., etc.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 23, 1857.

The Army Estimates are fixed for Monday, and Lord Palmerston will introduce them, leaving Sir John Ramsden to argue the details as each vote is submitted to the Committee,

Forthcoming
Army
Estimates.

Sir John Ramsden's attention has been exclusively devoted to getting up the estimates since his appointment to office, and Lord Panmure confidently hopes that he will be successful. He has gained considerable favour in the House by his courteous manner towards those who come in contact with him.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

May 23, 1857.

I have received your letter of yesterday. I was sure you would find the matter regarding the rifles as I stated ; I am very glad, however, that you mean to take energetic means of providing at least the 1000 men going out to India with the new arm.

Immediate
cause of the
Indian Mutiny.

I understand that the Mutiny in India amongst the native troops was caused by some regulation regarding the grease wanted to grease the new ammunition with. I well remember that the difficulty of keeping a lubricating substance in the cartridge in a hot climate was considered a strong objection against the new arm, and was particularly set forth by Colonel Gordon, whom Lord Hardinge employed in 1852 upon the inquiry. If some million of small-arm ammunition got dry, and upon being served out were

¹ Alluding to a letter, dated May 10th, in which Prince Albert had remonstrated against the sending out of a battalion of Rifles to India armed with the long musket and bayonet.

not to go down the barrels, the effect might be terrible, and constant unpacking and repacking of large stores hardly feasible. Would it not be proper to have the question investigated? The East India Company must be as anxious about it as we can be.

I am very glad that the Treasury has complied with your recommendation to issue some bronze to the Guards' Committee; they will be very grateful for it.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May* 26, 1857.

The Queen is glad to see that the Army Estimates have so far passed satisfactorily in the House of Commons, and trusts that the remainder will be equally satisfactorily passed. The great point is to hold a high, firm tone.

CHAPTER XXX

JUNE 1857

LORD PANMURE'S letter of June 8th refers to the outbreak of the 10th of the previous month, when the native troops stationed at Meerut had inaugurated the Mutiny by firing upon their officers and releasing from gaol those of their comrades who had been imprisoned for refusing to use the famous greased cartridges. Thenceforth the correspondence is concerned with the means of rendering assistance to the British in India, which are discussed in turn by the Queen, the Commander-in-Chief, the War Minister, and the Prime Minister. The raising of men for the Army; the arrangements for sending out reinforcements by the desert route, and for drawing them from China; the formation of reserves at Ceylon, the Cape, and Australia, to support the Army in India; the immediate recall of officers on leave—all these things tend to prove that the gravity of the crisis was already realised at home, and that all possible steps were being taken to meet it. In the second of two letters of which the copies before us are undated, Lord Panmure gives details as to the force to be raised. After urging the departure of reinforcements (June 29th), the Queen 'agrees with Lord Panmure that it will be good policy to oblige the East India Company to keep permanently a larger portion of the Royal Army in India than heretofore. The Empire has nearly doubled itself within the last twenty years, and the Queen's troops have been kept at the old establishment. They are *the* body

on which the maintenance of the Indian Empire depends.' Another question debated is that of sending out the reinforcing regiments in Brigade formation with Brigade Staffs—a plan favoured by the Queen and Prince Albert, but opposed by Lord Panmure on the ground that the Brigade organisation was already in existence in India.

In the midst of these discussions (June 15th), Panmure is called to face an approaching necessity for retrenchment, which he desires to do without cutting down the numbers of the Army or interfering with its depôts. The remainder of the month's correspondence is mainly occupied with arrangements in view of a distribution of the new decoration, the Victoria Cross.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

June 8, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to solicit Your Majesty's pleasure as to the time when it will be agreeable to Your Majesty to decorate with the Victoria Cross those officers and men on whom it has been bestowed.

It will take a few days to get them together after Your Majesty's pleasure is known.

Lord Panmure has likewise the honour of submitting to Your Majesty that Major-General Hearsey,¹ who so admirably performed the painful and delicate duty of disbanding the 19th Native Infantry in Bengal, and also of bringing to punishment the mutinous native officers and sepoy in the 34th, should receive the K.C.B. as a mark of Your Majesty's approval of his conduct. The East India Company will apply for this honour, but Lord Panmure humbly suggests that it is a case wherein Your Majesty should take the initiative step.

The news from India is far from satisfactory, and it is

¹ 'That brave soldier and distinguished officer, John Hearsey,' Kay's *Sepoy War in India*, vol. i. p. 495.

a matter of great surprise to Lord Panmure that so serious an outbreak as described at Meerut¹ should have occurred under the eyes of two of Your Majesty's regiments, viz., the 6th Dragoon Guards and a battalion of the 60th.

The outbreak
at Meerut.

Lord Panmure had a long conversation with Lord Dalhousie yesterday on the condition of the Indian Army, in which the latter said that he did not anticipate the possibility of any combined action among the different regiments, though he thought it not impossible that the spirit might extend, and that some serious examples might be necessary before it was quelled.

Opinion of Lord
Dalhousie.

Lord Dalhousie does not, however, feel any alarm at the present state of affairs, which he looks upon as exaggerated.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *June 12, 1857.*

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord Panmure's letter of the 8th, as well as his formal submission (which she returns) of the 2nd.

She has consulted with the Duke of Cambridge on the subject of the ceremony for the Victoria Cross, and has come to the conclusion that it will be best to have a Review in Hyde Park, where she would attend on horseback and give the Crosses to the recipients before the front. The day might be the 26th inst. Thus most people would see it, and the ceremony would still remain an entirely military one.

Distribution of
Victoria Cross
and other
honours.

With respect to Generals Outram and Hearsey, the Queen thinks that they may well have the honour for which Lord Panmure recommends them, in time; but with regard to the first she thinks it much too soon, well remembering what inconvenience arose from giving the honours in the Crimea immediately after Inkerman, which was followed by all the accusations for mismanagement of the very officers decorated by the Queen. When the Persian campaign is entirely concluded, the Queen will

¹ On May 10, 1857.

expect to have the case of the officers employed brought before her.

General Hearsey's case may be a very good one, but the Queen would ask to have the whole of it, with the reports upon it, well substantiated, brought before her, and not to take a decision on mere rumour.¹ Many gallant acts have been first exaggerated and extolled, and afterwards detracted from and debased by the public.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

[June 1857.]

This is the first I have ever heard of any offer of troops by Belgium or any foreign power.

Before you can accept such aid, you must meet Parliament and get its sanction.

I concur with Palmerston in the strong objections which exist to the introduction of foreign troops into India. After you have done with them, they remain the drill-masters of all the independent Rajahs.

Raising troops
in consequence
of the Mutiny.

I have desired Sir C. Yorke to let me know how the new battalions are filling, and the Commander-in-Chief has power to form as many of the cadres of these fifteen new corps as he thinks will enable him to raise the bodies quickly. We are getting on well with recruiting, but our men are flowing principally into regiments on service.

I have written to Labouchere to know if he will spare me one black regiment from Jamaica immediately—in which case, I could manage to send it directly to India, and replace it by a new corps to be raised in Canada.

On receipt of Hammond's letter, I assumed that the Pashas would concur with the Porte—and, therefore, the following troops move by the desert route:—

1. 200 57th Foot, by Bosphorus.
2. 400 R.E., by same.
3. Artillery, I believe, 400, by same.
4. When large steamers reach Red Sea.

¹ By a letter of June 19th the Queen approved of General Hearsey receiving a step of promotion in the Order of the Bath.

I have told Vernon Smith that I will send a Cavalry regiment to Bombay, and arrangements should then be made to send out monthly drafts and get home invalids by same route if practicable.

The Maltese Corps and white regiment in Canada are in the hands of the respective Governors.

Everybody that knows Malta predicts that there will be no regiment forthcoming there. We shall see.

You cannot do better than write a civil letter in the Queen's name to the Pasha of Egypt.

Green Bey,¹ whom I saw yesterday, says he will do anything if a proper application of soft sawder be made.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

[June 1857.]

The messenger does not go on Sunday, so it has occurred to me to write you of our doings, in case you may like to mention them to the Queen. We met at half-past eleven, and the Duke of Cambridge attended. We discussed the best means of raising men for the Army, and he is still of opinion that by proceeding regiment by regiment he could overtake the ten battalions soonest. However, he and I have a *carte blanche* to take any way which experience shall show us to be the best. H.R.H. is of opinion that it will be well to form reserves, as soon as we have troops to do it with, at Ceylon and Cape, and perhaps even Australia, for supporting the Army in India, and exchanging regiments there, as they become used up, with fresh ones. This must be attended to. After he left us, we got the Indian mail. I am not disposed to take a gloomy view of anything, but I confess the letters from Canning and Elphinstone, Haines and Grant, are all sufficient to stagger me.

As to raising
men for the
Army.

If we meet with no reverse before some English troops reach, all will go well; but if we are beat anywhere, I

¹ An officer in the Khedive's service, acting as an agent in this country. He had been formerly in the service of the East India Company.

would not trust the Mussulman population either in Madras or Bombay, and you will see how anxious they are for the peace of Hyderabad.

The details of the massacres are horrible, rending the heart at one moment, and creating in it an almost fiendish appetite for revenge in the next.

No death would be too horrible for that Nana Sahib.

But to our Councils.

We concluded to call out 15,000, instead of 10,000, Militia, some of them Artillery.

Details of force
for India.

To raise 15 instead of 10 2nd Battalions, each 1000 strong, as soon as possible; to have prepared for India:—

2 Troops Horse Artillery.

3 Batteries Foot Artillery.

5 Companies Foot Artillery.

3 Regiments of Cavalry, in which arm they seem deficient.

4 Regiments Infantry.

2 Companies of Royal Engineers.

The *Vulcan* is to go to Halifax immediately for a regiment of Infantry, and the *Conqueror* to return and bring home another regiment and another till we get our troops home from the Mediterranean.

We purpose to desire General Michel to go on from the Cape in command of the brigade which will proceed from thence, and to send Ashburnham from China to serve as Lieut.-General on the Staff. Delhi has, I fear, little prospect of being taken for some time. The first troops which will arrive in India after the 90th, which has arrived, are the 82nd, which sailed in April, and will arrive about July. The others will drop in, some every month.

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

June 15, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Royal Highness' letter of yesterday. . . .

In regard to the second subject of your Royal High-

ness' letter, I wish to lay before you that before next year a very considerable diminution of the Staff vote must be made; our revenue will be reduced, and our income and expenditure are now too evenly balanced to leave a hope of any great margin. We shall lose six millions of taxes, and if we are to make the two ends meet, Charles Wood and I must manage to reduce a million at least, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer may make arrangements for the rest; of this a moiety must come out of the Army Estimates, and every little must be brought in aid.

Coming
necessity for
retrenchment.

I wish to avoid, if it be possible, any further reduction in our numbers of men or horses, but, in order to achieve this, something must be sacrificed. I do not see why we should not maintain the organisation of Divisions and Brigades by the Major-Generals commanding the Divisions, and the senior officer in a Brigade being Brigadier for the time. The Brigadiers of Cavalry will in all probability have to fall into the category of reductions.

If we cannot obtain our desired end in any other way, I foresee two things that will inevitably happen. First, our twelve companies will be reduced to ten, and secondly, no regiments at home will have a depôt, and so several of the depôt battalions will be broken up.

It is with all these things in prospect that I wish to be as economical as we can in any arrangement that is made, and therefore at the Cape I wished to have a colonel on the staff who might command a brigade. I quite admit the apparent niggardliness of this proceeding, but it is better to do these acts than to have the Chancellor of the Exchequer fix a sum for our expenditure about January, and in two months having to cut our coat according to his cloth.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

June 19, 1857.

The pins attached to the Victoria Cross, as in the specimen you submitted, will answer very well. The Queen has tried them and found them to do so.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 22, 1857.*Calling out
Militia.

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter of the 20th, and sanctions the proposed arrangement respecting the calling out of the Militia, viz., that only those which have not been embodied should be called out for training this year. The Queen concludes that financial reasons oblige this to be done; it is to be regretted, but she trusts that another year they will all be properly called out for their due time.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

*June 28, 1857.*Reinforcements
for India.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that, after anxious deliberation, the Cabinet sanctioned Lord Panmure's giving verbal instructions to the Commander-in-Chief to hold four regiments in readiness to embark for India, in addition to those already under orders. It appears that Lord Canning has drawn upon Ceylon for a regiment, and as Lord Panmure had directed an additional regiment to be stationed there as a reserve for China, that colony will not be denuded of Your Majesty's regular troops.

Your Majesty is aware that these regiments which are sent to China are also destined for India, as soon as the operations in which they are engaged shall have been completed.

These twelve regiments of 1000 strong, and about 4500 recruits for the regiments at present in India, will be added to the force of Your Majesty's troops in India in the course of the autumn, for Lord Panmure anticipates that nothing in China will at all events be sufficiently settled to admit of the troops moving on within a few weeks after their arrival at Hong-Kong.

The *Princess Charlotte*, which is on its way to China,

sailed yesterday from Portsmouth. Sir C. Wood was to send a small, quick steamer from Plymouth to try and catch her, so that she might touch at the Cape, and empower the Governor to send on a regiment to India, there being two of Your Majesty's steamers there which can easily convey it.

The Court of Directors are to issue orders for officers on leave from the Indian Army to rejoin immediately, and the Commander-in-Chief proposes to take similar steps with Your Majesty's officers. The crisis is one of great anxiety, and painful from the reflection of the serious examples which will be required when the Mutiny is quelled. A crisis of great anxiety.

Lord Panmure trusts that the opportunity will be taken advantage of to employ in India a larger proportion of Your Majesty's troops than have hitherto been stationed in India, which may be easily done without pulling upon the finances of the Company.

Lord Panmure was to have met Your Majesty in Manchester, but the present position of affairs, and the arrangement consequent upon the arrival of the details by the despatches which are expected late this evening, or early to-morrow morning, will prevent his leaving London.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 29, 1857.*

The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday. She had long been of opinion that a reinforcement waiting to go to India ought not to be delayed. The moment is certainly a very critical one, and the additional reinforcements now proposed will be very much wanted. The Queen agrees with Lord Panmure, that it will be good policy to oblige the East India Company to keep permanently a larger portion of the Royal Army in India than heretofore. The Empire has nearly doubled itself within the last twenty years, and the Queen's troops have been kept at the old establishment. They are *the* body on whom the maintenance of the Indian Reinforcements for India.

Empire depends, and the Company ought not to sacrifice the highest interests to love of patronage.

The Queen hopes that the new reinforcements will be sent out in their Brigade organisations,¹ and not as detached regiments; good commanding officers, knowing their troops, will be of the highest importance next to the troops themselves.

Regiments for
India; their
places at home
to be filled.

The Queen must ask that the troops by whom we shall be diminished at home, by the transfer of so many regiments to the Company, should be forthwith replaced by an increase of the establishment up to the number voted by Parliament, and for which the estimates have been taken; else we denude ourselves altogether, and to a degree dangerous to our own safety at home and incapable of meeting a sudden emergency which, as the present example shows, may come upon us at any moment. If we had not reduced in such a hurry this spring, we should now have all the men wanted!

The Queen wishes Lord Panmure to communicate this letter to Lord Palmerston.

The accounts in to-day's papers, from India, are most distressing.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 29, 1857.*

The Queen thinks that the persons decorated with the Victoria Cross might very properly be allowed to bear some distinctive mark after their name. The Warrant instituting the decoration does not style it 'an order,' but merely a 'Naval and Military decoration,' and a distinction; nor is it, properly speaking, an order, being not *constituted*.² V.C. would not do. K.G. means a Knight of the Garter; C.B., a Companion of the Bath; M.P., a Member of Parliament; M.D., a Doctor of Medicine, etc., etc.—in all cases designating a person. No one could

¹ The objection to this was that the *personnel* of the Brigade organisation already existed in India.

² *i.e.* by Royal Warrant.

be called a Victoria Cross. V.C., moreover, means Vice-Chancellor at present. D.V.C., decorated with the Victoria Cross, or B.V.C., bearer of the Victoria Cross, might do. The Queen thinks the last the best.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

MANCHESTER, *June 30, 1857.*

The Queen is quite right as to the expediency of raising the home force up to its voted establishment, so as to fill up the gap that will be made by the sending four additional regiments to India; but your reasoning against sending out the regiments in Brigade formation seems to me conclusive. If they were going to join an army of operations in the field, it would be quite right to do what the Queen suggests. If, for instance, it was a war with any native or foreign power, in regard to which the troops sent out would be kept together, and would be united to a larger body already organised and acting together; but in this case, as you justly say, these regiments will probably be distributed immediately on their arrival in India, and will be placed under the command of the General Officers already serving on the various stations at which additional force may be required, and General Officers who might now be sent out with these regiments would probably clash with those already there and in command; moreover, as no one ship could carry even as much as a whole regiment, the Generals of Brigade would not have during the passage opportunities of getting acquainted with the regimental officers, and they would not land with the advantage of having acted together and of being well known to each other.

The news is distressing by reason of the individual sufferings and deaths, but it is not really alarming as to our hold upon India, and it may lead to our establishing our power in those countries upon a firmer basis.

Four additional
regiments for
India.Distressing
news from
India;]

CHAPTER XXXI

JULY 1857

THE letters of this month refer to military arrangements designed to meet the outbreak in India.

The Queen had desired to carry out to the fullest possible extent the organisation of the Army by Brigades, and to adopt this system in the relief of troops in the colonies. Nor is Her Majesty convinced by the arguments against the adoption of this principle which are put forward by Lord Panmure after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief.

The question whether the additional European troops for India shall be raised by the Company or shall consist of Queen's troops is another important point which comes up for discussion.

The addition of four British regiments to the force maintained in India, the bringing home of four regiments from the Mediterranean, the increasing of the strength of regiments next for foreign service, the sending out of guns with the Royal Artillery, and the serviceableness of British-made gun-carriages in the Indian climate, are among other matters referred to.

Together with some useful hints on recruiting, Lord Panmure's letter of July 23rd gives details of a plan for supplying the vacuum created by the sending out of reinforcements to India.

MISS NIGHTINGALE TO LORD PANMURE

30 OLD BURLINGTON STREET, *July 1, 1857.*

I have seen the revised plans for Netley Hospital, which have undergone very great improvements, viz. : (1) The throwing open the corridor; (2) the giving more window-space in the wards; (3) the abolition of borrowed lights and odd corners; (4) the ventilation and separation of the appurtenances; (5) the abandoning all idea of artificial ventilation, and trusting to air-shafts, doors, and windows, and giving the fire air to itself. Captain Laffan has done the very best that could be done with the impossible problem given him to solve.

Now, the best plans I have ever seen for a field-hospital were those made by Mr. Bonnel for the *Renkioi* Hospital, sent out by you to the East, in huts. The principle applies equally well to permanent hospitals. Should Lord Panmure wish for another opinion before he finally decides on the revised plans for Netley Hospital, Mr. Bonnel's opinion would be the very best, probably, to be had, his hospital having been tried and succeeded.

I would only suggest, should the above idea be at all taken into consideration, that, before a consultation be held over the patient (viz., the hospital), Mr. Bonnel should see the revised plans, first, without any other engineer. Consultations are always fatal.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 2, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of the 29th June, which, in obedience to Your Majesty's commands, Lord Panmure forwarded to Lord Palmerston.

Lord Panmure thinks that there will eventually be no difficulty in inducing the East India Company to add at least four regiments of Infantry of Your Majesty's Army to the force maintained in India, and that it is not impossible even that a greater number of regiments may be admitted.

Military
arrangements
in view of out-
break in India.

The embarkation of the four additional regiments will no doubt carry off a considerable portion of the men voted by Parliament for home and colonial service, but Your Majesty may rely upon the hiatus being filled up.

On the 27th June the strength of the Army was 5088 above the numbers voted by Parliament. The four regiments recently placed under orders for India cannot be embarked more than 900 strong. This will reduce the excess to 1488, which will soon be absorbed by casualties, and reductions in the colonies which have been ordered. In order to meet future contingencies, Lord Panmure has authorised the Commander-in-Chief to recruit the ten regiments which stand next for foreign service up to 1000 rank and file each, and to stop for the present any further reductions in the regiments at Malta, Gibraltar, and Corfu. To meet the duties and possible exigencies in the country, the Commander-in-Chief proposes to recall four regiments from the above-named stations, and to this Lord Panmure has agreed. These arrangements are made subject to the approval of the Cabinet on Saturday, but this Lord Panmure anticipates.

In sending the reinforcements to India, Your Majesty expresses a hope that they will be sent out in their Brigade organisation, and not as detached regiments. Lord Panmure regrets that in this respect Your Majesty may feel disappointed. If these troops had been proceeding to join an army of operations in the field, and were destined to act together and to rendezvous at a common port of landing, then Your Majesty's views could have been carried out; but in this case these regiments proceed to different presidencies, and are destined to join Divisions and Brigades already formed in India, and each corps as it lands will be immediately forwarded to its destination. Under these circumstances, and more especially as the regiments named for this service have not been brigaded together, no advantage could be gained by sending out the staffs of a Division or even of a Brigade, for the voyage.

While upon this subject, Lord Panmure feels it to be his duty to inform Your Majesty that, knowing Your

Majesty's anxiety to carry out to its full extent the organisation of the Army by Brigades, and to adopt this system in the relief of Your Majesty's troops in the colonies, he has had many conversations with the Commander-in-Chief and given much consideration to the subject, and he cannot see how it is possible to arrive at the desired object.

The vast extent of territory to be supplied with troops, and the impossibility of keeping regiments within hundreds of miles of each other, and in many cases the necessity of breaking up regiments themselves, all militate against the possibility of carrying out a Brigade organisation abroad, except in such large garrisons as Malta and Gibraltar, and perhaps at the Cape. The system may be carried out in name in other colonies, but we must not deceive ourselves that it is so in reality.

Reasons against
sending out
troops in
Brigade organ-
isation, and
Brigade organ-
isation abroad
generally.

Lord Panmure humbly tenders to Your Majesty many apologies for this lengthened intrusion.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 3, 1875.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday. She has sanctioned the giving of four regiments to the East Indies.

With regard to the reduction of the garrison of Malta to four regiments, she hopes the Government will well consider whether this will not reduce this valuable and exposed spot to a state of insecurity.

The Queen is sorry to find Lord Panmure still objecting to a proper Brigade system, without which no army in the world can be efficient. We want general officers, and cannot train them unless we employ them on military duty, not on clerk's duty in a District or Colony, but in the command of troops. The detachment of regiments is no reason for having no system, and the country will not pay for general officers whose employment is not part of a system; our Army is then deprived of its efficiency by the refusal to adopt a system on the part of the Government.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 4, 1857.

Military
arrangements
in view of out-
break in India.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the Cabinet have considered the military engagements which the Indian emergency have rendered necessary.

Lord Panmure communicated to his colleagues Your Majesty's approval of four regiments being added to the force now in India. He likewise informed them of Your Majesty's anxiety that these reinforcements should be sent out in Brigade organisation, but the difficulties which Lord Panmure had stated to Your Majesty seemed sufficiently grave to prevent their recommending this course for adoption. They have expressed a strong opinion that some more general officers of Your Majesty's service should be forthwith sent out to India to be at the disposal of the Governor-General for some of the higher and more responsible commands.

The Cabinet at once agreed to raise to one thousand rank and file the ten regiments next for foreign service. They concurred in the expediency of bringing home four regiments from the Mediterranean, but decided, in accordance with Your Majesty's views, to leave five regiments and the Malta Fencibles at Malta, and for the present to have a regiment less at Gibraltar.

Your Majesty will doubtless remember having sanctioned a considerable increase both of Artillery and Engineers at both these important stations.

Mr. Labouchere stated that he had seen Sir Edmund Head, who said that a regiment might safely be spared from Nova Scotia if required at home.

The Cabinet were of one opinion that every care should be taken to keep up the numbers of the Army, as voted by Parliament, exclusive of all additional troops transferred to the Indian establishment.

LORD PANMURE TO MISS NIGHTINGALE

WAR OFFICE, *July 6, 1857.*

DEAR MISS N.,—I am glad you think that the patient is improved. It has had so many doctors and so much consultation that I wonder it is not dead and buried long since. Admitting fully the great credit due to Mr. Bonnel for his Renkioi Hospital, and as you admit that Captain Laffan has done the very best that could be done for the impossible problem given him to solve, I really think I must now give my poor patient permission to grow; and I feel assured that, if it be ever permitted to arrive at maturity, it will make its merits acknowledged even by those who still condemn it.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *July 17, 1857.*

. . . I did not get any answer from you as to whether I might recruit up for the Artillery the numbers now going to India. The same for the two regiments of Cavalry. This would all be *within* your this year's estimate. . . . I still wish the 7th Hussars could go. As to horses, I think they could certainly be promised from the Cape and Persia. Why not send the 7th to the Cape to get mounted, and to take on their horses with them to India? It might take a little longer, but it could be done perfectly, you may rely on it. I still think some guns should go with the Artillery. We may want to land them where no guns could be procured, and what a mess we should then be in! The large screw-steamers would carry these guns in addition to their Infantry. It is well worthy of consideration.

As to troops to
be sent to India.

Only 200 men of the drafts have gone without arms. All the rest will be armed. I shall send out the ten years' men, whose period of service has not yet expired. It is better, and we cannot do without them.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, July 18, 1857.

Standard of
height of
recruits.

I do not know whether the standard height for recruits has been raised since the end of the war, and whether it would admit of being lowered, but I should imagine that if it were lowered you would get more recruits in a given time, and it would be a great object to get men as fast as possible.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, July 18, 1857.

Additional
European force
required for
India.

We ought to-day to determine the question whether the India Company should raise European regiments, or whether the additional European force required for India should consist of Queen's troops; it would be well, I think, to have the Duke of Cambridge present, and we might at the same time go through the rest of his memorandum.

I will try to have Mangles¹ also.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private and Confidential.

HORSE GUARDS, July 22, 1857.

Military
arrangements
in view of
events in India.

I was very sorry that the principle was not at once adopted to-day of having *Queen's* Europeans instead of Company's, though at the same time it was evident to me that the feeling of the Cabinet was all but unanimous on that point. Still it would have been well to have got that settled. However, I must leave it to you to work it out, and the fact of having consented to add to the number of corps makes it certain, in my mind, that the other will follow as a matter of course. Pray do not let the question of the officers stand in the way. I am ready to absorb as many as possible in our Army on equitable terms. Besides that, a number might be handed over to the Civil

¹ Chairman of East India Company.

Service, others again employed to fill up the gaps in the regiments that are still faithful. Would the whole question not be greatly facilitated if we were to have a meeting with some of the Indian people in order to understand exactly how they stand, without at all telling them the object in view? Vernon Smith might meet you and me and have his secretaries with him, who would furnish us with all the necessary details. We could then judge better of the actual state of things, and report as a Minute for your next Cabinet, for all that was this day said about it was extremely vague. I cannot help thinking that it might be well for the Government to have a short Act taking the power to call out a certain number of the Militia. It need not come into operation unless it was found absolutely necessary. But it would be a good thing to have the power of doing so, without being compelled again to assemble Parliament. We should then be prepared for all eventualities.

As regards the guns for the Artillery and the harness and saddles for them, I have had a long talk just now to Blucher Wood,¹ who knows India well. He strongly urges upon me the propriety of sending them, and I therefore think it right again to mention it to you, in the hope that you will let them be sent. The embarkation of these guns would, after all, not be a very great difficulty, and their not finding any on arrival would be a very serious drawback. If you prefer not delaying the men, why not embark their guns in a separate ship to follow the force as soon as possible? Of course I should prefer their being sent in the ship with the men whenever practicable. Wood tells me further that there will be difficulty about General Mansfield's appointment² if it is not guarded against by orders from home. The Adjutant-General of the Indian Army corresponds direct with Government, and is in fact the War Minister for India. If the Chief of the Staff is hereafter to have the general duties hitherto

Suggests sending guns for Artillery in India.

¹ Colonel B. Wood, a nephew of Lord Hardinge's, who had been in India with him.

² As Chief of the Staff.

performed by the Indian Adjutant-General, orders must be sent out to India to that effect by the Secret Committee, and this should be done as soon as possible.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *July 23, 1857.*

Urges sending
Engineers to
India.

Do you think it right that no Engineers should go to India? Recollect that 800 Native Engineers have mutinied and are lost to the service. These must be replaced, and how is this to be accomplished unless by reinforcement from home? I wish you would speak to Charles Wood about the Marines doing a little more duty at the various dockyards. We can get nothing out of them, and yet we are sadly in want of men for duty in our garrison, and at Plymouth the duties are very heavy, not less so at Portsmouth. It is absurd to suppose that they have not plenty of men to give, but they object greatly.

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

July 23, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Royal Highness' letter, and I enclose for your information the results of the Cabinet yesterday, after having been favoured with your opinion and knowing the sentiments of the Queen.

I will, of course, signify officially the various points not already communicated to your Royal Highness.

Future con-
dition of
European
troops in India.

The question as to the future condition of European troops in India is not so easy to carry out as it is in principle.

I have no doubt myself that all European troops in India ought to be Queen's troops, but, as the revenues of India are to be charged with their maintenance, I think it but fair to hear what the Court of Directors have to say on the proposition. For this reason we have postponed our decision, which is not so material, as we have agreed to raise ten second battalions. I see no advantage in meeting any of the directors to talk this matter over;

what we desire is to have on paper all the facts, and then we can see how to meet and overcome difficulties. Vernon Smith has been desired to inform the Court of the strong opinion that we all entertain in favour of Queen's troops, and to ask them to state their own case fully on the other side.

We have decided not to ask for any powers as to the Militia until after the next mail, but I do not myself think it necessary. If it should become necessary to embody any portion of the Militia, it would be high time to call Parliament together again. Indian affairs.

I have no fear of the Artillery not finding sufficient guns on their arrival, and I would not delay them a day to put their material on board, but I am of the opinion that the Company are deficient in field-guns, and I have volunteered to furnish them with some from our arsenals, which will follow in ships to be taken up specially for them.

I will see immediately to the position of General Mansfield. Aided by such an officer as Chief of the Staff, to convey and see executed his orders to the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, no one should correspond directly with the Governor-General in Council, or the Governor-General unofficially, but the Commander-in-Chief. I can now understand why the appointment is so distasteful to the Court of Directors, but it must be carried out in its full spirit.

In carrying out the enclosed measures, your Royal Highness will have to consider the standard, and I would prefer in the first instance winking at close measurements to a publication of a reduced standard, because it will infallibly entail an unearned bounty, and all enlistments will be suspended till the expectation is fulfilled. I think we should send out parties into all towns as soon as we can, and reserve the agricultural districts till the harvest is over. I would also in recruiting follow the harvest from south to north. These are, however, points upon which your experience will enable you to act better than I can possibly suggest.

Plan for supplying vacuum made by reinforcements to India.

Plan for supplying the vacuum made by reinforcements to India; in order of execution:—

1. To raise all regiments at home to one thousand.
2. To replace the Artillery sent to India.
3. To form two dépôt companies of one hundred each to provide for casualties, *i.e.* each regiment twelve companies, ten in India of one hundred each, two at home of one hundred each.
4. To raise ten second battalions, at first to consist of eight companies of eighty men without dépôts, and afterwards to be increased to the full establishment when it shall be seen what the permanent force in India of Queen's troops is.
5. To raise regiments in the colonies to one thousand strong, but keeping the surplus at the dépôts, unless required to be sent abroad to strengthen garrisons from which it may be desirable to withdraw corps for general relief.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

July 26, 1857.

Plans for defences of commercial harbours.

The Queen has received a portfolio with plans for the defences of commercial harbours, as it appears, for approval and signature. She wishes me to say that no explanation has accompanied them. Is there a report in existence explaining the principles upon which the particular forms of construction have been chosen? Their fitness or unfitness must necessarily entirely depend upon the peculiarity of the locality and position in each case. Has an Artillery officer and a Naval officer been consulted? An Engineer may have made a very good fort or battery, but a Naval officer may place his ship in a position for which the Engineer was not prepared, and the Artillery may find it impossible to stand to their guns under the fire which may be brought upon them. The latter case may be very possible as the plans show all guns *en barbette*, without any sort of cover, and with regard to the shipping no soundings are shown on the plans, showing the positions ships can or must take up.

CHAPTER XXXII

AUGUST 1857

IN the letters of this month, the gravity of the situation in the East is strongly dwelt on by Lords Palmerston and Clarendon. Among measures to meet it, the strengthening of the Guards, the raising of second battalions, and the calling out of a portion of the Militia are decided on, and the details of these measures are discussed.

Meantime the Commander-in-Chief remonstrates upon the continued drain of reinforcements for India which has reduced the Infantry regiments at home to fourteen in number, and urges that this may be stayed at least until the embodied Militia regiments and newly-raised second battalions shall have had time to attain to a higher degree of military efficiency. Among arguments to this end, he presses into his service the present aspect of affairs nearer home. But Lord Palmerston differs from His Royal Highness in regarding the European horizon as serene.

The sending out of Cavalry and Artillery *viâ* Egypt with their horses, the sending of Engineers and of a Military Train, the supplying of reinforcing troops from home so as to render them in the matter of stores independent of India, are among the Duke's further recommendations.

At the same time an independent, but not inexperienced, critic advocates the employment of Cape Mounted Rifles, Kaffirs, and Fingoes against the rebellious Sepoys.

The remarks of Prince Albert on Coast Defences, and the military criticisms of the Queen further combine to lend interest to the month's correspondence.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 1, 1857.

defences of
commercial
harbours.

I have been much pleased with Captain Westmacott, and his explanations. He will have brought back to you the plans signed by the Queen. It still strikes me, however, that the best principle for coast defences is not yet quite settled, and I would suggest a further inquiry whether in detached points like those of the commercial harbours, the best and cheapest mode of defence is not a mere line of guns properly protected by parapets, but far apart, so that the concentrated battery a ship carries will not at once crush the whole fire by a broadside. A forty-gun frigate would bring twenty guns to bear upon the four-gun battery, for instance; if the four guns were detached she could silence only one, the other three playing upon her unmolested. These guns would have to depend for their security against being taken by a landing-party upon a defensible keep, tower, or work of some shape, with ditch, etc., in rear, and so placed as to look into the battery, but unassailable, and mounting one or more guns. The batteries now proposed are in some cases quite defenceless against a landing-party (however small), although having the disadvantage of the guns being huddled together; in others they depend upon a defensible barrack, defended, however, only by musketry, and not always protected itself against shot.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *August 1, 1857.*

The *smallest* siege-train that is so called consists of fifty guns, but this is [a] very small one, therefore the fact of *forty recruits* accompanying the siege-train before Delhi

is the most lamentable thing I ever heard of.¹ The real fact is that matters have now come to that pass that the troops going out should be *fully organised* as an army, and depend upon *nothing from India*. I do beg of you to send out more superior officers and a regular Staff. Artillery with guns and harness complete, Brigadiers for Infantry and Cavalry. I think this so imperatively called for that I hope you will not fail to bring it this day before the Cabinet.

Troops going to India should depend upon nothing from India.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

August 2, 1857.

The Generals' list is the most hopeless one I ever saw, and the more I look at it the less I like it. Something must be done to mend it, and to get rid of these temporary Major-Generals, the most inconvenient men possible. Windham I have had written to to succeed Reid, but who shall be taken for Scott at Bombay? A man who wants to go to India is General Mansel, and I really think he is about the best and most active man we have got, though he is somewhat old, but he did his work during the war admirably, saw every detachment at Cork on board himself, and is really a very efficient officer. Shall I send for him and make him the offer? I don't quite think Rose would do. He is an intelligent man, but of late years has had nothing to do with troops, and so to place him at the head of them would be hardly the thing. At least I should not like to take the responsibility of it. As regards the Colonels, we can do much better. . . .

The Generals' list.

The Colonels.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, August 4, 1857.

. . . I got your letter last night, and the two regiments shall be furnished, one of Cavalry and one of Infantry. But

¹ 'In the suppression of the Mutiny no want was felt more than that of Artillery. In relation to the Bengal Army Sir Charles Napier had urged the necessity for an augmentation, of the need of which the Government of India

Time has
arrived for the
Militia to be
called out.

Forces at home
reduced to
fourteen regi-
ments of
Infantry.

the time has certainly arrived for a portion of Militia to be called out, without which measure it will be quite impossible for us to carry on the duties of the United Kingdom. Besides which it is essential that we should have a force in hand of some sort or kind, and I am now reduced to *fourteen regiments of Infantry* all told, which really leaves us in a most pitiable state of destitution. Indeed no time is to be lost, and I hope you will not fail to bring the subject before your next Cabinet meeting. I have written you an official letter on this subject. We have done nothing as yet about recruiting at the Guards, but seeing the reduced state of our garrison, and that the Guards might be made available to some extent, should they be stronger in numbers (at present they are 700 per battalion), I really think we should make them up without delay to 800, or rather 900, men per battalion. . . .

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 5, 1857.

Enfield small-
arms factory.

On examining the returns for the last quarter of the works performed in the different Army Departments, the Queen was struck with the fact that the small-arms factory at Enfield has again failed to furnish any number of muskets. It has turned out in three months only 1000! The Queen wishes me to remark upon this, as at the end of the last quarter, when she remarked upon a similar want of productiveness, she was told it had been the consequence of unforeseen circumstances, and incompleteness of the machinery, which could and should not happen again, and henceforth the factory would turn out great numbers of arms in a very short time.

I am also to say that the Queen is pleased to see a sufficient force of Artillery go out to India, with a proper

was even then fully sensible. Later on, when the financial position had improved (*i.e.* in February 1856), Lord Dalhousie pressed strongly for the adoption of a plan which would add a fifth company to each of the six battalions of European foot Artillery, and a Grenadier company to each of the three Native foot batteries.'—Lee Warner's *Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, vol. ii. p. 282.

staff of officers, but that she hopes the batteries thus abstracted from the home force will be at once replaced, and the horses, which must be left behind, at once turned over to the new batteries; they were splendid animals, got together with great difficulty, and it takes years to form a good *Horse* Artillery-man in particular.

Batteries sent to India to have their places filled at home.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 12, 1857.

The Queen has had laid before her the general plan for the defences of Portsmouth and Gosport, which appears to her to be the result of close examination and the application of the best principles.

Plans for defence of Gosport and Portsmouth.

The Gosport lines are very good and ought to prevent any thought of attacking on that side; particularly if the advanced work near Rowner Church be executed, which appears at present to be only pointed out as useful in case of war.

The Hilsea lines appear also very sufficient with the work in their rear. Perhaps the advanced work at Shut Point is a little forlorn, being neither, from its design, enfiladed by the works on Portsea Island, nor, from its proposed construction, defensible in itself.

The only point which must be considered as left comparatively undefended is the long line between Fort Cumberland and Southsea Castle. The Committee have recognised the possibility of an attack upon this point, and the necessity of guarding against it, but have rather arbitrarily assumed that the attack would not be made in force. There is no reason, however, why an attack in force should not be made by gunboats at high water, and the eight guns proposed to defend that long line would be soon silenced notwithstanding the flank fire, which is given to them for mutual support. The two proposed works at Lumps and Eastney, containing accommodation for only forty men each, and these insufficiently protected, would soon be taken, and the enemy, if daring, would at once, and unopposed, enter into the interior of Portsea Island,

A weak spot in said defences.

and in a few hours set fire to the dockyards from the villages around Portsea, where he might entrench himself and hold his ground perfectly. This could not be done without a certain sacrifice, but one inconsiderable, if compared to the damage done to us. Southsea Castle, being at all hands acknowledged to be thoroughly bad, would be knocked to pieces by ships which would engage it sufficiently, and if Fort Cumberland were at the same time cut off and blocked by riflemen, the landing on the long beach at Lumps and Eastney would become very easy, and particularly so at night.

The Queen wishes these points to be considered and reported upon; either stronger works on the coast, or a work in rear, connecting Hilsea and Fort Cumberland with the main fortress and with each other, would appear essential.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 20, 1857.

calling out of
the Militia.

The Queen wishes to know when the Militia regiments will be called out, and to express her hope that they will be sufficient in number to form a reserve for eventualities. We have got all in all 10,000 bayonets in battalions in the three kingdoms (exclusive of depôts), but these include the aged, infirm, etc., etc. ! The ten new battalions cannot be raised and fit for service under a year. The Militia regiments to be called out will not be complete in numbers nor fit for service for months, volunteering would naturally further diminish them; twenty battalions would therefore be the very least you could call out. You must have plenty of money, as the transfer of 14,000 men to the East India Company, which cannot be replaced for months, leaves you a large saving, and the times are most critical.

scarcity of guns
at Woolwich.

How is it that there was not a six-pounder battery in store at Woolwich when the Horse Artillery embarked for India, and that the battery at Aldershot had absolutely to give up their guns, etc., etc., to enable six guns to go?

If we have no reserve in men, we ought at least to be able to have one in 'materials.'

The Queen hopes that you will impress a certain vigour to the arrangements which the crisis demands.

We know nothing in the Guards yet of the augmentation to 800 a battalion which is decided upon.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

August 22, 1857.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Royal Highness' note which I received this morning.

The first step towards calling out the Militia will be the passing of the Order in Council, which will be submitted to Her Majesty on the first occasion of a Council a day or two hence.

The present proposal is to call out some fourteen or fifteen regiments, the strongest in numbers, most efficient in drill, and having the smallest proportion of untrained men in them. Militia training.

I propose to form two Brigades at Aldershot with the six least efficient regiments, and to change them, as these become fit for garrison duty, with the eight or nine others which will be required to take that duty immediately. I propose to arm the whole with pattern 53, and teach them the use of it, giving them instructors as in the line. Colonel Douglas informs me that he believes that a very short period will revive the drill of the best Militia regiments. It is not intended to call on these regiments to volunteer for the Line, but to maintain them as a reserve, taking other means, and applying to other sources, for our recruits.

Should we find that 10,000 bayonets of Militia is insufficient, more can be called out.

The deficiency of material for a 6-pounder battery was not in the guns, so far as I understand it, but in the carriages, and of these we have no store, because it had been decided to forego that description of gun and to have

The future of
Artillery.

only 9 in. and 12 in. It seems this arrangement dates from 1851. I have, however, desired forty-six batteries to be mounted and kept complete as a reserve. I confess that I am somewhat cautious in forming large stores, because I am certain that our present gun of all calibres must ere long give way to rifled inventions, so as to enable Artillery to keep pace with the improved small-arms.

In regard to the Guards being raised to 800 bayonets, your Royal Highness will see by the enclosed that I gave instructions on the 8th inst. to that effect.

Defence of
Cherbourg and
Portsmouth
compared.

I have no doubt that Cherbourg struck Her Majesty, and I wish Portsmouth were as well defended. Still the sailors maintain that they can shell a fleet in Cherbourg notwithstanding the formidable precautions. I hope we may not be called upon to make the experiment. The troops in the unhappy *Transit*¹ were:—

H.M.S.
Transit.

285 95th, Calcutta.
116 59th, Hong-Kong.
193 Medical Staff Corps.

I have no doubt that they have gone to Singapore, and not to Suez, which is impossible. The whole wretched telegram requires elucidation, but I fear Sir H. Lawrence's death is too true, and his loss is the greatest calamity which could have befallen us *en personnel*.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

August 22, 1857.

On calling out
Militia.

If you discuss the Militia question in Cabinet, pray remember that it is my most decided opinion, that more Militia ought to be called out, say at the very least 30,000. If this is not done, we shall never be able to get the men we require for the Line, as it is impossible to call for volunteers for the Army from a Militia force of only 10,000 men. This is a matter of so great consequence that I cannot too strongly urge it upon you and Her Majesty's Government.

¹ Lost at sea.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 23, 1857.

Many thanks for your letter. I return the papers belonging to your office, which show that the augmentation of the Guards and the preparation of new batteries are in good train.

The Queen hopes to receive soon the answer of the Defence Committee to the observations which I made in the Queen's name in a letter to you on the plan for the defences of Portsmouth.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

August 29, 1857.

I consider the enclosed letter contains so much of importance, that I lose not a moment in forwarding it for your perusal, though I mean to write officially to you on the subject of stores for the Army. From what Somerset¹ says, it is quite clear to me that the troops we have, and are now sending out, must be supplied with everything from home. Not a moment should be lost in collecting these supplies and sending them out. You will want them there, of that there can be no doubt, but even should you not, what does it signify? Send them, and if not wanted, throw them away rather than not have them on the spot. Pray do not set the question aside lightly, it is a most important one, and we shall be justly blamed if we neglect these warnings. Don't let us wait for requisitions from the Court of Directors. The time has gone by for that. Let us act on our own responsibility with vigour, and we shall do the right thing and be praised for our forethought. There are several things contained in this letter which ought to be fully considered. Now, I would most strongly urge upon you the propriety of sending this week these Cavalry regiments destined for India, as also the Artillery, *through Egypt*, and *with their horses*. In

Importance of stores for the troops going to India, and of prompt despatch.

¹ General Somerset, commanding the British troops at Bombay.

I have been thinking of you very much lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I have managed to find some time to write to you. I have been thinking of you very much lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I have managed to find some time to write to you.

not ask for them at this moment, for I do not feel myself in a position to give them with safety to the country or the future prospects of the Army. I will prepare them quickly for reserve, but all I ask is, don't send them for a little time longer, otherwise I cannot properly prepare and keep up the required Reserves. As regards the political part of the question, of course that is no affair of mine, but I cannot help observing that Europe is not so well disposed to this country as not to cause some little anxiety, and to be entirely denuded of even the troops for one small garrison town is surely hardly prudent. Would it not be right under present circumstances, seeing the denuded state in which we are, to have something of a Channel Fleet, say 16,000 men on board ship, to protect us from insult from without?

The political aspect of the question.

Urges maintenance of a strong Channel Fleet.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *August 30, 1857.*

The objections of the Duke of Cambridge to sending away any more Infantry regiments deserve full consideration. They had not escaped my attention, but it seemed to me that we have urgent and great danger to meet in India with no additional means but such as we may send out from home. That this danger may have greatly increased by the time that troops now to be sent can arrive, and that, therefore, any reinforcement now going may be of the utmost importance at the time when it reaches India: on the other hand, we have no danger threatening us in Europe and at home. France is perfectly and sincerely friendly, Russia may snarl and growl in secret, but has been too severely chastised to venture as yet openly to show her teeth; besides which, it would be with her Navy alone that she would make a demonstration, and September is too late in the year for Baltic fleets to be put in motion, and Charles Wood could at the shortest notice place ten or twelve thousand good men on board ships of war. I am therefore in no fear of any danger threatening us at home, and as to our national reputation for strength, the best way

Great and pressing danger to be met in India.

Present situation in Europe.

of maintaining that, and of deterring any foreign power from presuming on our supposed weakness, will be to crush the Indian revolt as soon as can be done. The Duke indeed says that the regiments of the Line now at home are wanted for the purpose of organising the new battalions to be raised, at least for a time; if, on full consideration, he should think this a bar to sending away at present even two more regiments, that is an objection which must be well considered.

As to the Militia, I think the Duke underrates its efficiency, and I am much of opinion that he will find the regiments when called out quite equal to the performance of any duties which may be required of them. It will certainly be advisable to call out some Artillery regiments, and I believe some of those corps will be found to be the most efficient of the Militia regiments.

I went yesterday afternoon to Hammond and settled with him, subject to the decision of the Cabinet to-morrow, the following arrangements :—

Reinforcements
for India.

We can telegraph to Stratford to ask and obtain the consent of the Porte to the passage of troops, horses, arms, and baggage through Egypt; that consent obtained, we should send off by the small vessel always lying in the Bosphorus a messenger to the Pasha of Egypt, bearing the consent of the Sultan, and a request for the Pasha's concurrence. That obtained, the vessel would go on to Cagliari and by telegraph inform us of the result. It might then come on to Marseilles, to wait for and carry back to Alexandria the officer or officers you might send to make arrangements, and we should tell Elphinstone to send transports to Suez to be ready to take them on to Bombay or to Calcutta or Kurrachee.

General Somerset's requisitions seem large, but I agree with the Duke of Cambridge that we had better overdo than underdo our supplies. Whatever we send should be asked for officially by the East India Company, as such supplies from home stand in lieu of stores which ought to be in their Indian magazine; but when we reflect how many lives may depend, and what important results may

turn upon the want or abundance of such things, there cannot be a doubt that we ought to send all that is asked for, even though we may think it more than may be wanted.

What Somerset says about Cavalry and military horses, especially as to Cavalry horses, is obviously true.

I am much afraid that the anticipations of attempted risings at the Moharrem may be realised, and whether such attempts succeed or not, they will have caused loss among the British troops, for which reinforcements will have become necessary.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BALMORAL, August 31, 1857.

Many thanks for your letter which I received at 12 o'clock last night and sent this morning to the Queen, who will, I am sure, be pleased with what you are doing, but I have not yet heard from her, and the messenger goes at 11.

The news from India is very bad, but not worse than I expected, because the means of striking a blow and checking the revolt did not exist, nor am I surprised at the urgent demand for more troops, as it was always clear to me that Canning's demands had reference to the state of things existing at the time he wrote, and therefore that they must be insufficient for a worse state of things and still greater pressure upon his resources. In fact he felt bound, like every other Governor-General, to be careful of the Company's pockets, and to keep his requirements as low as possible.

The news from India.

The Queen and the Prince are satisfied that there is now more vigour in our Councils, though they regret that what is now doing should not have been done when the first news of the outbreak reached us. They wish that 20,000 Militia instead of 15,000 had been decided upon, and still more that 20 instead of 15 second battalions were to be raised.

Views of the Queen and Prince Albert on the situation.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

August 31, 1857.

Suggests keeping a war-ship off Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta.

In our conversation of yesterday I quite forgot to mention to you that I think a good line-of-battle ship, or frigate, off Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, would give great confidence to these presidential head-quarters. I don't know how far this would be practicable, but if it could be managed it would be desirable. I send you a letter from Colonel Edward Napier about raising Kaffirs and Fingoes. I hardly think it practicable, but it is worth the experiment, and Colonel Napier might be asked to go out to raise them himself.

COLONEL NAPIER TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

August 29, 1857.

Colonel Napier recommends employment of Kaffir and Fingo troops in India.

I avail myself—though with some diffidence—of your Royal Highness' condescending permission, of sometimes communicating with your Royal Highness on military matters, to state that a short time ago I sent the accompanying communication to the *Times*, and having since received letters from officers of high rank and standing in the service, approving much of my suggestion, I have taken the great liberty of bringing it to the notice of your Royal Highness, as perhaps it may be deemed worthy of attention at this moment, when every available arm is in requisition to quell the rebellion and administer the sternest retributive justice for all those atrocities that have been so lately committed in the East.

From having been many years in India and several likewise in Southern Africa, I think—from my knowledge of the natives of both those parts of the world—that I can (if it is deemed practicable) advisedly recommend the adoption of the plan I suggest, on the feasibility of which I have likewise communicated with my friend Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape. Independently of their real efficacy as brave and hardy soldiers, whose constitution is well adapted to the climate of India, the very name of

'Kaffir' (which in Hindostanee means *infidel, unbeliever*, and everything that both Hindoo and Mussulman most abhor) would strike terror into the rebellious Sepoys, who might easily fancy, on beholding such a force, that we had by some supernatural agency enlisted against them in our cause a host of fiends! Whilst (from having on several occasions acted with, and commanded bodies of the Cape Mounted Rifles) I can answer for the efficiency of the latter, not only as irregular Cavalry, but as constituting excellent 'Voltigeurs' on foot; for while one trooper remained mounted, taking care of the horses of his two right and left comrades, the latter would often with their double-barrelled rifles and unerring aim do excellent service as Light Infantry in the 'Bush.'

THE INDIAN ARMY

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'TIMES'

There can be but one opinion, that when we shall again have conquered India, its native army must be entirely remodelled, and composed of very different materials from those of which it has been formed up to the present time.

Colonel
Napier's letter
to the *Times*.

Dearly-bought experience has proved the necessity of having in that country a far greater body of English soldiers than the parsimony of the Hon. East India Company has hitherto allowed; but the climate alone of India will prevent our being able to maintain a footing there, without the co-operation of coloured troops. Neither indigenous Hindoos nor Mahommedans are apparently to be trusted. Arabs might, it is true, be subsidised, but they would prove troublesome customers. Negro regiments could be raised for Indian service in the West Indies, or the western coast of Africa, but (supposing always that we could induce them to 'take the shilling' and to expatriate themselves for a certain length of time) there are no troops of that description who would be found more efficient than the Kaffirs, or even the Fingoes

of our own settlements in Southern Africa; 8000 or 10,000 of these fine stalwart fellows, drilled as Light Infantry and properly commanded, would be a match for 'lakhs' of Asiatics; heat, fatigue, privation, and danger they would set at naught, and could sufficient inducements be only held out to tempt a few thousands of them to cross the 'great water,' they would not only do good service in Hindostan, but relieve the colonists of our eastern provinces at the Cape from as many slippery and troublesome neighbours. Southern Africa could also supply excellent coloured Cavalry; few bodies of horse can be, for desultory or irregular warfare, more efficient than our gallant 'Cape Mounted Rifles,' chiefly composed of Hottentots, to whom a tropical climate would be congenial, and whose light weight would be well adapted to the small breed of horses in the East. See what good service these sturdy little fellows have always performed in our numerous Kaffir wars, and depend upon it equally good service would they render on the now blood-stained plains of Hindostan.

E. NAPIER, Colonel.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

August 31, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty's signature twelve more warrants for embodying additional Militia regiments in Great Britain.

Reinforcements
for India.

The names of these regiments will be sent to Your Majesty as they are fixed upon, care being taken to select the most effective regiments and to include in the number at least two regiments of M. Artillery. The additional force to be sent to India will be as follows:—

- 1 Troop H. Artillery.
- 3 Batteries of Field-Artillery.
- 5 Companies of batt. Artillery.
- 4 Companies of R. Engineers.
- 3 Regiments of Cavalry with a General of Brigade.
- 4 Regiments of Infantry.

Lord Panmure, with the consent of the Cabinet, has given H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief a discretion to form the cadres of fifteen second battalions as he may deem most expedient with a view to forming the corps most speedily.

Lord Panmure will forward to Your Majesty to-morrow a scheme for permitting an individual to raise a regiment at once, reserving to Your Majesty the right of nominating the officers.

Lord Panmure observes from the detailed accounts in the papers to-day that the mutineers seem to be running short of caps. There are none to be had except at the manufactories, which are at Calcutta and Bombay. There was a considerable supply in Delhi, but some of these are supposed to be blown up. Ball ammunition would seem to be getting scarce among them.

Mutineers
reported to be
running short
of caps.

CHAPTER XXXIII

SEPTEMBER 1857

IN the correspondence of this month the Mutiny continues to be the one all-absorbing topic.

Writing from Balmoral, whither he had gone as Cabinet Minister in attendance, Lord Clarendon states that the thoughts of the Queen and Prince Albert seem to be exclusively occupied with the Army, the means of recruiting, and the course to be pursued for carrying on the 'monster struggle.' Hence, whilst advocating the raising of additional new battalions, and trusting that those already decided upon will be strengthened to their full establishment of twelve companies, the Queen expresses her approval of the formation of military reserves at the Cape and Ceylon, providing, however, that such reserves be not employed on interior duty. She, likewise, favours the embodying of a larger force of Militia than had hitherto been intended.

In supporting the Queen's views in these matters, Lord Palmerston adds the suggestion of raising a Negro regiment or two in Canada, to replace a West India regiment which it is proposed to send to Bengal. As to the latter proposal, the Governor of Demerara gives as his opinion that it would have a 'good moral effect,' and further suggests raising Negro troops for the performance of labours which would tell heavily on the whites in India.

In the midst of these and other suggestions, the Duke of Cambridge, on the side, as usual, of precaution and

conservatism, deprecates the proposal to reduce the numbers of our troops in the colonies, and regards with disfavour the idea of Volunteer Corps. Meantime recruiting at home is going on admirably.

But, judged by the light of recent events, undoubtedly the most interesting passage in the month's letters is that which relates to the volunteering of the Canadian Artillery Corps at Kingston (Canada) to serve in India. The offer was at that time regarded as somewhat startlingly novel. But, writes Mr. Labouchere to Lord Palmerston (September 23rd), 'I cannot imagine why means cannot be found of employing colonists who make such an offer. I feel sure that the effect of doing so would, in the colony itself, be most useful.'

Side by side with the above, it is regrettable to read in Palmerston's letter of September 28th, that 'Young Ireland' is praising the mutineers through its newspaper organs, and calling on the Irish to follow their example.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 1, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty's information the papers to which he referred in his letter of yesterday, accompanied by some others which may be interesting to Your Majesty. Military arrangements consequent on the outbreak in India.

Lord Panmure has arranged with the Admiralty to send the *Vulcan* troop-ship immediately to Halifax, to bring home the 76th, and the *Conqueror* will return to the Mediterranean to bring home one of the regiments due from that quarter, and will convey orders to Lord Lyons to give all the aid he can by means of his fleet to expedite the return of the others.

Sir Edmund Head, having intimated that he can spare a regiment from Canada, it is probable that one may be brought from thence.

Lord Panmure thinks that Your Majesty will be pleased with the progress of the recruiting, a return of which he encloses.

All the machinery for raising and embodying the Militia, and despatching the reinforcements for India, will be set in motion to-morrow.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 2, 1857.*

Views of the
Queen and
Prince Albert
as to Army
measures
necessitated by
the Mutiny
in India.

Your letter of the 29th has been maturely considered by the Queen and the Prince, and by their desire I communicate to you the following remarks. The mode of raising men for the Army by providing regiment by regiment is entirely approved, so is the plan for forming reserves at the Cape and Ceylon, provided that such reserves are not employed on interior duty, but are brigaded and have a Brigade Major. Twenty thousand or even twenty-five thousand Militia would be much preferred to fifteen thousand.

It is considered that, instead of fifteen second battalions, twenty-five ought to be raised, now that more troops are to be sent to India. Thirty battalions are now gone, and they will be at the expense of the East India Company; they should be replaced with the least possible delay, and this would facilitate the absorption of half-pay officers. The new battalions should not at first go to India, but should be employed at home or in the colonies, relieving other regiments which might go to India.

The five companies of Foot Artillery now ordered to India should be replaced by the same numbers, and the utmost exertion should be used in replacing the two companies of Royal Engineers.

The three regiments of Cavalry now ordered to India should be replaced by adding to the strength of the Cavalry regiments at home, handing over to them the horses.

The Queen approves of the arrangement respecting

Generals Michel¹ and Ashburnham. If the *Vulcan* and *Conqueror* can be sent to Halifax and the Mediterranean for troops, why should not more of H.M.'s ships be employed for the conveyance of troops?

I believe that the above were the principal remarks made, and I need not tell you that the anxiety felt upon the whole subject is extreme—the state of the Army, the means of recruiting, and the course to be pursued for carrying on the monster struggle in which we are engaged, seem exclusively to occupy the thoughts of the Queen and the Prince.

Pray let Palmerston see this letter.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 4, 1857.*

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord Panmure's letters of the 31st and 1st inst. She is much pleased with the improvement shown in the arrangements for raising an Army capable of acting as a Reserve for India, and as a defence for this country.

She thinks, however, twenty new battalions will be required instead of fifteen, and trusts that these fifteen will at least be put upon their full establishment of twelve companies each. The great drain of Cavalry will render it necessary to strengthen the remaining regiments to the full amount of men and horses abstracted. The country saving all the officers of seven regiments, two new troops should be given to the home regiments, which would make them efficient.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *September 21, 1857.*

The two companies from the regiment at Malta will go on by the mail-steamer which left, or was to leave, Southampton yesterday. Will you give the necessary Reinforcements for India.

¹ Sir John Michel, British General employed in China.

orders for 150 or 200 Sappers and Miners to go by the next mail-steamer, which will start a fortnight hence? They will go to Bombay. They should go in plain clothes, with their uniforms in packages, and their arms and ammunition packed up likewise, in parcels fit for carriage across the desert, if arms are necessary for them. The India Board should be informed that the men will be ready, in order that that Board may make arrangements with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company.

The *Chesapeake* frigate is under orders for Bombay; would it not be well to send by her a quantity of gunpowder, shot and shell, and cartridges? I think that every transport which goes to India ought to take out a supply of these things over and above what belongs to the troops which the transport carries. There is so much shooting going on in India, with great guns and small-arms, that it is very possible they may run short of ammunition. Caps should also not be forgotten.

I wish you would take the necessary steps for setting agoing the arrangements for raising the Maltese regiment, and the additional West India regiment to be formed out of the blacks in Canada. These operations will take much time in their completion, and we ought not to delay beginning them. When will the troops now under orders be ready to embark? The Directors say the ships will be ready before the troops, especially the Cavalry. I suppose the delay arises from the time requisite to get the men of other regiments to volunteer in numbers enough to fill up the regiments that are to go.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

September 25, 1857.

Suggests
raising a black
regiment in
Canada.

I send you the enclosed from Labouchere. I am all for raising a black regiment from the Negroes in Canada, and for sending it as soon as formed to the West Indies to take the place of a West India regiment to be sent on to India. If we find no great difficulty in raising one black regiment in Canada, we might go on to raise a second.

These troops would be very useful in India, and there are in India many Negroes from Africa. The sight of black men would therefore be no novelty, but it would indicate the beginning of a flow from a source which they know to be inexhaustible.

Why should not the Canadian Artillery be gratified by a couple of years' service in India?

MR. LABOUCHERE¹ TO LORD PALMERSTON

Private.

September 23, 1857.

I send you a letter from Governor Wodehouse of Demerara about the black regiment for India. It seems to me that his suggestions are well worthy of attention. Perhaps you will send it on to Panmure.

The Canadian Artillery Corps at Kingston in Canada have volunteered to go to India. Panmure wishes me to write to say that the General declines their offer. I confess that I have great doubts of the wisdom of this step, and am afraid that it will be ill-received in Canada. I cannot imagine why means cannot be found of employing colonists who make such an offer. I feel sure that the effect of doing so would in the colony itself be most useful. I will consult Sir E. Head² about it, and not write to Canada till after the next Cabinet, when you can tell me what you think about it.

Colonial troops
volunteer for
service in India.

GOVERNOR WODEHOUSE TO MR. LABOUCHERE

Saturday Afternoon.

I have only just found here your note, and must answer it in five minutes to save the post. My own opinion is that it might have a very good moral effect if one of the West India regiments were sent to Bengal. They have no sort of affinity for the natives of India, and would pro-

Proposed
employment of
a West India
regiment.

¹ Secretary of State for the Colonies.

² Formerly Governor-General of Canada.

bably stand the climate well. But it ought under present circumstances to be a regiment in good order and well commanded, and therefore, as you have done me the honour to refer to me on the matter, I shall venture to add that there can be no sort of comparison between the 2nd West India Regiment and the other two.

Certainly an increase of the white troops in the West Indies is desirable, and I really believe that the country would not lose in any way by sending one white regiment there in exchange for the black for India.

Perhaps it may be worth while for the Government to consider whether a great effort should not be made to raise black Negro troops for the performance of work which would tell heavily on the whites in India.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

September 25, 1857.

*Commends
tentes d'abri.*

I returned safely last night,¹ and am much pleased with my reception at Chalons and all I have seen of the French Army. There is one thing which I shall propose to you to adopt for our Army, and that is the *tentes d'abri*,² which are decidedly most excellent and worthy of imitation. I believe you have some in store from the Crimea, and I think you should issue some to me for trial. I saw Smith³ to-day. He had been with Mr. Labouchere, and had discussed with him some plans for further diminishing our troops in the colonies. I do not approve of these plans, and must warn you against carrying them out. We have reduced our forces sufficiently everywhere, and shall run great risk if we go any further in this respect. Canada must have new regiments, Sir William Eyre in his last letter suggesting even an increase to the Canadian Rifles,

¹ From a visit to the French Emperor at Chalons, to witness the military reviews.

² Described by Hamley as small roofs of canvas, propped on short sticks at each end, each accommodating three occupants with space to lie down. Though extremely portable, these tents afford little defence against mud and snow.

³ Vernon Smith.

which, however, I fear it will be difficult to comply with, though I wish it could be done. I would not move a black regiment from the West Indies until I had a new one, as now proposed to be raised in Canada, to replace it. From New South Wales, again, I should certainly not remove a regiment, for these vast colonies must have some force, merely as a protection to the authority of the Government. I cannot forget the observation made by the Emperor Napoleon, who said, in alluding to our Indian affairs, that we should keep an eye to all our colonies, and on no account think of reducing our force in them, as a mutiny was a very catching thing, and nobody could foresee how other localities might take the infection.

Deprecates proposal to reduce our troops in the colonies.

I agree with him, and on this account warn you against any measures to reduce further our colonial forces. As soon as one or two corps of the new battalions are formed, I can send them abroad, and then some of the older regiments can proceed to India, in case of your wanting further reinforcements for that country. I also hope you will on no account give way to Volunteer Corps, of which I see so much said in the newspapers. These never will answer; they are unmanageable bodies, and would ruin our Army. I consider that the recruiting is going on admirably, and I really feel very confident of the success of our efforts. . . . I have proposed Havelock to you for the substantive rank of Major-General, to which I make no doubt you will at once assent. . . . I find it is again intended to send the Sappers by way of Egypt. I have no objection to such a plan, but I do beg of you to insist upon their going in *uniform* and as soldiers. It will be impossible to answer for the consequences if they do not, and depend upon it we shall get into a scrape if we try to smuggle them through, as it cannot be done without everybody knowing who they are. The Emperor Napoleon asked me several times if we did not intend to make use of Egypt for the conveyance of troops, so there will be no difficulty in that question, and indeed I feel confident that he will be surprised and not altogether pleased if we make a mystery of it. He likes to be treated with confidence,

Against Volunteer Corps.

Recruiting is going on admirably.

Urges that Engineers being sent out to India by way of Egypt shall go openly as soldiers.

The French Emperor's views on this question.

and it is far better to trust him in this matter, as in all others, so pray urge it strongly.

I highly approve of your strong letter to the Court of Directors.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *September 28, 1857.*

I am very anxious to hear that the troops last ordered out to India have sailed. It is quite evident that they will be much wanted before they can arrive.

Young Ireland, the Catholic Party and its newspaper organs in Dublin are trying to do all the mischief they can. They are praising the mutineers, and calling upon the Irish to follow their example.

Attitude of the
disaffected
Irish.
Troops for
Ireland.

I think it will be advisable to call out and embody five thousand more Militia, making twenty thousand in all, and it would be best to bring over to England all the Irish regiments belonging to the Catholic counties, and to send English regiments to Ireland.

Some of the Northern Irish regiments would be well left in Ireland. They are chiefly Protestants, and would be delighted to put down the Croppys if they should rise.

Recruiting.

The recruiting seems to go on prosperously, but would it not be better to lower the standard to what it was during the Crimean War? The great object is to get men *soon*, in order that they may be trained soon, and that we may have reinforcements to send to India.

One man now is worth two three months hence, and if five foot four was good enough against the Russians, it is surely good enough against the Sepoys.

All agree that Cavalry is much wanted in India; what is now the Cavalry standard for height?

CHAPTER XXXIV

OCTOBER 1857

By the beginning of October anxiety over the crisis in India had entered its acutest phase.

The need for more troops is urgent, writes the Duke of Cambridge, the Bengal army having 'disappeared,' whilst those of Bombay and Madras are not to be trusted. Our own troops are running out of ammunition, and are without shoes, harness, and other necessities.

To meet this emergency, he urges either the calling out of the whole of the Militia, or the raising of a Foreign Legion, or, as an alternative to the latter, the admission of foreigners to British regiments. Yet it is noticeable that his military conservatism is still strongly opposed to Volunteer Corps, a point in which Panmure shares his opinion. Slightly later, he advocates the sending of a Brigade of Guards to the East. Most of the troops and needful supplies are to be sent out by the overland route, for which the necessary international arrangements have now been completed.

Lord Panmure's reply to His Royal Highness shows that his head had not lost its coolness. For the present it is considered enough to embody 25,000 of the Militia, whilst it has also been decided not to have recourse to foreign legionaries, who, when once they have served the immediate purpose for which they are raised, may easily constitute a source of danger. 'The mutiny in India is no doubt vast,' adds the writer, 'but it will vanish as

suddenly as it sprung up. Delhi once taken, the mutineers will melt away. I do not believe that either Bombay or Madras will break out. The regiments which I have asked to be in readiness I do not expect will be wanted.' He also opposes the sending of Guards to India.

Meantime recruiting at home progresses at the great rate of 4000 a month, and the new second battalions which had been decided on are rapidly being formed.

Also, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland takes a much more favourable view of Irish loyalty than had been taken by an anonymous correspondent whose well-meant warning Lord Palmerston had considered not unworthy of notice.

In connection with the raising of four Cavalry regiments for India, the Cabinet has decided, in opposition to the views of both War Minister and Commander-in-Chief, that they shall be raised by the Company rather than the Crown. 'The military administration of India,' writes Panmure, in acquiescing in this, 'must be directly under the military authorities at home, but it must be well arranged and the foundations made sure, before the present system, bad and hollow as it is, can be broken down.'

Before the end of the month, news of the capture of Delhi had reached England.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

NEWBURGH PARK, EASING WOLD, *October 2, 1857.*

Most serious
condition of
affairs in India.

Shoes and
ammunition for
troops in India.

. . . Matters there [in India] are very bad, and we must exert ourselves greatly or all will go ill. I have requested Yorke to send you all the letters I have got, and which I send up by to-day's bag, and to speak to you about an immediate supply of shoes for the men, say 100,000 pairs, also ammunition, which Sir Colin wishes to be sent out *overland*, as he is in such great want of it. I would send a military agent as Consul to Alexandria and

Suez to forward men and supplies as they reach from home and are to be passed through Egypt. You must have some responsible persons in Egypt, or else all will go wrong.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Confidential.

NEWBURGH PARK, *October 2, 1857.*

I feel more than ever uneasy about the state of affairs in India, from the private accounts I have this day received from the Commander-in-Chief of the three Presidencies. All these letters I have desired Yorke to forward to you, and you will observe from all that the cry is for more troops, that the Bengal army has calmly disappeared, and that neither the Madras nor Bombay can be trusted. In fact, that these latter tolerate us, but no more, fearing that reinforcements are not far distant who would overcome them. It therefore becomes a matter of the most serious moment to consider how we are to augment and keep efficient a very considerable number of troops beyond our usual establishment.

Urgency of
sending more
troops to India.

Our recruiting is going on wonderfully well, particularly for the time of year, and we may say we are getting upwards of 4000 men per month, 1200 in fact per week, which would be at the rate of 60,000 a year. But even these large numbers are not sufficient for the demand, and if it can be further increased it ought to be so. I dismiss at once from my mind all the ideas I see stated in the public prints about Volunteer Corps. If such a system were to be adopted, the spirit of the regular army would be destroyed, jealousies would at once be engendered, the Volunteers would do as much or as little duty as they liked, and, in fact, they would be an armed and a very dangerous rabble. Some gentlemen are coming forward promising to raise 1000 men for a Lieut.-Colonelcy, other 100 men for an Ensigncy, but none have as yet found anything like that number of men, and I doubt much whether many will succeed in their expectations.

Great success of
recruiting.

Opposes
Volunteer
Corps.

Urges putting
the entire
Militia of the
United King-
dom under
arms.

Two courses now remain for us, the one the calling out the whole of the Militia, the other the raising a Foreign Legion. Now I admit that it would be most desirable to be able to recruit our Army from our own resources and our own countrymen, and I am disposed to think that to a great extent it can be done. But if it is to be accomplished to the large extent now required, the whole Militia of the United Kingdom must in the first instance be put under arms. I am well aware that it is not wanted for home defence, I am also aware that it would entail a very heavy expenditure, but we are in the midst of a great, a fearful crisis; great exertions are required to be made by the country if it intends to get over it. England will get over it, and will make these exertions. Let not the responsible advisers of the Crown hang back. It is by calling out the Militia only, that the whole military ardour of the country will be roused. Then get the Militia clothed and embodied, and the Red Coat will soon induce the men to volunteer in numbers to the Line. I may be told the Lieut.-Colonels of the Militia will object to this. My reply is, if they do, they are not worthy to fill the honourable position they occupy. But they will not object. They dare not object. The country would never stand it, and an officer making difficulties, on account of his authority being interfered with, in such an emergency as the present would be scouted out of society, and would be held up to the contempt which he deserved.

The alternative,
to raise foreign
regiments.

However, if this is not to be done or thought of, or indeed simultaneously with calling out the Militia, why not raise some foreign regiments? Begin with two or three, and increase that number if it is found to answer. Now if this plan should be decided upon, I would suggest that the recruiting for these foreigners should not be conducted in other countries, but in England itself. I am confident it could be done, and the men would come over by hundreds. I would not have Germans, Swiss, or Italians separately, but I would mix them all up together, and, above all, I would have the English Army system established, discipline and interior economy; and I would

officer the whole of these corps by English officers. A few foreign officers might be taken, but none without the highest character as to conduct and intelligence in the armies in which they may have served, and all others should be summarily rejected. Should this plan not be acceptable to you, I would then suggest that some foreigners might be taken into all our English regiments, say at the rate of ten per week. These could do no harm, and our men would keep them in their places. But I propose a few foreign battalions complete incorporated into the English Army, as the French have a Foreign Legion always in Algeria, whose conduct and discipline have been invariably good. You might raise this legion as Queen's troops for India, let it serve there regularly, and keep it from falling into bad Indian habits by changing its station occasionally, a battalion or two at a time to the Cape, Mauritius, Ceylon, and even England if it is thought advantageous. Some such step, believe me, will have to be adopted, therefore the sooner it is determined upon the better. As soon as I have filled up the Cavalry regiments to eight troops, I shall ask you for two or three more Cavalry regiments, for it is very clear that this force will be specially required for India for a very long time to come. I shall also require two additional troops of Horse Artillery, and probably one or two more battalions of Artillery, but I do not press this till I get some more recruits up.

Prospect of
additional
Cavalry being
required.

And now I must bring to your notice the wants of the Indian Army. It is clear from Sir Colin's letter that it is deficient in *everything*. Not a spare set of harness in store, no shoes, no ammunition, no man able to make use of the beautiful machinery sent out to make Minié bullets. It is almost incredible, and yet from the first I feared it and told you so, but you thought otherwise, relying very naturally on the assurance of the Company. . . . This must, however, be remedied. I would send 100,000 pairs of shoes of the largest size, that is to say of various sizes, but large ones. The ammunition must evidently go overland. Sir Colin says he cannot get on without it, so it

Wants of the
Indian Army.

must be sent. I would strongly urge upon you the necessity of at once establishing a military officer as agent for the furtherance of stores both at Alexandria and Suez. Without such agents we shall never be able to get on, and the overland route must henceforth be largely used for the conveyance not alone of stores but of men. A regular transit for soldiers should now be established. At first it would have been no gain to have sent men that way, as no transport was established, but now it can be established, and it ought to be insisted upon.

Overland route
to be used for
military
purposes.

We have sent harness and guns for most of the battalions, but it is not enough. Pray send large supplies, also plenty of shot and shell. . . . The real fact is that our Army in India now should be treated as a force to be chiefly supplied from home. Such being the case, every facility should be afforded to us to know its state. This we are not sufficiently informed of, and the time is come when you must speak out to the Court of Directors and insist upon having more power in these matters than has been hitherto the case. This opens a large question which it will be necessary for us to discuss more fully, for it is my very decided opinion that two armies cannot co-exist as they at present do in India without serious injury to the State. But, of that, more hereafter. Meanwhile pray supply everything in abundance, and send whatever is most urgently required, particularly the *ammunition*, and this in large quantities, overland. However, I think I have said enough for once. Pray decide the most important points contained in this letter before the Cabinet again leaves London, if such be possible.

Indian Army
must be
supplied from
home.

Danger of
co-existence of
two armies.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 3, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a list of the Militia regiments of Great Britain and Ireland, showing those which have been already ordered for

embodiment, and those in England and Scotland which it is intended to embody, so as to raise the number of Militia from 15,000 to 25,000 to be placed under arms.

Some of the Militia regiments ordered for embodiment are coming up very well, others not so well, so that it is necessary to call out a considerable number of regiments to secure the force required. . . .

Embodiment
of Militia
regiments.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

October 5, 1857.

I am glad to find by your letter that your views and mine coincide in nearly every point as regards what ought to be done. . . . The troops you want shall be prepared at once for India, but before giving out any order about them, I think it right to bring to your notice that in my opinion the time has arrived when we ought to be thinking of a Brigade of Guards for the East. A very large portion of the Army are now either in India or on their road thither. Every branch of the service takes its share of the arduous duties, but hitherto the Guards have been excepted. Would it be right that they should be excepted any longer? I think not, and I think it would be a great blow to the institution of the Guards if they were not now to be permitted to go out, when the Mutiny has taken such vast dimensions, and one or two campaigns must evidently be fought. Of course, as soon as the thing is over, the Guards would return to England. I could give you three splendid battalions of 800 rank and file each, all good and efficient men, who would form a magnificent reserve in the work to be accomplished, and would arrive just at the right moment if you would send them through Egypt, as might be perfectly done. I advise, therefore, that a Brigade of Guards be at once put under orders for India with Her Majesty's sanction. We have a precedent for it, as in the rebellion in Canada two battalions were sent, and remained there some time. I hope you will arrange the transit through Egypt. . . .

Urges sending
a Brigade of
the Guards to
India.

Use of over-
land route.

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

October 6, 1857.

I am honoured with two letters from your Royal Highness of 2nd and 5th current. . . .

Schemes for
reinforcement.

It would be a great gratification to me to meet your Royal Highness, as we might have some conversation. In case this does not occur, I may mention that I think the plan of calling out the whole Militia somewhat premature, and the Cabinet came to this conclusion. Twenty-five thousand of that force will not only provide for the service of the country, but be sufficient to spread the scarlet fever well through the land.

I have thrown cold water on all schemes of 'Gentlemen Volunteers,' and I was surprised to see the *Times* so foolish on the subject. I quite agree with your Royal Highness in their utter uselessness; the danger would be greater to their friends than the foes.

The proposals of private individuals to raise regiments and companies are visionary, as none have the least prospect of success as far as I know.

Objections
to raising a
Foreign Legion.

There are many objections to raising a Foreign Legion :—

1. You can only do so by calling Parliament together and obtaining its sanction, which would not be so easy.
2. The expense is very much more than if you gave a treble bounty to men in your own country.
3. There are strong political objections against introducing into India a Foreign Legion, who would when they left your service remain in the country and probably be adopted by the independent Rajahs, and at some future time prove thorns in your side.
4. It will, even supposing the above difficulties overcome, take a long time to bring foreigners to

our drill and a competent understanding of our words of command. The Cabinet have decided, after consideration upon these points, not to raise foreign legionaries at present.

Whenever your Royal Highness has filled up the additional troops, I will submit to the Cabinet the subject of additional Cavalry regiments.

I scarcely think that more Artillery will be required.

The East India Company are to get 4000 spare sets of harness from me, and steps are likewise taken to send ammunition as speedily as may be. There is difficulty in getting any quantity overland, but they will probably get all the China supply. I have put the shoes in train. Horse-shoes the chairs¹ positively decline. I quite agree with your Royal Highness that we must know more of our troops in India, and also of the resources of the East India Company from which they profess to supply an army. I now come to your Royal Highness' letter of the 5th.

I am very doubtful of the policy of sending the Guards to India. Were any glory to be achieved, they should have their share. But by the time they got there they could be of no use but as a patrol. Moreover, you could not replace them so easily as the Line, and I confess that I like to keep the Guards at home and around the sovereign's person as long as I can.

The mutiny in India is no doubt vast, but it will vanish as suddenly as it sprung up. Delhi once taken, the mutineers will melt away. I do not believe that either Bombay or Madras will break out. The regiments which I have asked to be in readiness I do not expect will be wanted, unless it be for Madras, where Lord Harris is much and overmuch alarmed.

I quite agree that in our arrangements across the desert no delay must occur in the transit.

We are contemplating sending a black regiment immediately. . . .

¹ The official term for the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Company.

Forecast of
events in India.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

October 8, 1857.

Your proposed instructions are excellent, and the measures which they prescribe will be of very great advantage to the Army. You will save many lives, and preserve the health and strength of hundreds of soldiers. . . .

I return you the letter of the Duke of Cambridge.

If there were a real war going on, in India, for instance, against a Russian invasion, or a French Army, it might be right to send some of the Guards thither, but they are not wanted in India with a view to their own military reputation, and they are wanted in England as a reserve for all possible contingencies in Europe.

As to the proposal of sending the Guards to India.

I quite agree with you that sending them to India would look as if we were put to our last shifts and were forced to play out our last trump card.

The Canadian rebellion was a different thing, the Yankees were close by, and there was no saying what enemy our troops might have to meet.

PS.—I am rather for letting the India Company raise their pigmy Cavalry¹ on further reflection. I doubt our being able to give for refusal any reason which would be satisfactory to Parliament.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, October 11, 1857.

Carlisle is right in saying that there is no serious danger to be apprehended from Ireland, but what I want to prevent is any, even the slightest, outbreak, and this is only to be done by showing that we have in Ireland a sufficient Saxon force to make any movement on the part of the Celts perfectly hopeless, and sure to bring immediate destruction on those who take part in it. Any outbreak

The way to prevent an outbreak in Ireland.

¹ So called because below the standard of height required for the Queen's service.

of any kind in Ireland would be magnified by our enemies and rivals, and would greatly weaken our political position in Europe. . . .

LORD CARLISLE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

VICE-REGAL LODGE, U.R.L., *October 8, 1857.*

Many thanks for the trophies, which have arrived safely, and the Corporation are in debate upon the best locality for them.

I believe, as well as very sincerely hope, that you take a graver view of danger from Ireland than is requisite. There is always a certain chronic amount of disaffection in Ireland, which events now and then bring to the surface, and the people who had forgotten its existence feel surprised and startled. The embodiment of the Militia is a great purifier of peccant humours, and I hope you will soon let me call out some more. I want very particularly to beg that, when this is done, you will at all events let there be not less than three regiments called out on the next occasion.

Lord Carlisle on
Irish loyalty.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 16, 1857.

. . . Lord Panmure has likewise the honour to submit to Your Majesty the name of Sir John Lawrence for the dignity of Grand Cross of the Civil Order of the Bath.

Sir John Lawrence is strongly recommended for the honour by the Court of Directors, and the great success with which his administration of the Punjab has been distinguished marks him as one well worthy of Your Majesty's favour.

Services of Sir
J. Lawrence
recommended
for recognition.

His revenues have been punctually paid notwithstanding the excitements, and his levies in aid of Your Majesty's forces are proofs of his energy and zeal.

Under these circumstances Lord Panmure submits his name with confidence to Your Majesty.

LORD PANMURE TO THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

TAYMOUTH, *October 28, 1857.*

I promised your Royal Highness to answer your letter from this, and I now redeem that promise.

An unacceptable decision of the Cabinet.

I am not surprised at your vexation at the decision of the Cabinet,¹ but I confess that I regret that you should have entered an official protest against it, as, after all, it is a decision of a collective government, taken with a full knowledge of your Royal Highness' opinion, and to which in our individual capacity you and I must bow.

Sharing in that opinion, I can assure you that I fully stated it, but the Cabinet were of opinion that under the circumstances it was better to permit the East India Company to raise these regiments, as Cavalry is the force of all others we require in India. I cannot see that it at all embarrasses the question of the future control of European troops in India, because, whatever is decided, all the Company's European regiments must bow to it.

This is a question which will require long and mature consideration, as it develops new features and political considerations the more one thinks of it. I do not shrink from my opinion that the military administration of India must be directly under the military authorities at home, but it must be well arranged, and the foundations made sure, before the present system, bad and hollow as it is, can be broken down. I will send your letter to Lord Palmerston and let him see the full strength of your objections.

I have written to Mr. Vernon Smith to look well to his law before he goes too far, but I believe myself that the East India Company have full legal authority to raise these men, if sanctioned by the authority of the responsible advisers of the Queen.

These regiments will be officered by the large body in the East India Company's pay, for whom they must provide, and this could not have been accomplished by your

¹ It was necessary to raise Cavalry for India. The Duke of Cambridge and Lord Panmure wished that the regiments raised should be royal regiments, but the Cabinet decided against them.

Royal Highness ; you could only have taken a portion, whereas they will take the whole so far as the force to be raised admits ; they may give promotion to merit, and without creation of fresh patronage to themselves will fill up the corps.

This business does not lie in my official administration, and I presume that either Lord Palmerston or Mr. V. Smith have informed the Queen of the decision of the Cabinet, and I trust that reflection will reconcile your Royal Highness to that decision.

I received last night the gratifying news of the fall of Delhi. It has been dearly bought, but the results are immense. At least 5000 men can be immediately sent to Lucknow, and I hope Sir Colin has already arranged his Divisions to sweep India from one end to the other.

News of fall
of Delhi.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 30, 1857.*

We agreed in Cabinet yesterday that I should write to the Duke of Cambridge to say that we had well considered the question about the four regiments of Cavalry to be raised by the East India Company, and that we saw no reason to change the decision we had come to. We cannot gag a Commander-in-Chief, nor prevent him from stating any objections which he may feel to any decision taken by the Cabinet on a military question, but we can tell him civilly that we abide by our own opinion.

The capture of Delhi, followed, as I trust it will be, by the relief of Lucknow, will give a new character to the contest. It will now resemble a widespread tiger-hunt.

CHAPTER XXXV

NOVEMBER 1857

THE few letters of November 1857 show that the pressure of anxiety for India has begun to be relieved. There are proposals for conferring honours on Lord Canning, Sir John Lawrence, Generals Archdale Wilson and Have-lock; and before the month is out, the Duke of Cambridge announces the reinforcement of Lucknow. Further, subjects not directly connected with the Mutiny are dealt with: for example, Military Education, in reference to which the Commander-in-Chief makes the suggestion, at that time apparently novel, that officers be made to undergo examination in professional subjects before receiving promotion.

A sympathetic letter of the Queen's refers to a forthcoming distribution of the V.C.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

HORSE GUARDS, *November 3, 1857.*

Military
education.

The papers on education for the Staff School and for the future organisation of the Royal Military College have been returned to me by Her Majesty *unsigned*, and with the accompanying observations which I would request of you to return to me. There is a good deal of truth in what the Prince states as to Mathematical studies. I have shown these observations to Cameron, and he is rather disposed himself to think that we have gone too far in requiring four books of Euclid. I have therefore desired him to reconsider the subject and to prepare an amended

program of studies, which will be ready for your decision when you return to town. The Adjutant-General and Military Secretary are further of opinion that it will be quite impossible to carry out the system of Provisional Commissions, and that the plan will break down under the pressure from officers with their regiments in the field. I think they are right, and we have, I think, induced Cameron to come to the same opinion.

Under these circumstances I would wish to amend that paper also, which has not yet gone to the Queen, and I think we must try a different plan, which will be that of not promoting an officer to a higher rank till he has gone through a certain examination in professional subjects. It cannot then be said that we send him back to school, but he feels the necessity of acquiring information before he can rise in his profession. I hope you will concur in these views.

Suggests examining officers in professional subjects before promotion.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 8, 1857.*

The Queen has communicated with Lord Palmerston on the subject of conferring the G.C.B. on that distinguished public servant, Sir John Lawrence,¹ as she was doubtful of the propriety of conferring such a distinction on a subordinate officer without at the same time conferring a mark of approbation on his chief, Lord Canning. However, as it is thought best to delay till the Mutiny seems more completely at an end conferring such a mark on Lord Canning, the Queen empowers Lord Panmure to inform Sir J. Lawrence by this mail that the Queen has given him the Civil Grand Cross of the Bath.

Honour to Sir J. Lawrence.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 14, 1857.

. . . Lord Panmure has received from Lord Clarendon a copy of a despatch from Lord Stratford, announcing that

The Memoria at Scutari.

¹ Afterwards Lord Lawrence.

the foundations of the Scutari monument will soon be in process of erection. The time is therefore come for ascertaining Your Majesty's pleasure as to the proper inscription to be placed upon it.

It has been suggested, and in that Lord Panmure thinks that Your Majesty will concur, that the inscription should be in English in front and most prominent side, the other sides being occupied in translations into different languages hereafter to be decided on. In order to enable him to submit something to Your Majesty upon which Your Majesty should exercise criticism, Lord Panmure requested Lord John Russell, Lord Macaulay, and Sir David Dundas to favour him with their ideas, and then he submitted them to Lord Palmerston, who has adopted very nearly those of Sir David Dundas. It appears to both Lord Palmerston and Lord Panmure that the characters of the inscription should be massive relief.

Lord Panmure forwards the four inscriptions for Your Majesty's consideration.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 17, 1857.*

The Queen would wish to have the distribution of the Victoria Cross on Saturday 21st (she had mentioned the day, 23rd). It is the Princess Royal's birthday—the last she will spend as a child in her home—and as in our present affliction and mourning we can do nothing in the way of festivity, we should like to mark the day by bestowing this distinction on those brave officers and men. Perhaps Lord Panmure will communicate with the Duke of Cambridge upon the subject.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

November 29, 1857.

Very late last night and early this morning I received the accompanying letters and papers from Sir Colin Campbell. Taking the account as a whole, I think it

satisfactory, but I have still very great fears about the force in Lucknow, which, as Sir Colin says, continues in a most critical position. It is clear to me, without positively stating it in so many words, that the Commander-in-Chief thinks Outram and Havelock were *very rash* in throwing themselves into Lucknow without knowing for certain whether or not they could get out again. I think Sir Colin is doing *admirably*. His reports are clear and decided, he appears conciliatory in all his views, but very firm. It is fortunate we have him there. His memo. about the European Companies' Army is most valuable to us, and bears out most fully all I have ever said on the subject. May I request of you to send me back Sir Colin's two letters and the Journal, in order that I may this day, if possible, forward it to Her Majesty?

Receipt of despatches from Sir Colin Campbell as to reinforcement of Lucknow.

Eulogy of Sir Colin.

CHAPTER XXXVI

DECEMBER 1857

THE correspondence of this month deals almost exclusively with questions of Army organisation.

In a letter of December 10th, Lord Panmure gives details of the force to be maintained for the year 1858-59, as proposed at a meeting of the War Committee, with the increase which it involved. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has, however, something to say on this point, and out of his objections there arises an interesting discussion between Lord Panmure and the Queen (letters of December 15th, 16th, 17th, 29th), the Queen holding to her point, and urging the view that numerous 'cadres,' with fewer men, afford the readiest means of increasing an army on short notice—a consideration of prime importance in a country such as Great Britain.

Among other points discussed are the proportions of the British Army to be kept respectively at home, in the colonies, and in India: whilst the Duke of Cambridge expresses the opinion that for the future the entire Army in India should be a Royal Army, though the European and Native portions of it be distinct in many respects, the latter being indeed on the footing of a colonial army.

On the position of the Commander-in-Chief in India, His Royal Highness writes to Lord Panmure: 'I quite agree with you that it is most important that the Commander-in-Chief should on military subjects report directly to me, and not be the servant of the Governor-General.

In fact, as you state it, he and his Army should be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defence and general interests of the country, but in respect to organisation, etc., he must look to the home authorities.' The progress made by the newly-raised second battalions is reported on.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 10, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour, in resuming his post, to tender to Your Majesty his most grateful thanks for the kind and gracious inquiries which Your Majesty was pleased to make for him during his illness.

Lord Panmure has to acquaint Your Majesty that there has been a meeting of the War Committee, which was assisted at by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, at which the force for 1858-59 was considered. The meeting is just over, and Lord Panmure hastens to lay the result before Your Majesty, though the calculations are not exactly accurate within thirty or forty of the gross numbers proposed to be voted.

Proposals of the
War Committee
for the force to
be maintained
during year
1858-59.

Your Majesty will observe that it is intended to ask Parliament for the means of maintaining at home fourteen regiments of Cavalry, exclusive of Household troops. It is thought that two may be spared by-and-by from India, but if not, they will fall to be raised here.

It is proposed to make the battalions of the Line 950 rank and file, by which means seventy-three battalions will be maintained for home and the colonies. It has been thought proper to reduce the strength of regiments, so as to get more regiments, [rather] than to have regiments stronger, and fewer of them. To obtain these regiments, it will be necessary to go on raising nine regiments more than the fifteen already ordered. There is no doubt that this will, with every possible exertion, require time, but it is satisfactory to know that there are no fewer than 30,000

excellent Militia under arms, being 5000 more than Your Majesty's servants contemplated.

It is intended to appeal to this body of Militia to transfer some of its men to the Line, and Lord Panmure has no doubt that the balance will easily be kept preserved, and many men trained and ready for service be given cheerfully to the Line.

Lord Panmure trusts that these arrangements will prove generally satisfactory to Your Majesty, and if so, the usual formal submissions will be proceeded with.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *December 11, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's communication, and was glad to see it written, and so well written, in his own hand.

The Schedule which accompanied it gives the numbers proposed for next year, as the Queen supposes, exclusive of the troops now in India, and the numbers of last year equally so; so that when the fifteen new battalions are complete, and the nine new ones (now proposed) are raised, we shall have the same force of Infantry at home and in the colonies as were voted last year, but eight battalions less [at home], viz., twenty-four new battalions raised, whilst thirty-two additional ones have gone to India. Whether this will enable us to keep up our reliefs must be well considered, for foreign service will now press very heavily upon the Army.

Moreover, Indian regiments ought to be relieved oftener than they have been to keep them efficient.

The increase in the Cavalry will be most useful, as that arm cannot be replaced as fast as Infantry. Your numbers, however, of fourteen regiments of Cavalry to be maintained in future at home, and 9240 men to be voted, do not seem to tally. Does the Schedule here include the Indian force by mistake? and how is it with regard to the Horse Artillery? The Queen would wish this doubt cleared up.

*Schedule giving
numbers of
Army com-
mented on.*

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 12, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's gracious letter.

The numbers 130, 193 are of all ranks, and exclusive of the troops in India.

In the Infantry there will be about 168 more than last year, but this may be considered as margin.

Your Majesty justly observes that we shall have eight battalions fewer, but the Committee looked to the probability, after the Mutinies were over, of six out of the fifty-six regiments of the Line being withdrawn, and fifty battalions of Infantry being sufficient to maintain order in India, in addition to the force of Cavalry and Artillery and other troops to be organised locally.

Lord Panmure thinks that for 1858-59 the number of battalions will suffice for reliefs, and if the expectations of bringing six battalions from the Indian establishment prove delusive, other arrangements will be necessary for 1859-60. We may be able, without risk to the tranquillity of our colonies, to draw in a regiment or two, or even three, which will place the force at home nearer the proportion which it is desirable to maintain, viz., one-third at home and two-thirds abroad.

To elucidate this, there are proposed to be one hundred and twenty-nine battalions; the present distribution of which is, fifty-six in India, thirty-eight colonies, thirty-five home. Suppose, however, it was made fifty India, thirty-five colonies, eighty-five abroad, then forty-four would be at home, whereas the real proportion required for eighty-five battalions abroad would only be forty-two and a half.

In regard to the Cavalry, there are at present eleven regiments in India and twelve at home. These latter, at 660 of all ranks, give a present strength of 7920. It is intended to ask for 1320 more, which is the strength of two regiments. These regiments, it is expected, may be

Military
arrangements
for 1858-59.

Details of said
arrangements.

withdrawn from India when the Mutiny is put down, and so leave in that country nine regiments of Cavalry instead of eleven, but if this hope again prove delusive, it will be necessary to raise two additional regiments of Cavalry at home, or to distribute throughout the twelve now existing the 1320 additional men and officers by the addition of more troops. The Horse Artillery has been erroneously stated to Your Majesty, and its numbers placed too high. It is only intended to maintain six troops at home, of 221 of all ranks, which will give 1326—add 200 for a dépôt and five staff-officers, the whole will amount to 1531 instead of 2176, making a difference 639 (645), which will fall to be added to the Foot Artillery: thus the force to be submitted to Your Majesty will be Horse Artillery, 1531; Foot, 17,093; amounting to 18,624, the same total.

Lord Panmure regrets that Your Majesty should have the trouble of reading so long a detail of figures, but he could not compress the explanation called for by Your Majesty into smaller space.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *December 13, 1857.*

Position of the
Commander-in-
Chief in India.

. . . I am strongly impressed with the opinion, that the whole Army of India, both European and Native, should be a *Royal Army*, though distinct in many respects, and, of course, the Native portion on the footing of a *Colonial Army*. The Native Princes must most decidedly not have any *Artillery* in their pay, and no Native must be an Artillery-man. I quite agree with you that it is most important that the Commander-in-Chief should on military subjects report *directly* home, and not be the servant of the Governor-Generals. In fact, as you state it, he and his Army should be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defence and general interests of the country, but in respect to organisation, etc., he must look to the home authorities. I shall expect you here tomorrow at 12.15.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *December 14, 1857.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's explanations, which were by no means too long for her. She wishes merely to say in return that she considers the formation of two new Cavalry regiments at once absolutely necessary. After this will have been done, and two more will have been withdrawn again from India, we shall still have three regiments of Cavalry less than we had before this Indian outbreak, and the experience of the Crimea, and now again India, has sufficiently proved that we have always been too short of Cavalry.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 15, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's gracious note.

The War Committee met yesterday, assisted by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge. The subject under discussion was the Navy, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer was present, and having ascertained the united demands of Sir Charles Wood and myself to amount to twenty-two millions, seven hundred thousand pounds, informed us that to provide that sum would leave a deficit in ways and means of upwards of two millions.

To raise two Cavalry regiments immediately would, in consequence of the vigour of our recruiting and the fact of our having 30,000 Militia under arms, greatly exceed the votes for the present year and interfere with the progress of filling up our existing corps to their establishment, and Lord Panmure feels assured that Your Majesty would not desire to see either of these results attained. To raise two additional Cavalry regiments, and run the risk of having two added to the home force from India, would be the addition of two regiments to the force detailed in the

Army and Navy
Estimates.

memorandum before Your Majesty, and would add not less than £50,000 to the estimates, or compel a reduction of that sum in other matters of very vital importance.

Your Majesty justly observes that there will be three regiments of Cavalry less, but the remaining regiments are much stronger, and in numbers sufficient to give reliefs to India.

Lord Panmure humbly submits the above explanation to Your Majesty's judgment.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *December 16, 1857.*

Urging increase
to Cavalry.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's reply to her last letter. If the two additional regiments of Cavalry are not raised, there will be five regiments less kept in this country than heretofore, and not three, and before the two regiments from India come home the deficiency will be seven! Now we were very short of Cavalry before, and that arm is most difficult to prepare, and should any European or other emergency call upon the services of the Army, we should be found ill able to meet it. Supposing these two regiments should entail the increase of £50,000 to the estimate, this would be more than covered by sending home two battalions of Militia; the Queen therefore hopes that Lord Panmure, in conjunction with the Duke of Cambridge, will yet replace the Cavalry upon what alone the Queen can consider as a sufficient footing.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

December 17, 1857.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that he has this morning submitted to the War Committee Your Majesty's views as to raising two more regiments of Cavalry; whether it shall appear at the commencement of the financial year possible to bring two home from India or not.

The attendance at the Committee was full, and H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge assisted. Lord Panmure was authorised humbly to submit to Your Majesty that the great requirement at present is to get as efficient a force of Infantry as it is likely that the country will stand in need of. The financial condition of our resources will not warrant any expenditure beyond what the strictest economy justifies, and 130,000 of all ranks must be considered the limit of the force to be submitted to Parliament for next year. If two more regiments of Cavalry are raised, and two return from India, 1320 men will be added to the Cavalry, and will have to be deducted from some other force from which it does not appear to the Committee that they could conveniently be spared. Moreover, it would be very questionable whether, if two regiments came home in skeleton from India, they could be raised to their effective strength and the existing regiments maintained effective likewise, and, in addition to the two new regiments raised during the next financial year, even were funds voted for the purpose; the Cavalry recruit slowly and have many casualties to meet.

The House of Commons criticise, and, from an indisposition to consider the Army with a military mind, always object to the due proportion of Cavalry of which it ought to be composed, and they assert that it is wrong to keep up a force for which we have little or no general employment. It is vain to contend with these opinions, and in the struggle every year Your Majesty's servants feel satisfied if they can keep the Infantry and Artillery at a proper and reasonable establishment.

Objections to raising two new regiments of Cavalry as suggested by the Queen.

It is well to mention also that every country in Europe is disarming, and the prospects of war on the Continent are small. This would be the only chance of a call for Cavalry. If India continues to demand eleven regiments, then two more will be raised here as soon as ever the twelve regiments are nearly completed to 660 of all ranks, and these fourteen regiments will suffice for reliefs for India.

Under these circumstances, though Your Majesty's arguments in favour of a larger force cannot be set aside

on their merits, Lord Panmure trusts that on financial grounds Your Majesty will concur in the arrangement which is under Your Majesty's consideration.

Your Majesty suggests that the financial difficulty might be met by disembodiment of two regiments of Militia. This could not be done for some time to come, as it would be impossible to disband any Militia until they could be absorbed in the labour market of the country, and, moreover, Your Majesty's servants hope, if India becomes tranquil, and as the Army is recruited to its establishment, and provision is made for casualties in India, by degrees to be able in the spring to restore the Militia to their homes and domestic pursuits.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *December 29, 1857.*

Plea for maintaining numbers of Army.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter and memorandum of the 24th. She must say that she still adheres to her views as formerly expressed. Lord Panmure admits that the two plans don't differ materially in expense. It becomes then a mere question of organisation and of policy. As to the first, all military authorities of all countries and times agree upon the point that numerous 'cadres' with fewer men give the readiest means of increasing an army on short notice, the main point to be attended to in a constitutional and democratic country like England.

As to the second, a system of organisation will always be easier defended than mere numbers arbitrarily fixed, and Parliament ought to have the possibility of voting more or voting fewer men according to their views of the exigencies of the country or the pressure of finance at different times, and to be able to do so without deranging the organisation.

The Queen hopes Lord Panmure will look at our position as if the Indian demands had not arisen, and he will find that to come to Parliament with the Cavalry borne on the estimates reduced by three regiments (as will be the case even after two shall have returned from India,

and the two new ones shall have been formed) will certainly not prove too little anxiety on the part of the Government to cut down our military establishments. . . .

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

HORSE GUARDS, *December 30, 1857.*

I went to Shorncliffe on Monday and yesterday to Canterbury to make a minute inspection of the 2nd battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Foot, the two battalions first raised, and who would stand first of the new battalions for foreign service. The 2nd Regiment is the most advanced. It is not complete in men, wanting 300 to make up 1000 rank and file, but it is getting on very satisfactorily with its drill and equipment, and as men will come in fast, I should hope that in six weeks or two months 800 rank and file might be ready for easy garrison duty in the Mediterranean. It would be impossible for it to go with any chance of getting on well, or being of any real use to the garrison to which it is to be sent, under that period of time, and I cannot recommend its going at present. The men are a new body of young lads, and Lieut.-Colonel Muir has done wonders with them. The 2nd battalion of the 3rd Foot is even more backward. It is not yet fitted as to clothing, which has only just arrived, has not yet got all its accoutrements, arms, etc. In short, it is at squad drill and nothing more. It is a very fine battalion of men, complete in number to its full establishment of 1000 rank and file, but it would not have a chance if sent abroad under *three months*. In fact, at this moment it could not possibly be sent. Lieut.-Colonel Maude is getting on admirably, and will make a beautiful battalion of it, and it is no fault of his that matters have not more progressed. The real fact is that time is necessary to organise an entire new battalion from nothing but raw recruits, and if we attempt to run before we can walk we shall get into a serious difficulty. . . .

The newly-raised battalions.

Their stage of advancement.

CHAPTER XXXVII

JANUARY 1858

THE letters of this month are of a technical character, dealing with such subjects as the raising of two new regiments of Cavalry, the fitness of newly-raised second battalions for foreign service, and the issuing of beating-orders to staff-officers of Pensioners.

The Duke of Cambridge advocates a change in the existing system of military depôts, draws attention to anti-British feeling in France, and urges the adoption of some means of raising men more rapidly than can be done at present.

Meantime Lord Palmerston enters an energetic protest against 'pipe-clayism,' and stands up for the rights of the Militia—arguing that, unless the gain of drawing upon that force is to be considerable, it is far better to leave it alone, and to deal with it 'as a substantive force forming part of the home garrison of the country,' rather than 'break the system down by letting the officers feel that they are merely recruiting-officers and drill-sergeants for the Line.'

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 1, 1858.

Application
to Lord
Palmerston
for sanction to
raise two
Cavalry
regiments.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of 29th.

In deference to your Majesty's opinions, Lord Panmure has written to Lord Palmerston for his sanction to raise

two Cavalry regiments, and to redistribute the numbers over the number of corps.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *January 3, 1858.*

... As to the increase of the number of Cavalry regiments, there may be good reasons for it of which I am not aware; but it must be obvious that, the number of men remaining the same, an increase in the number of regiments must be attended with an increase of expense. My impression is that the strength which we proposed for each Cavalry regiment is not too great, and would even admit of augmentation in the event of war. The small establishment per regiment of our Cavalry on the breaking out of the Russian War was very inconvenient and injurious. We had to draft from one regiment to another in order to get together even those small bodies which went to the Crimea under the name of Cavalry regiments, with twice as many officers in each as was required for the number of men. The regiments left at home were spoilt, the regiments sent abroad were composed of officers and men new to each other, and were more like a battalion of dépôts than a regiment with an *esprit de corps*. One should like to know what your regimental establishment would be with two new regiments and no additional men or horses.

The Duke of Cambridge's objection to sending the newly-raised second battalions to the Mediterranean garrisons is a piece of Horse Guards' pedantry. The Militia regiments, composed of raw recruits and of many officers who were entirely new to military matters, were many of them quite fit for garrison duty at the end of their first twenty-eight days' training, and no man will persuade me that some of these second battalions, which have now been two or three months under officers of the Line, are not fit for duty at Malta or Gibraltar. This is not Red Tapeism but Pipe-Clayism. However, if it involves only a delay of a few weeks, it may be submitted to.

As to fitness of newly-raised battalions for foreign service.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 14, 1858.*

The Queen hesitates signing the enclosed Warrant 'authorising the issue of beating-orders to staff-officers of Pensioners to empower them to raise recruits,' without receiving some explanation as to the future working of the scheme. If made to work together and under the superintendence of the Recruiting Department at the Horse Guards, it may do a great deal of good: if intended as a rival establishment, it must lead to confusion, professional jealousy, and waste of expenditure.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

*Confidential.**January 15, 1858.*

As to
a successor
to Sir Colin
Campbell,
should one be
required.

With reference to the conversation I had with you yesterday on the subject of a successor to Sir Colin Campbell, in the event of anything unforeseen happening to him, I am anxious to bring to your notice that the Governor-General in Council has the power to make a provisional appointment on the spot pending instruction from home. He appointed on the former occasion, on the death of General Anson, Sir Patrick Grant. I have no doubt that he would be inclined to do so again. Would it not be well, under these circumstances, to send out instructions that, in the event of any accident happening to Sir Colin, the senior General Officer in India, Sir Henry Somerset, should hold the *provisional* appointment. With so many Queen's troops in India, it would be a very serious evil if a Companies' officer assumed the supreme command. I do not by this at all mean to say that Somerset is the man most fitted for the command-in-chief. I only wish to guard against unforeseen events, which would have to be met on the instant, and which could not be delayed.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

DOWNING STREET, *January 15, 1858.*

You suggested yesterday the expediency of offering to Militia. the Militia an Ensigncy in the Line for every officer who would bring a hundred men. Is it worth while to meddle with the Militia for the sake of the number of men which such a measure would bring you?

Would you get by such means 2000 recruits, or at the utmost 3000, that is to say, the produce of a fortnight or three weeks of ordinary recruiting? How many men did you get by that means in the Russian War? If the necessity is not great and urgent, and if the gain would not be considerable, it would be far better to leave the Militia alone, and to deal with them as a substantive force forming part of the home garrison of the country, and not to break the system down by letting the officers feel that they are merely recruiting-officers and drill-sergeants for the Line. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 15, 1858.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the proposal to recruit by means of the Pensioners is not intended as a rival establishment to the recruiting by means of the officers of the Line, but merely to extend the basis of recruiting, which has become absolutely necessary as the returns of recruiting are not such as could be wished. The instructions to the Pensioners will be to work with the officers of the Line, and they will be subject to the control of the Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Panmure trusts this explanation will satisfy Your Majesty sufficiently to lead Your Majesty to affix the Royal signature to the Warrant.

*Memorandum.**January 1858.*

As to the two
additional
regiments of
Cavalry about
to be raised.

Lord Panmure had certainly misconceived Her Majesty's wishes and assumed that the two additional regiments which Her Majesty desired to have raised immediately were to be of the same strength to which the present regiments of Cavalry have been raised, namely 660 of all ranks.

The question therefore takes a new aspect, and as 9240 of all ranks are to be the total numbers voted, it will make no material difference in expense whether they are divided into 14 regiments of 660 or more regiments of a diminished strength. Deducting one-tenth for officers, non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, etc., the number of rank and file will be 8298. This number, if divided into 16 corps, will give 518 rank and file for each. A small portion of non-commissioned officers would come from the present regiments, but only a small portion—the principal part will be new appointments, as well as all the officers, and to allow for these in point of numbers, it will be necessary to keep each regiment of the 16 to 510 rank and file, or thereabouts. All the officers will be an increase of expense, and, if colonels are appointed, it will raise objections in the House of Commons, as the Infantry has been increased without any such addition. Lord Panmure does not, however, see how the appointment of colonels could well be dispensed with, as it would be a precedent for dispensing with those officers elsewhere.

Considers two
modes of organ-
ising the two
additional
Cavalry
regiments.

Lord Panmure would consider the two modes of organisation :—

- 1st. That suggested by Her Majesty.
- 2nd. That which was approved by the War Committee and submitted by Lord Panmure.

Her Majesty's plan would make the establishment of a Cavalry regiment 510 rank and file, of whom 384 should be mounted and 126 dismounted men. This would form a good Cavalry regiment, but it would leave no margin—

indeed, in the event of war, considerable additions would be necessary.

2nd. The plan submitted to Her Majesty would give 660 rank and file, of whom not less than 384 should be always fit for duty in the field and the rest dismounted men amounting to 276. They would be in every way drilled, and in the event of a war might give off 150 to form a new regiment, or by an addition of horses would be immediately fit to proceed in service.

Craving Her Majesty's forgiveness, Lord Panmure prefers the latter system for a country which has only one field for its Cavalry during peace, and a jealous Parliament watching every shilling voted for military purposes. A few strong regiments are more defensible than several weak ones, and Lord Panmure cannot help thinking that they are more convenient likewise. At the breaking out of the Crimean War, the regiments which were to remain at home were depopulated to fill up the ranks of those which were ordered on service, and it was long before their ranks were again replenished, whereas, had they been as strong as those now proposed, a very trifling addition would have fitted them for the field.

H.R.H. the Prince observes that, if our Cavalry regiments were strong, they would require to be broken up to find accommodation in our present Cavalry barracks. Lord Panmure believes that it is a very general practice at this moment to distribute Cavalry throughout the country in detachments of squadrons, and even troops, bringing them together again in their turn of change of quarters.

Lord Panmure thinks it necessary again to state that, if there is no prospect of two regiments of Cavalry being recalled from India when the financial year commences, orders will be immediately issued to raise the two additional regiments referred to in the paper submitted to Her Majesty. If it is the Queen's pleasure still to adhere to her own views, Lord Panmure will inform the War Committee of Her Majesty's desire.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*PICCADILLY, *January 24, 1858.*

I quite agree with you about this proposal. The Persian expedition was most successful, the victories gained by it were very brilliant, and the political results highly important. The officers and men fully deserve honourable distinction, and the medal and clasp seem to be an appropriate reward.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*HORSE GUARDS, *January 26, 1858.*Feeling in
Paris.

I think you should see the enclosed private letter I have had from Cowley. The feeling at Paris is growing, I am told, worse and worse,¹ and what it is to end in I do not know. On the plea of wanting to raise more troops for India, I should be much disposed to call out more Militia regiments. Rest assured that we ought to be prepared. I have this from several very safe quarters.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 28, 1858.*Desirability of
raising men
more rapidly
than at present.
The increased
bounty
to recruits.

. . . One thing, however, is more than ever clear to me, and that is that more men will be required for India, and seeing our present position as regards France, I cannot help feeling extremely anxious about our recruiting for the Army. Some mode of getting men more rapidly than we do at present *must* be devised. Herein lies our great difficulty, but the subject must be met at once. I certainly would at once advise an increased bounty. Doubtless this will attract more men, and even if some more desert, that cannot be helped, for men we must have. I again hope that you will allow us to draw on the Militia. I know Militia colonels will give us the men, and find

¹ Referring to the anti-British feeling which in France had followed Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon the Third, on January 14th, 1858.

others to replace them in their own regiments, if we will but give them a commission for one hundred men given by them, and this is the work of recruiting to which I would have recourse. But if this cannot be, I am ready to adopt any other practicable plan that can be devised. But men we *must have* in much larger numbers than we get them at present, and I consider it my duty to press this on your attention and hope that you will take the subject in hand at once. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

January 29, 1858.¹

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to solicit Your Majesty's commands on the following subject.

Two new regiments of Cavalry are to be raised forthwith, but before submitting the details to Your Majesty, Lord Panmure would be much obliged by Your Majesty informing him whether there will be any objection to take this opportunity of restoring to its place in the list of Your Majesty's forces the 5th Dragoons.

Your Majesty is doubtless aware that this regiment was disbanded for misconduct at Vinegar Hill, in the Irish Rebellion in 1798.

It appears to Your Majesty's servants that sixty years' disgrace may be sufficient to purge the crime of which this regiment was guilty, and they have authorised Lord Panmure so to acquaint Your Majesty. They consider, moreover, that it would be good policy at this time were Your Majesty graciously pleased to remove from the corps the Royal displeasure.

Lord Panmure has been assured by Lord Carlisle that such an act of grace would be accepted with great satisfaction in Ireland, and it would give an impetus to recruiting extremely beneficial at the present moment.

Should Your Majesty consent to restore the regiment,

¹ Written apparently before the Queen's letter of the previous day had been received.

Lord Panmure will take steps to have it done, in the most formal manner, by a proper communication to the Commander-in-Chief, on which H.R.H. could found a general order to the Army.

As to a medal
for the Persian
War.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit in this box a communication which he has received from the President of the India Board on the subject of the issue of a medal for the Persian War. The medal would be the Indian Army reserve medal, and, to those officers and men who at present are entitled to wear it, a bar or clasp with the word Persia upon it would be all that would be required. Those who have not the medal would receive both medal and clasp.

Lord Palmerston concurs with Lord Panmure in recommending this act of grace and favour to Your Majesty.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *January 28 (sic) (31st?), 1858.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter of the day before yesterday, and entirely approves of the 5th Dragoons being, on the occasion of the new Cavalry regiments which are raising, restored to its place in the list of her forces. The Queen approves of the proposed medal and clasp for Persia, but is most anxious for a special one for the never-to-be-forgotten campaign in India, with clasps for Delhi, Cawnpore, and Lucknow, as she suggested to Lord Palmerston.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

FEBRUARY 1858

AMONG the few remaining letters written during Panmure's tenure of office, the only ones of any special interest are those which refer to the Canadian Regiment, and to a proposal by Panmure to issue warrants to the Governors of colonies to enable them to raise men for the service of the mother-country.

Lord Panmure's ministerial correspondence then concludes with the testimonies of Prince Albert and the Prime Minister to the value of his services.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 1, 1858.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward a copy of the letter which, with Your Majesty's approval, he proposes to send to H.R.H. the General Commanding-in-Chief.

Lord Panmure has further the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that, at a meeting of the Cabinet on Friday, Your Majesty's servants were of opinion that the bounty for recruits should be raised. A discretionary power as to the amount of bounty to be given in future was left with Lord Panmure, who was instructed to communicate with H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge on the subject. . . . The exigencies of Your Majesty's service requiring that every possible means should be taken to rally Your Majesty's subjects round the national Standard, Lord Panmure proposes to issue warrants to the Governors of Your

Recommends raising the bounty for recruits ; as to issuing warrants for recruiting in the colonies.

Majesty's colonies to enable them to raise men for Your Majesty's service. Your Majesty's servants are informed that many men may be obtained, especially in the Australian colonies, by this step.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

HORSE GUARDS, *February 4, 1858.*

What about the Canadian Regiment?¹ Labouchere presses for an answer to go by to-morrow's mail, and I am quite prepared to give it, but I have not, of course, as yet been able to submit the formation of this corps officially to Her Majesty. In any reply to Labouchere I must remark that, though individually I see no objection, I cannot act in this matter till Her Majesty's sanction is obtained.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *February 8, 1858.*

The two new
Cavalry
regiments.

I am extremely anxious to know for certain what the equipment of the two new regiments of Cavalry is to be. I therefore should feel obliged to you if you will let me know to-day whether you see any objection to the 5th Dragoons being formed into a regiment of Lancers, and the 18th into one of Hussars, which they were previous to being disbanded. I also am anxious to know whether you see any objection to my offering a Cornet's Commission in these corps to any young gentleman bringing *fifty* men. I think in this way I should soon get the men, and further, I should get Cornets, which at present is one of my great difficulties, as my candidates for Cornetcys are not numerous. I would also wish to know whether you see any objection to making Hope Grant a Substantive Major-General, and placing him on the Staff of India in the room of Ashburnham, who has resigned. I think Hope Grant has proved himself so valuable and

Proposal of
promotion for
General Hope
Grant.

¹ Raised in Canada during the Crimean War. When the war ceased it became necessary, from difficulty of getting recruits, to abandon the idea of maintaining it as a Canadian regiment.

good an officer, and has held such important commands, that he well deserves this mark of Royal favour, and it would be a great compliment to the regiment, as it would promote two most deserving officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Parry and Major Drysdale, who have been performing most valuable service. I ask this question now, as it may to some extent bear on my selection of officers for the command of the two new Cavalry regiments. Could you settle the point as regards the additional year to be counted by the garrison of Lucknow for pension and retirement, as it might be well, if decided upon, to announce it in the vote of thanks to-night?

Proposed additional year to be counted by garrison of Lucknow for pension and retirement.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 24, 1858.

I return you my best thanks for the transmission of the interesting report on the proceedings of the Small-Arms Committee at Enfield.

I am very sorry that our official intercourse about these matters should be about to close, but you may look back with great satisfaction to the period of your useful labours for the Army and defences of the country.

Although I trust you are very much better, I hope you will not scruple to make use of another hand in answering this.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

Undated [February 1858].

I have the honour to acknowledge your Royal Highness' note, and I feel deeply grateful for the kind and valuable testimony borne by your Royal Highness with respect to my conduct of the War Department.

My duties have in many instances been made easy by the able advice and assistance of your Royal Highness.

Advice and assistance of Prince Albert acknowledged.

I think that your Royal Highness will be interested in the enclosed returns, which I have had made out for my own satisfaction.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

94 PICCADILLY, *March 5*, 1858.

Acknowledg-
ing value of
Panmure's
services as War
Minister.

Thank you for your letter. I can assure you that I think your colleagues have good reason to look back with satisfaction and pride upon your administration of the important department which was placed under your charge, and I am certain that this country never was in time of peace in so good a state of military preparation as that in which you have placed it.

CHAPTER XXXIX

CONCLUSION

IN February 1858 Lord Palmerston's Ministry went out of office, the immediate occasion of its fall being a defeat sustained, on the 19th of that month, over an amendment to the Conspiracy Bill, which had been introduced in Parliament in consequence of Orsini's attempt upon the life of Napoleon the Third. Thus ended Lord Panmure's term of administration at the War Office, and with it his career as a Minister of the Crown. For, though his leader returned to power in the year following, he was not invited to join the new Ministry. The following letters were exchanged on this occasion.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

94 PICCADILLY, *June 14, 1859.*

I was very sorry that, being compelled to go away early yesterday evening, I had not an opportunity of talking to you, and of explaining how very much I regret that circumstances do not admit of my proposing to you to become a member of the Government about to be formed, and again to take charge of that department which you administered with so much ability and success.

But the conditions under which the new Government is to be formed involve a necessity for very much widening the range from which its elements are to be drawn, and, though my strong wish would be to surround myself with the same colleagues with whom I acted with so much

satisfaction to myself and with so much advantage to the public service, that unfortunately it is not in my power to do. I should like, however, very much to hear your opinion upon several matters, and I will either call on you, or see you here, this evening between ten and eleven, if that should suit you.

To this Panmure replied:—

LORD PANMURE TO LORD PALMERSTON

19 CHESTER STREET, *June* 15, 1859.

On the writer's
exclusion from
the new
Ministry.

On reflection it appears to me that your note of yesterday ought to be answered by me in writing. I cannot say that I altogether regret that the conditions under which the new Government is to be formed preclude you from making me the offer of resuming my former position under you. The circumstances of the Government which you are now forming are very different from those of the Government over which you presided from 1855 to 1858. That Government was composed of men well known to each other in the walks of private life, having the same political aspirations, and desirous, from motives of friendship as well as duty, to support you and each other. The very nature of the conditions under which the new Government is being formed precludes the hope of any such spirit existing in it. The Cabinet will contain sections of different parties. More than one 'open question' must exist in it, and, where that is the case, you start with the seeds of division sown, to vegetate at some future hour. As your personal friend, I wish you well in this arduous undertaking, and again I say that I am grateful to you for not giving me a choice of forming one of your Cabinet, for I should have been sorely divided between my desire to serve with you and my indisposition to be in a Cabinet composed as this must be.

I shall now feel myself at liberty to follow an independent course, and, that I may do so entirely, I must request you to transfer to another the honorary office of

Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland, which I have held for some time past.

I shall watch your progress with much interest, as I am persuaded that your earnest desire is to do that which you think best for the country.

The 'different parties' alluded to by the last writer as being represented in the new Cabinet were, in addition to the Whigs, the Peelites and the Manchester School.

A further letter from Palmerston now expresses the hope that, 'although the Government is composed of elements that had no general combination before they were put together, the cement of a common sense of public duty will bind the mass together,' and likewise urges Panmure to retain the dignity of Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland, which cannot by any possibility be a clog upon his perfect independence—a request to which Panmure acceded.

The above letters serve to illustrate the relations of the correspondents. But, however doubtful under the given conditions might have been Panmure's acceptance of office, there is little doubt that, like many another in a similar position, he would have liked at least to have the chance of refusing it. At the same time it must be remembered that we have his own authority for saying that he had looked upon his political career as closed when the Russell Ministry resigned, and that it was without eagerness that he had accepted office under Palmerston, having 'no wish, for my own part, to return to public life.' The words were used at a public dinner given to him by his tenantry in October 1856. Except in the sense of doing good service to his country, he was no ambitious politician.

The next letter treats more intimately of the same circumstances. The writer, afterwards Viscount Halifax, had been a colleague of Panmure's, and remained to the last his close friend and frequent correspondent on public affairs.

SIR CHARLES WOOD¹ TO LORD PANMURE*June 16, 1859.*

It was only yesterday that I found you were certainly not to be one of us, and I cannot help writing to say how very sorry I am not to see you in the concern. I well remember your saying, on the breaking up of J. Russell's Government, that it was the last comfortable Cabinet we should ever sit in—and so, for one reason or another, it has certainly proved. I do not think that we shall be very long-lived, and after that I shall make my bow under any circumstances, for I am heartily sick of it, and have taken the shilling with no heart in it. Of course Grey is much in the same mind. . . . If I could have seen Clarendon and you in the Cabinet, I would have borne the rest philosophically. But it makes a sad void not to see you there; and my private and personal comfort is gone without you. G. Grey, you and I, have been a little comfortable triumvirate so long that I am quite unhappy at its not remaining intact. God bless you, dear Maule. I cannot get over the separation in public. Some day or another I must come and bury myself in the recesses of Mount Keene.²

We have now only to review briefly Lord Panmure's work at the War Office, and to give some account of the remaining fifteen years of his life, which were not very eventful. The position to which he had been called in February 1855 was one which might well have daunted a brave man. For, not only had his predecessor been driven from office by a storm of public anger, but the state of matters which had provoked that anger had not yet visibly begun to improve. That his own health, too, was seriously impaired is shown by the frequent allusions of his correspondents, of which a few only have been allowed to

¹ Secretary for India in the new Government.

² A mountain lying between Balmoral and Lord Panmure's deer forest of Invermark. A bridle-path leading across it was used by the Queen when visiting Invermark.

stand.¹ Nor, as we have just seen, had he the spur of personal ambition to stimulate him in overcoming difficulties. The sense of public duty was his sole incentive to self-sacrifice, and this he obeyed, in the spirit of a soldier, almost as a matter of course. And, having once accepted the task, he persevered until he had successfully performed it.

To speak more in detail, the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, dated January 6th, 1855,² may be taken as roughly exhibiting the state of matters at the seat of war when Lord Panmure succeeded to office. The condition of things which it describes is deplorable in the extreme. For example, it speaks of regiments, and even of men on trench-duty, being 'on half and in some instances quarter rations for two or three days together, whilst there is no deficiency of stores at Balaclava'; of horses starved to death, at a time when horse-transport was of the very last importance; of sickness prevailing and precautions against it being neglected, and of such easily avoidable mishaps as that which befell a newly-arrived detachment of Guards—which was first allowed to lose its way for want of guidance to the Camp, and afterwards, for want of preparations to receive it, was compelled to spend its first night in the Crimea without shelter. The revival of the revelations of Howard Russell and the complaints of the Tulloch Commission is no welcome task; but it is as well, perhaps, that these things should not be allowed just yet to fade from recollection.

Again, the Duke of Newcastle tells how sick soldiers, sent to Scutari, had been 'allowed to embark without a

¹ In a letter of February 1868, Sir George Grey writes, in reference to an attack of gout from which he was recovering: 'I thought often of you while I was suffering, and wondered how I could have borne what I have seen you endure with far more patience than, I fear, I could ever hope for.'

² See *Correspondence relating to the Expedition to the East*, pp. 267 *et seq.*

medical officer to assist them on board, and without help in their distress other than that which they could afford to each other'; how the baggage of several regiments had been left behind at Varna, so that officers and men in the Crimea had been for weeks together without a change of clothes—a minor trial, possibly, yet no less indicative of mismanagement than other greater ones; finally that, whilst these things were occurring, with one exception no requisitions of any kind had been made to the military offices at home from the departments of either the Adjutant-General or Quartermaster-General. The writer of the despatch concludes by declaring that the nation's honour now centres in the condition of her troops in the field, and that the demand is universal that the valour of the troops and the skill of the General shall not be paralysed by defective administration in the Camp.

Such, then, was the situation left to Lord Panmure by his predecessors; it is satisfactory to be able to give his own account of the spirit in which he determined to face it. Speaking at the public dinner already mentioned, shortly after the conclusion of peace, he thus alludes to it: 'I accepted the office of Secretary of State for War with hesitation, because I had no wish, for my own part, to return to public life. Other duties had occurred to call me to reside upon my own property, and I was then looking forward rather to the study of the interests of my tenants than to the study of the public interests of the nation. But I was assured by my noble friend, Lord Palmerston, that it was his opinion that the experience which I had had of the administration of military affairs—not simply from having passed an apprenticeship in early life in the Army, but from having been six years connected with the administration of the civil affairs of the Army formerly—would be useful to him in his government, and that I might devote

the knowledge I had then acquired profitably to the Army and to the public. In these circumstances I did not hesitate to accept the office tendered to me.'

But no man was less inclined than the speaker to exaggerate his own share in the improvement of the condition of the Army. He continued: 'I have on many occasions disclaimed an especial credit for restoring the Army from the state into which it had fallen to the state in which it left the Crimea. I have said often, and I repeat it now, when I succeeded to the administration of the affairs of war, the barometer was steadily on the rise, and many of the plans which had been laid, and the steps which had been taken by my friend and predecessor, I had only to work out as he had left them, and little to add in order to bring them to a fortunate maturity. I believe if the Duke of Newcastle had remained in office—if that clamour, for I must call it clamour, which drove him from the reins of the office in which I succeeded him had not occurred, he would have succeeded as well as I have done in bringing the Army round, from the state into which it had unfortunately fallen, to the state of discipline and of improvement in every way in which it left the shores of the Crimea.'

Having premised thus much, it remains to summarise the various steps, already casually mentioned in the letters, which were taken by Lord Panmure in grappling with so formidable a situation.

The Memorandum which he drew up upon entering on his new duties shows that the health of the troops and sanitation of the Camp received his immediate attention. In speaking of this he says: 'There were some steps which were taken by me which I think did a great deal, not to bring the Army especially from its low estate, but to prevent the consequence of that low estate upon the return of the ensuing summer. And I think that no

greater benefit has accrued to the Army than resulted from the labours of the Sanitary Commissioners whom I sent out to the shores of the Crimea, who by their skill and foreknowledge removed all offensive matter from the Camp, and prevented that which every one was prophesying with horror—namely, the rage of contagion and disease when the hot weather set in. From the exertions of these gentlemen, and from the manner in which the commanding officers of the Army, from the highest to the lowest, seconded their efforts, no contagion broke out in the ranks of our gallant forces; and, from the time that spring burst upon that island, nothing but health pervaded the Army, and they left the Crimea and returned to England in a state of health unknown even at home.'

One immediate result of these precautions was that General Simpson, writing on April 16th, was already able to declare that 'more healthy encampments he never saw'; whilst Admiral Houston Stewart reports, on April 21st, that 'our troops are in excellent spirits, and health and strength coming fast.' And, notwithstanding the occurrence of an outbreak of cholera in the interval, it is undeniable that the British troops exhibited to the foreign Generals in Codrington's parades and field-days at the close of the war formed as fine and as fit an army as any lover of his country might wish to see. Meantime, as is no less universally acknowledged, the French Army had been steadily deteriorating. So that, whilst avoiding the mistake of attributing to one that which in the nature of things was due to many, it is still impossible not to claim great credit for Lord Panmure for his share in bringing about this result.

Meanwhile, in addition to his efforts to improve the condition of the Army in the field by attention not merely to sanitation but also to transport and supplies, he was bringing much energy to bear upon the work of rein-

forcing it—a work of scarcely secondary importance, if the war was to be carried on at all. In this he was not less prompt than in the measures just described. For example, by the end of April 1855, the coming into force of his Limited Enlistment Bill is being looked forward to; by the middle of May, he is hard at work forming his Foreign Legion—of which, by June 11th, the German and Swiss portions are already mustering and soon to be shipped off. They sailed in August, and on arrival at Scutari were much approved by British officers. Later in the year, French-Swiss and Italian Legions were in process of formation; whilst a Polish Legion, recently embodied, was already moving eastward. The unexpected delay which eventually arose in getting these legions forward is accounted for by Panmure's letter to the Queen, dated November 11th, in which he explains that he would be 'too glad to hand over the different regiments much sooner' to the Commander-in-Chief, but that 'experience has proved that there are many things which require correction and conforming to British practice, which a Secretary of State can do at once and quietly, but which the Commander-in-Chief would find great trouble in carrying out, as he can only act within the Sovereign's regulations, and by following established etiquette.' There is no doubt that Panmure acted wisely in not making the system of organisation to be applied to the Legions too strict or hard-and-fast, and it may also be regretted that the interesting experiment involved in their embodiment was put to no proof in the field. Lord Panmure himself looked forward confidently to the result to be obtained from it.¹

In writing to Lord Clarendon, September 17th, 1855,

¹ At the close of the war there would have been, including Foreign Legions, at least 120,000 men ready to take the field under the British General. When Panmure took office, he found the army so reduced by sickness and death that only about 12,000 were returned as fit for duty.

Prince Albert assigns much credit to Lord Panmure for the courage with which he has met the difficulties connected with the inauguration of the Army Works Corps. And already, in a letter of the previous June, we have seen the Secretary of State plead earnestly with the conservatism of Lord Raglan to give his Corps of Navvies a fair trial. 'Believe me,' he writes, 'you are wrong, and you will do yourself and your Army great injustice to refuse them. They will not disgrace you, and will do all sorts of work in advance of the Army.'

'They carry with them artificers of all kinds, and they will run you up an encampment or build you huts on a line of march in no time. . . . I sincerely hope you will have them, or, if I send them on my own responsibility, that you will give them a fair trial.' Military prejudice, however, dies hard, and the civilian labourers found little more toleration from General Codrington than they had done from Lord Raglan. In the meantime, Panmure's consideration for the over-worked officers at the front had led to his creation of the office of Chief of the Staff.

To have failed to lay to heart the lessons of the past winter was scarcely possible, yet, for all that, the prudence and energy with which he prepared to meet the coming one deserve especial credit. For, as early as August 4th, he is already writing to Simpson, 'Whether we winter in the lines or not, for such an event I have been making all due preparation, and I think I have got huts, stores, forage, and warm clothing well advanced.' At this time there were still good hopes that the Army might not be called upon to pass a second winter on the heights, but the history of the next six months was to prove the value of his forethought and precaution. Throughout that time, he was never tired of preaching that the best way to hasten peace is to act as though war were to continue.

Nor were the details of his department at home re-

ceiving less than their due of attention, as is illustrated by a letter of September 20th, in which the Prime Minister writes, after a visit to Woolwich Arsenal, 'The state of the establishment does great credit to your administration. You have some remarkably intelligent men at the head of departments, and there is throughout a spirit of activity and progress which is very gratifying to me.' Nor, again, in estimating the amount and the success of Panmure's work, must it be forgotten that, during much of this time, he was required to make head against an active opposition in Parliament, where the fate of the hostile motions of Lords Grey and Ellenborough serve to show that he was successful in carrying the country's representatives along with him.

That Lord Panmure, though essentially a man of strong will and dominating personality, was neither harsh nor overbearing to those over whom his position gave him power is sufficiently proved by the tone of his letters to Lord Raglan, General Simpson, and General Codrington, which is kindly and considerate, and invites the confidence of the person addressed. For example, on August 27th, he writes to Simpson, 'My object is to act with you as a friend, as well as to direct you as a Minister,' and, on August 20th, 'I must observe, however, that you are to understand that, when I touch on any particular topic, or urge any special point, I do not mean to assume that you have overlooked it, and I hope you will not view any remarks made in my private letters as offered in any but a kindly spirit.' The arrangements contrived by him on Simpson's behalf show a genuine and delicate thoughtfulness, and, indeed, his endeavours to support and encourage the suffering and despondent Commander may be said to have carried patience and consideration for another quite as far as was compatible with the duty of a Minister of State. Similarly, too, in all necessary changes of the military

personnel he had shown the utmost consideration for Lord Raglan's feelings, nor was it found necessary to sacrifice a single member of that Staff, for which the Commanding Officer had stood up so loyally against popular feeling at home.

It is true that the author of the *History of the Invasion of the Crimea* has denounced, in unmeasured terms, the despatch addressed by Panmure to Lord Raglan on February 12th, 1855. But it is now pretty generally recognised that, between the two purposes of impartial record of events and impassioned defence of an individual, Kinglake's work stumbles and falls. Certainly, in the particular instance under consideration, his methods are less those of the historian than of the special pleader. And, indeed, as long ago as January 1881,¹ a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* had already come forward to clear Lord Panmure's memory from the imputation brought against it. 'That which Mr. Kinglake calls censure on Lord Raglan,' says this writer, the then Lord Bury, 'was, after all, only a reiteration of the complaint that he did not furnish the Government with necessary information.' Nor did the onus even of this remonstrance rest upon Panmure alone. 'Of one thing,' continues the author just quoted, 'we can assure Mr. Kinglake on the best authority. He is mistaken in saying that Lord Panmure was responsible for the despatch, and that his colleagues "merely assented." If the opinions recorded by Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Canning, Sir Charles Wood, Lord Granville, Sir William Molesworth, and the Duke of Argyll had been reproduced in the War Minister's despatch, that document would have contained a heavier indictment against Lord Raglan than the one which actually reached the Crimea.'² That the Queen shared in

¹ The volume containing Kinglake's charge was published in 1880.

² The *Edinburgh Review*, No. 313, p. 268.

the feeling expressed by Panmure is evident from the letters incorporated in these volumes.

' . . . It is difficult,' adds Lord Bury, 'to see how any Minister could without dereliction of duty refrain from acting as Lord Panmure acted. By the Constitution of England, he was responsible for the Army to his Queen and to his country. It was his duty to speak out. Cowardice would justly have been charged against him if under the circumstances he had kept silence, even though by speaking out he risked a wound to the feelings of a well-loved comrade.' There is also abundant evidence in the correspondence between Lord Raglan and Lord Panmure that good feeling continued between them up to the time of Lord Raglan's death.¹

An administrative point which is perhaps more open to divergence of opinion than the above is the appointment of Simpson's successor. No longer ago than within the last three or four years, a very high authority, who himself took part in the war, gave fresh sanction to the view that Sir Colin Campbell should have been preferred to Sir William Codrington. But it is difficult to believe that the brilliancy of Sir Colin's post-Crimean achievements have counted for nothing in the formation of this conviction; nor must it be forgotten that, rightly or wrongly, the fiery old Highlander was not credited with any great share of those diplomatic qualifications which were so important to

¹ In regard to Kinglake's allegation of Lord Panmure's subserviency to the *Times*—that 'he took his marching orders submissively from the sheets of the *Times*,' and that, 'what the *Times* had been enjoining he made it his first task to do' (vol. vi. p. 327), it may be worth while to state, which is here done on the most reliable authority, that during the time he was at the War Office, excepting communications which were sent alike to all the principal newspapers, no communications, direct or indirect, existed with the *Times*; that no persons other than those belonging to the recognised organ of the Government, whose announcements were semi-official, ever entered the Private Secretary's room; and that, though in later life Lord Panmure was glad to reckon the late Mr. Delane among the most valued of his acquaintance, it was not until he had left the War Office that he first became acquainted with him.

the maintenance of our relations with our Allies, and in which Lord Raglan had so signally excelled. With Marshal Pélissier on the one hand and Sir Colin on the other, there was at least ground for apprehension of difficulty.

A somewhat ludicrous incident belonging to this time requires a word of allusion and explanation.

To one of his telegrams to the Commanding Officer at the seat of war, Lord Panmure had appended a recommendation of the interests of his nephew, Captain Dowbiggin, of the 4th Regiment.¹ The words used by him were these: 'I recommend Dowbiggin to your notice, should you have a vacancy, and if he is fit.' But in those early days of the electric telegraph, the telegraphist would sometimes assume a right to cut down messages as he judged fit. Hence, by the time Lord Panmure's message reached its destination, it had assumed the form, 'Take care of Dowb'—a cryptic sentence, which is said to have long and greatly puzzled the Head-quarters' Staff. Becoming known, this story raised a laugh at a time when occasions of laughter were few, and has in consequence happened to survive. But for this, it would not now be worth mentioning.

But it was not only by the successful carrying through of the longer half of the Crimean War that Panmure's term of administration of the War Office was made memorable. The suppression of the Indian Mutiny,² an expedition to Persia, and an expedition to China fell also within that period, which must hence be characterised as one of the most strenuous, as well as one of the most successful of recent times. To announce the capture of

¹ Having lost his mother at an early age, Dowbiggin had been brought up and placed in the Army by Lord Panmure, who regarded him as an adopted son.

² During the Mutiny, 80,000 men were sent from home and from the Colonies to reinforce the European army in India.

Canton was one of Palmerston's last acts before going out of office in 1858.

The less warlike part of Lord Panmure's work—the introduction, that is, of reforms in his department—does not call for very detailed mention here, being dealt with, like the wars last mentioned, with considerable fulness in the foregoing letters.

At the Cabinet Council held on February 10th, 1855, he had been instructed to prepare, for the consideration of the Cabinet, a scheme for breaking up the office of Ordnance as a separate and independent department—the object being to transfer to the Commander of the Forces the discipline and patronage of the corps of Artillery and Engineers, hitherto controlled by the Master-General of the Ordnance; while, at the same time, the civil business of the Ordnance should be placed under the direction and control of the Secretary of State for the War Department, suitable arrangements being made for the construction and maintenance of fortifications and barracks. Accordingly, following upon this instruction, in May 1855 the Letters Patent for the Board of Ordnance were revoked, its duties being thenceforth vested in the Secretary of State, who, at the same time, by the Queen's command, transferred the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, as military bodies forming part of the British Army, to the Commander-in-Chief. In this connection, it may be noted that, on withdrawing from Lord Palmerston's Cabinet, Mr. Gladstone, writing to Lord Panmure, refers to the breaking up of the Ordnance as 'a measure towards which my desires have long pointed.'

But the above transfer was in reality only part of the larger scheme by which the Army Offices were now consolidated—the control of the Militia and Yeomanry being transferred from the Home Office, and the clothing of the Infantry and Cavalry being undertaken directly by the

War Department,¹ which also absorbed the Army Medical Department. The Commissariat Department had already, in the previous December, been transferred from the Treasury to the War Department.

The gain in simplicity and saving of time to be obtained by this reform is obvious, whilst its details also kept in view Lord Panmure's consistent policy of preserving the personal authority of the Sovereign over the Army.

But, like other ardent advocates of reform, Lord Panmure, with the advance of years, reached the end of his tether as a reformer, and so, when in 1871 Mr. Cardwell introduced his Army Regulation Bill, directed to the Abolition of Purchase in the Army, he spoke against it in the House of Lords. In so doing, he was actuated by a sense of the political security which is afforded to a State by having its army officered by men belonging to the higher classes, or, at least, having a stake in the country, and in this connection he recalled the dictum of De Narbonne, War Minister in France during the Revolutionary Period, who declared that the effect of giving promotion solely for merit would not in reality be favourable to political liberty, because a Staff composed of soldiers of fortune would be much more likely to support a Dictator than would a body of officers who were already bound to the ancient institutions of their country.

It will be seen from the above that, after his retirement from official life, Lord Panmure continued to attend the House of Lords and take part in its discussions, especially in those relating to military matters. He also served upon several Commissions—acting, in particular, as Chairman of one 'to inquire into the grievances of Indian officers' in 1865, and of another, on Recruiting, in 1866. Much

¹ Through a Director-General of Army Clothing, to whom was transferred from the abolished Board of General Officers the custody of the 'sealed patterns.'

importance was attached by the Government of the time to the services rendered by him in this capacity—Lord Palmerston writing, for instance, in reference to the former Committee, 'We want as Chairman somebody who, from habits and position and military knowledge, would give weight to the recommendations of the Commission whatever they might be.'

But it was Scotland that was the principal scene of his activity during these later years. There he found work to do in promoting the well-being of his tenants by erecting good buildings upon his estates, in encouraging agriculture, and in exercising the prescriptive functions of a leading country gentleman, the Lord-Lieutenant of a county. His interest in the life of the Free Church of Scotland was also maintained, and his assistance continued to be sought in such church ceremonies as, for instance, the laying of the foundation-stone of the new Free St. George's in Edinburgh.¹

Having long been an active Freemason, he was in 1867 elected Grand Master Mason of Scotland, and it may be mentioned that it was largely to his good offices that Scottish Freemasonry owed the patronage of the then Prince of Wales, now King Edward the Seventh. In such ways as this, he continued, even after his professed retirement, to touch contemporary life at many points, and to enjoy a large share of the respect and liking of those among whom he lived, which was especially manifested at a complimentary banquet to which he was entertained at Arbroath, in April 1871, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.

Not many characteristic anecdotes of Lord Panmure have been preserved. Among them, however, is one which illustrates his intolerance of what he held to be unjustifiable ignorance. He had introduced a deputation on the subject

¹ November 1867.

of the Tweed Acts to Sir George Cornwall Lewis, the Home Secretary of the day, who was paying careful heed whilst the spokesman of the deputation read aloud from a memorandum. Presently the Home Secretary interrupted, asking, 'Do I understand you, sir, to say that the salmon sometimes visits the sea?' Now, Sir George had a great and doubtless well-deserved reputation for learning, but the fatuity, as it seemed to him, of this inquiry was too much for Lord Panmure, an enthusiastic salmon-fisher. He brought down the black walking-stick, which he used for support, upon the floor of the Committee-room, and rapped out the words, 'Good God! with how little wisdom is this country governed!'

On another occasion the Prince Consort had paid him a visit when he was laid up with gout. On the Prince's departure, the Private Secretary entered the room, and to him Lord Panmure exclaimed impulsively, 'Is it not extraordinary that no person has courage to tell His Royal Highness the truth?'

The following, which shows him in a milder light, is a reminiscence of the late Professor Masson's. At a reception given by the Queen's Commissioner at Holyrood, at the time of the General Assembly, a young lady had sung Carolina Nairne's inimitable song, 'The Laird of Cockpen.' At the conclusion of the song, Lord Panmure approached the singer, complimented her upon her music, and bowing to her in an old-fashioned, courtly style, archly added, 'Madam, *I* am the Laird of Cockpen!' For, sure enough, Cockpen is on the Dalhousie estate.

A fellow-passenger who, in 1860, travelled out with him to the East, remembers that he spent most of his time on shipboard in reading Horace.

It should perhaps have been stated ere this that in 1860, on the death of his cousin, James Andrew, tenth Earl and first Marquis of Dalhousie, he had succeeded to

the entailed estates and to the title of Earl of Dalhousie. But it was as Lord Panmure that his most important work had been done, and it is by that name that he is best remembered.

Keen and accomplished sportsman as he was, he had now ample means to compensate himself for the comparative hardships of his early years, his deer forest of Invermark being one of the finest in Scotland, and his grouse-bag for several years one of the heaviest, whilst at Brechin Castle he maintained the state of a Grand Seigneur. Twice he had the honour of receiving visits from the Queen at Invermark, the second time being during her widowhood; and, indeed, the chill which, developing into peritonitis, finally proved fatal to him, is believed to have been contracted through his desiring not to fail in his attendance on Her Majesty when she happened to be travelling in his neighbourhood. He died at Brechin Castle, July 6th, 1874, at the age of seventy-three. That the Queen recognised in him a faithful and devoted servant, and set high value on his services, is apparent from the following letters, graciously addressed by Her Majesty, during his illness and after his death, to his sister:—

THE QUEEN TO LADY CHRISTIAN MAULE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *July 6, 1874.*

DEAR LADY CHRISTIAN,—I have this morning received your kind letter, for which pray accept my best thanks. I am so deeply grieved at your dear brother's severe illness, and cannot help fearing that he must have got a chill, or tired himself, by coming to the Bridge of Dun, as by your letter I see it came on that very same evening. Leopold is as distressed as I am at this serious illness of dear Lord Dalhousie, who has always been so kind to me and mine.

Helena and her husband are also most anxious in their inquiries.

So many sad events have taken place since I saw you. Poor Lady Clarendon's and Lady Amberley's deaths, and that of her only little girl! You have probably not told your dear brother of these events.

Begging you to say everything most kind to him from me and my children, and hoping to receive good accounts,
—Believe me always, yours most sincerely, V. R.

THE QUEEN TO LADY CHRISTIAN MAULE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *July 7, 1874.*

DEAR LADY CHRISTIAN,—I little thought when I wrote to you yesterday that I should this morning receive the distressing intelligence which was conveyed to me in your telegram of last night. From the accounts of the last two days, I had so hoped that your dear brother would have recovered. Most truly and deeply do I feel for you who have been for so many years his constant and devoted companion, and I feel *I* have lost a most kind, faithful, and loyal friend in dear Lord Panmure.

On all occasions he was always ready to serve his Sovereign loyally and truly, and his name will ever be gratefully (remembered) by me and my children.

The two visits to Invermark, so different in their character, I shall ever look back to with pleasure and interest. I cannot believe that I shall no longer be kindly and warmly greeted by him on my arrival in the dear Highlands and on my return to the South, when he never shunned the inclemency of the weather to come and meet us at the Bridge of Dun, where only this day fortnight I saw him with you looking well and strong, little thinking it was the last time I should ever see him in this world. I can never either forget the feeling of sympathy he showed for me at the time of my great sorrow.

May God support and comfort you is the sincere prayer
of yours affectionately, VICTORIA, R. I.

QUEEN VICTORIA TO LADY C. MAULE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *December 8, 1874.*

DEAR LADY CHRISTIAN,—Pray accept my very sincere thanks for the valuable and interesting book you have so kindly sent me in the name of your poor dear brother.

We missed his ever kind and friendly welcome on our journey to Scotland very much, and I thought both going and coming back that I *must* see him as I always did, and so frequently accompanied by you.

I trust your health is good, but you must sadly miss your dear companion, and find England a great change after Scotland.—Ever yours affectionately, V. R.

Doubtless Lord Panmure's reputation as a man and as a War Minister has suffered somewhat at the hands of Kinglake. But Kinglake's partisanship is notorious. In writing his history of the Crimean War, he had one main object in view, to wit, the rehabilitation and glorification of Lord Raglan; and the effect of this preoccupation was to render him less than just to whomsoever he chose to consider hostile to his hero. It is indeed with difficulty that the Sovereign herself escapes those animadversions which he allows to fall by implication on those nearest to her person.¹ Since Kinglake's day, however, the writing of history has been revolutionised. And one result of this revolution is that his literary portraits, whether of Louis Napoleon, of St. Arnaud, or of Lord Panmure, are recognised less as the serious studies of a sober chronicler than as extravagant exercises of a sportively ironical fancy. In one case, at least, there is good ground for believing that a bitter personal animosity contributes harshness to the outline. That case, is not, however, the case in which we are here most interested.

¹ See vol. vi. p. 333 *et seq.*

Time and the clearer light which it brings with it have already proved the futility of Kinglake's defence of Raglan's generalship—we do not say of Raglan's public or private character, which were of the noblest and most lovable, or of the many services rendered by him to his country,—most notably, perhaps, in preserving the friendly relations of the Allies in the Crimean campaign. And just as Kinglake has done more than justice to the military talents of the Commander, so he has done less than justice to the temper and administrative talents of the War Minister.

In the foregoing letters Lord Panmure has spoken for himself. Special brilliancy of endowment is not claimed for him. But it is claimed that he there reveals himself as a high-minded, hard-working, and self-sacrificing public servant; one who proved himself 'good at need'—of service in emergency, who was well qualified by natural ability to administer the affairs of his country, and who in that capacity consistently worked his hardest and did his best. He was without those striking and winning attributes, physical and intellectual, of enthusiasm and of ideality, which made Sidney Herbert so attractive to his contemporaries, but in his own peculiar qualities of sound sense and vigour of character he was probably Herbert's superior.

As regards his private character, he had a warm temper, which gout aggravated, but of which the manifestations were of brief duration. And he had also that redeeming attribute which is so often associated with warmth of temper—a warm heart. In his own house he was a hospitable and attentive host, and many instances of his substantial kindness to friends and dependants were brought to light upon his death. For example, there was found among his papers a long list of persons, of various degree, to whom he had been in the habit of paying annuities—among them being friends in his own station in

life whose circumstances had become reduced, or the widows and children of the same. As a politician he was without rancour, and was ever ready to do the fullest justice to his political opponents. A true sportsman, he carried with him into public life the sportsman's instinct of fairness—as an instance of which it may be mentioned that, when Disraeli was rousing the Liberal party in the House of Commons to cheers by his attacks on Sir Robert Peel, Fox Maule, as he then was, would invariably refrain from taking any part in the demonstration. But probably the best testimony to the true amiability of his character is to be found in the warm affection with which he was regarded by those who were brought into closest relation with him. And among these must be numbered not only his relatives, dependants, and political colleagues—such as Sir Charles Wood, who had the 'greatest possible affection for him'—but also the Sovereign whom it was his pride to serve with chivalrous loyalty and devotion.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER

BY

THE LATE REV. PRINCIPAL RAINY, D.D.

LORD DALHOUSIE AND THE FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

A VERY appreciable element and influence in the life of Lord Dalhousie must be recognised in connection with Scottish Church affairs. He identified himself with the Evangelical and reforming party in the Church of Scotland: he aided them in every way open to him during the conflict which ended in the Disruption of 1843: and he continued as long as he lived to give his hearty support to the Free Church. On these questions he diverged from the views of his father. His sisters shared his Church tendencies, and were not less consistent and thorough in their adherence.

An old and great question in the history of the Scottish Church had been the question of the Church's independence in matters spiritual, that is, practically, in matters of faith and discipline. In many forms of Church life this would have meant the independence of the clergy. But the Scottish Church was organised in a series of representative Courts rising from the kirk-session to the General Assembly, in which elders took part with the ministers in all the proceedings; and a popular interest in the principles which the Church professed and on which the Church was governed was rigorously maintained from the Reformation downwards. The General Assembly was the ecclesiastical parliament of Scotland, and while in all the great turns of the history the people supported the Church Courts, the Courts, on the other hand, were relied on to support the special rights of the people.

The Scottish Church was an Established Church, and

therefore had to reckon with State power as well as State favour. The Church maintained her independence and believed that the State had guaranteed it; but this applied only to matters spiritual. On the other side, the State's right to control her own gifts of money and privilege were as frankly recognised. It was believed that these two forms of independent authority, the ecclesiastical and the civil, could walk together, and indeed they succeeded in doing so, not without times of serious friction and conflict, for about three hundred years. But it was known that the relation was a delicate one, and required for its maintenance some prudence on both sides.

It was the duty of the Church to maintain and guard the rights of her people. If the Church Courts were at any time disposed or tempted to encroach on these, or to sacrifice them, the people were generally prompt to protest and to assert them. Among these rights one of the most important was their claim to a potential voice in the appointment of the ministers who were to care for their souls. The simplest and fullest expression of such a potential voice was the right of congregations to choose their own minister, and that was the line prescribed in the first Book of Discipline. Changes in this respect took place at various periods; but the right of the people to have their mind regarded and, at least, not to have a minister thrust upon them against their will, continued to be the constitutional principle of the Church. Hence no minister was settled in any organised congregation without a 'Call'—an invitation from the office-bearers and people to the person in view, to become their minister—which was signed under fixed precautions, and considered by the Presbytery prior to the induction of the minister. Thus even when the nomination of the minister to a vacant charge was in other hands, the consent at least of the congregation was expressed by the call.

Lay patronage had passed away at the Revolution settlement, being formally abolished in 1690: it was restored again in 1712, against the unanimous protest of the Church, by a party in the British Parliament which

had no sympathy with Scottish Presbyterianism. After about twenty years from the date of this Act, settlement on presentation by Patrons began to be carried through, but in all cases the call continued to be required and formally proceeded on, as the ancient practice of the Church.

During the remainder of the eighteenth century a party prevailed in the Church Courts which was not disposed to care much for popular sentiment, nor for the Reformation theology which was generally acceptable to the people. This party did not venture to dispense with the call; but they formed a habit of accepting and sustaining calls, signed by any fraction of the congregation, however small. In this way the presentation of the patron must as a rule prevail, for it was always possible to procure some signature in favour of his presentee. Under this system dissent from the Established Church made rapid progress.

With the progress of the religious awakening which was felt in the later years of the eighteenth century and became powerful in the nineteenth, the Evangelical and reforming party in the Church of Scotland became again powerful, and regained the lead in the General Assembly. The effort to reform and invigorate the system of the Church was commenced. At more points than one in their programme, the power of the Church through her Assembly to determine how spiritual relations should be formed was challenged by interested parties, who brought the question into the Civil Courts. A conflict of jurisdictions ensued, and as the Crown and Parliament took the side of the Civil Courts, the Disruption ensued in 1843.

With regard to the settlement of ministers the obvious course for the reforming party to take was to revive the authority of the call by providing that the call should not be sustained, and therefore that the patron's presentee should not be inducted, unless the call were signed by a majority of the communicants. But it was resolved to take what seemed the milder course of requiring, not that the majority should invite the presentee, but that at least

a majority of male heads of families, being communicants, should not object. The settlement, after due preliminaries, was to proceed, unless a paper in prescribed form, objecting to the settlement, and signed by a majority as just described, were tendered to the Presbytery. In that case the Presbytery should not proceed to induct, and the presentation having failed, the patron might present anew. The Act of Assembly which contained these points, along with some provisions to guard against malicious or spiteful objections, was popularly called the Veto Act. Its real and official name was the ACT ON CALLS. The formal contest about it was begun in connection with a presentation to the charge of the parish of Auchterarder, which led to process in the Civil Courts in 1837 and following years.

The leader in these efforts of the Church was Dr. Chalmers, who had already signalised his devotion to the cause of religion and of the Scottish Church by a Church Extension movement, which added nearly two hundred charges to the congregations of the Church. It was one symptom of an immense impulse of zeal and hopeful effort which was penetrating every part of the Church, and promised to achieve great things at home and abroad.

A collision of jurisdictions between the Courts of Civil Law and the Courts of the Church could not take place without great excitement and painful scandals. The Church maintained her rights as not only scriptural, but constitutional, rooted in the history of Scotland, and of the Scottish Church. Because they were scriptural, she could not give way; because they were constitutional, she could not retire from her connection with the State, unless the State made it plain that the new reading of her constitution by the Courts of Law was sanctioned by the State. Once the Courts Ecclesiastical and the Courts Civil came into collision on the point of settlements, cases of conflict multiplied rapidly along the frontiers of the two jurisdictions, each as it arose and took shape adding to the excitement which stirred the whole community.

Lord Aberdeen made an attempt to effect a settlement

by a Bill which he introduced into the House of Lords, but as the provisions of this Bill, in the opinion of the General Assembly, did not secure the liberties which it was matter of conscience with them to maintain, the measure was dropped. Sir Robert Peel, then at the head of the Government [*sic*] and in the zenith of his influence, took occasion to make a statement on the subject in the House of Commons during the session of 1840. He expressed regret that the Church had determined in certain particulars to disregard the decision of the Civil Courts, and he advised that the Church should set a good example by implicit obedience. This view of the case was probably quite natural from the point of view of English Churchmanship, and was probably generally shared by Englishmen on both sides of the House.

But the Scottish Church found a prompt and resolute champion in Mr. Fox Maule. He took the distinction with perfect clearness between the spiritual acts, in which the Church claimed the right to apply her own principles, and the civil functions which her Courts might occasionally have to discharge. In the latter the Church frankly owned that the decisions of her Courts were subject to review and correction by the Courts of Law. Mr. Fox Maule said:—

‘The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland had over and over again declared that so far as civil rights were concerned it would bow implicitly to the decisions of the Law; but so closely was the possession of benefices bound together with the care of souls, that it was scarcely for one not acquainted with the constitution of the Church of Scotland to draw a line of demarcation between those two rights. To those who knew the constitution of the Church the line was clear and distinct. So then it was apparent that all the Church had done was to say, that while, on the one hand, they obeyed the law as to benefices, still they owed a duty to a higher authority than man, when they inducted to a congregation of their Church any individual to have a care of souls. On this point it was that the General Assembly had maintained the constitution of the Church, and had recognised and upheld the principle of what had been called Non-intrusion. . . . The right hon. gentleman (Sir Robert Peel) had expressed a hope that the ministers of the Church of Scotland would show to their respective flocks an example of devoted obedience to the

laws of the country, and that they would induce them not to persist in their present opinions. He had no doubt that the clergy would preach peace and goodwill to men, and would induce their flocks to obey in all those matters in which they were bound to obey. But if the right hon. gentleman meant to say that those persons, who had gone through so much obloquy, should desert the points they had contended for, and thus abandon what they sincerely believed to be their sacred duty, he could not concur in that expectation.'

Fresh legal decisions increased the complications in Scotland during 1841 and 1842. It was clear that the situation could not be indefinitely prolonged. Those who maintained the ancient liberties of the Church, and who felt that without them an Establishment must cease to be defensible, could not suddenly resign the conflict and separate from the State; they were bound to do their utmost to preserve what they had received. But unless the Legislature interposed with an adequate *modus vivendi*, the time was plainly hastening on when the Church must seek, apart from the State, the freedom which the Courts of Law refused to recognise.

In 1841 the Duke of Argyle introduced a Bill in the House of Lords, which would have satisfied the Church, but which failed to find support. Early in 1842 Mr. Campbell of Monzie, a member of the Church of Scotland and a supporter of the Government, introduced a Bill in the Commons; but he was induced to postpone the second reading by a statement from Sir James Graham that the Government were prepared to legislate. Sir James Graham explained to the House the nature of the measure referred to, and was at once told by Mr. Fox Maule that it could effect no real settlement. Mr. Maule was supported by Mr. P. Maxwell Stewart, and by Mr. Rutherford, at that time one of the most eminent members of the Scottish Bar. A similar situation was presented on a later occasion, when Sir A. Leith Hay called attention to the urgency of the question. Sir James Graham identified himself with the position of the Scottish judges—which was equivalent to saying that he would apply no remedy—and Mr. Maule maintained that Acts of the Scottish

Parliament, and decisions of the Scottish Courts of Civil Law in the eighteenth century, evinced that the liberties claimed had been conceded long ago, and recognised by the Civil Courts.

¹ In these circumstances the General Assembly of 1842, realising the full gravity of the situation, deliberately prepared for bringing the matter to a final issue. They adopted the document called the CLAIM OF RIGHT, in which they set forth the rights which had been assailed, and the grounds on which they held that these were not only theologically sound, but were part of the ancient constitution of Church and State in Scotland. They also made it clear that on these points they held themselves bound in conscience to make no surrender. If they were in any danger of underrating the seriousness of their position, the sense of it was quickened by an interdict from the Court of Session being laid on the table of the Assembly—the first event of that kind in the Church's history. It purported to prohibit the Assembly from admitting two of the ministers sent up from Presbyteries to seats in the House.

All this time the conviction cherished by the Government and its Scottish advisers was that the attitude of the Church partook largely of the element of bluff, and would give way to firmness on the part of the authorities.

It was soon after this that the postponed Bill of Mr. Campbell of Monzie came in for second reading in the House of Commons; and an impressive situation arose, which created lively interest at the time. The Speaker had been advised that the Bill affected Crown patronage, and he ruled that it could proceed no further without the consent of the Crown. Mr. Maule made an appeal to the Prime Minister. He said he believed it was in the power of the Prime Minister (Sir Robert Peel) to remove the objection, and he appealed to him to do so. The appeal was ineffectual, and the Bill went no further.

The final crisis was prepared by two events. One was the decision of the House of Lords in what was known as the second Auchterarder case, in 1842. This decision

confirmed the judgment in that case of the Courts below, and it affirmed the right of the Civil Court to order and to prohibit spiritual acts. The second event was the reply of the Government to the CLAIM OF RIGHT. They said in effect that they could not propose legislation on the lines demanded in the CLAIM OF RIGHT. In order to make it clear whether the House of Commons occupied the same ground, a petition was sent up, which was made the basis of a motion in the House. This duty was undertaken by Mr. Maule. His motion was in substance that the House should take the matter into their own hands and should express their opinion as to the respective spheres of jurisdiction of Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Courts in Scotland. The House rejected the motion; but out of thirty-seven Scottish members who voted, twenty-five voted for it.

It may be well to reproduce some part of Mr. Maule's important speech on this debate, because it throws light on a discussion which has historical significance, and because it illustrates, also, the strong and clear method in which Mr. Maule discussed it. It is to be observed that while the most important question at the root of the whole business is whether Churches ought on Christian grounds to claim these liberties, the practical question, forced to the front by the nature of the case, was whether these liberties had been claimed by and legislatively assured to the Established Church of Scotland. That was a constitutional question, and it had to be argued on constitutional lines.

Mr. Maule said that the Church of Scotland brought two grievances before the House. The first was that an infringement had been made upon the Constitution of the Ecclesiastical Courts in Scotland, of which the General Assembly was the chief, through an invasion of their rights and privileges by the Civil Courts. What the Church of Scotland claimed was that, within their own sphere, they were independent Courts, like as any other Courts which existed in Scotland were independent in their own sphere. It was said that they alone claimed to be the judges of what was spiritual and what was civil.

They did not. They held that other Courts had a right to determine for their own purposes, in the cases brought before them, what was civil and what was spiritual. All they set up for was that they were independent Courts recognised by the law. And he thought that claim was fully borne out by the Statutes of Scotland.

Here Mr. Maule entered on a full statement of the effect of the Scottish Statutes relating to the Church from 1567 downwards—closing this part of his statement with the ACT OF UNION between the kingdoms, which ratified and confirmed the Presbyterian Government of the Church as confirmed by former statutes, and declared it to be a fundamental and unalterable condition of any treaty of Union to be concluded between the two kingdoms. On this point Mr. Maule summed up by saying :—

‘There is by the Constitution of these Realms an exclusive and perpetual jurisdiction, both judicial and legislative, in all matters ecclesiastical, vested in the Courts of the Presbyterian Church: and though these were at various times vehemently opposed by certain orders of the community, I must say that till the present discussion arose I never heard them denied.’

The other grievance which the Church’s petition brought before the House was that of PATRONAGE. This had not been till now brought before Parliament by the Church: nor did she now propose the removal of it as an essential condition of an acceptable settlement. But PATRONAGE was the pretext on which most of the invasions of the Church’s jurisdiction had been founded; and now, when the last effort was being made to reach the ear of Parliament, it was thought proper to point this out. The Church had endeavoured to work patronage into the genuine system of the Church, and the difficulty had proved to be too great. Mr. Maule pointed out that it was an old grievance, inflicted on the Church by the enemies of Presbyterianism then in power, and never regarded as other than a grievance. Now, however, it proved to be a serious danger. Mr. Maule closed by saying :—

‘If Parliament means to save the Church of Scotland from the

disruption of all its best and most efficient ministers, they must take the matter into their own hands. The House may believe that I do not exaggerate when I say that there will be a huge secession of ministers and also of a body to which you can scarcely attach less importance, I mean the Eldership of the Church and her communicants. This you may rely upon. To expect anything else from such a resolute people as the Scotch is but a disordered fancy. I entreat this House to take the matter into their own hands.'

When the General Assembly met on 18th May 1843, between four and five hundred ministers left their manse and gave up their stipends rather than sacrifice their principles. They constituted themselves, along with the elders accredited to join them, into the FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. One of the acts of that first Free Church Assembly was to pass a vote of thanks to members of Parliament who had advocated the Church's cause in the House of Commons. In moving this resolution Mr. Murray Dunlop said:—

'First we have Mr. Fox Maule. I do not know how to express my sense of his services. A more earnest, a more upright, a more sincere friend of the cause does not exist in this Assembly. I have had the most ample means of knowing how anxiously and devotedly he laboured in our cause, and the assiduity with which he sought to maintain our rights. When Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Maule had much to do in the disposal of Church patronage; and I can confidently assert that there never was a period when the patronage of the Crown was administered with more fidelity, or a more perfect desire to present such ministers as would labour to promote the glory of God, and be acceptable to the people. To Mr. Maule I am sure that this Assembly will with its whole heart give thanks.'

Mr. Maule's reply, which winds up one stage of his services in connection with the Free Church, must be given at length. It was dated at Brighton, 9th June. He acknowledges the Assembly's appreciation of his services, and proceeds:—

'I look upon this as an honour of which I may greatly boast, not simply as tending to raise me in the eyes of my fellow-countrymen, but because it will hand down to posterity my name in association with those of the great and good men who for

conscience' sake have made one of the noblest sacrifices which history has been called on to record. I congratulate you, sir, and the high-minded men who took part in that great event, which the civilised world has scarcely yet learned to comprehend and can never cease to admire, on the response which the people of Scotland have made to the voice of the faithful among his ministers. I rely upon you, sir, to convey to the Assembly my sincere gratitude for their notice of me, my determination cordially to unite with them in promoting the best interests and usefulness of the FREE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.'

Fox Maule, as he was familiarly called in Scotland, evidently felt all the significance of this position as the trusted and special representative of his Church before Parliament. In this connection it may be well to point out that neither in his view, nor in that of those he represented, was the question one merely of constitutional law, of ecclesiastical tradition, or even of high practical expediency. The liberty claimed by the Church was liberty in the matters committed to his Church by Christ, to learn His Will, and, according to the Church's own conviction of duty, to do it. That was why, in those things, every other authority must be declined. It was a religious loyalty to Christ as Founder and Lord of the Church. Mr. Maule believed that it was valued and contended for in Scotland in that light. But no doubt it thrilled him when he saw how the sincerity of that profession was vindicated by the sacrifices of ministers, by the prompt enthusiasm of effort with which the people gathered round them, and by the gladness and the aspiration which pervaded the whole movement. His strong convictions on the merits of the case and his grasp of principles secured his advocacy during the contest. But probably one may think that the impressions just referred to drew him to the Church he had fought for by another tie. He liked, and he found it, no doubt, to be helpful, to associate with men whose religious sincerity had survived that trial. Certainly he cherished his Free Church friendships and was most faithful to the end in his attendance at the Assembly. He was a man who at one period of his life had had no great religious advantages, and at all periods of his life refrained

from ostentatious religious profession. But it always seemed to the writer that he liked and profited by the fellowship of the Christian men who had made good their profession by the fidelity of their actions.

In 1845 Mr. Maule, who had become an elder (after his succession to the family title, he served as such in the congregation in which he worshipped at Brechin), was sent to the General Assembly as a representative, and with a few interruptions from political engagements, he attended the Assembly regularly for many years. His first speech was in support of petitioning against the MAYNOOTH COLLEGE BILL then before Parliament. After referring to the fact that he had already in Parliament opposed the principle of the Bill, he went on to say:—

‘My friend, my gracious friend, Mr. Shiel, told me in Parliament that when I returned to what he was pleased to call my “spiritual dominions,” I should be received by my countrymen with dismal hallelujahs and lugubrious hosannas. Now, fathers and brethren, of the dismal hosannas and the cheers with which you greeted my appearance among you, long may I live to be so received, and long may I live to stand in such circumstances as these, when I know that all the best feelings, all the right sense, and all the true religion of my countrymen approve of the acts I have performed. “My spiritual dominions!” I wish it may be said of Scotland that it is the spiritual dominion among the dominions of our Sovereign, and that whatever may be done elsewhere, we at least will stand foremost to maintain here true religious liberty.’

The speaker went on to show that what was claimed by the Church of Scotland in 1842 had now been granted to the Catholics of Ireland, by the ENDOWMENT OF MAYNOOTH.

Mr. Maule did not confine himself to semi-political subjects. During the sittings of this Assembly, Dr. Chalmers had resigned the Convenership of the Fund he had organised with so much success for the support of the ministry. In the discussion which followed no minister took part: it was conducted entirely by laymen. Lord Breadalbane, Mr. Fox Maule, Mr. Campbell of Monzie, Sheriff Speirs, and Mr. Murray Dunlop vied with one

another in their veneration for their great leader, and their enthusiasm for the cause of the Church. Among the other topics on which Mr. Maule spoke at this Assembly was the organisation of the Church's NEW THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE. His interest in this department of the Church's work continued unabated to the end of his life. As late as 1873 he took a practical interest in constituting and endowing the Students' Dining-Hall, and more than once was present as a guest. He was generous also to the College Library.

In the Assembly of 1846 the subject of refusal of sites became prominent. In many parts of the country landowners refused to grant sites for churches, and at the same time many ministers, owing to refusal of sites for manse, were obliged to live at a distance from their congregations. At Kelmaltic (*sic*) the Free Church congregation, after resorting to a cemetery, from which they were ejected by interdict, took refuge on the sea-shore within high-water mark, to hold public worship. At Strontian a floating church had to be provided, which was anchored in the sound and was reached by boats. At Wanlockhead (one of the highest inhabited spots in Scotland) the turnpike road was the only place where the people could worship unmolested; and they had to do so in driving snow. Other congregations had to assemble in quarries, or on the commons known in Scotland as 'drove stands.' Mr. Maule shared deeply in the indignation aroused by these experiences, and he expressed it on the floor of the Assembly.

'When I cast my eye on this my native country and see what is going on there with respect to the Free Church, I, like Sheriff Speirs, blush for those of my countrymen who are guilty of these acts—I take leave to say these atrocious acts. I hold them responsible not simply to society at large in this world, but to a far higher Authority for the manner in which they execute the duties which devolve on them as proprietors of land. It has been said that property has its duties as well as its rights: and what is it, I would ask, that secures to property the enjoyment of those rights? Why, it is the Law. And the Law reserves to itself the right of again interfering with the use of the rights which it protects. Not only do I maintain, on general grounds of tolera-

tion, that the refusal of sites is not to be endured, but I will say that if property is to be used in this manner, not for promoting the happiness of the community, but to cause or enhance suffering, then let those who hold property beware lest the question be raised, "Why should we protect the tenure of property, while rights of property have become to us a source of suffering instead of encouragement?" I do not enter now into the details of every case of oppression, but there is no case that may be entrusted to me which I shall not bring out fully for the information of England, of Ireland, and of the world.'

The speaker was as good as his word, and in 1846 he brought in a Bill upon the subject, in connection with which he depicted to the House the treatment which congregations had received and the shifts to which they had been driven in arranging for public worship. Tents, halls, floating churches, private dwellings, disused quarries, caves, and abandoned sheds had been resorted to. One proprietor (Lord Macdonald) had responded to a petition from four thousand persons:—

'I beg to decline to give ground for the erection of a Free church on my property.'

Another (Sir James Riddell of Ardnamurchan) refused to give any site on his wide property, explaining that

'any one who did not agree with him should not worship within walls.'

A third (Lord Moray), finding that a manse had been erected on ground just outside of his park, three miles from his house, caused a dead wall to be run up within three feet of the manse windows. Other great landlords (the Earl of Seafield, Lord Ailsa, Lord Cawdor, the Duke of Buccleuch) had acted in the same way as to site-refusing. The Ministry of the day had been expressing sympathy with sufferers under religious persecution; and Mr. Maule asked them whether they had no redress to offer for such cases to a Church in their own country which, within three years, had erected 600 churches, 191 manses, and 558 schools.

The Bill did not pass, but the discussion led several

landholders to reconsider the subject and frankly to change their policy.

In spite, however, of Parliamentary discussion and private influence, a certain number held out. We may anticipate so far as to say that, in 1865, congregations were still churchless from this cause. The congregation of Shielding, Ross-shire, worshipped for twenty-three years in a recess in a cliff, the proprietor (Vice-Chancellor Sir John Stuart) rejecting all appeals for a site. In 1865 Mr. Maule, now Earl of Dalhousie, spoke in the Assembly of these refusals, which he regarded as not only unchristian but inhuman, in terms of the severest kind. Happily he lived to see the petty narrowness which he denounced pass away, and the congregations which had suffered so long worshipping in comfort in their own churches.

After 1846 the exigencies of public life prevented Mr. Maule from attending Assemblies until 1852. By that time he was known as Lord Panmure, having succeeded to his father's title. In the Assembly of 1854 Dr. Grierson of Errol, under whose ministry he had sat for some time, was called to the Chair of the Assembly, and Lord Panmure seconded the nomination, briefly and happily. He continued to act the same part in the case of Moderators of subsequent Assemblies, and it became a thing expected that he should do so. It gave much satisfaction to the Assembly, and evidently gave pleasure to himself.

In 1857 proposals were first mooted in the Free Church for union with the United Church. It was not at that time proposed to press the proposal in the Church Courts, as it was not supposed that the general mind of the Church was prepared for it. But resolutions were privately drawn up and signed by influential men of both Churches which indicated the lines on which a satisfactory and harmonious union might ultimately be effected, and these were circulated privately, on the responsibility of those who had signed. Lord Panmure's name was attached to this document. A complaint was made to the General Assembly on the ground that these proceedings

were irregular, and tended towards a departure from the CLAIM OF RIGHT of 1842. Lord Panmure defended them, but he deprecated formal discussion of the resolutions as useless and mischievous. He said :—

‘Here is a document to which I have put my name. It does not meet with the approbation of the Presbytery of Glasgow. They condemn it, and they overture the General Assembly to condemn it, for reasons which they state. The General Assembly goes into this discussion. I must defend myself. I defend myself by justifying all the resolutions to which I put my name. Are these resolutions in the possession of the Assembly? No, they are not. How then can the Assembly know from what I am justifying myself? At present we shall come to the discussion of the condemnation, without having in our possession, as a body, the articles on which the condemnation is based. I am as ready as my friend, *Mr. Dunlop*,¹ to justify that to which I have put my name; but I must say at the same time that it will lead to a discussion which will not be to the benefit of the Church. I would advise the Assembly to avoid all hasty conclusions in a matter of such importance: I believe that if they do so, much benefit will ensue.’

The subject of the Union was formally taken in hand in 1863. The Union itself was not effected till 1900.

In 1859 certain difficulties had arisen in the College of Glasgow in the form of differences between a professor there and some of his students on points of theological statement. The College Committee on the whole supported the students, and the case came up to the Assembly. Lord Panmure spoke with great vigour in support of the Committee, and in the line of indicating reasonable liberty of theological thoughts, and the Assembly took the same view. At this Assembly, also, he spoke on the subject of FOREIGN MISSIONS, and paid a warm tribute to the character and work of Dr. Duff. He had watched that work and supported it with unfailing sympathy.

On the death of his cousin, the Marquis of Dalhousie, in 1860, Lord Panmure succeeded to the Earldom. He continued to take the same warm interest in the Free Church, which had grown wonderfully during the seven-

¹ Alexander Dunlop, M.P. for Greenock.

teen years of its history which had now elapsed. In the Assembly of 1861 he seconded the election of Dr. Candlish as Moderator, and he supported the Report on HOME MISSIONS given in by Dr. Buchanan. In this able speech he left to others the illustration of the higher grounds on which Home Mission work proceeds, and 'descended to the platform of political economy.' He reviewed the conditions of life in this country and the tendencies of the time, and from these considerations he pressed on the Assembly the duty incumbent on all parties to support vigorously the Home Mission work of the Church.

In the same Assembly, in supporting the nomination of Dr. Candlish to the Principalship of NEW COLLEGE, EDINBURGH, he paid a singularly graceful tribute to his talents and his fitness for the office. Lord Dalhousie's utterances on such occasions were pervaded by the peculiar warmth of regard which binds together those who have been associated in experiences of great anxiety and great responsibility. Not long afterwards he found an opportunity of expressing similar regard for another lifelong friend. In 1864 Dr. Guthrie felt it necessary to be relieved from some of his responsibilities by the appointment of a colleague. When the report on the arrangements necessary in the circumstances was laid on the table of the Assembly of that year, Lord Dalhousie said:—

'I have read the list of applications for colleagues, and it is impossible, with my feelings towards Dr. Guthrie, to refrain from noticing the application with which his name is connected. Since the application has been laid before the Assembly, the fiat has gone forth that Dr. Guthrie is to be laid aside from either dispensing the Word of his Master from the pulpit, or advocating the great objects of philanthropy from the platform. I am sure this is intelligence which will strike sorrow to the heart of every member of the Assembly. . . . When Dr. Guthrie with his colleagues at the Disruption came out from the Establishment, such was the love his congregation bore him, he might almost have "lain down in green pastures" without taking much trouble or making much exertion. But that was not Dr. Guthrie's nature. He could not stand by and see his brother ministers throughout the country seeking, apparently without hope, where to lay their heads, while he had a comfortable house over his. He engaged

in and undertook that great scheme for providing manses for Free Church ministers. He sacrificed his health; we all know the hardships he endured, the trouble which he took, the zeal with which he prosecuted his work; and we have reason to thank God for the success with which he prosecuted that great movement.'

In the same Assembly he took an opportunity of expressing his profound respect and regard for the last Duchess of Gordon, who had lately died. That eminently Christian lady was a member of the Free Church congregation of Huntly, and had long been a consistent and very effective supporter of all forms of mission-work that tended to awaken and promote religious life, especially in the district around Huntly. Some persons who had views of their own as to the methods which ought, or ought not, to be employed for this end, were ill-advised enough to raise a controversy over her grave. Lord Dalhousie's few words on the occasion embodied a most effective expression of grave and scornful displeasure.

There remains one leading element in Free Church life in which Lord Dalhousie was keenly interested, and with reference to which he expressed his views not in one Assembly but in many. This was the Central Fund for the support of the ministry—known by the name of the SUSTENTATION FUND. He had watched its rise and progress with keen interest, and had given much thought to its management and administration. When it reached the point at which it became possible to pay £150 to each minister and £10 extra to most,¹ he expressed in the Assembly his gratitude and his satisfaction. He said:—

'Boasting is always a bad thing: yet it would be wrong on the part of the Free Church to hide its light under a bushel. All that is tending to make churches rely upon voluntary effort is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the satisfactory character of our present position. It is our duty, standing in the position we do, to show an example to the world. We exemplify the case of a Church which, while maintaining the preaching of the

¹ These figures refer to payments from Central Fund to ministers of all congregations, rich and poor. Congregations which were able to do so, made further provision for their ministers, in some cases very largely, under the name of supplement.

truth in its integrity, and throughout Scotland, can maintain it in reliance on our own resources, and without dependence on State aid.'¹

Reference has been made to tentative proposals for union with the United Presbyterian Church, in 1856-57, to which Lord Dalhousie had been a party. The subject continued to occupy men's minds, and it took shape as a practical matter for ecclesiastical discussion in 1863 and 1864. Lord Dalhousie felt as though he were now coming to his own. He believed the proposed union would lead to great and permanent spiritual results in Scotland, and he gave to it loyal and whole-hearted support. He took a keen interest in the debates, although he spoke but seldom. The question at issue was debated on grounds largely theological, and during his long connection with the Free Church he left theological questions to those to whom they naturally fell, and spoke mainly on the more practical side of church life and work. When the Union negotiations were arrested in 1873, and the whole project was postponed, his disappointment was keen, for he knew that he was not to see the consummation he had so much desired, and which he believed had in it such possibilities of good. He was not to be privileged to be a member of a UNITED FREE CHURCH, but he lost none of his faith in union, and felt assured that it would ere long be effected.

The Assembly of 1874 was the last which Lord Dalhousie attended. He seconded the appointment, as Moderator, of Dr. Stewart of Leghorn, laying stress on the principle that the highest honours of the Church should not be confined to ministers labouring at home. His last appearance in the Assembly was to make a short statement in connection with the work of the Church on the Continent. It was characteristic, and deserves to be quoted. He said:—

‘Before the subject is disposed of, I feel it incumbent upon

¹ In his will Lord Dalhousie gave a final expression of his interest in the proper support of the ministry by liberal provisions for the comfortable maintenance of the Free Church ministers in several parishes in which he had estates.

me to express my deep feeling of gratitude to the Continental Committee for the manner in which, for the last two years, they have supplied that station, in which I have the satisfaction of residing during the winter months. That station has been supplied by one . . . whose Gospel ministrations we have been blessed with during the last two winters. We shall expect the Committee to give us supply at Cannes this year, and be assured we shall be ready to welcome there any minister of the Church whom they may select for the mission. We will give him the same cordial welcome we have always done; and it would be ungrateful in me if I did not assure you that, so long as I am spared, it will be no charge to the Committee.'

During the stormy controversy preceding the DISRUPTION, Mr. Fox Maule was closely associated with ministers and laymen of the Evangelical party of the Church of Scotland, and many of them became his intimate personal friends. Before he himself died, their ranks had been rapidly thinning; and when Lord Dalhousie's death was recorded in the minutes of the Assembly of 1875, the names of Dr. Robert Buchanan¹ of Glasgow and of Sheriff Cleghorn had also to be commemorated. The minute in regard to Lord Dalhousie ran in these terms:—

'The death of the Earl of Dalhousie, in July of last year, deprived his countrymen of a high-minded patriot and statesman, who, during forty years of an active public life, took a leading part in the important political discussions of the time. For the Free Church it has been the loss of a greatly esteemed friend and office-bearer, who, with loyal enthusiasm, continued to the last his early attachment to her principles, and who gave to her during many years the benefit of his rank, his talent, and his energy, as well as of a large-hearted liberality. . . .

'When the Courts of Law had decided against the Church, and when the Government refused the redress which was demanded, it became necessary to represent to Parliament the claim which the Church had made on behalf of her own spiritual authority, and of the rights of the Christian people. This duty was entrusted to Mr. Fox Maule in 1843. . . . No Free Churchman can read without unfeigned gratitude the clear and intelligent defence of her position and principles made by Mr. Fox Maule in the House of Commons.

¹ An eminent minister of the Free Church, author of *The Ten Years' Conflict*, a standard work in Scottish Church History.

‘ After that event by which the Church of Scotland was broken up, came a time of hardship and persecution. Many congregations had to worship in the open air—not a few ministers were compelled to endure great privations—sites for churches and manses were refused, even in districts where nearly the whole population belonged to the Free Church. . . . The manner in which Mr. Fox Maule brought this subject before the House of Commons, and through it before the country, ensured success. It was conciliatory, but it was dignified and firm. . . .

‘ Lord Dalhousie’s interest in all the proceedings of the Free Church has been very conspicuous throughout the country, and especially in his own district his aid in the erection and support of new churches was cheerfully afforded : and his regular attendance at the meetings of the Assembly, the influential part he took in all its proceedings, his fitting remarks on the election of a Moderator, and on moving the annual address to the Queen—even the place which he usually occupied beside a much-honoured father, now no more, bring vividly to memory the loss which has been sustained.’

APPENDIX TO THE PANMURE PAPERS

LORD PANMURE TO FIELD-MARSHAL LORD RAGLAN¹

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 12, 1855.*

MY LORD,—When I call to my recollection the long period during which we served together in the two departments of military administration, and the cordiality which always existed between us, it enhances the pain which I feel in being now called upon, by a sense of public duty, to comment upon the condition of the Army under your command, and to require explanations from your Lordship as to the origin as well as the prolongation of the sufferings to which that gallant Army is still exposed.

I have to observe that on assuming the charge of the War Department, I cannot find that your Lordship has been in the habit of keeping Her Majesty's Government acquainted, in a clear and succinct manner, with the operations with which you are engaged, the progress which you have made in them, and the results likely to attend them.

Your notices of the condition of your Army are brief and unsatisfactory, and convey little more than is to be gathered from the gloomy character of the 'morning states'; while, on the other hand, elaborate statements reach us from quarters which you denominate as unauthentic, but to which it is impossible for the Government not, to some considerable extent at least, to attach credit.

We know that the communications between the Army and the port to which all its stores are shipped, have never been in a fit state for the transport of those stores, but from yourself we have had no satisfactory explanation how this came to be originally overlooked, and why the error has not even been attempted to be repaired.

We learn from sources the truth of which cannot be impeached, that while clothing and medical stores are in abundance at Balaclava, your troops have been suffering all the miseries of cold, and your sick all those melancholy consequences which the want of medicines occasions.

¹ *Correspondence relating to the Military Expedition to the East (Confidential)*, Part i. p. 370.

We hear likewise that a want of fresh vegetables is forcibly felt throughout the camp, and yet at Eupatoria fine fresh juicy onions are selling for a mere trifle.

We are likewise informed that while the tents of the troops are wet and filthy, a species of felt was to be had in abundance at Eupatoria, which would have easily made dry lying for the men.

It would appear that your visits to the camp were few and far between, and your staff seem to have known as little as yourself of the condition of your gallant men.

I confess I have had great difficulty in believing all these narratives, until concurrent and indisputable testimony from divers sources has forced the truth on my mind.

I cannot doubt for a moment your sympathy for the sufferings of your men, were you fully cognisant of them; but I believe you have been misled by your staff, and more especially by your Quartermaster-General, whose duty it was to have ascertained and reported to you the condition of the camp and the state of your communications with your magazines of stores.

In this Major-General Airey has totally failed, and thereby shown himself deficient in those qualities which constitute the very primary requirements in a Quartermaster-General.

To his want of foresight I mainly attribute the neglect to form a proper road between Balaclava and the camp. I do not perceive that any officer of his staff was ever fixed at Balaclava, or intermediate posts established at short intervals, which they surely might have been on the track—for I cannot call it a road—to the camp.

These deficiencies in the proper qualifications for his position on the part of Major-General Airey have given me much pain and uneasiness, feeling as I do that so much of the comfort of the Army depends on having an officer in his situation, of whom it is not merely sufficient to say that he is a good draughtsman, but that he is active, quick, and resolute, and fitted to instil similar qualities into his subordinates.

I cannot believe that you have had justice done to yourself by your staff, for with all the means at your disposal, with the full discretionary powers as to procuring supplies which you possess, it is foreign to your nature to suffer your Army to fall into the state in which it appears now to be.

I do not, however, wish to dwell on the past, but at once and speedily to deal with the present state of things in a way which shall give us better hopes for the future.

It seems to me that after all that has passed, Generals Airey and Estcourt might perform more efficient service in some other department of the Army than those which they now occupy. I

will not, however, insist on your Lordship at once removing those officers ; but I have determined to appoint an officer high in rank as Chief of the Staff, who shall superintend the whole routine of staff duties, and who will test the capabilities of any officer on the general staff of the Army, and report to your Lordship such as in his opinion are unfit for the positions which they occupy.

I hope to send out this officer in a very few days, and I will send to your Lordship at the same time a copy of the instructions which he receives.

It appears to me that your Lordship's reports to my department are too scanty, and in order to remove this inconvenience I have to request that you will call upon General Officers commanding Divisions, and they in turn will desire their Brigadiers to furnish reports once a fortnight, which you will regularly forward for my information. These reports must exhibit fully the state of the troops in camp. They will mention the condition of their clothing ; the amount and regularity of issue of their rations ; the state of their quarters, and the cleanliness of the camp in its several parts, to the strict maintenance of which I shall presently and more particularly refer.

The General Officers will mention in these reports any difficulties which may have occurred as to the issue of rations, fuel, or forage ; and you must inquire strictly and immediately into all neglect, and visit upon the delinquent punishment due to his fault.

By following the above directions you will, at little trouble to yourself, convey to me much interesting information, for all which I am at present compelled to rely on the reports of unofficial individuals.

I now come to a subject to which I have referred above, and which I consider of vital importance to the future existence of the Army. I mean the purification and cleansing of the camp. In all stationary camps, even under the most perfect regulations and notwithstanding the most vigilant care, nuisances speedily accumulate, and filth and ordure breed pestilence and death. While your camp is locked in the icy embrace of such a winter as you have to encounter, this evil is not perceived ; but it must exist, and will develop itself in all its frightfulness as soon as the sun acquires sufficient power to excite fermentation.

I cannot believe that your pioneers are fit to cope with this danger, and I beg you will lose no time in forming a strong corps of scavengers under the orders of the Quartermaster-General's Department, who shall proceed forthwith to remove the filth and ordure of the camp and deposit it in some place where it may be covered with rubbish ; the locality should be selected with due

consideration of the quarter from which the wind prevails in spring and summer.

The scavengers should be obtained by communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; but if they are so obtained, I trust that your Lordship will look well to their treatment by the soldiers.

The mail has just arrived, and the Government feel some disappointment in not receiving an official reply to my predecessor's despatch of the 6th January, for which we shall look anxiously next mail.

In the meantime I see no reason, from anything which has come to my hand, to alter the opinion which is universally entertained here of the inefficiency of your general staff.—I have etc.,

(Signed) PANMURE.

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE ¹

(Received March 16)

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 2, 1855.*

MY LORD,—I had the honour to receive the day before yesterday your Lordship's despatch No. 1, of the 12th February, in which you consider yourself compelled to comment upon the condition of the Army under my command, and to require explanations from me as to the origin, as well as the prolongation, of the sufferings to which that gallant Army is still exposed.

A review of what the Army has accomplished, and what it has been exposed to since the troops landed in Turkey, will at once account to your Lordship for the sickness under which it has suffered and continues to suffer.

The main body of the force assembled at Scutari before the end of April. Some part of it was collected at Gallipoli some weeks before, and when there encamped, encountered very severe weather, and the consequent suffering from cold was very great. At Scutari the weather was very variable; some days extremely hot, on others precisely the reverse.

From thence, towards the end of May, the Army moved to Varna, and took up a position in that neighbourhood, with one Division, and the Cavalry thrown as far forward as Devna, which I had the high authority of Omer Pasha for believing to be healthy.

This proved to be the case until the third week of July, when the cholera broke out there, in the other camps, and at Varna, and committed great ravages. Low fever likewise

¹ As before, Part v. p. 476.

became very prevalent about the same time, and the sick were still numerous when the Army was required to embark for the Crimea.

I was in hopes that shelter from the sun, and the passage across the Black Sea, would materially benefit those who had been placed on board. But in this I was disappointed; and I had the mortification of learning, when the fleet was collected, that many cases of cholera had ended fatally, and that the sick were numerous.

The 4th Division, which had not been at Varna, had suffered from the same disease, in some degree, in the Bosphorus, having arrived from England in perfect health, and were again attacked with it when the landing was effected. All the troops suffered from it in a greater or less degree, both then and on the march to Balaklava, at that place, and in the position taken up before Sebastopol; and this was the case for several months afterwards, and particularly in November and December.

From the end of September, when the siege operations commenced, to the present time, the troops have been fully and constantly occupied; and though, as the sick increased, and the number of men in the ranks diminished, the force in the trenches was decreased, yet it was impossible, without abandoning the enterprise, and placing the Army in extreme danger, to release the troops from the obligation of performing this harassing duty; and I believe I incurred some risk in allowing the working and covering parties to be so reduced.

Whilst the Divisions on the ridge were so engaged, the force left in the valley was busily employed in throwing up works of defence, and furnishing fatigue parties for Balaklava; and I can distinctly assert that there was no British soldier who had not as much as he could, and more than he ought under ordinary circumstances to have been called upon to do.

The bad weather commenced about the 10th of November, and has continued ever since. A winter campaign is under no circumstances child's play; but here, where the troops had no cantonments to take shelter in, where large bodies were collected in one spot, and where the want of sufficient fuel soon made itself felt, it told with the greatest severity upon the health, not of British alone, but of the French and Turkish troops.

I sent the Duke of Newcastle a paper upon this climate on the 23rd of October, and in that document will be found the statement of a gentleman who had resided in the Crimea thirteen years, that the inhabitants, as well as the Russian troops, are obliged to take every precaution for the preservation of their

lives in the severe months of the winter; and I, quoting his opinion in my letter of the 23rd October, state that 'our troops could not during that period remain under canvas even with great and constant fires, and the country hardly produces wood enough to cook the men's food.'

To the severity of the winter the whole Army can bear ample testimony. The troops have felt it in all its intensity, and when it is considered that they have been under canvas from ten to twelve months, that they have no other shelter from the sun in summer, and no other protection from wet and snow, cold and tempestuous winds—such as have scarcely been known even in this climate—in winter, and that they passed from a life of total inactivity, already assailed by deadly disease, to one of the greatest possible exertion, it cannot be a matter of surprise that a fearful sickness has prevailed throughout their ranks, and that the men still suffer from it, although I may venture to feel some confidence in a somewhat less degree.

The Duke of Newcastle's instructions of the 29th June led to the great enterprise in which the Allied Armies are now involved. Those instructions were communicated by me to Marshal St. Arnaud, Admirals Hamelin and Bruat, and Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons, and it was resolved without a dissentient voice that it should be undertaken.

It was felt by all that the two Governments which they, in conjunction with me, represented on the occasion, anxiously desired that the project should be carried out. It may be said that it was intimated to me that 'if I should consider that the strength of the two Armies is sufficient for the undertaking, I was not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in me.' I undoubtedly received such intimation, but I must observe that it was accompanied by the expression of the regret that Her Majesty's Government would feel 'that an attack from which such important consequences are anticipated must be any longer delayed'; and I was further informed that it was 'on all accounts most important that nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of ample preparation by either Army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.'

In my despatch announcing the result of the conference of the Allied Commanders by land and sea, I stated to the Duke of Newcastle: 'It becomes my duty to acquaint you that it was more in deference to the views of the British Government, as conveyed to me in your Grace's despatch, and to the known

acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or their state of preparation, that the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was adopted. The fact must not be concealed that neither the English nor French Admirals have been able to obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with respect to the army which the Russians may destine for operations in the field, or to the number of men allotted for the defence of Sebastopol, and Marshal St. Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in information upon these all-important questions, and there would seem to be no chance of their acquiring it.'

What I have stated above did not check the eagerness of Her Majesty's Government for the expedition; so far from it, indeed, some impatience was expressed that when I wrote to the Minister of War on the 14th of August, I was not enabled to name the day on which it would take its departure from the coast of Bulgaria.

The enterprise accordingly took place, and it will suffice to say that the landing was effected without opposition, that the battle of the Alma was gained, and the march to Balaclava accomplished in the space of twelve days.

The investment of the place on the south side was immediately proceeded with, and all the Infantry of the Army was employed upon it, with the exception of one battalion.

In the siege of Sebastopol the British Army is still engaged, in co-operation with that of France.

Could I withdraw the troops under my command from the undertaking, leaving the French to continue alone? What would Her Majesty have said? What would have been the feeling of the country if I had announced that I had found it necessary to make such a sacrifice, and to risk the continuance of the alliance which has been so happily established between England and France after ages of strife and rivalry? And if I had determined upon such a step, could I have acted upon it? Had I ships to carry off the troops and their material? Had I cantonments to put them in, and to provide them with rest and shelter? No such thing.

I therefore had but one course to pursue—to persevere through good report and evil report, and to endeavour to overcome the difficulties by which I was surrounded by every possible exertion.

This has been the constant and unremitting object and study of my life during the dreary months that have passed since the winter set in; and if the efforts I have made have not been

successful, or at least have not been appreciated, I have only to regret that the result has been so little in accordance with my anxious wishes.

I have kept her Majesty's Government as accurately informed of the operations of the Army as was possible under the circumstances, as my despatches and letters to the Duke of Newcastle will show. Lately there has been little to report. The repair of a battery, the attempt to clear the trenches of snow or mud, are almost all I could have announced. The sickness of the Army was too clearly shown in the 'morning state' which I have been in the habit of transmitting; and, moreover, the weekly return of sick which the Inspector-General has forwarded under instructions from the Duke of Newcastle, affords as much detail upon this painfully interesting subject as I could supply.

If the Government, on receiving the announcement that the expedition was determined upon, had at once sent out reinforcements, it is probable that I might have been able to employ a considerable body of men in converting the track, which leads to and along this ridge, into a stoned road before the weather broke up; but the number required to effect so extensive and serious a work would have been very great, and I had not an English soldier to apply to such a purpose, however important.

Some time, however, before the bad weather set in, a survey of the road was ordered leading from Balaclava, and as many Turks as were available were employed in its repair, but their labour was not very efficient, and it was not possible to employ them beyond Kadikoi, from whence it has been carried on by the French troops, under General Vinoy, nearly to the heights.

No time has been lost in providing the troops with warm clothing since any portion of it arrived at Balaclava; and the moment I learned that the *Prince* was wrecked, I sent a most intelligent officer to Constantinople to obtain all he could procure, and his mission was successfully fulfilled.

The men received the clothing as soon as it could be brought up, and they are now, and have been for some time, most abundantly supplied. I have already sent your Lordship a return of what has been issued since the 17th of November. Winter boots are the only deficiencies, and they are issued as they arrive.

I have called for a statement of the want of medical stores, and I will transmit to you Dr. Hall's report upon that point as soon as I receive it.

I have obtained fresh vegetables from almost every quarter. I never heard that any were to be had at Eupatoria, until I sent an officer there a short time ago upon another duty, and I immediately informed the Commissary-General, who, however,

stated in answer that his supply was abundant. Knowing the destitution of the pauper Tartars who have taken refuge in Eupatoria, I did not suppose that vegetables could be obtained there.

I learnt from Colonel Simmons, when he was here with Omer Pasha, that felt was to be procured, and I commissioned him to send me some, which he did ; but it has not proved so useful as I expected, as it imbibes damp, and can only be used on the inside walls of the huts.

General Cannon, when he was here, having mentioned that probably I might get nearly 300 horses at Eupatoria, where there was no forage forthcoming, I sent off an officer the following day who purchased above 280, which, on arrival, were at once turned over to the Commissariat.

I have visited the camps as frequently as the constant business in which I am engaged, and which occupies me throughout the day, and a part of the night, will permit ; and though I have made no note of those visits, I find from one of my aides-de-camp who keeps a journal, and who frequently, though not always, attends me, that he has accompanied me in my rides above forty times in the last two months. A ride is not taken for pleasure on this ridge and in this weather, and I have not had time to visit the monastery, the only spot worth seeing in the whole of the position.

Your Lordship has not hesitated to apply to me the charge that I know nothing of the condition of the Army, and that the staff is equally ignorant of it.

My Lord, I do not deserve this reproach, and in justice to myself I have to request you to be so good as to name the person who has uttered the slander. The staff are equally innocent of it. In my despatch of the 30th of January, I have fully stated my opinion of Major-General Airey. I adhere to that opinion, and in expressing my sense of his services, I deem it due to him to state that they were continued when he was suffering under severe illness ; an illness which he caught in the execution of his duty on a wet and tempestuous night.

Your Lordship is doubtless in a position to dispense with the services of this or any other staff-officer ; but you will permit me to observe that I cannot in fairness be called upon to withdraw my confidence from, or alter my opinion of, officers whom I hold in the highest estimation, and with whom I have always expressed myself fully satisfied.

If I am deprived of the assistance of General Airey, I shall have a serious loss inflicted upon me, and the Army will be deprived of a most able, active, and zealous officer, and it will be

difficult to find a successor in all respects so efficient and so worthy of my confidence.

The duties of General Estcourt are less intricate, and do not bring him quite so constantly under my notice, but he merits the expression of my approbation.

I will direct the reports your Lordship requires to be furnished by the Generals of Division and Brigade, and will take steps to form a corps of scavengers. But your Lordship is doubtless aware that this ridge is occupied by many thousands besides those composing the British Army, and that the cleaning the camp of the latter will do little to get rid of the ordures which cover its surface.

Having now replied to the several points in your despatch, I must be permitted, before I close this, to express the pain, the mortification, and I might add surprise, with which the abuse that has been unscrupulously lavished upon me by unavowed and irresponsible parties, has been entertained by your Lordship and your predecessor.

My Lord, I have passed a life of honour. I have served the Crown for above fifty years; I have for the greater portion of that time been connected with the business of the Army. I have served under the greatest man of the age more than half my life; have enjoyed his confidence, and have, I am proud to say, been ever regarded by him as a man of truth and some judgment as to the qualifications of officers; and yet, having been placed in the most difficult position in which an officer was ever called upon to serve, and having successfully carried out most difficult operations, with the entire approbation of the Queen, which is now my only solace, I am charged with every species of neglect, and the opinion which it was my solemn duty to give of the merits of officers, and the assertions which I have made in support of it, are set at naught, and your Lordship is satisfied that your irresponsible informants are more worthy of credit than I am.—I have, etc.,

(Signed) RAGLAN.

LORD PANMURE TO FIELD-MARSHAL LORD RAGLAN.¹

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 19, 1855.*

MY LORD,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, in reply to mine of the 12th of February, in which I felt it to be my very painful duty to make some stringent observations upon the condition of the Army under your command.

¹ As before, Part v. p. 486.

Had it been my duty merely to look to what the Army has accomplished since its arrival in Turkey and the Crimea, our correspondence would have commenced under much happier auspices; but I had to consider what the Army was suffering, to endeavour to discover the cause of its privations, and the reason of their continuance, in order to enable me to undertake the duties which lay before me with a clear conscience and a probability of doing good.

In no despatches from your Lordship could I trace any denial of those rumours of which you seem to have been aware, nor any explanation of the distressing circumstances which seem now, happily, to be passing away.

I admit all the difficulties with which you have had to contend; the early inactivity of your Army; the subsequent demands made on it for the greatest possible exertion in carrying out the important enterprise on which it was ordered under the instructions of the 29th of June, an enterprise in which Marshal St. Arnaud and the Admirals, as you state, entirely concurred with you.

I observe that it was to some extent in deference to the views of the British Government, and the known acquiescence in those views by the Emperor of the French, that you undertook an expedition to, and a descent upon, a country, and sat down before a formidable fortress, without knowing the resources of the former or the strength of the latter. But let me ask you whether, seeing so fully the immensity of the undertaking, and its risk to your Army, all the necessary precautions were taken for maintaining that Army in the most perfect efficiency?

Balaclava was selected as your port, and the station for the military stores and magazines of all sorts, either for the conduct of a siege or for the supply of the troops under any exigency.

Under the second heading of that little red book which you sent me, I perceive that it was the duty of the Quartermaster-General to have provided for the effectual establishment of his communications with the camp. This was unfortunately neglected. What was the result? That in the course of ten days after winter set in, all intercourse between the Army and its supplies was carried on under unexampled difficulties, and with ruin to your means of transport, already much weakened by a lack of forage in the Commissariat stores.

It is useless now to argue whether a winter campaign in the trenches could have been avoided by more determined action on the first arrival of the Allied Armies before Sebastopol. I

will enter into no such speculation; nor have I been so unreasonable as to blame you for not finding cantonments where none existed.

I have never doubted your deep personal anxiety for the safety and well-being of your Army. All that I mean to say is that, while asserting your constant and unremitting study during the dreary months of winter to overcome your difficulties, you have never furnished the Government with any details of your arrangements, so as to enable them to support you against those who taxed you with indifference to, and ignorance of, the real condition of your troops.

Of the operations of the Army there was, as you observe, very little latterly to tell; but of the state of your Army, except from figures, we gathered nothing. A short and occasional review of each Brigade; reports exhibiting their respective conditions; the reason why one was more healthy or more efficient than another;—such narratives, run down even to regiments, would have given us the means of meeting the reports with which we were taunted on all sides. But you were silent, and you cannot wonder that the Government were displeased.

In regard to warm clothing, no doubt it was served out to the men as soon as it was received from Balaclava; but why was it not received sooner? Because there was no road!

It is with pleasure that I learn your frequent visits to the different parts of the camp, as it enables me now to contradict the oft-repeated assertions to the contrary on the authority of your own word, which I hold to be irrefragable.

You appear to be much offended with the sentence in my despatch in which I state that 'your staff seem to have known as little as yourself of the condition of your gallant men.' You say that you do not deserve this reproach. I rejoice to find that such is the case; but you never so informed either the Duke of Newcastle or myself before, and how could we know the real facts of your case? Assertions based on the fullest confidence in your good feeling and discretion were the only weapons left us to contend with positive and, apparently, strongly-fortified averments. Can you be surprised that we required something more?

You ask me for the name of your slanderer. I will only say that my information has not been derived from the columns of the *Times*, but from eye-witnesses of the scenes by which you have been surrounded, but whom it would be a base breach of confidence in me to betray.

You seem to forget my position, and consider me as bound

solely to defend you against all assailants. I have a duty to discharge to the Army for which the country holds me strictly responsible: if I am told that it starves amidst the means of obtaining supplies; that it continues to empty its ranks into its hospitals, and finds no medicines by which its diseases can be alleviated; I cannot turn a deaf ear to such startling complaints, nor should you take offence when I call your attention to them, and require that they should be fully explained.

In regard to Major-Generals Airey and Estcourt, though I may be in a position to dispense with their services, I have no intention to exercise any such act of authority. I have expressed my opinion and taken all the measures which appear to me to be requisite to meet further miscarriages; and no one will rejoice more than I shall to find these officers ere long reinstated in the confidence of the Army and the public, as well as they have ever been in your own.

And now I hasten to the conclusion of your despatch, in which you have given expression to the pain, mortification, and surprise at the manner in which my predecessor and myself have entertained all the abuse which has been so lavishly poured upon you.

This is not so. It is my firm belief that had my predecessor taken this line—had he exhibited less magnanimity in honourably confronting the storm of popular indignation, that storm would have rolled more heavily upon you.

For myself, you need not doubt my readiness to defend you amid the trials and difficulties of your arduous career, but I must have your confidence; I must know from yourself the dark as well as the bright shades of the scenes in which you move; I must be enabled to fight your battles even against invisible and anonymous foes; and if you arm me with this power, you may look for all the support which a Minister can give to a General.

One word more, and I trust that this very painful correspondence is done. Why, my Lord, do you refer to your life of honour, of which you may be justly proud, and the regard for your truth which was entertained by the greatest man of the age? Is there a sentence in my despatch that calls in question either the one or the other? If so, I retract it at once.

But surely I may be permitted to question your judgment without impugning your truth or your honour, both of which, be assured, are as precious in my eyes and in those of your countrymen as they can be in your own.—I am, etc.,

(Signed) PANMURE.



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